CAMPAIGNING 
IN  CUBA 


BY 


CAMPAIGNING    IN 
CUBA 


CAMPAIGNING  IN 
CUBA 


BY 


GEORGE  KENNAN 

AUTHOR  OF  "  SIBERIA  AND  THE  EXILE  SYSTEM 


NEW  YORK 

THE  CENTURY  CO. 

1899 


Copyright.  1899,  by 
THE  CENTURY  Co. 


THE  DEVINNE  PRESS 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.  STARTING  FOR  THE  FIELD 1 

II.  UNDER  THE  RED  CROSS      .......  10 

III.  ON  THE  EDGE  OF  WAR 23 

IV.  WAR  CORRESPONDENTS  AND  DESPATCH-BOATS     ...  35 
V.  OFF  FOR  SANTIAGO        ........  44 

VI.  THE  CUBAN  COAST .53 

VII.  THE  FIGHT  AT  GUANTANAMO          ......    65 

VIII.  THE  LANDING  AND  ADVANCE  OF  THE  ARMY       ...        76 
IX.  A  WALK  TO  THE  FRONT        ....„,.    88 

X.   SlBONEY    ON    THE   EVE   OF   BATTLE          ,  104 

XI.  THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN        .        .        .        .116 
XII.  THE  FIELD-HOSPITAL .130 

XIII.  SlBONEY    DURING   THE    ARMISTICE       .  .  .  <  .  .150 

XIV.  ENTERING  SANTIAGO  HARBOR 164 

XV.  THE  CAPTURED  CITY 171 

XVI.  THE  FEEDING  OF  THE  HUNGRY 182 

XVII.  MORRO  CASTLE 192 

XVIII.  FEVER  IN  THE; 'ARMY 213 

XIX.  THE  SANTIAGO  CAMPAIGN 222 

XX.  THE  SANTIAGO  CAMPAIGN  (Continued)        ....      237 
XXI.  THE  SANTIAGO  CAMPAIGN  (Concluded)     .        .  .  256 


320340 


CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 


CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

CHAPTER   I 
STARTING   FOR   THE   FIELD 

WAR  broke  out  between  the  United  States  and  Spain 
on  April  21,  1898.  A  week  or  ten  days  later  I  was 
asked  by  the  editors  of  the  "  Outlook  "  of  New  York  to  go  to 
Cuba  with  Miss  Clara  Barton,  on  the  Red  Cross  steamer 
State  of  Texas,  and  report  the  war  and  the  work  of  the  Red 
Cross  for  that  periodical.  After  a  hasty  conference  with 
the  editorial  and  business  staffs  of  the  paper  I  was  to  repre 
sent,  I  accepted  the  proposition,  and  on  May  5  left  Wash 
ington  for  Key  West,  where  the  State  of  Texas  was  awaiting 
orders  from  the  Navy  Department.  The  army  of  invasion, 
under  command  of  General  Shafter,  was  then  assembling  at 
Tampa,  and  it  was  expected  that  a  hostile  movement  to 
some  point  on  the  Cuban  coast  would  be  made  before  the 
end  of  the  month. 

I  reached  Tampa  on  the  evening  of  Friday,  May  6.  The 
Pullman  cars  of  the  Florida  express,  at  that  time,  ran  through 
the  city  of  Tampa  and  across  the  river  into  the  spacious 
grounds  of  the  beautiful  Tampa  Bay  Hotel,  which,  after 
closing  for  the  regular  winter  season,  had  been  compelled  to 
i  1 


2  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

reopen  its  doors— partly  to  accommodate  the  large  number 
of  officers  and  war  correspondents  who  had  assembled  there 
with  their  wives  and  friends,  and  partly  to  serve  as  head 
quarters  for  the  army  of  Cuban  invasion. 

It  was  a  warm,  clear  Southern  night  when  we  arrived,  and 
the  scene  presented  by  the  hotel  and  its  environment,  as  we 
stepped  out  of  the  train,  was  one  of  unexpected  brilliancy 
and  beauty.  A  nearly  full  moon  was  just  rising  over  the 
trees  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  hotel  park,  touching  with 
silver  the  drifts  of  white  blossoms  on  dark  masses  of  olean 
der-trees  in  the  foreground,  and  flooding  with  soft  yellow 
light  the  domes,  Moorish  arches,  and  long  f  agade  of  the  whole 
immense  building.  Two  regimental  bands  were  playing 
waltzes  and  patriotic  airs  under  a  long  row  of  incandescent 
lights  on  the  broad  veranda;  fine-looking,  sunbrowned  men, 
in  all  the  varied  uniforms  of  army  and  navy,  were  gathered 
in  groups  here  and  there,  smoking,  talking,  or  listening  to 
the  music ;  the  rotunda  was  crowded  with  officers,  war  corre 
spondents,  and  gaily  attired  ladies,  and  the  impression  made 
upon  a  newcomer,  as  he  alighted  from  the  train,  was  that 
of  a  brilliant  military  ball  at  a  fashionable  seaside  summer 
resort.  Of  the  serious  and  tragic  side  of  war  there  was  hardly 
a  suggestion. 

On  the  morning  after  our  arrival  I  took  a  carriage 
and  drove  around  the  city  and  out  to  the  camp,  which  was 
situated  about  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  hotel  on  the  other 
side  of  the  river.  In  the  city  itself  I  was  unpleasantly  dis 
appointed.  The  showy  architecture,  beautiful  grounds,  semi- 
tropical  foliage,  and  brilliant  flowers  of  the  Tarnpa  Bay  Hotel 
raise  expectations  which  the  town  across  the  river  does  not 
fulfil.  It  is  a  huddled  collection  of  generally  insignificant 
buildings  standing  in  an  arid  desert  of  sand,  and  to  me  it 
suggested  the  city  of  Semipalatinsk— a  wretched,  verdure- 
less  town  in  southern  Siberia,  colloquially  known  to  Russian 


STARTING   FOR  THE   FIELD  3 

army  officers  as  "  the  Devil's  Sand-box."  Thriving  and  pros 
perous  Tampa  may  be,  but  attractive  or  pleasing  it  certainly 
is  not. 

As  soon  as  I  got  away,  however,  from  the  hotel  and  into 
the  streets  of  the  town,  I  saw  at  almost  every  step  sugges 
tions  of  the  serious  and  practical  side,  if  not  the  tragic  side, 
of  war.  Long  trains  of  four-mule  wagons  loaded  with  pro 
visions,  camp  equipage,  and  lumber  moved  slowly  through  the 
soft,  deep  sand  of  the  unpaved  streets  in  the  direction  of  the 
encampment;  the  sidewalks  were  thronged  with  picturesquely 
dressed  Cuban  volunteers  from  the  town,  sailors  from  the 
troop-ships,  soldiers  from  the  camp,  and  war  correspondents 
from  everywhere;  mounted  orderlies  went  tearing  back  and 
forth  with  despatches  to  or  from  the  army  headquarters  in 
the  Tampa  Bay  Hotel;  Cuban  and  American  flags  were  dis 
played  in  front  of  every  restaurant,  hotel,  and  Cuban  cigar- 
shop,  and  floated  from  the  roofs  or  windows  of  many  private 
houses;  and  now  and  then  I  met,  coming  out  of  a  drug-store, 
an  army  surgeon  or  hospital  steward  whose  left  arm  bore  the 
red  cross  of  the  Geneva  Convention. 

The  army  that  was  destined  to  begin  the  invasion  of  Cuba 
consisted,  at  that  time,  of  ten  or  twelve  thousand  men,  all 
regulars,  and  included  an  adequate  force  of  cavalry  and  ten 
fine  batteries  of  field-artillery.  It  was  encamped  in  an  ox- 
tensive  forest  of  large  but  scattered  pine-trees,  about  a  mile 
from  the  town,  and  seemed  already  to  have  made  itself  very 
much  at  home  in  its  new  environment. 

The  first  thing  that  struck  me  in  going  through  the  camp 
was  its  businesslike  aspect.  It  did  not  suggest  a  big  picnic, 
nor  an  encampment  of  militia  for  annual  summer  drill.  It 
was  manifestly  a  camp  of  veterans;  and  although  its  dirty, 
weather-beaten  tents  were  pitched  here  and  there  without 
any  attempt  at  regularity  of  arrangement,  and  its  camp 
equipage,  cooking-utensils,  and  weapons  were  piled  or  stacked 


4  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

between  the  tents  in  a  somewhat  disorderly  fashion,  as  if 
thrown  about  at  random,  I  could  see  that  the  irregularity  and 
disorder  were  only  apparent,  and  were  really  the  irregularity 
and  disorder  of  knowledge  and  experience  gained  by  long  and 
varied  service  in  the  field.  I  did  not  need  the  inscriptions 
— "  Fort  Reno*"  and  "  Fort  Sill  "—on  the  army  wagons  to  as 
sure  me  that  these  were  veteran  troops  from  the  Plains,  to 
whom  campaigning  was  not  a  new  thing. 

As  we  drove  up  to  the  camp,  smoke  was  rising  lazily  into 
the  warm  summer  air  from  a  dozen  fires  in  different  parts  of 
the  grounds;  company  cooks  were  putting  the  knives,  forks, 
and  dishes  that  they  had  just  washed  into  improvised  cup 
boards  made  by  nailing  boxes  and  tomato-crates  against  the 
trees;  officers  in  fatigue-uniform  were  sitting  in  camp-chairs, 
here  and  there,  reading  the  latest  New  York  papers;  and 
thousands  of  soldiers,  both  inside  and  outside  the  sentry- 
lines,  were  standing  in  groups  discussing  the  naval  fight  off 
Manila,  lounging  and  smoking  on  the  ground  in  the  shade  of 
the  army  wagons,  playing  hand-ball  to  pass  away  the  time, 
or  swarming  around  a  big  board  shanty,  just  outside  the 
lines,  which  called  itself  "  NOAH'S  ARK  "  and  announced  in 
big  letters  its  readiness  to  dispense  cooling  drinks  to  all 
comers  at  a  reasonable  price. 

The  troops  in  all  branches  of  the  army  at  Tampa  im 
pressed  me  very  favorably.  The  soldiers  were  generally 
stalwart,  sunburnt,  resolute-looking  men,  twenty-five  to 
thirty-five  years  of  age,  who  seemed  to  be  in  perfect  physi 
cal  condition,  and  who  looked  as  if  they  had  already  seen 
hard  service  and  were  ready  and  anxious  for  more.  In  field- 
artillery  the  force  was  particularly  strong,  and  our  officers 
in  Tampa  based  their  confident  expectation  of  victory 
largely  upon  the  anticipated  work  of  the  ten  batteries  of 
fine,  modern  field-guns  which  General  Shaf  ter  then  intended 
to  take  with  him.  Owing  to  lack  of  transportation  facilities, 


STARTING   FOR  THE   FIELD  5 

however,  or  for  some  other  reason  to  me  unknown,  six  of 
these  batteries  were  left  in  Tampa  when  the  army  sailed  for 
Santiago,  and  the  need  of  them  was  severely  felt,  a  few 
weeks  later,  at  Caney  and  San  Juan. 

Upon  my  return  from  the  camp  I  called  upon  General 
Shafter,  presented  my  letter  of  introduction  from  the  Presi 
dent,  and  said  I  wished  to  consult  him  briefly  with  regard 
to  the  future  work  of  the  American  National  Red  Cross. 
He  received  me  cordially,  said  that  our  organization  would 
soon  have  a  great  and  important  work  to  do  in  Cuba  in 
caring  for  the  destitute  and  starving  reconcentrados,  and 
that  he  would  gladly  afford  us  all  possible  facilities  and 
protection.  The  Red  Cross  corps  of  the  army  medical  de 
partment,  he  said,  would  be  fully  competent  to  take  care  of 
all  the  sick  and  wounded  soldiers  in  the  field;  but  there 
would  be  ample  room  for  our  supplementary  work  in  reliev 
ing  the  distress  of  the  starving  Cuban  peasants,  who  would 
undoubtedly  seek  refuge  within  our  lines  as  soon  as  we 
should  establish  ourselves  on  the  island.  He  deprecated 
and  disapproved  of  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Red 
Cross  to  land  supplies  for  the  reconcentrados  under  a  flag 
of  truce  in  advance  of  the  army  of  invasion  and  without  its 
protection.  "The  Spanish  authorities,"  he  said,  "under 
stress  of  starvation,  would  simply  seize  your  stores  and  use 
them  for  the  maintenance  of  their  own  army.  The  best 
thing  for  you  to  do  is  to  go  in  with  us  and  under  our  pro 
tection,  and  relieve  the  distress  of  the  reconcentrados  as 
fast  as  we  uncover  it."  I  said  that  I  thought  this  was  Miss 
Barton's  intention,  and  that  we  had  fourteen  hundred  tons 
of  food-stuffs  and  medical  supplies  on  the  steamer  State 
of  Texas  at  Key  West,  and  were  ready  to  move  at  an  hour's 
notice.  With  an  understanding  that  Miss  Barton  should 
be  notified  as  soon  as  the  army  of  invasion  embarked,  I 
bade  the  general  good-by  and  returned  to  the  hotel. 


6  CAMPAIGNING  IN   CUBA 

In  an  interview  that  I  had  on  the  following  day  with 
Colonel  Babcock,  General  Shafter's  adjutant-general,  I  was 
informed,  confidentially,  that  the  army  was  destined  for 
"eastern  Cuba."  Small  parties,  Colonel  Babcock  said, 
would  be  landed  at  various  points  on  the  coast  east  and  west 
of  Havana,  for  the  purpose  of  communicating  with  the  in 
surgents  and  supplying  them  with  arms  and  ammunition; 
but  the  main  attack  would  be  made  at  the  eastern  end  of 
the  island.  He  did  not  specifically  mention  Santiago  by 
name,  because  Cervera's  fleet,  at  that  time,  had  not  taken 
refuge  there;  but  inasmuch  as  Santiago  was  the  most  im 
portant  place  in  eastern  Cuba,  and  had  a  deep  and  sheltered 
harbor,  I  inferred  that  it  would  be  made  the  objective  point 
of  the  contemplated  attack.  The  Secretary  of  War,  in  his 
reply  to  the  questions  of  the  Investigating  Commission,  says 
that  the  movement  against  Santiago,  as  then  planned,  was 
to  be  a  mere  "reconnaissance  in  force,  to  ascertain  the 
strength  of  the  enemy  in  different  locations  in  eastern 
Cuba";  but  Colonel  Babcock  certainly  gave  me  to  under 
stand  that  the  attack  was  to  be  a  serious  one,  and  that  it 
would  be  made  with  the  whole  strength  of  General  Shafter's 
command.  The  matter  is  of  no  particular  importance  now, 
except  in  so  far  as  the  information  given  me  by  Colonel 
Babcock  indicates  the  views  and  intentions  of  the  War  De 
partment  two  weeks  before  Admiral  Cervera's  fleet  took 
refuge  in  Santiago  harbor. 

I  left  Port  Tampa  for  Key  West  on  the  Plant-line 
steamer  Mascotte  at  half -past  ten  o'clock  Saturday  evening, 
May  7.  The  long,  narrow,  and  rather  sinuous  channel  out 
of  Tampa  Bay  was  marked  by  a  line  of  buoys  and  skeleton 
wooden  frames  resting  on  driven  spiles;  but  there  were  no 
lights  for  the  guidance  of  the  mariner,  except  one  at  the 
outer  entrance,  ten  or  twelve  miles  from  the  port;  and  if 
the  Mascotte  had  not  been  provided  with  a  powerful  search- 


STARTING   FOR  THE   FIELD  7 

light  of  her  own  she  would  hardly  have  been  able  to  find  her 
way  to  sea,  as  the  night  was  cloudy  and  the  buoys  were  in 
visible.  With  the  long,  slender  shaft  of  her  search-light, 
however,  she  probed  the  darkness  ahead,  as  with  a  radiant 
exploring  finger,  and  picked  up  the  buoys,  one  after  an 
other,  with  unfailing  certainty  and  precision.  Every  two 
or  three  minutes  a  floating  iron  balloon,  or  a  skeleton  frame 
covered  with  sleeping  aquatic  birds,  would  flash  into  the 
field  of  vision  ahead,  like  one  of  Professor  Pepper's  patent 
ghosts,  stand  out  for  a  moment  in  brilliant  white  relief 
against  a  background  of  impenetrable  darkness,  and  then 
vanish  with  the  swiftness  of  summer  lightning,  as  the  elec 
tric  beam  left  it  to  search  for  another  buoy  farther  away. 

When  I  awoke  the  next  morning  we  were  out  on  the  blue, 
tumbling,  foam-crested  water  of  the  Gulf,  forty  or  fifty  miles 
from  the  Florida  coast.  All  day  Sunday  we  steamed  slowly 
southward,  seeing  no  vessels  except  a  Jamaica  "fruiter," 
whose  captain  shouted  to  us,  as  he  crossed  our  bow,  that 
he  had  been  blown  off  his  course  in  a  recent  gale,  and  would 
like  to  know  his  position  and  distance.  We  should  have 
reached  Key  West  at  half-past  two  Sunday  afternoon;  but 
an  accident  which  disabled  one  of  the  Mascotte's  boilers 
greatly  reduced  her  normal  speed,  so  that  when  I  went  to 
my  state-room  at  eleven  o'clock  Sunday  evening  we  were 
still  twenty  or  thirty  miles  from  our  destination. 

Three  hours  later  I  was  awakened  by  shouted  orders,  the 
tramping  of  feet,  and  the  rattling  of  heavy  chain-cable  on 
the  forward  deck,  and,  dressing  myself  hastily,  I  went  out 
to  ascertain  our  situation.  The  moon  was  hidden  behind 
a  dense  bank  of  clouds,  the  breeze  had  fallen  to  a  nearly 
perfect  calm,  and  the  steamer  was  rolling  and  pitching 
gently  on  a  sea  that  appeared  to  have  the  color  and  con 
sistency  of  greenish-gray  oil.  Two  hundred  yards  away,  on 
the  port  bow,  floated  a  white  pyramidal  frame  in  the  fierce 


8  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

glare  of  the  ship's  search-light,  and  from  it,  at  irregular  in 
tervals,  came  the  warning  toll  of  a  heavy  bell.  It  was  the 
bell-buoy  at  the  entrance  to  Key  West  harbor,  and  far 
away  on  the  southeastern  horizon  appeared  a  faintly  lumi 
nous  nebula  which  marked  the  position  of  Key  West  city. 
Under  the  war  regulations  then  in  force,  no  vessels  other 
than  those  belonging  to  the  United  States  navy  were  per 
mitted  to  enter  or  leave  the  port  of  Key  West  between 
late  evening  twilight  and  early  dawn,  and  we  were,  there 
fore,  forced  to  anchor  off  the  bell-buoy  until  5  A.  M.  Just 
as  day  was  breaking  we  got  our  anchor  on  board  and 
steamed  in  toward  the  town.  The  comparatively  shallow 
water  of  the  bay,  in  the  first  gray  light  of  dawn,  had  the 
peculiar  opaque,  bluish-green  color  of  a  stream  fed  by  an 
Alpine  glacier;  but  as  the  light  increased  it  assumed  a 
brilliant  but  delicate  translucent  green  of  purer  quality, 
contrasting  finely  with  the  scarlet  flush  in  the  east  which 
heralded  the  rising,  but  still  hidden,  sun.  On  our  right,  as 
we  entered  the  wide,  spacious  harbor,  were  two  or  three 
flat-topped,  table-like  islands,  or  "  keys,"  which,  in  general 
outline  and  appearance,  suggested  dark  mesas  of  foliage 
floating  in  a  tropical  ocean  of  pale  chrysolite-green.  Di 
rectly  ahead  was  the  city  of  Key  West— a  long,  low,  curv 
ing  silhouette  of  roofs,  spires,  masts,  lighthouses,  cocoanut- 
palms,  and  Australian  pines,  delicately  outlined  in  black 
against  the  scarlet  arch  of  the  dawn,  "  like  a  ragged  line  of 
Arabic  etched  on  the  blade  of  a  Turkish  simitar."  At  the 
extreme  western  end  of  this  long,  ragged  silhouette  rose 
the  massive  walls  of  Fort  Taylor,  with  its  double  tier  of  an 
tiquated  embrasures;  and  on  the  left  of  it,  as  the  distance 
lessened  and  the  light  increased,  I  could  distinguish  the 
cream-colored  front  of  the  Marine  Hospital,  the  slender 
white  shaft  of  the  lighthouse,  the  red  pyramidal  roof  of  the 
Government  Building,  and  the  pale-yellow  walls  and  cupola 


STARTING   FOR  THE   FIELD  9 

of  the  Key  West  Hotel— all  interspersed  with  graceful  lean 
ing  palms,  or  thrown  into  effective  relief  against  dark 
masses  of  feathery  Australian  pine. 

Along  the  water-front,  for  a  distance  of  half  a  mile,  ex 
tended  an  almost  unbroken  line  of  steamers,  barks,  schoon 
ers,  and  brigantines,  discharging  or  receiving  cargo,  while 
out  on  the  pale-green,  translucent  surface  of  the  harbor 
were  scattered  a  dozen  or  more  war-ships  of  the  North 
Atlantic  Squadron,  ranging  in  size  from  the  huge,  double- 
turreted  monitor  Puritan  to  the  diminutive  but  dangerous- 
looking  torpedo-boat  Dupont.  All  were  in  their  war-paint 
of  dirty  leaden  gray,  which,  although  it  might  add  to  their 
effectiveness,  certainly  did  not  seem  to  me  to  improve  their 
appearance  as  component  parts  of  an  otherwise  beautiful 
marine  picture.  Beyond  the  war-ships  and  nearer  to  the 
eastern  end  of  the  island  lay  the  captured  Spanish  prizes, 
including  the  big  black  liners  Pedro  and  Miguel  Jover,  the 
snow-white  Argonauta,  the  brigantine  Frascito,  and  a  dozen 
or  more  fishing-schooners  intercepted  by  the  blockading 
fleet  while  on  their  way  back  to  Havana  from  the  Yucatan 
banks. 

But  none  of  these  war-ships  or  prizes  had,  for  me,  the  in 
terest  that  attached  to  a  large  black  two-masted  steamer 
of  eighteen  hundred  tons,  which  was  lying  at  anchor  off 
the  government  wharf,  flying  from  her  mainmast-head  a 
white  flag  emblazoned  with  the  red  Greek  cross  of  the 
Geneva  Convention.  It  was  the  steamship  State  of  Texas, 
of  the  Mallory  line,  chartered  by  the  American  National 
Red  Cross  to  carry  to  Cuba  supplies  for  the  starving  recon- 
centrados,  and  to  serve  as  headquarters  for  its  president, 
Miss  Clara  Barton,  and  her  staff  of  trained  surgeons,  nurses, 
and  field-officers. 


CHAPTER  II 
UNDER  THE   RED   CROSS 

"TTTHEN  Miss  Barton  joined  the  State  of  Texas  at  Key 
VV  West  on  April  29  there  seemed  to  be  no  immediate 
prospect  of  an  invasion  of  Cuba  by  the  United  States 
army,  and,  consequently,  no  prospect  of  an  opportunity  to 
relieve  the  distress  of  the  starving  Cuban  people.  Know 
ing  that  such  distress  must  necessarily  have  been  greatly 
intensified  by  the  blockade,  and  anxious  to  do  something 
to  mitigate  it,— or,  at  least,  to  show  the  readiness  of  the 
Red  Cross  to  undertake  its  mitigation,  —  Miss  Barton  wrote 
and  sent  to  Admiral  Sampson,  commander  of  the  naval 
forces  on  the  North  Atlantic  Station,  the  following  letter: 

S.  S.  "STATE  OF  TEXAS,"  May  2,  1898. 
Admiral    W.    T.    Sampson,    U.    S.   N.,    Commanding   Fleet   before 

Havana. 

ADMIRAL:  But  for  the  introduction  kindly  proffered  by  our  mu 
tual  acquaintance  Captain  Harrington,  I  should  scarcely  presume 
to  address  you.  He  will  have  made  known  to  you  the  subject  which 
I  desire  to  bring  to  your  gracious  consideration. 

Papers  forwarded  by  direction  of  our  government  will  have  shown 
the  charge  intrusted  to  me,  viz.,  to  get  food  to  the  starving 
people  of  Cuba.  I  have  with  me  a  cargo  of  fourteen  hundred  tons, 
under  the  flag  of  the  Red  Cross,  the  one  international  emblem  of 

10 


UNDER  THE   RED   CROSS  11 

neutrality  and  humanity  known  to  civilization.     Spain  knows  and 
regards  it. 

Fourteen  months  ago  the  entire  Spanish  government  at  Madrid 
cabled  me  permission  to  take  and  distribute  food  to  the  suffering 
people  in  Cuba.  This  official  permission  was  broadly  published.  If 
read  by  our  people,  no  response  was  made  and  no  action  taken  un 
til  two  months  ago,  when,  under  the  humane  and  gracious  call  of 
our  honored  President,  I  did  go  and  distribute  food,  unmolested 
anywhere  on  the  island,  until  arrangements  were  made  by  our 
government  for  all  American  citizens  to  leave  Cuba.  Persons  must 
now  be  dying  there  by  hundreds,  if  not  thousands,  daily,  for  want 
of  the  food  we  are  shutting  out.  Will  not  the  world  hold  us  ac 
countable?  Will  history  write  us  blameless?  Will  it  not  be  said 
of  us  that  we  completed  the  scheme  of  extermination  commenced 
by  Weyler? 

Fortunately,  I  know  the  Spanish  authorities  in  Cuba,  Captain- 
General  Blanco  and  his  assistants.  We  parted  with  perfect  friend 
liness.  They  do  not  regard  me  as  an  American  merely,  but  as 
the  national  representative  of  an  international  treaty  to  which  they 
themselves  are  signatory  and  under  which  they  act.  I  believe  they 
would  receive  and  confer  with  me  if  such  a  thing  were  made  possible. 

I  should  like  to  ask  Spanish  permission  and  protection  to  land  and 
distribute  food  now  on  the  State  of  Texas.  Could  I  be  permitted  to 
ask  to  see  them  under  flag  of  truce?  If  we  make  the  effort  and  are 
refused,  the  blame  rests  with  them;  if  we  fail  to  make  it,  it  rests 
with  us.  I  hold  it  good  statesmanship  at  least  to  divide  the  respon 
sibility.  I  am  told  that  some  days  must  elapse  before  our  troops 
can  be  in  position  to  reach  and  feed  these  starving  people.  Our 
food  and  our  forces  are  here,  ready  to  commence  at  once. 

With  assurances  of  highest  regard, 

I  am,  Admiral,  very  respectfully  yours, 

[Signed]  CLARA  BARTON. 

At  the  time  when  the  above  letter  was  written,  the  Ameri 
can  National  Red  Cross  was  acting  under  the  advice  and 
direction  of  the  State  and  Navy  departments,  the  War  De 
partment  having  no  force  in  the  field. 


12  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

Admiral  Sampson  replied  as  follows: 

U.  S.  FLAGSHIP  "NEW  YORK,"  FIRST-RATE, 

KEY  WEST,  FLORIDA,  May  2,  1898. 
Miss  Clara  Barton,  President  American  National  Red  Cross  : 

1.  I  have  received  through  the  senior  naval  officer  present  a  copy 
of  a  letter  from  the  State  Department  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy; 
a  copy  of  a  letter  from  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  the  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  naval  force  on  this  station;  and  also  a  copy  of  a  letter 
from  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  the  commandant  of  the  naval 
station  at  Key  West. 

2.  From  these  communications  it  appears  that  the  destination  of 
the  steamship  State  of  Texas,  loaded  with  supplies  for  the  starving 
reconcentrados  in  Cuba,  is  left,  in  a  measure,  to  my  judgment. 

3.  At  present  I  am  acting  under  instructions  from  the  Navy  De 
partment  to  blockade  the  coast  of  Cuba  for  the  purpose  of  prevent 
ing,  among  other  things,  any  food-supply  from  reaching  the  Spanish 
forces  in  Cuba.    Under  these  circumstances  it  seems  to  me  unwise 
to  let  a  ship-load  of  such  supplies  be  sent  to  the  reconcentrados,  for, 
in  my  opinion,  they  would  be  distributed  to  the  Spanish  army.   Until 
some  point  be  occupied  in  Cuba  by  our  forces,  from  which  such  dis 
tribution  can  be  made  to  those  for  whom  the  supplies  are  intended, 
I  am  unwilling  that  they  should  be  landed  on  Cuban  soil. 

Yours  very  respectfully, 

[Signed]  W.  T.  SAMPSON, 

Rear-Admiral  U.  S.  N., 
Commander-in-Chief  U.  S.  Naval  Force,  North  Atlantic  Station. 

After  this  exchange  of  letters  Miss  Barton  had  a  confer 
ence  with  Admiral  Sampson,  in  the  course  of  which  the  lat 
ter  explained  more  fully  his  reasons  for  declining  to  allow 
the  State  of  Texas  to  enter  any  Cuban  port  until  such  port 
had  been  occupied  by  American  troops. 

On  May  3  Miss  Barton  sent  the  following  telegram  to 
Stephen  E.  Barton,  chairman  of  the  Central  Cuban  Relief 
Committee  in  New  York: 


UNDER  THE   RED   CROSS  13 

KEY  WEST,  May  3,  1898. 
Stephen  E.  Barton,  Chairman,  etc.: 

Herewith  I  transmit  copies  of  letters  passed  between  Admiral 
Sampson  and  myself.  I  think  it  important  that  you  should  present 
immediately  this  correspondence  personally  to  the  government,  as  it 
will  place  before  them  the  exact  situation  here.  The  utmost  cor 
diality  exists  between  Admiral  Sampson  and  myself.  The  admiral 
feels  it  his  duty,  as  chief  of  the  blockading  squadron,  to  keep  food 
out  of  Cuba,  but  recognizes  that,  from  my  standpoint,  my  duty  is 
to  try  to  get  food  into  Cuba.  If  I  insist,  Admiral  Sampson  will  try 
to  open  communication  under  a  flag  of  truce;  but  his  letter  expresses 
his  opinion  regarding  the  best  method.  Advices  from  the  govern 
ment  would  enable  us  to  reach  a  decision.  Unless  there  is  objection 
at  Washington,  you  are  at  liberty  to  publish  this  correspondence  if 
you  wish. 

[Signed]  CLARA  BARTON. 

On  May  6  the  chairman  of  the  Central  Cuban  Relief  Com 
mittee  replied  as  follows: 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  May  6,  1898. 
Clara  Barton,  Key  West,  Florida : 

Submitted  your  message  to  President  and  cabinet,  and  it  was  read 
with  moistened  eyes.  Considered  serious  and  pathetic.  Admiral 
Sampson's  views  regarded  as  wisest  at  present.  Hope  to  land  you 
soon.  President,  Long,  and  Moore  send  highest  regards. 

[Signed]  BARTON. 

Under  these  circumstances,  of  course,  there  was  nothing 
for  the  Red  Cross  steamer  to  do  but  wait  patiently  in  Key 
West  until  the  army  of  invasion  should  leave  Tampa  for  the 
Cuban  coast. 

Meanwhile,  however,  Miss  Barton  had  discovered  a  field 
of  beneficent  activity  for  the  Red  Cross  nearer  home.  In 
Tampa,  on  her  way  south,  she  learned  that  in  that  city,  and 
at  various  other  points  on  the  coast  of  southern  Florida, 
there  were  large  numbers  of  destitute  Cuban  refugees  and 
escaped  reconcentrados,  who  were  in  urgent  need  of  help. 


14  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

A  local  committee  in  Tampa,  composed  of  representatives 
from  the  various  churches,  had  been  doing  everything  in  its 
power  to  relieve  the  distress  of  these  unfortunate  people, 
but  the  burden  was  getting  to  be  beyond  its  strength,  and  it 
asked  the  Red  Cross  for  assistance.  The  desired  aid  was 
promptly  given,  and  the  committee  was  supplied  with  provi 
sions  enough  to  support  the  Cuban  refugees  in  Tampa  until 
the  middle  of  June. 

Upon  her  arrival  at  Key  West  Miss  Barton  found  a  simi 
lar,  but  even  worse,  state  of  affairs,  inasmuch  as  the  number 
of  destitute  refugees  and  reconcentrados  there  exceeded 
fifteen  hundred.  A  local  Cuban  relief  society  had  estab- 
ished  a  soup-kitchen  in  which  they  were  feeding  about  three 
hundred,  and  Mr.  G.  W.  Hyatt,  chairman  of  the  Key  West 
Red  Cross  Committee,  was  trying  to  take  care  of  the  rest; 
but  both  organizations  were  nearly  at  the  end  of  their  re 
sources,  and  the  local  committee  had  nothing  left  in  the  shape 
of  food-stuffs  except  corn-meal.  Miss  Barton  at  once  tele 
graphed  the  Central  Red  Cross  Committee  in  New  York  to 
forward  thirty  tons  of  assorted  stores  by  first  steamer,  and 
pending  the  arrival  of  these  stores  she  fed  the  Key  West 
refugees  from  the  State  of  Texas  and  from  such  local  sources 
of  food-supply  as  were  available. 

But  Cuban  refugees  and  reconcentrados  were  not  the  only 
hungry  and  destitute  victims  of  the  war  to  be  found  in  Key 
West.  On  May  9  Miss  Barton  received  the  following  letter 
from  the  United  States  marshal  for  the  southern  district  of 
Florida: 

DEPARTMENT  OF  JUSTICE,  OFFICE  OF  U.  S.  MARSHAL, 
SOUTHERN  DISTRICT  OF  FLORIDA, 

KEY  WEST,  FLORIDA,  May  9,  1898. 
Miss  Clara  Barton,  President  American  National  Red  Cross. 

DEAR  Miss  BARTON:  On  board  the  captured  vessels  we  find  quite 
a  number  of  aliens  among  the  crews,  mostly  Cubans,  and  some 


UNDER  THE   RED   CROSS  15 

American  citizens,  and  their  detention  here  and  inability  to  get 
away  for  want  of  funds  has  exhausted  their  supply  of  food,  and 
some  of  them  will  soon  be  entirely  out.  As  there  is  no  appropria 
tion  available  from  which  food  could  be  purchased,  would  you  kindly 
provide  for  them  until  I  can  get  definite  instructions  from  the  de 
partment  at  Washington? 

Very  respectfully  yours, 
[Signed]  JOHN  F.  HORR, 

U.  S.  Marshal. 

Appended  to  the  above  letter  was  a  list  of  fifteen  Spanish 
vessels  whose  crews  were  believed  by  the  marshal  to  be  in 
need  of  food. 

In  less  than  three  hours  after  the  receipt  of  this  commu 
nication  two  large  ships'  boats,  loaded  with  provisions  for  the 
sailors  on  the  Spanish  prizes,  left  the  State  of  Texas  in  tow 
of  the  steam-launch  of  the  troop-ship  Panther.  Before  dark 
that  night,  Mr.  Cobb  and  Dr.  Egan,  of  Miss  Barton's  staff, 
who  were  in  charge  of  the  relief-boats,  had  visited  every 
captured  Spanish  vessel  in  the  harbor.  Two  or  three  of 
them,  including  the  great  liners  Miguel  Jover  and  Argonauta, 
had  provisions  enough,  and  were  not  in  need  of  relief,  but 
most  of  the  others— particularly  the  fishing-smacks—were 
in  even  worse  straits  than  the  marshal  supposed.  The  large 
transatlantic  steamer  Pedro,  of  Bilbao,  had  no  flour,  bread, 
coffee,  tea,  sugar,  beans,  rice,  vegetables,  or  lard  for  cook 
ing,  and  her  crew  had  lived  for  fifteen  days  exclusively 
upon  fish.  The  schooner  Severito  had  wholly  exhausted  her 
supplies,  and  had  on  board  nothing  to  eat  of  any  kind.  Of 
the  others,  some  had  no  matches  or  oil  for  lights,  some  were 
nearly  out  of  water,  and  all  were  reduced  to  an  unrelieved 
fish  diet,  of  which  the  men  were  beginning  to  sicken.  The 
Red  Cross  relief-boats  made  a  complete  and  accurate  list  of 
the  Spanish  prizes  in  the  harbor,— twenty-two  in  all,— with 
the  numerical  strength  of  every  crew,  the  amount  of  provi- 


16  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

sions,  if  any,  on  every  vessel,  and  the  quantity  and  kind  of 
food  that  each  would  require. 

Finding  that  one  of  the  prizes  had  a  cargo  of  plantains 
and  bananas,  and  that  most  of  the  fishing-smacks  were  pro 
vided  with  salt-water  tanks  in  which  they  had  thousands  of 
pounds  of  living  fish,  Miss  Barton  and  her  staff  determined 
to  purchase  from  them  such  quantities  of  these  perishable 
commodities  as  they  were  willing  to  sell  at  a  low  nominal 
price,  and  use  such  food  to  increase  and  diversify  the  rations 
furnished  to  the  fifteen  hundred  Cuban  refugees  and  recon- 
centrados  on  shore.  This  would  give  the  latter  a  change 
of  diet,  and  at  the  same  time  lessen  the  amount  of  more  ex 
pensive  food-stuffs  to  be  taken  from  the  cargo  of  the  Red 
Cross  steamer  or  brought  from  New  York.  With  the  ap 
proval  of  the  United  States  marshal,  this  plan  was  imme 
diately  carried  into  effect,  and  it  worked  admirably.  The 
captains  of  the  Spanish  prizes  were  glad  to  give  to  the  Red 
Cross  perishable  commodities  for  which  they  had  no  acces 
sible  market,  and  ten  thousand  pounds  of  fish  and  large  quan 
tities  of  plantains  and  bananas  were  soon  obtained  for  dis 
tribution  among  the  Cuban  refugees  and  reconcentrados  in 
Key  West.  I  refer  to  this  incident  of  the  relief-work,  not 
because  it  has,  intrinsically,  any  particular  importance,  but 
because  it  shows  that  the  means  adopted  by  the  Red  Cross 
to  relieve  distress  in  Key  West  were  intelligent  and  busi 
nesslike. 

On  the  day  after  our  arrival  Mr.  Cobb,  of  Miss  Barton's 
staff,  called  at  the  hotel  to  tell  us  that  the  Red  Cross  relief- 
boats  were  about  to  make  another  visit  to  the  Spanish  prizes 
in  the  harbor,  and  to  ask  us  if  we  would  like  to  go  with 
them  and  see  the  work. 

In  half  an  hour  Miss  Barton  and  her  staff,  Mrs.  Kennan 
and  I,  started  in  the  steam-launch  of  the  monitor  Puritan 
to  make  the  round  of  the  captured  Spanish  ships,  towing 


UNDER  THE   RED   CROSS  17 

behind  us  two  large  boats  loaded  with  assorted  stores  for 
the  destitute  crews.  The  first  vessel  we  visited  was  a  small 
black  brigantine  from  Barcelona,  named  Frascito,  which  had 
been  captured  eight  miles  off  Havana  by  the  United  States 
cruiser  Montgomery.  The  swarthy,  scantily  clad  Spanish 
sailors  crowded  to  the  bulwarks  with  beaming  faces  as  we 
approached,  and  the  hurried,  almost  frenzied  eagerness  with 
which  they  threw  us  a  line,  hung  a  ladder  over  the  side,  and 
helped  us  on  board,  showed  that  although  we  were  inciden 
tally  Americans,  and  therefore  enemies,  we  were  primarily 
Red  Cross  people,  and  consequently  friends  to  be  greeted  and 
welcomed  with  every  possible  manifestation  of  respect,  grati 
tude,  and  affection. 

The  interior  of  the  little  brigantine  presented  an  appear 
ance  of  slovenly  but  picturesque  dirt,  confusion,  and  dis 
order,  as  if  the  crew,  overwhelmed  by  the  misfortune  that 
had  come  upon  them,  had  abandoned  the  routine  of  daily 
duty  and  given  themselves  up  to  apathy  and  despair. 
The  main-deck,  between  the  low  after-cabin  and  the  high 
forecastle,  had  not  been  washed  down,  apparently,  in  a 
week;  piles  of  dirty  dishes  and  cooking-utensils  of  strange, 
unfamiliar  shapes  lay  here  and  there  around  the  little  galley 
forward;  coils  of  running  rigging  were  kicking  about  under 
foot  instead  of  hanging  on  the  belaying-pins;  a  pig-pen, 
which  had  apparently  gone  adrift  in  a  gale,  blocked  up  the 
gangway  to  the  forecastle  on  the  port  side  between  the  high 
bulwark  and  a  big  boat  which  had  been  lashed  in  V-shaped 
supports  amidships;  and  a  large  part  of  the  space  between 
the  cabin  and  the  forecastle  on  the  starboard  side  was  a 
chaos  of  chain-cable,  lumber,  spare  spars,  pots,  pans,  earthen 
water-jars,  and  chicken-coops. 

The  captain  of  the  little  vessel  was  a  round-faced,  boyish- 
looking  man,  of  an  English  rather  than  a  Spanish  type,  with 
clear  gray  honest  eyes  and  a  winning  expression  of  friendli- 


1.8  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

ness  and  rustic  bonhomie,  like  that  of  an  amiable,  intelligent 
young  peasant.  He  greeted  us  cordially,  but  with  a  slight 
trace  of  shy  awkwardness,  and  invited  us  into  the  small, 
dark  cabin,  where  we  drank  one  another's  health  in  a  bottle 
of  sweet,  strong  liqueur,  and  he  told  us  the  rather  pathetic 
story  of  his  misfortune.  The  brigantine  Frascito  ("Little 
Flask"),  he  said,  belonged  in  part  to  him  and  in  part  to  a 
company  in  Barcelona.  The  cargo,  consisting  chiefly  of 
South  American  jerked  beef,  was  owned  by  his  father  and 
himself,  and  ship  and  cargo  represented  all  that  he  and  his 
family  had  in  the  world.  He  left  Montevideo  for  Havana 
about  the  middle  of  March,  and  had  no  intimation  whatever 
that  Spain  and  the  United  States  were  at  war,  until  a  round 
shot  was  fired  across  his  bow  by  the  cruiser  Montgomery, 
about  eight  miles  off  Morro  Castlo.  The  officers  of  the 
cruiser  treated  him  very  kindly— "I  could  n't  have  done  it 
better,"  he  said,  with  simple  sincerity,  "  if  I  had  done  it  my 
self;  but  it  was  very  hard  to  lose  everything  just  because  I 
did  n't  know.  Of  course  I  should  n't  have  tried  to  get  into 
Havana  if  I  had  known  there  was  war;  but  I  left  Montevideo 
in  March,  and  had  no  thought  of  such  a  thing."  We  tried 
to  cheer  him  up  by  telling  him  that  the  prize-court  would 
hardly  condemn  and  confiscate  his  vessel  under  such  cir 
cumstances,  but  he  was  still  sad  and  troubled.  He  thanked 
us  with  simple,  unaffected  earnestness  for  the  provisions  we 
had  put  on  board  his  ship,  and  said  that  the  unexpected  kind 
ness  of  the  Red  Cross  to  him  and  his  crew  had  cheered  and 
encouraged  them  all.  He  seemed  anxious  to  do  something 
to  show  us  his  gratitude  and  appreciation,  and  when  a 
member  of  our  party  manifested  interest  in  a  large  cage  of 
red-crested  tropical  birds  which  hung  beside  the  cabin 
door,  he  promptly  took  it  down  and  presented  it  "to  the 
senorita  for  the  Red  Cross  steamer,  with  the  compliments 
and  thanks  of  the  Frascito." 


UNDER  THE   RED   CROSS  19 

After  putting  on  board  the  little  brigantine  such  supplies, 
in  the  shape  of  bread,  beans,  rice,  canned  meats,  etc.,  as 
the  crew  required,  we  bade  the  captain  and  mate  good-by, 
and  left  them  apparently  somewhat  cheered  up  by  our  visit. 

From  the  Frascito  we  went  successively  to  the  Oriente,  the 
Espana,  the  Santiago  Apostol,  the  Poder  de  Dios,  and  fifteen 
or  sixteen  other  vessels  of  the  prize-fleet,  ascertaining  their 
wants,  furnishing  them  with  such  food-supplies  as  they 
needed,  and  listening  to  the  stories  of  their  captains. 

Among  the  sailors  on  the  fishing-smacks  were  many  un 
familiar  and  wild-looking  Cuban  and  Spanish  types— men 
with  hard,  dark  faces,  lighted  up  by  fierce,  brilliant  black 
eyes,  who  looked  as  if  they  would  have  been  in  their  proper 
sphere  fighting  under  a  black  flag,  on  the  Spanish  Main,  in 
the  good  old  days  of  the  bucaneers.  But  hard  and  fierce 
as  many  of  them  looked,  they  were  not  wholly  insensible  to 
kindness.  On  the  schooner  Power  of  God,  where  there 
seemed  to  be  more  wild,  cruel,  piratical  types  than  on  any 
other  vessel  except,  perhaps,  St.  James  the  Apostle,  I  noticed 
a  sailor  with  a  stern,  hard,  almost  black  face  and  fierce,  dark 
eyes,  who— had  such  a  thing  been  possible— might  have 
stepped,  just  as  he  stood,  out  of  the  pages  of  "Amyas 
Leigh."  He  was  regarding  me  with  an  expression  in  which, 
if  there  was  no  actual  malevolence,  there  was  at  least  not 
the  slightest  indication  of  friendliness  or  good  will.  Taking 
from  my  haversack  a  box  of  the  cigarettes  with  which  I  had 
provided  myself  in  anticipation  of  a  tobacco  famine  among 
the  Spanish  sailors,  I  sprang  over  the  bulwark,  and,  with 
as  cordial  a  smile  of  comradeship  as  I  could  give  him,  I 
placed  it  in  his  hand.  For  an  instant  he  stared  at  it  as 
if  stupefied  with  amazement.  Then  his  hard,  set  face  re 
laxed  a  little,  and,  throwing  his  head  forward  and  raising 
his  fierce  black  eyes  to  mine,  he  gave  me  a  long  look  of  sur 
prise  and  intense,  passionate  gratitude,  which  seemed  to  say, 


20  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

"  I  don't  know  your  language,  and  I  can't  tell  you  how  grate 
ful  I  am,  but  I  can  look  it "  —and  he  did.  He  had  evidently 
been  out  of  tobacco  many  days,  and  in  a  moment  he  went 
below  where  he  could  light  a  match  out  of  the  wind,  and 
presently  reappeared,  breathing  smoke  and  exhaling  it 
through  his  nostrils  with  infinite  satisfaction  and  pleasure. 

Nearly  all  the  sailors  on  the  fishing-smacks  were  bare 
footed,  many  were  bareheaded,  and  all  had  been  tanned  a 
dark  mahogany  color  by  weeks  of  exposure  to  the  rays  of 
a  tropical  sun.  Their  dress  consisted,  generally,  of  a  shirt 
and  a  pair  of  loose  trousers  of  coarse  gray  cotton,  like  the 
dress  worn  in  summer  by  Siberian  convicts.  Dr.  Egan 
prescribed  and  furnished  medicines  for  the  sick  wherever 
they  were  found,  and  on  one  vessel  performed  a  rather  diffi 
cult  and  delicate  surgical  operation  for  the  relief  of  a  man 
who  was  suffering  from  a  badly  swollen  neck,  with  necrosis 
of  the  lower  jawbone. 

At  half-past  six  o'clock  we  returned  to  the  State  of  Texas, 
having  attended  to  all  the  sick  that  were  found,  relieved 
all  the  distress  that  was  brought  to  our  attention,  and  fur 
nished  food  enough  for  a  week's  consumption  to  the  crews 
of  nineteen  vessels. 

Two  days  later,  at  the  suggestion  of  Miss  Barton,  Mr. 
Cobb  purchased  a  quantity  of  smoking-  and  chewing-tobacco 
for  the  Spanish  sailors,  and  we  made  another  double  round 
of  the  prize-ships,  in  the  steam-launch  of  the  New  York 
"  Sun,"  which  was  courteously  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Red  Cross  for  the  whole  afternoon.  On  our  outward  trip 
we  left  on  every  vessel  tobacco  and  matches  enough  to  last 
the  crew  for  a  week,  and  Mr.  Cobb  notified  all  the  captains 
that  if  they  or  their  crews  wished  to  write  open  letters  to 
their  relatives  and  friends  in  Cuba  or  Spain,  the  Red  Cross 
would  collect  them,  submit  them  to  the  United  States  prize- 
court  for  approval,  and  undertake  to  forward  them. 


UNDER  THE   RED   CROSS  21 

The  tobacco  and  the  offer  to  forward  letters  seemed  to 
excite  more  enthusiastic  gratitude  in  the  hearts  of  the 
Spanish  prisoners  than  even  the  distribution  of  food.  On 
one  schooner  my  attention  was  attracted  to  a  ragged  sailor 
who  was  saying  something  very  earnestly  in  Spanish,  and 
pointing,  in  a  rather  dramatic  manner,  to  the  sky.  "What 
is  he  saying?"  I  inquired  of  Mr.  Cobb.  "He  says,"  replied 
the  latter,  with  a  smile,  "  that  if  they  were  prisoners  up  in 
heaven,  they  could  n't  be  better  treated  than  they  have 
been  here." 

I  was  touched  and  gratified  to  see  the  interest  and  sym 
pathy  excited  by  the  work  of  the  Red  Cross  in  all  who 
came  in  contact  with  it,  from  the  commodore  of  the  fleet  to 
the  poorest  fisherman.  The  captains  of  the  monitor  Puritan 
and  the  auxiliary  cruiser  Panther  offered  us  the  use  of  their 
swift  steam-launches  in  the  work  of  distributing  food;  the 
representative  of  the  New  York  "Sun"  followed  their  ex 
ample;  the  marines  on  the  Panther  doffed  their  caps  to  our 
boats  as  we  passed,  and  even  a  poor  Key  West  fisherman 
pulled  over  to  us  in  his  skiff,  as  we  lay  alongside  a  Spanish 
vessel,  and  gave  us  two  large,  lobster-like  crawfish,  merely 
to  show  us,  in  the  only  way  he  could,  his  affectionate  sym 
pathy  and  good  will.  Mr.  Cobb  offered  him  some  of  the  to 
bacco  that  we  were  distributing  among  the  Spanish  sailors, 
but  he  refused  to  take  it,  saying  :  "  I  did  n't  bring  the  fish 
to  you  to  beg  tobacco,  or  for  money,  but  just  because  I 
wanted  to  help  a  little.  I  hoped  to  get  more,  but  these 
were  all  I  could  catch." 

One  touch  of  kindness  makes  all  the  world  kin.  Even  the 
engineer  of  the  New  York  "  Sun's  "  naphtha-launch  gave  his 
cherished  pipe  to  a  sailor  on  a  Spanish  vessel  who  had  none, 
and  when  one  of  his  mates  remonstrated  with  him,  say 
ing,  "You  're  not  going  to  give  him  your  own  brier-wood 
pipe!"  he  replied,  with  a  shamefaced  smile:  "Yes,  poor 


22  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

devil!  he  can't  get  one  away  out  here.     I  can  buy  another 
ashore." 

Late  in  the  afternoon  we  made  a  second  round  of  all  the 
Spanish  ships  to  collect  their  letters,  and  then  returned  to 
the  State  of  Texas.  Mr.  Cobb  that  same  evening  submitted 
the  open  letters  to  the  United  States  prize-court  for  ap 
proval,  and  I  made  an  arrangement  with  Mr.  E.  F.  Knight, 
war  correspondent  of  the  London  "Times,"  who  was  just 
starting  for  Havana,  to  take  the  Cuban  letters  with  him 
and  mail  them  there.  The  letters  for  Spain  were  sent  to 
the  National  Red  Cross  of  Portugal. 


CHAPTER  III 
ON   THE   EDGE   OP  WAR 

UNTIL  the  illuminating  search-light  of  war  was  turned 
upon  the  island  of  Key  West,  it  was,  to  the  people  of 
the  North  generally,  little  more  than  a  name  attached  to  a 
small,  arid  coral  reef  lying  on  the  verge  of  the  Gulf  Stream 
off  the  southern  extremity  of  Florida.  Few  people  knew 
anything  definitely  about  it,  and  to  nine  readers  out  of  ten  its 
name  suggested  nothing  more  interesting  or  attractive  than 
Cuban  filibusters,  sponges,  and  cigars.  In  less  than  a  month, 
however,  after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  it  had  become  the 
headquarters,  as  well  as  the  chief  coaling-station,  of  two 
powerful  fleets;  the  news-distributing  center  for  the  whole 
Cuban  coast;  the  supply-depot  to  which  perhaps  a  hundred 
vessels  resorted  for  water,  food,  and  ammunition;  the  home 
station  of  all  the  newspaper  despatch-boats  cruising  in  West 
Indian  waters;  the  temporary  headquarters  of  more  than  a 
hundred  newspaper  correspondents  and  reporters,  and  the 
most  advanced  outpost  of  the  United  States  on  the  edge  of 
war.  In  view  of  the  importance  which  the  place  had  at  that 
time,  as  well  as  the  importance  which  it  must  continue  to 
have,  as  our  naval  base  in  Cuban  waters,  a  description  of  it 
may  not  be  wholly  without  interest. 

The  island  on  which  the  city  of  Key  West  stands  forms 
one  of  the  links  in  a  long,  curving  chain  of  shoals,  reefs,  and 

23 


24  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

keys  extending  in  a  southwesterly  direction  about  a  hundred 
miles  from  the  extreme  end  of  the  peninsula  of  Florida. 
It  is  approximately  six  miles  long,  has  an  average  width  of 
one  mile,  and  resembles  a  little  in  shape  a  huge  comma,  with 
the  city  of  Key  West  for  its  head  and  a  diminishing  curve 
of  low,  swampy  chaparral  and  mangrove-bushes  for  a  tail. 
The  shallow  bay  of  pale-green  water  between  the  head  and 
the  tail  on  the  concave  side  of  the  comma  is  known  as  "  the 
bight."  It  is  the  anchorage  of  the  sponging-fleet,  and  is 
the  eastern  limit  of  settlement  on  that  side  of  the  island. 
Beyond  it  are  sandy  flats  and  shallow,  salt-water  lagoons, 
shut  in  by  a  dense  growth  of  leather-leaved  bushes  and 
low,  scrubby  China-berry,  sea-grape,  and  Jamaica-apple  trees. 
The  highest  part  of  the  Key  is  occupied  by  the  city,  and 
the  highest  part  of  the  city  is  the  low  bluff  on  its  western 
side,  where  the  slender  shaft  of  the  lighthouse  stands  at  a 
height  of  fifteen  or  eighteen  feet  above  the  level  of  tide 
water.  Owing  to  its  geographical  position  in  a  semi-tropical 
sea,  just  north  of  the  Gulf  Stream  and  within  the  zone  of 
the  northeast  trade-winds,  Key  West  has  a  climate  of  re 
markable  mildness  and  equability.  Twenty  years'  observa 
tions  show  that  its  lowest  monthly  mean  of  temperature  is 
70°  F.  in  January,  and  its  highest  84°  in  August— an  annual 
range  of  only  14°.  Between  the  years  1886  and  1896  the 
highest  temperature  recorded  was  92°,  and  the  lowest  40°- 
a  range  of  only  52°  between  maximum  and  minimum  in  a 
period  of  ten  years.  New  York  and  Chicago  often  have  a 
greater  variation  of  temperature  than  this  in  the  course  of 
ten  days. 

Equability,  however,  is  not  the  only  noteworthy  charac 
teristic  of  the  Key  West  climate.  It  is  also  remarkable  for 
its  sunniness  in  winter  and  its  breeziness  at  all  seasons  of 
the  year.  The  average  number  of  cloudy  days  there  is 
only  sixty-four  per  annum,  and  between  October  and  April 


ON  THE   EDGE   OF  WAR  25 

the  sun  often  shines,  day  after  day,  in  a  cloudless  sky,  for 
weeks  at  a  time.  But  even  more  constant  and  continuous 
than  the  sunshine  are  the  cool  breezes  from  the  foam-crested 
waters  of  the  Atlantic,  which  temper  the  heat  of  the  almost 
perpetual  summer.  From  the  reports  of  the  Weather  Bureau 
it  appears  that  the  average  number  of  calm  days  at  Key 
West  is  only  ten  per  annum.  In  1895  only  three  days  were 
calm,  and  in  1894  there  were  only  twenty-seven  hours,  of 
day  or  night,  in  which  there  was  not  breeze  enough  to  ripple, 
at  least,  the  pale-green  water  of  the  harbor.  For  all  prac 
tical  purposes,  therefore,  the  sea-breeze  at  Key  West  may  be 
regarded  as  perennial  and  incessant.  It  varies  in  strength, 
of  course,  from  day  to  day  and  from  hour  to  hour;  but  in 
the  two  weeks  that  I  spent  there  it  was  never  strong  enough 
to  be  unpleasant  in  the  city,  nor  to  necessitate  the  reefing 
of  small  sail-boats  in  the  comparatively  open  and  unsheltered 
bay. 

The  average  annual  rainfall  on  the  island  is  about  thirty- 
nine  inches,  and  nearly  the  whole  of  this  precipitation  is 
confined  to  the  so-called  "  rainy  season,"  between  May  and 
November,  when  showers  fall,  now  and  then,  at  irregular  in 
tervals  of  from  three  to  ten  days.  For  their  fresh  water 
the  inhabitants  depend  entirely  upon  this  rainfall,  which  is 
carefully  collected  and  saved  in  large  roof-covered  cisterns. 
There  are  a  few  wells  on  the  island,  but  the  water  in  them 
is  generally  brackish,  or  is  so  impregnated  with  lime  and 
earthy  salts  as  to  be  unfit  either  for  drinking  or  for  irriga 
tion.  To  sum  up  briefly,  the  climate  of  Key  West  may  be 
roughly  described  as  mild  and  dry  in  winter,  warm  but 
showery  in  summer,  and  breezy  and  sunny  at  all  seasons. 

In  this  geographical  and  climatic  environment  there  has 
grown  up  on  the  island  an  interesting  but  rather  sleepy 
and  unprogressive  city  of  twenty-two  thousand  inhabitants. 
The  most  important  of  the  elements  that  go  to  make  up  its 


26  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

population  are,  first,  whites  from  the  United  States,  who 
are  chiefly  engaged  in  shipping  or  commerce;  second,  Cubans 
of  mixed  blood,  employed,  for  the  most  part,  in  the  cigar 
factories;  third,  immigrants  from  the  Bahamas,  known  as 
"conchs,"  who  devote  themselves  mainly  to  fishing,  spong 
ing,  and  wrecking;  and,  fourth,  negroes  from  America  and 
the  West  Indian  Islands,  who  turn  their  hands  to  anything 
they  can  find  to  do,  from  shoveling  coal  to  diving  into  the 
clear  water  of  the  bay  after  the  pennies  or  nickels  thrown 
by  Northern  tourists  from  the  deck  of  the  Mascotte  or  the 
Olivette.  Nothing  in  the  shape  of  fruit,  grain,  or  vegetables 
is  raised  on  the  island  for  export,  and  the  greater  part  of 
the  city's  food-supply  comes  either  from  Florida  or  from  the 
islands  of  the  West  Indies. 

The  first  thing  that  strikes  a  newcomer  in  Key  West  is 
the  distinctly  and  unmistakably  foreign  aspect  of  the  city. 
In  spite  of  the  English  names  on  many  of  the  sign-boards 
over  the  shops,  the  American  faces  on  the  streets,  and  the 
crowd  of  American  officers  and  war  correspondents  smok 
ing  or  talking  on  the  spacious  piazzas  of  the  Key  West 
Hotel,  one  cannot  get  rid  of  the  impression  that  he  has  left 
the  United  States  and  has  landed  in  some  such  town  as  San 
Juan  de  Guatemala  or  Punta  Arenas,  on  the  Pacific  coast  of 
Central  America.  Everything  that  meets  the  eye  seems 
new,  unfamiliar,  and,  in  some  subtle,  indefinable  way,  un- 
American.  The  vivid  but  pale  and  delicate  green  of  the 
ocean  water;  the  slender,  fern-headed  cocoanut-palms  which 
stand  in  clumps  here  and  there  along  the  streets;  the  feathery 
Australian  pines  and  dark-green  Indian  laurels  which  shade 
the  naval  storehouse  and  the  Marine  Hospital ;  the  masses  of 
tamarind,  almond,  sapodilla,  wild-fig,  banana,  and  cork-tree 
foliage  in  the  yards  of  the  white,  veranda-belted  houses;  the 
Spanish  and  Cuban  types  on  the  piers  and  in  front  of  the 
hotels;  the  unfamiliar  language  which  strikes  the  ear  at 


ON   THE   EDGE   OF  WAR  27 

almost  every  step— all  suggest  a  tropical  environment  and 
Spanish,  rather  than  American,  influences  and  character 
istics. 

The  two  features  of  Key  West  scenery  that  appear,  at 
first  glance,  to  be  most  salient,  and  that  contribute  most  to 
the  impression  of  strangeness  and  remoteness  made  by  the 
island  as  a  whole,  are,  unquestionably,  the  color  of  the  water 
and  the  character  of  the  vegetation.  The  ocean  in  which 
the  little  coral  key  is  set  has  a  vividness  and  a  delicacy  of 
color  that  I  have  never  seen  equaled  elsewhere,  and  that  is 
not  even  so  much  as  suggested  by  the  turbid,  semi-opaque 
water  of  the  Atlantic  off  the  coast  of  Massachusetts  or 
New  Jersey.  It  is  a  clear,  brilliant,  translucent  green,  pale 
rather  than  deep  in  tone,  and  ranging  through  all  possible 
gradations,  from  the  color  of  a  rain-wet  lawn  to  the  pure,  deli 
cate,  ethereal  green  of  an  auroral  streamer.  Sometimes, 
in  heavy  cloud-shadow,  it  is  almost  as  dark  as  the  green  of 
a  Siberian  alexandrite;  but  just  beyond  the  shadow,  in  the 
full  sunshine,  it  brightens  to  the  color  of  a  greenish  tur 
quoise.  In  the  shallow  bay  known  as  "the  bight,"  the  yel 
lowish  brown  of  the  marine  vegetation  on  the  bottom  blends 
with  the  pale  green  of  the  overlying  water  so  as  to  repro 
duce  on  a  large  scale  the  tints  of  a  Ural  Mountain  chrysolite, 
while  two  miles  away,  over  a  bank  of  sand  or  a  white  coral 
reef,  the  water  has  the  almost  opaque  but  vivid  color  of  a  pea- 
green  satin  ribbon.  Even  in  the  gloom  and  obscurity  of 
midnight,  the  narrow  slit  cut  through  the  darkness  by  the 
sharp  blade  of  the  Fort  Taylor  search-light  reveals  a  long 
line  of  green,  foam-flecked  water.  Owing  to  the  very  limited 
extent  of  the  island,  the  ocean  may  be  seen  at  the  end  of 
every  street  and  from  almost  every  point  of  view,  and  its 
constantly  changing  but  always  unfamiliar  color  says  to  you 
at  every  hour  of  the  day:  "You  are  no  longer  looking  out 
upon  the  dull,  muddy  green  water  of  the  Atlantic  coast;  you 


28  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

are  on  a  tropical,  palm-fringed  coral  reef  in  the  remote  soli 
tude  of  the  great  South  Sea." 

Next  to  the  color  of  the  ocean,  in  its  power  to  suggest  re 
moteness  and  unfamiliarity,  is  the  character  of  the  vegeta 
tion.  The  flora  of  Key  West  is  wholly  tropical,  and  in  my 
first  ramble  through  the  city  I  did  not  discover  a  single 
plant,  shrub,  tree,  or  flower  that  I  had  ever  seen  in  the  North 
except  the  oleander.  Even  that  had  wholly  changed  its 
habits  and  appearance,  and  resembled  the  pot-grown  plant  of 
Northern  households  only  as  the  gigantic  sequoia  of  Cali 
fornia  resembles  the  stunted  Lilliputian  pine  of  the  Siberian 
tundra.  The  Key  West  oleander  is  not  a  plant,  nor  a  shrub; 
it  is  a  tree.  In  the  yard  of  a  private  house  on  Carolina 
Street  I  saw  an  oleander  nearly  thirty  feet  in  height,  whose 
branches  shaded  an  area  twenty  feet  or  more  in  diameter, 
and  whose  mammoth  clusters  of  rosy  flowers  might  have  been 
counted  by  the  hundred.  Such  an  oleander  as  this,  even 
though  its  loaves  and  blossoms  may  be  familiar,  seems  like 
a  stranger  and  an  exotic,  and,  instead  of  modifying  the  im 
pression  of  remoteness  and  alienation  made  by  the  other 
features  of  the  tropical  environment,  it  deepens  and  intensi 
fies  it.  Among  the  vines,  plants,  shrubs,  and  trees  that  I 
noticed  and  identified  in  the  streets  and  private  grounds  of 
Key  West  were  jasmine,  bergamot,  poinsettia,  hibiscus,  al 
mond,  banana,  sapodilla,  tamarind,  Jamaica  apple,  mango, 
Spanish  lime,  cotton-tree,  royal  poinciana,  "  Geiger  flower " 
(a  local  name),  alligator-pear,  tree-cactus,  sand-box,  cork 
tree,  banian-tree,  sea-grape,  cocoanut-palm,  date-palm,  Indian 
laurel,  Australian  pine,  and  wild  fig.  Most  of  these  trees 
and  shrubs  do  not  grow  even  in  southern  Florida,  and  are 
to  be  found,  within  the  limits  of  the  United  States,  only  in 
southern  California  and  on  the  island  of  Key  West. 

A  mere  perusal  of  this  long  list  of  unfamiliar  names  will 
enable  the  reader  to  understand  why  the  vegetation  of  the 


ON  THE   EDGE   OP  WAR  29 

island  reinforces  the  impression  of  strangeness  and  remote 
ness  already  made  by  the  color  of  the  sea. 

Key  West,  after  the  outbreak  of  war,  had  two  chief 
centers  of  interest  and  excitement:  first,  the  harbor,  be 
tween  Fort  Taylor  and  the  government  wharf,  where  lay  all 
the  monitors,  cruisers,  and  gunboats  of  the  North  Atlantic 
Squadron  that  were  not  actually  engaged  in  sea  service;  and, 
second,  the  Key  West  Hotel,  which  was  the  headquarters  of 
the  war  correspondents,  as  well  as  of  naval  officers  assigned 
to  shore  duty,  and  visitors  on  all  sorts  of  business  from  the 
North.  I  found  it  hard  to  decide  which  of  these  two  centers 
would  oifer  better  opportunities  and  facilities  for  observa 
tion  and  the  acquirement  of  knowledge.  If  I  stayed  on  board 
a  vessel  in  the  harbor,  I  should  miss  the  life  and  activity  of 
the  city,  the  quick  delivery  of  daily  papers  from  the  North, 
the  news  bulletins  posted  every  few  hours  in  the  hotel,  and 
all  the  stories  of  fight,  peril,  or  adventure  told  on  shady 
piazzas  by  officers  and  correspondents  just  back  from  the 
Cuban  coast;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  if  I  established  myself 
at  the  hotel,  I  could  not  see  the  bringing  in  of  Spanish 
prizes  from  the  Florida  Strait,  the  arrival  and  departure  of 
despatch-boats  with  news  and  orders,  the  play  of  the  search 
lights,  the  gun  practice  of  the  big  war-ships,  the  signaling, 
the  saluting,  and  the  movements  generally  of  the  fleet. 

After  having  spent  a  week  at  the  hotel,  I  decided  to  go 
on  board  the  Red  Cross  steamer  State  of  Texas,  which  was 
lying  off  the  government  wharf,  nearly  opposite  the  custom 
house,  and  within  one  hundred  yards  of  the  two  big  monitors 
Puritan  and  Miantonomoh.  I  made  the  change  just  in  time 
to  see,  from  the  best  possible  point  of  vantage,  the  great 
event  of  the  week— the  arrival  of  the  two  powerful  fleets 
commanded  respectively  by  Admiral  Sampson  and  Commo 
dore  Schley.  Early  Wednesday  morning  the  graceful,  black, 
schooner-rigged  despatch-boat  of  the  New  York  "  Sun >?  came 


30  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

racing  into  the  harbor  under  full  head  of  steam,  followed 
closely  by  the  ocean-going  tug  of  the  Associated  Press  and 
two  or  three  fast  yachts  in  the  service  of  New  York  papers, 
all  blowing  their  whistles  vigorously  to  attract  attention 
from  the  shore.  Something,  evidently,  had  happened,  and, 
looking  seaward  with  a  powerful  glass,  I  had  no  difficulty 
in  making  out  on  the  horizon,  at  a  distance  of  eight  or  ten 
miles,  the  cruiser  Brooklyn,  the  battle-ships  Texas  and  Massa 
chusetts,  and  two  or  three  smaller  cruisers  and  gunboats  of  the 
United  States  navy.  The  Flying  Squadron  from  Hampton 
Roads  had  arrived. 

The  harbor  at  once  became  a  scene  of  rapid  movement  and 
intense  activity.  Steam-launches  darted  out  from  the  piers 
carrying  war  correspondents  to  their  respective  despatch- 
boats,  and  naval  officers  to  the  monitors  and  the  huge  four- 
masted  colliers;  a  long  line  of  party-colored  flags  was  dis 
played  from  the  signal-halyards  of  the  Miantonomoh;  two 
or  three  fast  sea-going  tugs  carrying  the  naval  commandant 
and  other  harbor  officers  started  seaward  at  full  speed,  with 
long  plumes  of  black  smoke  trailing  to  leeward  from  their 
lead-colored  stacks;  and  the  eight  hundred  marines  on  the 
auxiliary  cruiser  Panther  swarmed  on  deck  and  crowded 
eagerly  aft  to  gaze  at  the  dim,  distant  outlines  of  the  newly 
arrived  vessels. 

About  the  middle  of  the  forenoon  the  swift,  heavily  armed 
gunboat  Scorpion  entered  the  harbor  flying  the  commodore's 
pennant,  and  was  received  with  a  salute  of  eleven  guns  from 
the  monitor  Miantonomoh.  The  remainder  of  the  day  passed 
without  any  other  unusual  or  noteworthy  incident,  but  some 
time  in  the  night  the  fleet  of  Admiral  Sampson  joined  the 
Flying  Squadron  in  the  offing,  and  Thursday  morning  the 
people  of  Key  West  saw,  in  their  harbor  and  at  sea  off  Fort 
Taylor,  the  largest  and  most  powerful  fleet  of  war-vessels 
that  had  ever  assembled,  perhaps,  under  the  American  flag. 


ON   THE   EDGE   OF  WAR  31 

All  day  Thursday  the  harbor  was  the  center  of  incessant 
movement,  activity,  and  excitement.  The  lighter  vessels  of 
the  Flying  Squadron,  which  had  come  in  to  coal,  rejoined 
the  heavier  cruisers  and  battle-ships  in  the  offing,  and  their 
places  were  taken  by  the  big  monitors  Amphitrite  and  Terror, 
the  cruisers  Detroit  and  Marblehead,  and  the  gunboats  Wil 
mington,  Helena,  Castine,  and  Machias,  which  steamed  in  one 
after  another  from  the  fleet  of  Admiral  Sampson.  When 
all  these  vessels  had  anchored  off  Fort  Taylor  and  the  gov 
ernment  wharf,  there  were  in  the  harbor  more  than  twenty 
ships  of  war,  including  three  torpedo-boats  and  four  mon 
itors;  six  or  eight  armed  yachts  of  the  mosquito  fleet;  twelve 
or  fifteen  big  transports,  troop-ships,  and  colliers  awaiting 
orders;  twenty-two  Spanish  prizes  of  all  sorts,  from  the  big 
liner  Argonauta  to  the  little  brigantine  Frascito;  and,  finally, 
a  fleet  of  newspaper  tugs,  launches,  and  despatch-boats 
almost  equal,  numerically,  to  the  fleets  of  Commodore  Schley 
and  Admiral  Sampson  taken  together.  The  marine  picture 
presented  by  the  harbor  with  all  these  monitors,  cruisers, 
gunboats,  yachts,  transports,  troop-ships,  torpedo-boats,  col 
liers,  despatch-boats,  and  Spanish  prizes  lying  at  anchor, 
with  flags  and  signals  flying  in  the  clear  sunshine  and  on  the 
translucent  green  water  of  the  tropics,  was  a  picture  of  more 
than  ordinary  interest  and  beauty,  and  one  that  Key  West, 
perhaps,  may  never  see  again. 

About  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  I  was  able,  through 
the  courtesy  of  Mr.  Trumbull  White  in  offering  me  the'use 
of  the  Chicago  "  Record's  "  despatch-boat,  to  go  off  to  the 
flagship  New  York  and  present  my  letter  of  introduction 
from  the  President  to  Admiral  Sampson.  I  was  received 
most  cordially  and  hospitably,  and,  after  conferring  with 
him  for  half  an  hour  with  regard  to  the  plans  and  work 
of  the  Red  Cross,  so  far  as  they  depended  upon  or  related  to 
the  navy,  I  returned  to  the  State  of  Texas.  The  fleet  sailed 


32  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

again  at  half-past  ten  o'clock  that  night  for  the  coast  of 
Cuba. 

After  the  departure  of  the  blockading  fleet  and  the  Fly 
ing  Squadron  on  May  19  and  20,  the  small  army  of  war 
correspondents  at  Key  West  had  little  to  do  except  watch 
for  the  arrival  of  vessels  with  news  from  the  Cuban  coast. 
Most  of  them  regarded  this  work— or  rather  absence  of 
work— as  tedious  and  irksome  in  the  extreme;  but  if  they 
had  been  living  on  board  ship  instead  of  at  the  hotel  they 
would  have  found  a  never-failing  source  of  interest  and  en 
tertainment  in  the  constantly  changing  picture  presented 
by  the  harbor.  Six  or  eight  war-ships,  ranging  in  size  and 
fighting  power  from  monitors  to  torpedo-boats,  were  still 
lying  at  anchor  off  the  custom-house  and  the  Marine  Hos 
pital;  transports  with  stores  and  munitions  of  war  were 
discharging  their  cargoes  at  the  piers;  big  four-masted 
schooners,  laden  with  coal  for  the  blockading  fleet,  swung 
back  and  forth  with  the  ebbing  and  flowing  tides  as  they 
awaited  orders  from  the  naval  commandant;  graceful  steam- 
yachts,  flying  the  flag  of  the  Associated  Press,  were  con 
stantly  coming  in  with  news  or  going  out  in  search  of  it; 
swift  naphtha-launches  carrying  naval  officers  in  white  uni 
forms  darted  hither  and  thither  from  one  cruiser  to  another, 
whistling  shrill  warnings  to  the  slower  boats  pulled  by  sailors 
from  the  transports;  officers  on  the  monitors  were  exchang 
ing  "wigwag"  flag-signals  with  other  officers  on  the  gun 
boats  or  the  troop-ships;  and  from  every  direction  came 
shouts,  bugle-calls,  the  shrieks  of  steam-whistles,  the  pecu 
liar  jarring  rattle  of  machine-guns  at  target  practice,  and 
the  measured  beats  of  twenty  or  thirty  ships'  bells,  striking, 
at  different  distances,  but  almost  synchronously,  the  half- 
hours. 

Interesting,  however,  as  Key  West  harbor  might  seem 
in  the  daytime,  it  was  far  more  beautiful  and  impressive 


ON   THE   EDGE   OF   WAR  33 

at  night.  One  clear,  still  evening  late  in  May,  when  the 
rosy  flush  of  the  short  tropical  twilight  had  faded,  and  the 
Sand  Key  beacon  began  to  glow  faintly,  like  a  setting  planet, 
on  the  darkening  horizon  in  the  west,  I  went  up  on  the  hur 
ricane-deck  alone  and  looked  about  the  harbor.  The  city, 
the  war-ships,  and  the  massive  square  outlines  of  Fort  Tay 
lor  had  all  vanished  in  the  gathering  darkness  and  gloom, 
but  in  their  places  were  rows,  clusters,  and  constellations 
innumerable  of  steadily  burning  lights.  A  long,  slender 
shaft  of  bluish  radiance  streamed  out  from  the  corner  of 
Fort  Taylor,  widening  as  it  extended  seaward,  until  it  struck 
and  illuminated  with  a  sort  of  ghostly  phosphorescence  the 
whitish  hull  of  a  gunboat  stealing  noiselessly  into  the  harbor 
from  the  direction  of  the  Cuban  coast.  The  strange  craft 
hung  out  a  perpendicular  string  of  red  and  white  lights, 
which  winked  solemnly  once  or  twice,  changed  color  two  or 
three  times,  and  then  vanished.  A  second  search-light  from 
the  monitor  Miantonomoh  sent  another  slender  electric  ray 
of  inquiry  in  the  direction  of  the  intruder,  as  if  still  doubt 
ful  of  its  character;  but  when  the  straight  blue  sword  of 
the  Fort  Taylor  search-light  rose  to  the  clouds  and  fell  to 
the  water  three  times,  as  if  striking  a  whole  league  of  ocean 
three  successive  and  measured  blows,  the  Miantonomoh  under 
stood  that  all  was  well,  and  her  own  search-light  left  the 
gunboat  and  swept  across  the  starry  sky  overhead  like  the 
tail  of  a  huge  blue  comet  swinging  at  its  perigee  around  a 
darkened  sun. 

In  a  moment  the  monitor  itself  hung  out  a  string  of  lights 
which  winked,  changed  color,  vanished,  reappeared,  and  again 
vanished,  leaving  only  a  red  light  at  the  masthead.  In  a 
moment  an  answering  signal-rocket  was  thrown  up  by  an  in 
visible  war-ship  in  the  direction  of  Fort  Taylor,  and  instantly 
two  powerful  search-lights  were  focused  upon  a  pale,  whit 
ish  object,  far  out  at  sea,  which  looked  in  the  bluish,  ghostly 


34  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

glare  like  the  mainsail  of  the  Flying  Dutchman.  Before  I 
had  time  to  form  a  conjecture  as  to  the  significance  of  these 
mysterious  signals  and  apparitions,  I  was  startled  by  a  sud 
den  flash  and  the  thunder  of  a  heavy  gun  from  the  darkness 
ahead;  and  away  out  at  sea,  in  the  strip  of  green  water  illu 
minated  by  the  search-lights,  a  heavy  projectile  plunged  into 
the  ocean,  near  the  sail  of  the  Flying  Dutchman,  and  sent 
a  column  of  white  spray  thirty  feet  into  the  air.  Then  I 
understood  what  it  all  meant.  The  Wilmington  was  engaged 
in  night  gun  practice.  For  half  an  hour  or  more  the  war 
ship  threw  solid  shot  and  explosive  shells  into  that  illumi 
nated  strip  of  green  water,  and  the  thunder  of  her  cannon, 
which  could  be  heard  all  over  the  island,  suggested  to  the 
startled  negro  and  Cuban  population  that  the  Spanish  fleet 
had  arrived  and  was  bombarding  the  city.  Then  the  Mmn- 
tonomoh  hung  out  another  string  of  colored  lanterns,  the  up 
roar  ceased,  and  the  pallid,  ghostly  canvas  of  the  Flying 
Dutchman  suddenly  vanished  as  the  search-lights  left  it  and 
resumed  their  slow,  sweeping  exploration  of  the  harbor,  the 
channel,  and  the  open  sea. 


CHAPTER   IV 

WAR  CORRESPONDENTS   AND   DESPATCH- 
BOATS 


things  impressed  me  more  forcibly,  in  the  course 
-J-'  of  my  two  weeks'  stay  at  Key  West,  than  the  costly, 
far-sighted,  and  far-reaching  preparations  made  by  the  great 
newspapers  of  the  country  to  report  the  war.  There  were 
in  the  city  of  Tampa,  at  the  time  of  my  arrival,  nearly  one 
hundred  war  correspondents,  who  represented  papers  in  all 
parts  of  the  United  States,  from  New  England  to  the  Pacific  • 
coast,  and  who  were  all  expecting  to  go  to  Cuba  with  the 
army  of  invasion.  Nearly  every  one  of  the  leading  metro 
politan  journals  had  in  Tampa  and  Key  West  a  staff  of  six 
or  eight  of  its  best  men  under  the  direction  of  a  war-cor- 
respondent-in-chief,  while  the  Associated  Press  was  repre 
sented  by  a  dozen  or  more  reporters  in  Cuban  waters,  as  well 
as  by  correspondents  in  Havana,  Key  West,  Tampa,  Kings 
ton,  St.  Thomas,  Port-au-Prince,  and  on  the  flagships  of  Ad 
miral  Sampson  and  Commodore  Schley.  Every  invention  and 
device  of  applied  science  was  brought  into  requisition  to 
facilitate  the  work  of  the  reporters  and  to  enable  them  to 
get  their  work  quickly  to  their  home  offices.  The  New  York 
"  Herald,"  for  example,  paid  fifty  dollars  an  hour  for  a  special 
leased  wire  between  New  York  and  Key  West,  and  set  up, 

35 


36  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

in  the  latter  place  and  in  Tampa,  newly  invented,  long-dis 
tance  phototelegraph  instruments,  by  means  of  which  its  ar 
tist  in  the  field  could  transmit  a  finished  picture  to  the  home 
office  every  twenty  minutes. 

In  their  efforts  to  get  full  and  accurate  news  of  every 
event  at  the  earliest  possible  moment,  the  war  correspon 
dents  shrank  from  neither  hardship  nor  danger.  A  week  or 
two  before  my  arrival  in  Key  West,  for  example,  Mr.  Scovel, 
one  of  the  most  daring  and  enterprising  of  the  war  corre 
spondents,  landed  from  a  despatch-boat  on  the  coast  of  Cuba 
in  the  night,  with  the  intention  of  making  his  way  to  the 
camp  of  General  Gomez.  As  he  had  not  had  a  previous 
understanding  with  the  latter,  no  arrangements  had  been 
made  to  meet  him,  he  could  get  no  horses,  and,  with  only 
two  or  three  companions,  he  walked  eighty  miles  through 
tropical  forests  and  swamps,  dodging  Spanish  sentinels  and 
guerrillas,  living  wholly  upon  plantains  and  roots,  and  sleep 
ing  most  of  the  time  out  of  doors  in  a  hammock  slung  be 
tween  two  trees.  He  finally  succeeded  in  obtaining  horses, 
reached  the  insurgent  camp,  had  an  interview  with  General 
Gomez,  rode  back  to  the  coast  at  a  point  previously  agreed 
upon,  signaled  to  his  despatch-boat,  was  taken  on  board,  and 
returned  safely  to  Key  West  after  an  absence  of  two  weeks, 
in  the  course  of  which  he  had  not  once  tasted  bread  nor 
slept  in  a  bed. 

Upon  the  record  of  such  an  achievement  as  this  most  men 
would  have  been  satisfied,  for  a  time,  to  rest;  but  Mr.  Scovel, 
with  untiring  energy,  went  from  Key  West  to  the  coast  of 
Cuba  and  back  three  times  in  the  next  seven  days.  On  the 
last  of  these  expeditions  he  joined  a  landing  force  carrying 
arms  and  ammunition  to  the  insurgents,  participated  in  a 
hot  skirmish  with  the  Spanish  troops,  wrote  an  account  of 
the  adventure  that  same  night  while  at  sea  in  a  small,  toss 
ing  boat  on  his  way  back  to  Key  West,  and  filed  six  thousand 


CORRESPONDENTS  AND  DESPATCH-BOATS     37 

words  in  the  Key  West  cable-station  at  two  o'clock  in  the 
morning. 

I  speak  of  this  particular  case  of  journalistic  enterprise, 
not  because  it  is  especially  noteworthy  or  exceptional,  but 
because  it  illustrates  the  endurance  and  the  capacity  for  sus 
tained  toil  in  unfavorable  circumstances,  which  are  quite  as 
characteristic  of  the  modern  war  correspondent  as  are  his 
courage  and  his  alert  readiness  for  any  emergency  or  any 
opportunity. 

Owing  to  the  distance  of  the  seat  of  war  from  the 
American  coast  and  the  absence  of  telegraphic  commu 
nication  between  Cuba  and  the  mainland,  newspapers  that 
made  any  serious  attempt  to  get  quick  and  exclusive  infor 
mation  from  the  front  had  not  only  to  send  correspondents 
into  the  field,  but  to  furnish  them  with  means  of  moving 
rapidly  from  place  to  place  and  of  forwarding  their  des 
patches  promptly  to  an  American  telegraph  office  or  a  West 
Indian  cable-station.  Every  prominent  New  York  paper, 
therefore,  had  at  least  one  despatch-boat  for  the  use  of  its 
correspondents,  several  of  them  had  two  or  three,  and  the 
Associated  Press  employed  four.  These  boats  were  either 
powerful  sea-going  tugs  like  the  Hercules  and  the  Premier, 
or  swift  steam-yachts  of  the  class  represented  by  the  Wanda, 
the  Kanapaha,  and  the  Bucaneer.  Exactly  how  many  of  them 
there  were  in  West  Indian  waters  I  have  been  unable  to  as 
certain;  but  I  should  say  not  less  than  fifteen  or  twenty, 
with  almost  an  equal  number  of  naphtha-  and  steam-launches 
for  harbor  and  smooth-water  work.  In  these  despatch-boats 
the  war  correspondents  went  back  and  forth  between  Key 
West  and  Cuba;  watched  the  operations  of  the  blockading 
fleet  off  Havana,  Matanzas,  or  Cardenas;  cruised  along  a 
coast-line  nearly  a  thousand  miles  in  extent,  and,  if  neces 
sary,  went  with  Admiral  Sampson's  squadron  to  a  point  of 
attack  as  remote  as  Santiago  de  Cuba  or  San  Juan  de  Porto 


38  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

Rico.  Whenever  anything  of  importance  happened  in  any 
part  of  this  wide  area,  they  were  expected  to  be  on  the  spot 
to  observe  it,  and  then  to  get  the  earliest  news  of  it  to  the 
nearest  cable-station— whether  that  station  were  Kingston, 
Cape  Haitien,  St.  Thomas,  Port-au-Prince,  or  Key  West. 
All  of  the  newspaper  despatch-boats  were  small,  many  of 
them  had  very  limited  coal-carrying  capacity,  and  some  were 
nothing  but  sea-going  tugs,  with  hardly  any  comforts  or  con 
veniences,  and  with  no  suitable  accommodations  for  passen 
gers.  The  correspondents  who  used  these  boats  were,  there 
fore,  compelled  to  live  a  rough-and-tumble  life,  sometimes 
sleeping  in  their  clothes  on  benches  or  on  the  floor  in  a  small, 
stuffy  cabin,  and  always  suffering  the  hardships  and  priva 
tions  necessarily  involved  in  a  long  cruise  on  a  small  vessel 
in  a  tropical  climate  and  on  a  turbulent  sea.  The  Florida 
Strait  between  Key  West  and  the  north  Cuban  coast  is  as 
uncomfortable  a  piece  of  water  to  cruise  on  as  can  be  found 
in  the  tropics.  It  is  the  place  where  the  swiftly  running  Gulf 
Stream  meets  the  fresh  northeast  trade-winds;  and  in  the 
conflict  between  these  opposing  terrestrial  forces  there  is 
raised  a  high  and  at  the  same  time  short,  choppy,  and  irregu 
lar  sea,  on  which  small  vessels  toss,  roll,  and  pitch  about  like 
corks  in  a  boiling  caldron.  I  was  told  by  some  of  the  corre 
spondents  who  had  cruised  in  these  waters  that  often,  for 
days  at  a  time,  it  was  almost  impossible  to  get  any  really 
refreshing  rest  or  sleep.  The  large  and  heavy  war-ships  of 
the  blockading  fleet  rode  this  sea,  of  course,  with  compara 
tively  little  motion;  but  it  is  reported  that  even  Captain 
Sigsbee  was  threatened  with  seasickness  while  crossing  the 
strait  between  Havana  and  Key  West  in  a  small  boat. 

Discomfort,  however,  was  perhaps  the  least  of  the  war 
correspondent's  troubles.  He  expected  discomfort,  and  ac 
cepted  it  philosophically;  but  to  it  was  added  constant  and 
harassing  anxiety.  As  he  could  not  predict  or  anticipate 


CORRESPONDENTS  AND  DESPATCH-BOATS    39 

the  movements  of  the  war-ships,  and  had  no  clue  to  the 
plans  and  intentions  of  their  commanding  officer,  he  was 
compelled  to  stay  constantly  with  the  fleet,  night  and  day, 
in  order  to  be  on  the  scene  of  action  when  action  should 
come.  This  part  of  his  duty  was  not  only  difficult,  but  often 
extremely  hazardous.  As  soon  as  night  fell,  every  light  on 
the  war-ships  was  extinguished,  and  they  cruised  or  drifted 
about  until  daybreak  in  silence  and  in  darkness.  Owing  to 
their  color,  it  was  almost  impossible  to  follow  them,  or  even 
to  see  them  at  a  distance  of  a  mile,  and  the  correspondent 
on  the  despatch-boat  was  liable  either  to  lose  them  alto 
gether  if  he  kept  too  far  away,  or  be  fired  upon  if  he  came 
too  near. 

On  my  visit  to  the  flagship  New  York  I  was  accompanied 
by  Mr.  Chamberlain,  one  of  the  war  correspondents  of  the 
Chicago  "  Record."  Just  before  we  went  over  the  side  of 
the  ship  on  our  return  to  the  "Record's"  despatch-boat, 
Mr.  Chamberlain  said  to  Admiral  Sampson:  "Can  you  give 
me  any  directions  or  instructions,  admiral,  with  regard  to 
approaching  your  fleet  in  hostile  waters?  I  don't  want  to 
be  in  your  way  or  to  do  anything  that  would  imperil  my  own 
vessel  or  inconvenience  yours." 

"Where  do  you  propose  to  go?"  inquired  the  admiral. 

"Anywhere,"  replied  the  war  correspondent,  "or  rather 
everywhere,  that  you  do." 

The  admiral  smiled  dryly  and  said:  "I  can't  give  you  any 
definite  instructions  except,  generally,  to  keep  away  from 
the  fleet— especially  at  night.  You  may  approach  and  hail 
us  in  the  daytime  if  you  have  occasion  to  do  so,  but  if  you 
come  within  five  miles  of  the  fleet  at  night  there  is  likely 
to  be  trouble." 

This  was  all  that  Mr.  Chamberlain  could  get  from  the 
admiral;  but  the  officer  of  the  deck,  whose  name  I  did  not 
learn,  had  no  hesitation  in  explaining  fully  to  us  the  nature 


40  CAMPAIGNING  IN   CUBA 

of  the  "trouble"  that  would  ensue  if,  through  design  or 
inadvertence,  a  newspaper  despatch-boat  should  get  within 
five  miles  of  the  fleet  at  night.  "  We  can't  afford  to  take 
any  chances,"  he  said,  "  of  torpedo-boats.  If  you  show  up 
at  night  in  the  neighborhood  of  this  ship,  we  shall  fire  on 
you  first  and  ask  questions  afterward." 

"But  how  are  we  to  know  where  you  are?"  inquired  the 
correspondent. 

"That  's  your  business,"  replied  the  officer;  "but  if  you 
approach  us  at  night,  you  do  it  at  your  own  peril." 

When  we  had  returned  to  the  despatch-boat,  Mr.  Cham 
berlain  said  to  me:  "Of  course  that  's  all  right  from  their 
point  of  view0  I  appreciate  their  situation,  and  if  I  were  in 
their  places  I  should  doubtless  act  precisely  as  they  do;  but 
it  's  my  business  to  watch  that  fleet,  and  I  can't  do  it  if  I 
keep  five  miles  away  at  night.  I  think  I  '11  go  within  two 
miles  and  take  the  chances.  Some  of  us  will  probably  lose 
the  numbers  of  our  mess  down  here,"  he  added  coolly,  "if 
this  thing  lasts,  but  I  don't  see  how  it  can  be  helped." 

The  difficulty  of  keeping  five  miles  away,  or  any  specified 
distance  away,  from  a  blockading  fleet  of  war-ships  at  night 
can  be  fully  realized  only  by  those  who  have  experienced  it. 
Except  on  Morro  Castle  at  Havana  there  were  no  lights  on 
the  northern  coast  of  Cuba;  if  it  was  cloudy  and  there  hap 
pened  to  be  no  moon,  the  darkness  was  impenetrable;  the 
war-ships  did  not  allow  even  so  much  as  the  glimmer  of  a 
binnacle  lamp  to  escape  from  their  lead-colored,  almost  in 
visible  hulls,  as  they  cruised  noiselessly  back  and  forth;  and 
the  correspondent  on  the  despatch-boat  not  only  did  not 
know  where  they  were,  but  had  no  means  whatever  of  ascer 
taining  where  he  himself  was.  Meanwhile,  at  any  moment, 
there  might  come  out  of  the  impenetrable  darkness  ahead 
the  thunder  of  a  six-pounder  gun,  followed  by  the  blinding 
glare  of  a  search-light.  Unquestionably  the  correspondents 


CORRESPONDENTS  AND  DESPATCH-BOATS     41 

were  to  be  believed  when  they  said  privately  to  one  another 
that  it  was  nervous,  harassing  work. 

But  the  list  of  difficulties  and  embarrassments  which  con 
fronted  the  correspondent  in  his  quest  of  news  is  not  yet  at 
an  end.  If  he  escaped  the  danger  of  being  sunk  or  disabled 
by  a  shell  or  a  solid  projectile  at  night,  and  succeeded  in 
following  a  fleet  like  that  of  Admiral  Sampson,  he  had  to 
take  into  serious  consideration  the  question  of  coal.  Fuel 
is  quite  as  essential  to  a  despatch-boat  as  to  a  battle 
ship.  The  commander  of  the  battle-ship,  however,  had  a 
great  advantage  over  the  correspondent  on  the  despatch- 
boat,  for  the  reason  that  he  always  knew  exactly  where  he 
was  going  and  where  he  could  recoal;  while  the  unfortunate 
newspaper  man  was  ignorant  of  his  own  destination,  was 
compelled  to  follow  the  fleet  blindly,  and  did  not  know 
whether  his  limited  supply  of  coal  would  last  to  the  end  of 
the  cruise  or  not.  When  Mr.  Chamberlain  sailed  from  Key 
West  at  night  with  the  fleet  of  Admiral  Sampson,  he  believed 
that  the  latter  was  bound  for  Santiago,  on  the  southeastern 
coast  of  Cuba.  The  Hercules  could  not  possibly  carry  coal 
enough  for  a  voyage  there  and  back;  in  fact,  she  would  reach 
that  port  with  only  one  day's  supply  of  fuel  in  her  bunkers. 
What  should  be  done  then?  The  nearest  available  source 
of  coal-supply  would  be  Kingston,  Jamaica,  and  whether  he 
could  get  there  from  Santiago  before  his  fuel  should  be 
wholly  exhausted  Mr.  Chamberlain  did  not  know.  However, 
he  was  ready,  like  Ladislaw  in  " Middlemarch,"  to  "place 
himself  in  an  attitude  of  receptivity  toward  all  sublime 
chances,"  and  away  he  went.  Nothing  can  be  more  exas 
perating  to  a  war  correspondent  than  to  have  a  fight  take 
place  while  he  is  absent  from  the  scene  of  action  looking 
for  coal;  but  many  newspaper  men  in  Cuban  waters  had 
that  unpleasant  and  humiliating  experience. 

The  life  of  the  war  correspondent  who  landed,  or  at- 


42  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

tempted  to  land,  on  the  island  of  Cuba,  in  the  early  weeks 
of  the  war,  was  not  so  wearing  and  harassing,  perhaps,  as 
the  life  of  the  men  on  the  despatch-boats,  but  it  was  quite 
as  full  of  risk.  After  the  1st  of  May  the  patrol  of  the 
Cuban  coast  by  the  Spanish  troops  between  Havana  and  Car 
denas  became  so  careful  and  thorough  that  a  safe  lai.ding 
could  hardly  be  made  there  even  at  night.  Jones  and  Thrall 
were  both  captured  before  they  could  open  communications 
with  the  insurgents;  and  the  English  correspondents,  Whig- 
ham  and  Robinson,  who  followed  their  example,  met  the 
same  fate.  Even  Mr.  Knight,  the  war  correspondent  of  the 
London  "  Times,"  who  landed  from  a  small  boat  in  the  har 
bor  of  Havana  with  the  express  permission  of  the  govern 
ment  at  Madrid  and  under  a  guaranty  of  protection,  was 
seized  and  thrown  into  Cabanas  fortress. 

If  a  war  correspondent  succeeded  in  making  a  safe  land 
ing  and  in  joining  the  insurgents,  he  had  still  to  suffer 
many  hardships  and  run  many  risks.  Mr.  Archibald,  the 
correspondent  of  a  San  Francisco  paper,  was  wounded  on 
the  Cuban  coast  early  in  May,  in  a  fight  resulting  from  an 
attempt  to  land  arms  and  ammunition  for  the  insurgents; 
and  a  correspondent  of  the  Chicago  "Record"  was  killed 
after  he  had  actually  succeeded  in  reaching  General  Gomez's 
camp.  He  was  sitting  on  his  horse,  at  the  summit  of  a  little 
hill,  with  Gomez  and  the  latter's  chief  of  staff,  watching  a 
skirmish  which  was  taking  place  at  a  distance  of  a  quarter 
of  a  mile  or  more,  between  a  detachment  of  insurgents  and 
a  column  of  Spanish  troops.  One  of  the  few  sharp-shooters 
in  the  enemy's  army  got  the  range  of  the  little  group  on 
the  hill,  and  almost  the  first  ball  which  he  sent  in  that  direc 
tion  struck  the  "  Record  "  correspondent  in  the  forehead  be 
tween  and  just  above  the  eyes.  As  he  reeled  in  the  saddle 
Gomez's  chief  of  staff  sprang  to  catch  him  and  break  his 
fall.  The  next  Mauser  bullet  from  the  hidden  marksman 


CORRESPONDENTS  AND  DESPATCH-BOATS    43 

pierced  the  pommel  of  the  saddle  that  the  staff-officer  had 
just  vacated;  and  the  third  shot  killed  Gomez's  horse.  The 
general  and  his  aide  then  hastily  escaped  from  the  dan 
gerous  position,  carrying  the  "  Record  "  correspondent  with 
them;  but  he  was  dead.  In  the  first  two  months  of  the 
war  the  corps  of  field  correspondents,  in  proportion  to  its 
numerical  strength,  lost  almost  as  many  men  from  death  and 
casualty  as  did  the  army  and  navy  of  the  United  States. 
The  letters  and  telegrams  which  they  wrote  on  their  knees, 
in  the  saddle,  and  on  the  rocking,  swaying  cabin  tables  of 
despatch-boats  while  hurrying  to  West  Indian  cable-stations 
were  not  always  models  of  English  composition,  nor  were 
they  always  precisely  accurate;  but  if  the  patrons  of  their 
respective  papers  had  been  placed  in  the  field  and  compelled 
to  write  under  similar  conditions,  they  would  be  surprised, 
perhaps,  not  at  the  occasional  imperfection  of  the  corre 
spondents'  work,  but  at  the  fact  that  in  so  unfavorable 
and  discouraging  an  environment  good  work  could  be  done 
at  all. 


CHAPTER  V 
OFF  FOR  SANTIAGO 

THE  most  important  event  in  the  early  history  of  the 
war,  and  the  event  that  controlled  the  movements  of 
the  Red  Cross  steamer  State  of  Texas,  as  well  as  the  move 
ments  of  General  Shafter's  army,  was  the  arrival  of  the 
Spanish  fleet  of  cruisers  and  torpedo-boats  at  Santiago  de 
Cuba  on  May  19.  There  had  been  skirmishes  and  bombard 
ments  before  that  time,  at  Matanzas,  Cardenas,  and  various 
other  points  on  the  Cuban  coast;  but  none  of  them  had  any 
strategic  importance,  or  any  particular  bearing  upon  the 
course  or  the  conduct  of  the  war.  It  was  the  appearance 
of  Admiral  Cervera  at  Santiago  which  determined  the  field 
of  action,  and,  to  some  extent,  the  plan  of  campaign.  The 
invasion  of  eastern  Cuba  had  already  been  under  considera 
tion,  and  when  the  Spanish  fleet  took  refuge  in  Santiago 
harbor  the  President  and  his  counselors  decided,  definitely 
and  finally,  to  begin  operations  at  that  end  of  the  island,  and 
to  leave  the  western  provinces  unmolested  until  fall.  The 
regular  army,  it  was  thought,  would  be  strong  enough,  with 
the  aid  and  cooperation  of  Admiral  Sampson's  fleet,  to  re 
duce  the  defenses  of  Santiago,  and  the  volunteers  might  be 
left  in  camp  at  Chickamauga,  Tampa,  and  Jacksonville,  to 
get  in  training  for  an  attack  upon  Havana  at  the  end  of  the 
rainy  season. 

The  preparations  for  the  invasion  of  Cuba  seemed,  at  that 

44 


OFF   FOR   SANTIAGO  45 

time,  to  be  nearly,  if  not  quite,  complete.  The  whole  regular 
army,  consisting  of  seven  regiments  of  cavalry,  twenty-two 
regiments  of  infantry,  and  fourteen  batteries  of  artillery,  had 
been  mobilized  and  transported  to  the  Gulf  coast;  the  quar 
termaster's  department  had,  under  charter,  twenty-seven 
steamers,  with  a  carrying  capacity  of  about  twenty  thousand 
men ;  immense  quantities  of  food  and  munitions  of  war  had 
been  bought  and  sent  to  Tampa,  and  there  seemed  to  be  no 
good  reason  why  General  Shafter's  command  should  not  em 
bark  for  Cuba,  if  necessary,  at  twenty-four  hours'  notice. 

On  May  26,  just  a  week  after  the  appearance  of  Admiral 
Cervera  and  his  fleet  at  Santiago,  the  President  held  a  con 
sultation  at  the  Executive  Mansion  with  the  Secretary  of 
War,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and  the  members  of  the 
Board  of  Strategy,  and  decided  to  begin  the  invasion  of 
Cuba  at  once.  Orders  were  presumably  sent  to  General 
Shafter  to  prepare  for  an  immediate  movement,  and  Secre 
tary  Long  telegraphed  Admiral  Sampson  as  follows: 

WASHINGTON,  May  27,  1898. 
Sampson,  Care  Naval  Base,  Key  West : 

If  Spanish  division  is  proved  to  be  at  Santiago,  it  is  the  intention 
of  the  department  to  make  a  descent  immediately  upon  that  port 
with  ten  thousand  United  States  troops,  landing  about  eight  nauti 
cal  miles  east  of  the  port.  You  will  be  expected  to  convoy  trans 
ports.  .  .  .  [Signed]  LONG. 

Three  days  later  General  Shafter  was  directed,  in  the  follow 
ing  order,  to  embark  his  command  and  proceed  at  once  to 
Santiago: 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  WASHINGTON,  May  30,  1898. 
Major-General  William  R.  Shafter,  Tampa,  Florida: 

With  the  approval  of  the  Secretary  of  War  you  are  directed  to 
take  your  command  on  transports,  proceed  under  convoy  of  the  navy 
to  the  vicinity  of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  land  your  force  at  such  place 
east  or  west  of  that  point  as  your  judgment  may  dictate,  under  the 


46  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

protection  of  the  navy,  and  move  it  on  to  the  high  ground  and  bluffs 
overlooking  the  harbor,  or  into  the  interior,  as  shall  best  enable  you 
to  capture  or  destroy  the  garrison  there  and  cover  the  navy  as  it 
sends  its  men  in  small  boats  to  remove  torpedoes,  or,  with  the  aid  of 
the  navy,  capture  or  destroy  the  Spanish  fleet  now  reported  to  be  in 
Santiago  harbor. 

You  will  use  the  utmost  energy  to  accomplish  this  enterprise,  and 
the  government  relies  upon  your  good  judgment  as  to  the  most 
judicious  use  of  your  command,  but  desires  to  impress  upon  you  the 
importance  of  accomplishing  this  object  with  the  least  possible 
delay.  .  .  .  [Signed]  H.  C.  CORBIN, 

Adjutant-General. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  General  Shafter  had  been  nearly 
a  month  at  Tampa,  and  of  the  further  fact  that  his  command 
was  composed  wholly,  or  almost  wholly,  of  regular  troops, 
who  were  completely  equipped  for  service  when  they  left 
their  stations,  he  should  have  been  able,  it  seems  to  me,  to 
comply  with  this  order  at  once;  but,  apparently,  he  was  not 
ready.  Day  after  day  passed  without  any  noticeable  change 
in  the  situation,  and  on  June  7  the  army  at  Tampa  was 
apparently  no  nearer  an  advance  than  it  had  been  when 
Cervera's  fleet  entered  Santiago  harbor  on  May  19. 

Admiral  Sampson,  who  was  anxious  to  strike  a  decisive 
blow  before  the  enemy  should  have  time  to  concentrate  and 
intrench,  then  telegraphed  Secretary  Long  as  follows: 

MOLE,  HAITI,  June  7,  1898. 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

Bombarded  forts  at  Santiago  7: 30  A.  M.  to  10  A.  M.  to-day,  June  6. 
Have  silenced  works  quickly  without  injury  of  any  kind,  though 
stationary  within  two  thousand  yards.  If  ten  thousand  men  were 
here 1  city  and  fleet  would  be  ours  within  forty-eight  hours.  Every 
consideration  demands  immediate  army  movement.  If  delayed  city 
will  be  defended  more  strongly  by  guns  taken  from  fleet. 

[Signed]  SAMPSON. 

1  Referring  to  the  ten  thousand  men  spoken  of  in  the  secretary's  telegram 
of  May  27. 


OFF   FOR   SANTIAGO  47 

When  this  despatch  reached  Washington,  the  Secretary 
of  War  sent  General  Shafter  two  peremptory  telegrams,  as 
follows: 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  June  7. 
Major-General  Shafter,  Port  Tampa,  Florida: 

You  will  sail  immediately,  as  you  are  needed  at  destination  at  once. 
Answer.  [Signed]  R.  A.  ALGER, 

Secretary  of  War. 

EXECUTIVE  MANSION,  WASHINGTON, 

June  7,  1898,  8: 50  P.M. 
Major-General  Shafter,  Port  Tampa,  Florida: 

Since  telegraphing  you  an  hour  since,  the  President  directs  you 
to  sail  at  once  with  what  force  you  have  ready. 

[Signed]  R.  A.  ALGER, 

Secretary  of  War. 

Upon  receipt  of  these  "rush"  orders,  General  Shafter 
hastily  embarked  his  army,  amid  great  confusion  and  dis 
order,  and  telegraphed  the  Secretary  of  War  that  he  would 
be  ready  to  sail,  with  about  seventeen  thousand  officers  and 
men,  on  the  morning  of  June  8.  Before  the  expedition 
could  get  away,  however,  Commodore  Remey  cabled  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  from  Key  West  that  two  Spanish 
war-ships— an  armored  cruiser  and  a  torpedo-boat  destroyer 
—had  been  seen  in  Nicholas  Channel,  off  the  northern  coast 
of  Cuba,  on  the  night  of  June  7,  by  Lieutenant  W.  H.  H. 
Southerland  of  the  United  States  gunboat  Eagle.  Fearing 
that  these  Spanish  vessels  would  intercept  the  fleet  of  trans 
ports  and  perhaps  destroy  some  of  them,  Secretary  Alger 
telegraphed  General  Shafter  not  to  leave  Tampa  Bay  until 
he  should  receive  further  orders. 

Scouting-vessels  of  the  navy,  which  were  promptly  sent 
to  Nicholas  Channel  in  search  of  the  enemy,  failed  to  locate 
or  discover  the  two  war-ships  reported  by  the  commander  of 


48  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

the  Eagle,  and  on  June  14  General  Shafter's  army,  after 
having  been  held  a  week  on  board  the  transports  in  Tampa 
Bay,  sailed  for  Santiago  by  way  of  Cape  Maysi  and  the 
Windward  Passage.  The  Spanish  fleet  under  command  of 
Admiral  Cervera  had  then  been  in  Santiago  harbor  almost 
four  weeks. 

It  is  hard  to  say  exactly  where  the  responsibility  should 
lie  for  the  long  delay  in  the  embarkation  and  despatch  of 
General  Shafter's  expedition.  When  I  passed  through 
Tampa  on  my  way  south  in  June,  the  two  railroad  com 
panies  there  were  blaming  each  other,  as  well  as  the  quar 
termaster's  department,  for  the  existing  blockade  of  unloaded 
cars,  while  army  officers  declared  that  the  railroad  com 
panies  were  unable  to  handle  promptly  and  satisfactorily  the 
large  quantity  of  supplies  brought  there  for  the  expedition. 
Naval  authorities  said  that  they  had  to  wait  for  the  army, 
while  army  officers  maintained  that  they  were  all  ready  to 
start,  but  were  stopped  and  delayed  by  reports  of  Spanish 
war-ships  brought  in  by  scouting-vessels  of  the  navy. 

That  there  was  unnecessary  delay,  as  well  as  great  con 
fusion  and  disorder,  there  seems  to  be  no  doubt.  As  one 
competent  army  officer  said  to  me,  in  terse  but  slangy  Eng 
lish,  "The  fact  of  the  matter  is,  they  simply  got  all  balled 
up,  and  although  they  worked  hard,  they  worked  without 
any  definite,  well-understood  plan  of  operations." 

The  principal  trouble  seemed  to  be  in  the  commissary  and 
quartermaster's  departments.  Many  of  the  officers  in  these 
departments  were  young  and  inexperienced;  army  supplies 
from  the  North  came  down  in  immense  quantities  on  two 
lines  of  railway  and  without  proper  invoices  or  bills  of  lading; 
it  was  often  utterly  impossible  to  ascertain  in  which,  out  of 
a  hundred  cars,  certain  articles  of  equipment  or  subsistence 
were  to  be  found;  and  there  was  a  lack  everywhere  of  cool, 
trained,  experienced  supervision  and  direction.  It  was  the 


OFF   FOR   SANTIAGO  49 

business  of  some  one  somewhere  to  see  that  every  car-load  of 
supplies  shipped  to  Tampa  was  accompanied  by  an  invoice 
or  bill  of  lading,  so  that  the  chief  commissary  at  the  point  of 
destination  might  know  the  exact  nature,  quantity,  and  car- 
location  of  supplies  brought  by  every  train.  Then,  if  he 
wanted  twenty-five  thousand  rations  of  hard  bread  or  fifty 
thousand  pounds  of  rice  before  the  cars  had  been  unloaded, 
he  would  know  exactly  where  and  in  what  cars  to  look  for  it. 
As  it  was,  he  could  not  tell,  often,  what  car  contained  it 
without  making  or  ordering  personal  examination,  and  it  was 
almost  impossible  to  know  how  much  of  any  given  commodity 
he  had  on  hand  in  trains  that  had  not  yet  been  unloaded  or 
inspected.  As  the  result  of  this  he  had  to  telegraph  to 
Jacksonville  at  the  last  moment  before  the  departure  of  the 
expedition  for  three  or  four  hundred  cases  of  baked  beans 
and  forty  or  fifty  thousand  pounds  of  rice  to  be  bought  there 
in  open  market  and  to  be  sent  him  in  "  rush  shipment."  It 
is  more  than  probable  that  there  were  beans  and  rice  enough 
to  meet  all  his  wants  in  unloaded  trains  at  Tampa,  but  he 
had  no  clue  to  their  car-location  and  could  not  find  them. 
Such  a  state  of  things,  of  course,  is  wholly  unnecessary, 
and  it  should  not  occur  a  second  time.  To  take  another 
example: 

When  our  army  embarked  at  Port  Tampa  it  was  the  busi 
ness  of  some  officer  somewhere  to  know  the  exact  capacity  of 
every  transport  and  the  numerical  strength  of  every  regi 
ment.  Then  it  was  some  one's  business  to  prearrange  the 
distribution  of  troops  by  assigning  one  or  more  designated 
regiments  to  one  or  more  designated  steamers  and  giving 
necessary  orders  to  the  colonels.  As  it  was,  however,  accord 
ing  to  the  testimony  of  every  witness,  a  train-load  of  troops 
would  come  to  the  docks  at  Port  Tampa,  apparently  without 
orders  or  assignment  to  any  particular  steamer,  and  while 
they  were  waiting  to  learn  what  they  should  do,  and  while 


50  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

their  train  was  still  blocking  the  way,  another  train-load  of 
soldiers  would  arrive  in  a  similar  state  of  ignorance  and  add 
to  the  disorder  and  confusion.  As  a  natural  consequence, 
men  got  on  wrong  steamers  and  had  to  be  unloaded,  and 
often,  after  transports  had  moved  out  into  the  bay,  parts  of 
companies  and  regiments  had  to  be  transferred  in  small 
boats  from  one  vessel  to  another.  These  are  examples  of 
what  seems  to  have  been  bad  management.  In  another 
class  of  cases  the  trouble  was  apparently  due  to  mistaken 
judgment.  To  the  latter  class  belongs  the  loading  and 
treatment  of  horses  and  mules.  It  would  have  been  much 
better  and  safer,  I  think,  to  load  these  animals  on  vessels 
especially  prepared  for  and  exclusively  devoted  to  them  than 
to  put  them  into  stifling  and  unventilated  holds  of  steamers 
that  also  carried  troops.  If,  however,  this  was  impracticable, 
it  was  manifestly  best  to  load  the  animals  last,  so  as  to  expose 
them  for  as  short  a  time  as  possible  to  such  murderous  con 
ditions.  The  mules,  however,  were  loaded  first,  and  held  in 
the  holds  of  the  transports  while  troops  were  embarking. 
They  began  to  die  from  heat  and  suffocation,  and  then  they 
were  unloaded  and  reshipped  after  the  troops  were  on  board. 
This  caused  unnecessary  delay,  as  well  as  the  loss  of  many 
valuable  animals.  Eighteen  perished,  I  am  told,  on  one 
transport  while  the  troops  were  embarking. 

These  cases  of  disorder  and  bad  judgment  are  only  a  few 
out  of  many  which  were  the  subject  of  common  talk  among 
officers  and  civilians  in  Tampa.  I  could  specify  many  others, 
but  criticism  is  at  best  unpleasant  duty,  and  the  only  justi 
fication  for  it  is  the  hope  that,  if  mistakes  and  disorders  are 
pointed  out  and  frankly  recognized,  they  may  be  guarded 
against  in  future. 

The  army  of  invasion,  when  it  finally  left  Tampa  Bay  for 
the  Cuban  coast,  consisted  of  803  officers  and  14,935  enlisted 


OFF  FOR  SANTIAGO  51 

men.1  With  its  animals  and  equipment  it  filled  thirty-five 
transports.  It  comprised  (in  addition  to  regular  infantry) 
four  batteries  of  light  field-artillery,  two  batteries  of  heavy 
siege-guns,  a  battalion  of  engineers,  a  detachment  of  the 
Signal  Corps,  twelve  squadrons  of  dismounted  cavalry,  and 
one  squadron  of  cavalry  with  horses.  All  of  the  troops  were 
regulars  with  the  exception  of  three  regiments,  namely,  the 
First  Cavalry  (Rough  Riders,  dismounted),  the  Seventy-first 
New  York,  and  the  Second  Massachusetts.  The  command 
was  well  supplied  with  food  and  ammunition,  but  its  facilities 
for  land  transportation  were  inadequate;  its  equipment,  in 
the  shape  of  clothing  and  tentage,  was  not  adapted  to  a 
tropical  climate  in  the  rainy  season;  it  carried  no  reserve 
medical  stores,  and  it  had  no  small  boats  suitable  for  use  in 
disembarkation  or  in  landing  supplies  on  an  unsheltered 
coast.  Some  of  these  deficiencies  in  equipment  were  due, 
apparently,  to  lack  of  prevision,  others  to  lack  of  experience 
in  tropical  campaigning,  and  the  rest  to  lack  of  water  trans 
portation  from  Tampa  to  the  Cuban  coast;  but  all  were  as 
unnecessary  as  they  afterward  proved  to  be  unfortunate. 

When  the  army  of  invasion  sailed,  the  Red  Cross  steamer 
State  of  Texas,  laden  with  fourteen  hundred  tons  of  food  and 
medical  supplies,  lay  at  anchor  in  Tampa  Bay,  awaiting  the 
return  of  Miss  Barton  and  a  part  of  her  staff  from  Wash 
ington.  As  soon  as  they  arrived,  the  steamer  proceeded  to 
Key  West,  and  on  the  morning  of  Monday,  June  20,  after  a 
brief  consultation  with  Commodore  Remey,  we  sailed  from 
that  port  for  Santiago  de  Cuba.  In  the  group  assembled  on 
the  pier  to  bid  us  good-by  were  United  States  Marshal  Horr; 

1  Report  of  General  Miles  ("Army  and  Navy  Register,"  November  12, 
p.  311).  General  Shafter  reported  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  September  13, 
that  he  sailed  from  Tampa  with  815  officers  and  16,072  men.  General  Miles 
is  probably  right. 


52  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

Mr.  Hyatt,  chairman  of  the  local  Red  Cross  committee;  Mr. 
White,  correspondent  of  the  Chicago  "  Record,"  whose  wife 
was  going  with  us  as  a  Red  Cross  worker;  and  Mrs.  Porter,  wife 
of  the  President's  secretary,  who  had  come  with  Miss  Barton 
from  Washington  to  Key  West  in  order  to  show  her  interest 
in  and  sympathy  with  the  work  in  which  the  Red  Cross  is 
engaged.  About  ten  o'clock  the  steamer's  lines  were  cast  off, 
the  gang-plank  was  drawn  ashore,  the  screw  began  to  churn 
the  green  water  into  boiling  foam  astern,  and,  amid  shouted 
good-bys  and  the  waving  of  handkerchiefs  from  the  pier,  we 
moved  slowly  out  into  the  stream,  dipped  our  ensign  to  the 
Lancaster,  Commodore  Remey's  flagship,  and  proceeded  down 
the  bay  in  the  direction  of  Sand  Key  light. 


CHAPTER  VI 
THE   CUBAN   COAST 

THE  course  usually  taken  by  steamers  from  Key  West 
to  Santiago  lies  along  the  northern  coast  of  Cuba, 
through  the  Nicholas  and  Old  Bahama  channels,  to  Cape 
Maysi,  and  thence  around  the  eastern  end  of  the  island  by 
the  Windward  Passage.  Inasmuch,  however,  as  we  were 
going  without  a  convoy,  and  Commodore  Remey  had  advised 
us  to  keep  out  of  sight  of  land,  in  order  to  avoid  possible 
interception  by  a  Spanish  gunboat  from  some  unblockaded 
port  on  the  coast,  we  decided  to  go  around  the  western  end 
of  the  island,  doubling  Cape  San  Antonio,  and  then  proceed 
ing  eastward  past  the  Isle  of  Pines  to  Cape  Cruz  and  San 
tiago.  Tuesday  afternoon  we  saw  the  high  mountains  in  the 
province  of  Pinar  del  Rio  looming  up  faintly  through  the 
haze  at  a  distance  of  twenty-five  or  thirty  miles,  and  late 
that  same  evening  we  passed  the  flash-light  at  the  extremity 
of  Cape  San  Antonio  and  turned  eastward  toward  Cape  Cruz 
and  Santiago.  After  rounding  the  western  end  of  the  island 
we  had  a  succession  of  thunder-storms  and  rain-squalls,  with 
a  strong  easterly  breeze  and  a  heavy  head  sea;  but  Thursday 
night  the  weather  moderated,  and  at  half-past  six  o'clock 
Friday  morning  we  sighted  Cape  Cruz  rising  out  of  the  dark 
water  ahead  in  a  long,  transverse  stretch  of  flat  table-land, 

53 


54  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

backed  by  mountains  and  terminating  on  the  sea  in  a  high, 
steep  bluff. 

The  coast  of  Cuba  between  Cape  Cruz  and  Santiago  is 
formed  by  a  striking  and  beautiful  range  of  mountains,  known 
to  the  Spaniards  as  the  "  Sierra  Maestra,"  or  "  Master  Range," 
which  extends  eastward  and  westward  for  more  than  a  hun 
dred  miles  and  contains  some  of  the  highest  peaks  to  be 
found  on  the  island.  As  seen  from  the  water  its  furrowed 
slopes  and  flanks  are  deceptively  foreshortened,  so  that  they 
appear  to  fall  with  extraordinary  steepness  and  abruptness 
to  the  sea;  its  rocky,  wave-worn  base  is  whitened  by  a  long 
line  of  snowy  breakers;  its  deep,  wild  ravines  are  filled  with 
soft  blue  summer  haze;  and  down  from  the  clouds  which 
shroud  its  higher  peaks  tumble  in  white,  tortuous  streaks 
the  foaming  waters  of  unnamed  and  almost  unknown  moun 
tain  torrents.  As  one  sails,  at  a  distance  of  two  or  three 
miles,  along  this  wild,  beautiful  coast,  the  picture  presented 
by  the  fringe  of  feathery  palms  over  the  white  line  of  surf, 
the  steep  slopes  of  the  foot-hills,  shaggy  with  dark-green 
tropical  vegetation,  and  the  higher  peaks  broken  in  places 
by  cliffs  or  rocky  escarpments  and  rising  into  the  region  of 
summer  clouds,  is  one  hardly  to  be  surpassed,  I  think,  in  the 
tropics.  The  average  height  of  this  range  is  three  or  four 
thousand  feet;  but  in  many  places  it  is  much  greater  than 
this,  and  the  summit  of  the  peak  of  Turquino,  about  midway 
between  Cape  Cruz  and  Santiago,  is  eighty-four  hundred 
feet  above  the  level  of  the  sea. 

Our  captain  thought  that  we  should  be  off  the  entrance  to 
Santiago  harbor  about  three  o'clock  Saturday  morning,  and 
at  half-past  three  I  was  on  the  bridge.  There  was  not  a 
sign,  as  yet,  of  dawn,  and  although  I  could  make  out  faintly 
the  loom  of  high  land  to  the  northward,  it  was  so  dark  on 
the  water  that  nothing  could  be  distinguished  at  a  distance 
of  five  hundred  yards,  and  in  the  absence  of  all  lights  on  the 


THE   CUBAN   COAST  55 

coast  it  was  almost  impossible  to  determine  our  exact  posi 
tion.  Somewhere  ahead  of  us,— or  perhaps  around  us,— in 
the  impenetrable  gloom,  were  twelve  or  fifteen  ships  of  war; 
but  they  were  cruising  about  in  silence  and  darkness,  and 
the  first  evidence  that  we  should  probably  have  of  their 
proximity  would  be  the  glare  of  a  search-light  and  the 
thunder  of  a  gun.  About  four  o'clock  the  lookout  forward 
shouted  to  the  captain,  "  Vessel  on  the  port  bow,  sir,"  and  a 
large,  dark  object  stole  silently  out  toward  us  from  under 
the  shadow  of  the  land.  I  took  it,  at  first,  for  a  gunboat; 
but  it  proved  to  be  the  transport  Santiago,  which  had  not 
yet  disembarked  her  troops  and  was  cruising  aimlessly  back 
and  forth,  as  we  were,  waiting  for  daylight. 

At  a  quarter  past  four  the  sky  in  the  east  began  to  grow 
lighter,  and  as  the  hidden  sun  climbed  swiftly  to  the  horizon 
the  world  about  us  began  to  assume  form  and  color.  Almost 
directly  in  front  of  us  were  two  fine  groups  of  high,  forest- 
clad  mountains,  separated  by  an  interval  of  perhaps  ten  or 
fifteen  miles.  In  this  gap  and  nearer  the  sea  was  a  long 
stretch  of  lower,  but  still  high,  table-land,  which  extended 
from  one  group  of  mountains  to  the  other  and  seemed  to 
form  the  outer  rampart  of  the  coast.  About  the  middle  of 
this  rocky,  flat-topped  rampart  there  was  a  deep,  narrow 
notch,  on  the  eastern  side  of  which  I  could  see  with  a  glass 
a  huge  grayish-stone  building,  elevated  a  little  above  the 
level  of  the  table-land  on  one  side  and  extending  down  the 
steep  declivity  of  the  notch  in  a  series  of  titanic  steps  on 
the  other.  I  hardly  needed  to  be  informed  that  the  notch 
was  the  entrance  to  the  harbor  of  Santiago,  and  that  the 
grayish-stone  building  was  Morro  Castle.  Between  us  and 
the  land,  in  a  huge,  bow-shaped  curve,  lay  the  war-ships  of 
the  blockading  fleet,  with  Commodore  Schley's  flagship,  the 
Brooklyn,  at  one  end,  Admiral  Sampson's  flagship,  the  New 
York,  at  the  other,  and  the  battle-ships  Texas,  Indiana, 


56  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

Iowa,  Massachusetts,  and  half  a  dozen  gunboats  and  cruisers 
lying  at  intervals  between.  The  convex  side  of  the  crescent 
was  nearest  to  Morro  Castle,  and  in  this  part  of  the  curve 
were  the  battle-ships  Texas,  Indiana,  and  Iowa,  with  the 
small  gunboat  Suwanee  thrown  out  as  scout  or  skirmisher 
in  the  position  that  the  head  of  the  arrow  would  occupy  if 
the  line  of  the  blockading  vessels  were  a  bent  bow  eight 
miles  long. 

We  steamed  directly  in  toward  the  entrance  to  the  harbor, 
without  being  stopped  or  questioned,  and  took  a  position  in 
front  of  Morro  Castle,  about  one  thousand  yards  south  of  the 
battle-ship  Indiana.  From  this  point  of  view,  with  the  aid 
of  a  good  glass,  we  could  make  out  quite  distinctly  the  out 
lines  of  the  castle,  and  were  a  little  disappointed  to  see  still 
floating  over  it  the  red-and-yellow  banner  of  Spain.  We  had 
had  no  news  for  more  than  a  week,  and  thought  it  possible 
that  both  the  castle  and  the  city  were  in  the  possession 
of  General  Shafter's  army. 

The  entrance  to  the  Bay  of  Santiago  appears,  from  a 
distance  of  three  or  four  miles,  to  be  a  narrow  cleft  or  notch 
in  the  high,  flat-topped  rampart  which  forms  the  coast-line. 
On  account  of  an  eastward  curve  in  the  channel  just  be 
yond  Morro  Castle,  one  cannot  look  through  the  notch 
into  the  upper  harbor.  At  a  distance  of  a  quarter  of  a  mile 
from  the  entrance,  the  line  of  vision  strikes  against  a  steep 
hill,  which  forms  one  side  of  the  curving,  fiord-like  passage 
leading  to  the  city.  Owing  to  the  great  depth  of  water 
off  the  entrance  to  the  bay,  it  is  impossible  for  vessels  to 
anchor  there,  and  the  ships  of  the  blockading  fleet  simply 
drifted  back  and  forth  with  the  winds  and  tides,  getting 
under  way  occasionally,  when  it  became  necessary  to  change 
position. 

After  breakfast  I  went  off  in  a  boat  to  the  flagship  New 
York,  called  upon  Admiral  Sampson,  and  obtained  from  him 


THE   CUBAN  COAST  57 

a  brief  account  of  all  that  had  happened  off  that  coast  since 
the  1st  of  May. 

Admiral  Cervera,  with  a  fleet  of  seven  Spanish  war-ships, 
left  the  Cape  Verde  Islands  for  West  Indian  waters  on  the 
29th  of  April.  On  the  13th  of  May  he  was  reported  at  the 
French  port  of  St.  Pierre,  Martinique,  and  from  there  he 
sailed  to  Curasao,  an  island  off  the  coast  of  Venezuela,  nearly 
due  south  of  Haiti.  From  Curagao  it  was  thought  he  would 
be  likely  to  go  either  to  Cienfuegos  or  Havana;  and  on  the 
19th  of  May  Commodore  Schley,  with  the  Flying  Squadron, 
was  sent  to  watch  the  former  port,  while  Admiral  Sampson, 
who  had  just  returned  from  Porto  Rico,  resumed  the  blockade 
of  Havana.  Cervera,  however,  did  not  go  to  either  place. 
Leaving  Curagao  on  the  16th,  he  crossed  the  Caribbean  Sea, 
and  at  daybreak  on  the  morning  of  Thursday,  May  19,  he 
entered  the  harbor  of  Santiago  de  Cuba  for  the  purpose  of 
obtaining  a  fresh  supply  of  coal.  His  fleet  then  consisted 
of  the  second-class  battle-ship  Cristobal  Colon,  the  armored 
cruisers  Vizcaya,  Almirante  Oquendo,  and  Maria  Teresa, 
and  the  torpedo-boat  destroyers  Furor  and  Pluton.  What 
he  expected  to  do,  after  coaling  his  vessels,  does  not  clearly 
appear;  but  certain  of  his  Spanish  friends  in  the  United 
States  have  recently  published  what  seems  to  be  an  autho 
rized  statement,  in  which  they  set  forth  his  views  as  follows: 

Admiral  Cervera  did  not  enter  Santiago  harbor  with  any 
intention  of  remaining  there,  or  of  seeking  refuge  from  the 
pursuit  of  the  American  fleets.  His  object  was  merely  to 
make  some  slight  repairs  to  his  vessels,  obtain  a  fresh  supply 
of  coal,  and  then  run  out  to  sea.  As  a  result  of  interference 
from  Havana,  however,  he  was  prevented  from  carrying  out 
his  plans.  No  sooner  had  he  reported  his  arrival  in  Santiago 
than  "  Captain-General  Blanco  communicated  with  Spain  and 
asked  the  Minister  of  Marine  to  place  Admiral  Cervera  and 
his  fleet  under  his  (Blanco's)  orders.  Blanco  then  ordered 


58  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

Cervera  to  remain  in  Santiago  and  assist  in  the  defense  of 
the  shore  batteries.  Admiral  Cervera  protested  strongly 
against  this,  and  appealed  to  Spain;  but  it  is  doubtful 
whether  his  appeal  ever  reached  the  government.  He 
asked  to  be  allowed  to  coal  up  and  then  leave  Santiago, 
where  he  might  be  free  to  meet  the  American  fleet,  rather 
than  to  be  bottled  up  in  a  blockaded  harbor.  He  contended 
that  he  could  not  possibly  be  useful  to  Spain  by  remaining 
in  Santiago  harbor,  with  the  certainty  of  American  ships 
coming  to  keep  him  there,  whereas,  outside  and  free,  his 
strong  fleet  could  be  of  great  value  to  the  Spanish  cause. 
The  answer  of  General  Blanco  was  that  Admiral  Cervera 
was  now  subject  to  his  orders;  that  he,  and  not  Admiral 
Cervera,  was  in  command  of  affairs  in  Cuba,  and  that  the 
admiral  must  obey  his  command.  Cervera  could  then  do 
nothing." 

If  this  semi-official  statement  of  Admiral  Cervera's  case  is 
an  accurate  one,  the  Santiago  campaign,  which  ended  in  the 
destruction  of  Cervera's  fleet  and  the  capture  of  the  city, 
was  the  direct  result  of  General  Blanco's  interference.  The 
Spanish  admiral  had  plenty  of  time  to  coal  his  vessels  and 
make  his  escape  before  either  of  our  fleets  reached  the 
mouth  of  the  harbor,  and  if  he  had  done  so  there  might 
have  been  no  Santiago  campaign,  and  the  whole  course  of 
the  war  might  have  been  changed.  But  the  opportunity 
soon  passed. 

On  the  20th  of  May  the  news  of  Cervera's  appearance  at 
Santiago  was  reported  to  the  Navy  Department  in  Washing 
ton,  and  Secretary  Long  immediately  cabled  it  to  Admiral 
Sampson  by  way  of  Key  West.  On  the  following  day,  May 
21,  Sampson  sent  the  Marblehead  to  the  southern  coast  of 
Cuba  with  an  order  directing  Commodore  Schley  to  pro 
ceed  at  once  to  Santiago  unless  he  had  good  reason  to 
believe  that  the  Spanish  fleet  was  really  in  Cienfuegos. 


THE   CUBAN   COAST  59 

When  this  order  reached  Schley,  on  the  23d  of  May,  he  felt 
sure  that  he  had  Cervera  "  bottled  up  "  in  Cienf uegos  harbor, 
and  he  did  not  become  aware  of  his  error  until  the  25th. 
He  then  proceeded  with  his  fleet  to  Santiago,  but  did  not 
reach  there  until  the  26th.  Cervera  had  then  had  a  whole 
week  in  which  to  coal  his  vessels  and  make  his  escape. 
That  he  fully  intended  to  do  this  seems  to  be  evident  from 
the  statement  of  Mr.  Frederick  W.  Ramsden,  British  consul 
at  Santiago,  whose  recently  published  diary  contains  the 
following  entry,  under  date  of  May  23:  "The  Spanish  fleet 
is  taking  in  coal,  water,  and  provisions  in  a  hurry,  and  it  is 
evident  that  it  is  preparing  to  go  to  sea,  probably  to-night  or 
in  the  morning,  as  I  hear  the  pilots  have  been  ordered  for 
this  evening." 

If  Cervera  had  gone  to  sea  on  the  evening  of  May  23,  or 
the  morning  of  the  24th,  as  was  plainly  his  intention,  he 
would  have  made  his  escape  without  the  slightest  difficulty, 
because  Admiral  Sampson  was  then  cruising  off  Havana, 
while  Schley  was  still  blockading  Cienfuegos.  What  would 
have  been  the  course  of  the  war  in  that  event,  it  is  impossi 
ble  to  say;  but  General  Shafter  would  certainly  have  been 
held  at  Tampa  until  the  Spanish  fleet  had  been  overtaken 
and  destroyed,  and  then,  very  likely,  the  army  of  invasion 
would  have  landed  at  some  point  nearer  to  Havana. 
Admiral  Cervera,  however,  for  some  reason  not  yet  posi 
tively  known,  remained  in  Santiago  a  whole  week,  and  at  the 
expiration  of  that  time  it  is  doubtful  whether  he  could  have 
made  his  escape,  even  had  he  wished  to  do  so,  because  Com 
modore  Schley,  with  the  Flying  Squadron,  was  off  the 
entrance  to  the  harbor.  Six  days  later,  when  Schley's 
squadron  was  reinforced  by  the  powerful  fleet  of  Admiral 
Sampson,  Cervera's  last  chance  of  escape  vanished,  and  there 
was  nothing  left  for  him  to  do  but  assist  the  forts  and  the 
garrison  to  defend  the  city  to  the  last,  or  make  a  desperate 


60  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

and  almost  hopeless  attempt  to  break  through  the  line  of  the 
blockading  fleet. 

Late  in  May,  while  Admiral  Sampson  was  still  cruising  off 
Havana,  he  sent  an  order,  by  the  captain  of  the  New  Orleans, 
to  Commodore  Schley,  directing  the  latter  to  "use  the  collier 
Sterling  to  obstruct  the  [Santiago]  channel  at  its  narrowest 
part  leading  into  the  harbor,"  so  as  to  make  the  escape  of 
the  Spanish  fleet  absolutely  impossible.  "  I  believe,"  he  said, 
"  that  it  would  be  perfectly  practicable  to  steam  this  vessel 
into  position,  drop  all  her  anchors,  allow  her  to  swing  across 
the  channel,  and  then  sink  her,  either  by  opening  the  valves, 
or  whatever  means  may  be  best." 

Commodore  Schley,  for  some  reason,  did  not  obey  this 
order;  but  as  soon  as  Admiral  Sampson  reached  the  mouth 
of  Santiago  harbor,  he  proceeded  to  carry  out  the  plan  him 
self.  At  three  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  June  3,  Lieu 
tenant  R.  P.  Hobson,  with  a  volunteer  crew  of  seven  men, 
ran  the  steam-collier  Merrimac  into  the  mouth  of  the  harbor, 
under  a  heavy  fire  from  the  Spanish  batteries,  dropped  her 
anchors  in  mid-channel  between  Churruca  Point  and  Smith 
Cay,  opened  her  sea  connections,  exploded  a  number  of  tor 
pedoes  hung  along  her  sides  at  the  water-line,  and  when  she 
sank,  hung  on  to  a  raft  attached  by  a  rope  to  the  sunken 
vessel.  They  were  rescued  from  this  position  by  the  Span 
iards  and  thrown  into  Morro  Castle,  but  were  treated  with 
the  consideration  and  courtesy  to  which  their  gallantry  en 
titled  them.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day,  Admiral 
Cervera,  who  with  his  own  hand  had  dragged  Hobson  from 
the  water,  sent  his  chief  of  staff  out  to  the  New  York,  under 
a  flag  of  truce,  with  a  letter  to  Admiral  Sampson,  in  which 
he  informed  the  latter  that  the  lieutenant  and  his  men  were 
safe,  and  referred  in  terms  of  admiration  and  respect  to  their 
courage  and  devotion  to  duty. 

Unfortunately,— or  perhaps  fortunately,— the  object  for 


THE   CUBAN   COAST  61 

which  Lieutenant  Hobson  and  his  men  risked  their  lives 
was  not  attained.  The  Merrimac  failed  to  swing  around  so 
as  to  lie  transversely  across  the  channel,  but  sank  in  such  a 
way  as  to  place  her  hull  parallel  with  the  middle  of  it  and 
near  its  eastern  edge.  This  left  plenty  of  water  and  plenty 
of  room  for  vessels  to  pass  on  the  western,  or  Smith  Cay,v 
side.  Egress,  however,  although  still  possible,  was  extremely 
difficult  and  dangerous,  on  account  of  the  strictness  and 
closeness  of  the  blockade  which  was  established  when 
Admiral  Sampson  arrived  and  took  command  of  the  com 
bined  fleets.  The  battle-ships  and  larger  vessels,  which 
formed  the  outer  line  of  the  blockade,  were  disposed  in  a 
semicircle  around  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  at  a  distance  of 
four  or  five  miles,  with  the  flagship  New  York  at  one  end  of 
the  line  and  the  Brooklyn  at  the  other.  Inside  of  this  semi 
circle,  and  much  nearer  the  entrance,  were  stationed  two 
or  three  small  cruisers  or  gunboats,  whose  duty  it  was  to 
watch  the  mouth  of  the  harbor  incessantly  and  give  instant 
warning  of  the  appearance  of  any  hostile  vessel.  At  night, 
when  the  danger  from  the  Spanish  torpedo-boats  was  great 
est  and  when  Cervera's  fleet  was  most  likely  to  escape,  a 
powerful  and  piercing  search-light  was  held  constantly  on 
the  mouth  of  the  narrow  canon  between  Morro  and  Socapa; 
the  battle-ships  closed  in  so  as  to  diminish  the  radius  of  their 
semicircle  by  nearly  one  half;  the  cruisers  and  gunboats, 
under  cover  of  the  blinding  radiance  of  the  search-light, 
moved  a  mile  nearer  to  the  mouth  of  the  harbor;  and  three 
steam-launches  patrolled  the  coast  all  night  within  pistol- 
shot  of  the  enemy's  batteries.  In  the  face  of  such  a  block 
ade  it  was  virtually  impossible  for  Cervera  to  escape,  and 
almost  equally  impossible  for  his  torpedo-boats  to  come  out 
of  the  harbor  unobserved,  or  to  reach  any  of  our  larger 
vessels  even  if  they  should  venture  out.  Long  before  they 
could  get  across  the  mile  and  a  half  or  two  miles  of  water 


62  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

that  separated  the  harbor  entrance  from  the  nearest  battle 
ship,  they  would  be  riddled  with  projectiles  from  perhaps  a 
hundred  rapid-fire  guns.  Torpedo-boats,  however,  did  not 
play  an  important  part  on  either  side.  Our  own  were  pre 
vented  from  entering  the  harbor  by  a  strong  log  boom 
stretched  across  the  channel  just  north  of  the  Estrella  bat 
tery,  and  those  of  the  Spaniards  never  even  attempted  to 
make  an  aggressive  movement  in  the  period  covered  by 
the  blockade.  Admiral  Cervera  evidently  thought  that  the 
chance  of  accomplishing  anything  by  means  of  a  torpedo- 
boat  attack  was  too  remote  to  justify  the  risk. 

On  the  6th  of  June  Admiral  Sampson  bombarded  the 
shore  batteries  and  the  mouth  of  the  harbor  for  two  hours 
and  a  half,  destroying  a  number  of  houses  on  Smith  Cay, 
setting  fire  to  the  Spanish  cruiser  Reina  Mercedes,  which  was 
moored  near  the  end  of  the  Socapa  promontory,  and  killing 
or  wounding  twenty-five  or  thirty  officers  and  men  on  the 
cruiser,  in  the  batteries,  and  in  Morro  Castle.  The  earth 
work  batteries  east  and  west  of  the  entrance  did  not  prove 
to  be  very  formidable  and  were  quickly  silenced;  but  the 
submarine  mines  in  the  narrow  channel  leading  to  the  upper 
harbor,  which  prevented  our  fleet  from  forcing  an  entrance, 
could  not  be  removed  without  the  cooperation  of  a  land 
force.  All  that  Admiral  Sampson  could  do,  therefore,  was 
to  bombard  the  harbor  fortifications  now  and  then,  so  as  to 
prevent  further  work  on  them;  occupy  the  lower  part  of 
Guantanamo  Bay,  forty  miles  east  of  Santiago,  as  a  coaling- 
station;  and  urge  the  government  in  Washington,  by  tele 
graph,  to  send  the  army  forward  as  speedily  as  possible. 

The  fleet  of  transports  which  conveyed  General  Shafter's 
command  to  the  southern  coast  of  Cuba  arrived  off  the 
entrance  to  Santiago  harbor  at  midday  on  the  20th  of  June, 
after  a  tedious  and  uneventful  voyage  of  five  days  from  the 
Dry  Tortugas  around  the  eastern  end  of  the  island.  Gen- 


THE   CUBAN   COAST  63 

eral  Shafter  at  once  held  a  conference  with  Admiral  Samp 
son  and  with  the  Cuban  general  Garcia,  who  had  come  to 
the  coast  to  meet  the  fleet,  and,  after  considering  every  pos 
sible  line  of  attack,  decided  to  land  his  force  at  two  points, 
within  supporting  distance  of  each  other,  ten  or  fifteen 
miles  east  of  the  entrance  to  Santiago  harbor,  and  then 
march  toward  the  city  through  the  interior.  The  points 
selected  for  debarkation  were  Siboney,  a  small  village  about 
ten  miles  east  of  Morro  Castle,  and  Daiquiri,1  another  similar 
village  five  miles  farther  away,  which,  before  the  war,  was 
the  shipping-port  of  the  Spanish-American  Iron  Company. 
From  Daiquiri  there  was  a  rough  wagon-road  to  Siboney, 
and  the  latter  place  was  connected  with  Santiago  by  a  nar 
row-gage  railroad  along  the  coast  and  up  the  Aguadores 
ravine,  as  well  as  by  a  trail  or  wagon-road  over  the  foot 
hills  and  through  the  marshy,  jungle-skirted  valleys  of  the 
interior. 

When  we  reached  the  entrance  to  Santiago  harbor  in  the 
Red  Cross  steamer  State  of  Texas  on  the  25th  of  June,  the 
Fifth  Army-Corps— or  most  of  it— had  already  landed,  and 
was  marching  toward  Santiago  along  the  interior  road  by 
way  of  Guasimas  and  Sevilla.  The  landing  had  been  made, 
Admiral  Sampson  told  me,  without  the  least  opposition  from 
the  Spaniards,  but  there  had  been  a  fight,  on  the  day  before 
our  arrival,  between  General  Wheeler's  advance  and  a  body 
of  troops  supposed  to  be  the  rear-guard  of  the  retiring 
enemy,  at  a  place  called  Guasimas,  three  or  four  miles  from 
Siboney,  on  the  Santiago  road.  Details  of  the  fight,  he 
said,  had  not  been  received,  but  it  was  thought  to  be 
nothing  more  than  an  unimportant  skirmish. 

In  reply  to  my  question  whether  he  had  any  orders  for  us, 
or  any  suggestions  to  make  with  regard  to  our  movements, 

1  I  spell  this  word  as  it  is  spelled  by  the  officers  of  the  Spanish-American 
Iron  Company,  who  say  that  "  Daiquiri "  is  erroneous. 


64  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

he  said  that,  as  there  seemed  to  be  nothing  for  the  Red  Cross 
to  do  in  the  vicinity  of  Santiago,  he  should  advise  us  to  go 
to  Guantanamo  Bay,  where  Captain  McCalla  had  opened 
communications  with  the  insurgents  under  General  Perez, 
and  where  we  should  probably  find  Cuban  refugees  suffering 
for  food.  Acting  upon  this  suggestion,  we  got  under  way 
promptly,  steamed  into  the  little  cove  of  Siboney  to  take  a 
look  at  the  place  and  to  land  Mr.  Louis  Kempner  of  the 
Post-Office  Department,  whom  we  had  brought  from  Key 
West,  and  then  proceeded  eastward  to  Guantanamo  Bay. 


CHAPTER  VII 
THE   FIGHT  AT   GUANTANAMO 

AS  the  southeastern  coast  of  Cuba  is  high  and  bold,  with 
J__L  deep  water  extending  close  up  to  the  line  of  surf, 
vessels  going  back  and  forth  between  Santiago  and  Guan- 
tanamo  run  very  near  to  the  land;  and  the  ever-changing 
panorama  of  tropical  forest  and  cloud-capped  mountain 
which  presents  itself  to  the  eye  as  the  steamer  glides 
swiftly  past,  within  a  mile  of  the  rock-terraced  bluffs  and 
headlands,  is  a  constant  source  of  surprise  and  delight,  even 
to  the  most  experienced  voyager.  It  is  an  extremely  beau 
tiful  and  varied  coast.  In  the  foreground,  only  a  rifle-shot 
away  across  the  blue  undulating  floor  of  the  Caribbean,  rises 
a  long  terraced  mesa,  fronting  on  the  sea,  with  its  rocky 
base  in  a  white  smother  of  foaming  surf,  and  its  level  sum 
mit  half  hidden  by  a  drooping  fringe  of  dark-green  chaparral 
and  vines.  Over  the  cyclopean  wall  of  this  mesa  appear  the 
rounded  tops  of  higher  and  more  distant  foot-hills,  densely 
clad  in  robes  of  perennial  verdure,  while  beyond  and  above 
them  all,  at  a  distance  of  five  or  six  miles,  rise  the  aerial 
peaks  of  the  splendid  Sierra  del  Cobre,  with  a  few  summer 
clouds  drifting  across  their  higher  slopes  and  casting  soft 
violet  shadows  into  the  misty  blue  of  their  intervening 
valleys.  Here  and  there  the  terraced  mesa,  which  forms 
the  coast-line,  is  cut  into  picturesque  castle-like  bluffs  by  a 
5  65 


66  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

series  of  wedge-shaped  clefts,  or  notches,  and  through  the 
openings  thus  made  in  the  rocky  wall  one  may  catch  brief 
glimpses  of  deep,  wild  ravines  down  which  mountain  torrents 
from  the  higher  peaks  tumble  to  the  sea  under  the  dense 
concealing  shade  of  mango-  and  mimosa-trees,  vines,  flower 
ing  shrubs,  and  the  feathery  foliage  of  cocoanut  and  royal 
palms. 

Wild,  beautiful,  and  picturesque,  however,  as  the  coast 
appears  to  be,  not  a  sign  does  it  anywhere  show  of  a  bay,  an 
inlet,  or  a  safe  sheltered  harbor.  For  miles  together  the 
surf  breaks  almost  directly  against  the  base  of  the  terraced 
rampart  which  forms  the  coast-line,  and  even  where  streams 
have  cut  deep  V-shaped  notches  in  the  rocky  wall,  the  strips 
of  beach  formed  at  their  mouths  are  wholly  unsheltered 
and  afford  safe  places  of  landing  only  when  the  sea  is 
smooth  and  the  wind  at  rest.  Often,  for  days  at  a  time, 
they  are  lashed  by  a  heavy  and  dangerous  surf,  which  makes 
landing  upon  them  in  small  boats  extremely  difficult,  if  not 
absolutely  impracticable. 

About  thirty-five  miles  from  Santiago  harbor,  as  one  sails 
eastward,  the  wall-like  mesa  on  the  left  sinks  from  a  height 
of  two  or  three  hundred  feet  to  a  height  of  only  twenty  or 
thirty;  the  mountains  of  the  Sierra  del  Cobre  come  to  an 
end  or  recede  from  the  coast,  leaving  only  a  few  insignificant 
hills;  and  through  a  blue,  tremulous  heat-haze  one  looks  far 
inland  over  the  broad,  shallow  valley  of  the  Guantanamo 
River. 

We  entered  the  beautiful  Bay  of  Guantanamo  about  half- 
past  five  o'clock  on  Saturday  afternoon,  and  found  it  full 
of  war-ships  and  transports.  The  white  hospital  steamer 
Solace  lay  at  anchor  over  toward  the  western  side  of  the 
harbor,  and  between  her  and  the  eastern  shore  were  the 
Dolphin,  the  Eagle,  the  Resolute,  the  Marblehead,  and  three  or 
four  large  black  colliers  from  Key  West.  As  we  rounded 


THE   FIGHT  AT   GUANTANAMO  67 

the  long,  low  point  on  the  western  side  of  the  entrance  and 
steamed  slowly  into  the  spacious  bay,  a  small  steam-launch 
came  puffing  out  to  meet  us,  and,  as  soon  as  she  was  within 
hailing  distance,  an  officer  in  the  white  uniform  of  the  navy 
rose  in  the  stern-sheets,  put  his  hands  to  his  mouth,  and 
shouted:  "Captain  McCalla  presents  his  compliments  to  the 
captain  of  the  State  of  Texas,  and  requests  that  you  follow  me 
and  anchor  between  the  Marblehead  and  the  Haitian  cable- 
steamer." 

"  All  right,"  replied  Captain  Young,  from  the  bridge. 

"That  sounds  well,"  I  said  to  one  of  the  Red  Cross  men 
who  was  standing  near  me.  "  It  shows  that  things  are  not 
allowed  to  go  helter-skelter  here." 

We  followed  the  little  launch  into  the  harbor  and  dropped 
anchor  in  the  place  indicated,  which  was  about  one  hundred 
yards  from  shore  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  channel,  and 
just  opposite  the  intrenched  camp  of  Colonel  Huntington's 
marines.  I  was  impatient  to  land  and  see  the  place  where 
the  American  flag  had  first  been  raised  on  Cuban  soil;  but 
darkness  came  on  soon,  and  it  did  not  seem  worth  while  to 
leave  the  ship  that  night. 

After  breakfast  on  the  following  morning,  I  took  a  small 
boat  and  went  off  to  the  Marblehead  to  call  upon  Captain 
McCalla,  who  was  in  command  of  the  station.  I  had  made 
his  acquaintance  in  Washington,  when  he  was  one  of  the 
members  of  a  board  appointed  to  consider  means  of  sending 
relief  to  the  Greely  arctic  expedition;  but  I  had  not  seen  him 
in  many  years,  and  it  is  not  surprising,  perhaps,  that  I  almost 
failed  to  recognize  him  in  his  Cuban  costume.  The  morning 
was  hot  and  oppressive,  and  I  found  him  clad  in  what  was, 
in  the  strictest  sense  of  the  words,  an  undress  uniform, 
consisting  of  undershirt,  canvas  trousers,  and  an  old  pair  of 
slippers.  Like  the  sensible  man  I  knew  him  to  be,  he  made 
no  apology  for  his  dress,  but  welcomed  me  heartily  and  intro- 


63  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

duced  me  to  Captain  Philip  of  the  battle-ship  Texas,  who  had 
just  come  into  the  harbor  after  a  fresh  supply  of  coal.  As 
I  entered,  Captain  McCalla  was  telling  Captain  Philip,  with 
great  glee,  the  story  of  his  experience  off  the  Cuban  coast 
between  Morro  Castle  and  Aguadores,  when  his  vessel,  the 
Marbkhead,  was  suddenly  attacked  one  night  by  the  whole 
blockading  fleet. 

"  They  saw  a  railroad-train,"  he  said,  "  running  along  the 
water's  edge  toward  Siboney,  and  in  the  darkness  mistook  it 
for  a  Spanish  torpedo-boat.  The  train,  of  course,  soon  dis 
appeared;  but  I  happened  to  be  cruising  close  inshore,  just 
there,  as  it  passed,  and  they  all  turned  their  search-lights  on 
me  and  opened  fire." 

"All  except  the  Iowa"  corrected  Captain  Philip,  with  a 
smile. 

"Yes,  all  except  the  Iowa,"  assented  Captain  McCalla, 
laughing  heartily,  as  if  it  were  the  funniest  of  jokes. 
"Even  the  Texas  did  n't  show  me  any  mercy;  but  Bob 
Evans  knew  the  difference  between  a  railroad-train  and  a 
torpedo-boat,  and  did  n't  shoot.  I  told  him,  the  last  time  I 
saw  him,  that  he  was  clearly  entitled  to  take  a  crack  at  me. 
Every  other  ship  in  the  fleet  had  had  the  privilege,  and  it 
was  his  turn.  I  'm  the  only  man  in  the  navy,"  he  said,  with 
renewed  laughter,  "who  has  ever  sustained  the  fire  of  a 
whole  fleet  of  battle-ships  and  cruisers  and  got  away  alive." 

After  Captain  Philip  had  made  his  call  and  taken  his 
leave,  I  explained  to  Captain  McCalla  the  object  of  our  com 
ing  to  Guantanamo  Bay,  and  asked  whether  there  were  any 
Cuban  refugees  in  the  vicinity  who  needed  food  and  could  be 
reached.  He  replied  unhesitatingly  that  there  were.  He 
was  in  almost  daily  communication,  he  said,  with  General 
Perez,  an  insurgent  leader  who  was  then  besieging  Guan 
tanamo  city,  and  through  that  officer  he  thought  he  could 
send  food  to  a  large  number  of  people  who  had  taken  refuge 


THE   FIGHT   AT   GUANTANAMO  69 

in  the  woods  north  of  the  bay  and  were  in  a  destitute  and 
starving  condition.  He  had  already  sent  to  them  all  the 
food  he  himself  could  spare,  but  it  was  not  half  enough  to 
meet  their  wants.  With  characteristic  promptness  and 
energy  he  called  his  stenographer  and  dictated  a  letter  to 
General  Perez,  in  which  he  said  that  Miss  Clara  Barton, 
president  of  the  American  National  Red  Cross,  had  just 
reached  Guantanamo  Bay  in  the  steamer  State  of  Texas,  with 
fourteen  hundred  tons  of  food  intended  for  Cuban  recon- 
centrados,  and  asked  whether  he  (Perez)  could  furnish 
pack-animals  and  an  escort  for,  say,  five  thousand  rations,  if 
they  could  be  landed  on  the  western  side  of  the  lower  bay. 
This  letter  he  sent  to  General  Perez  by  a  special  courier 
from  the  detachment  of  Cubans  then  serving  with  the 
marines,  and  said  that  he  should  probably  receive  a  reply  in 
the  course  of  two  or  three  days.  As  nothing  more  could  be 
done  at  that  time,  I  returned  to  the  State  of  Texas,  reported 
progress  to  Miss  Barton,  and  then  went  on  shore  to  send  a 
telegram  to  Washington  by  the  Haitian  cable,  which  had 
just  been  recovered  and  repaired,  and  to  take  a  look  at  the 
camp  of  the  marines. 

When,  on  May  26,  Commodore  Schley,  with  the  Flying 
Squadron,  arrived  off  the  entrance  to  Santiago  harbor,  and 
began  the  blockade  of  that  port,  the  great  need  of  his 
vessels  was  a  safe  and  sheltered  coaling-station.  The  heavy 
swell  raised  along  the  southern  coast  of  Cuba  by  the  prevail 
ing  easterly  winds  makes  it  often  dangerous  and  always 
difficult  to  lay  a  collier  alongside  a  battle-ship  in  the  open 
sea  and  transfer  coal  from  one  to  the  other.  Understand 
ing  and  appreciating  this  difficulty,  Secretary  Long  tele 
graphed  Admiral  Sampson  on  May  28  to  consider  the 
question  whether  it  would  not  be  possible  to  "seize  Guan 
tanamo  and  occupy  it  as  a  coaling-station."  Sampson 
replied  that  he  thought  it  might  be  done,  and  immediately 


70  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

cabled  Commodore  Schley  off  Santiago  as  follows:  "Send  a 
ship  to  examine  Guantanamo  with  a  view  to  occupying  it  as 
a  base,  coaling  one  heavy  ship  at  a  time."  The  official 
correspondence  thus  far  published  does  not  show  whether 
Commodore  Schley  received  this  order  in  time  to  act  upon  it 
before  Sampson  arrived  or  not;  but  as  soon  as  the  latter 
came  he  caused  a  reconnaissance  of  Guantanamo  Bay  to  be 
made,  decided  that  the  lower  part  of  it  might  be  seized  by  a 
comparatively  small  land  force  if  protected  by  the  guns  of  a 
few  war-ships,  and  immediately  sent  to  Key  West  for  the 
first  battalion  of  marines,  which  was  the  only  available 
landing  force  at  his  command.  Meanwhile  the  auxiliary 
cruiser  Yankee  bombarded  and  burned  a  Spanish  blockhouse 
situated  on  a  hill  near  the  entrance  to  the  lower  harbor  of 
Guantanamo,  and  on  June  8  Captain  McCalla,  in  the  Marble- 
head,  seized  and  occupied— as  far  as  he  could  do  so  with 
out  a  landing  force— all  that  part  of  the  bay  which  lies  be 
tween  the  entrance  and  the  narrow  strait  leading  to  the 
fortified  post  of  Caimanera. 

The  marines,  under  command  of  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Huntington,  arrived  on  the  steamer  Panther,  Friday,  June 
10,  and  proceeded  at  once  to  disembark.  The  place  se 
lected  for  a  landing  was  a  low,  rounded,  bush-covered  hill 
on  the  right,  or  eastern,  side  of  the  bay,  about  a  quarter  of 
a  mile  from  the  entrance.  On  the  summit  of  this  hill  the 
Spaniards  had  made  a  little  clearing  in  the  chaparral  and 
erected  a  small  square  blockhouse;  but  inasmuch  as  this 
blockhouse  had  already  been  destroyed  and  its  garrison 
driven  to  the  woods  by  the  fire  of  the  Yankee,  all  that  the 
marines  had  to  do  was  to  occupy  the  abandoned  position  and 
again  fortify  the  hill.  In  some  respects  this  hill,  which  was 
about  one  hundred  and  fifty  feet  in  height,  made  a  strong 
and  easily  defended  position;  but,  unfortunately,  it  was  cov 
ered  nearly  to  the  summit  with  a  dense  growth  of  bushes 


THE   FIGHT  AT   GUANTANAMO  71 

and  scrub,  and  was  commanded  by  a  range  of  higher  hills  a 
little  farther  to  the  eastward.  The  enemy,  therefore,  could 
not  only  creep  close  up  to  the  camp  under  cover  of  the 
dense  chaparral,  but  could  fire  down  upon  it  from  the  higher 
slopes  of  the  wooded  range  which  runs  parallel  with  the  bay 
on  its  eastern  side. 

The  landing  was  made,  without  opposition,  about  two 
o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  Friday,  June  10.  Under  cover  of 
the  guns  of  the  war-ships,  the  marines  disembarked  on  the 
strip  of  beach  at  the  foot  of  the  hill;  burned  all  the  houses 
and  huts  left  by  the  Spaniards,  so  as  to  guard  against  the 
danger  of  infection  with  yellow  fever;  and  then  deployed  up 
the  hill,  pitched  their  shelter-tents  on  its  eastern  slope,  and 
spent  all  the  afternoon  and  a  large  part  of  the  next  day  in 
landing  ammunition  and  stores,  establishing  outposts,  and 
making  arrangements  for  a  permanent  camp. 

The  Spaniards,  who  must  have  been  watching  these 
operations  from  the  concealment  of  the  bushes  and  from  the 
slopes  of  the  adjacent  hills,  gave  no  sign,  at  first,  of  their 
presence;  but  seeing  that  the  marines  were  comparatively 
few  in  number,  they  finally  plucked  up  courage,  and  about 
five  o'clock  Saturday  afternoon  began  a  desultory,  skirmish 
ing  attack  which  lasted  the  greater  part  of  that  day  and 
night,  and,  indeed,  continued,  with  an  occasional  intermis 
sion,  for  three  or  four  days  and  nights.  Major  Cochrane, 
who  described  the  fight  to  me,  said  that  he  slept  only  an 
hour  and  a  half  in  four  days,  and  that  many  of  his  men 
became  so  exhausted  that  they  fell  asleep  standing  on  their 
feet  with  their  guns  in  their  hands. 

The  strength  of  the  marine  battalion  at  that  time  was 
between  five  and  six  hundred  men.  They  were  armed  with 
rifles  of  the  Lee  or  Lee-Metford  pattern,  and  had,  in  addi 
tion,  two  automatic  Colt  machine-guns  and  three  rapid-fire 
Hotchkiss  cannon  of  three-inch  caliber.  The  greatest  dis- 


72  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

advantage  under  which  they  labored  was  that  due  to  the 
tangled,  almost  impenetrable  nature  of  the  chaparral  that 
surrounded  the  camp,  and  the  facilities  which  it  afforded  the 
enemy  for  concealment  and  stealthy  approach.  The  gun 
boats  shelled  the  woods  from  time  to  time,  drove  the  hidden 
Spaniards  back,  and  silenced  their  fire;  but  as  soon  as  night 
fell  they  would  creep  silently  up  through  the  bushes  until 
they  were  so  near  to  the  camp  that  the  pickets  of  the 
marines  could  smell  the  smoke  of  their  cigarettes,  and  yet 
could  neither  see  them  nor  hear  them.  Then  the  nocturnal 
skirmishing  would  begin  again.  There  were  six  successive 
attacks  from  different  directions  on  the  night  of  the  llth, 
and  a  still  greater  number  on  the  night  of  the  12th,  with 
more  or  less  desultory  skirmishing  during  the  day,  so  that 
for  a  period  of  forty-eight  hours  the  gallant  marines  had  no 
rest  or  sleep  at  all. 

There  was  some  danger,  at  first,  that  the  enemy,  reinforced 
from  Caimanera  or  Guantanamo  city,  would  assemble  in 
force  on  the  slopes  of  the  eastern  hills,  creep  up  through  the 
scrub  until  they  were  within  a  short  distance  of  the  camp, 
and  then  overwhelm  the  marines  in  a  sudden  rush-assault. 
They  were  known  to  have  six  thousand  regulars  at  Guan 
tanamo  city,  only  about  fifteen  miles  away,  and  it  was  quite 
within  the  bounds  of  possibility  that  they  might  detach  a 
large  part  of  this  force  for  offensive  operations  on  the  east 
ern  side  of  the  lower  bay.  To  provide  for  this  contingency, 
and  to  strengthen  his  defensive  position,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Huntington  withdrew  his  men  from  the  eastern  slope  of 
the  hill,  where  they  had  first  been  stationed,  and  posted 
them  on  the  crest  and  upper  part  of  the  western  slope, 
where  they  would  be  nearer  the  fleet  and  better  protected  by 
its  guns.  At  the  same  time  our  small  force,  in  the  intervals 
of  fighting,  dug  a  trench  and  erected  a  barricade  around  the 
crest  of  the  hill  on  the  land  side,  so  as  to  enlarge  the  clear- 


THE   FIGHT   AT   GUANTANAMO  73 

ing,  give  more  play  to  the  automatic  and  rapid-fire  guns,  and 
make  it  more  difficult  for  the  enemy  to  approach  unseen. 
When  this  had  been  done,  there  was  little  probability  that  a 
rush-assault  would  succeed.  The  best  troops  in  the  world, 
unless  they  were  in  overwhelming  force,  could  hardly  hope 
to  cross  a  clearing  that  was  swept  by  the  fire  of  six  hundred 
rifles,  two  machine-guns,  and  three  Hotchkiss  cannon  hurling 
canister  or  shrapnel. 

In  the  course  of  the  first  three  days'  engagement  the 
marines  were  joined  by  eighty  or  a  hundred  Cuban  insurgents ; 
but  opinions  differ  as  to  the  value  of  the  latter's  cooperation. 
Some  officers  with  whom  I  talked  spoke  favorably  of  them, 
while  others  said  that  they  became  wildly  excited,  fired 
recklessly  and  at  random,  and  were  of  little  use  except  as 
guides  and  scouts.  Captain  Elliott,  who  saw  them  under 
fire,  reported  that  they  were  brave  enough,  but  that  their 
efficiency  as  fighting  men  was  on  a  par  with  that  of  the 
enemy;  while  Captain  McCalla  called  attention  officially  to 
their  devotion  to  freedom,  and  said  that  one  of  them,  who 
had  been  shot  through  the  heart,  died  on  the  field,  crying 
with  his  last  breath:  "Viva  Cuba  libre!" 

At  the  end  of  the  third  day's  fighting,  all  attacks  of  the 
Spaniards  having  been  repulsed,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hun- 
tington  determined  to  take  the  offensive  himself.  About  six 
miles  southeast  of  the  camp,  at  a  place  called  Cuzco,  there 
was  a  well  from  which  the  Spanish  troops  were  said  to  obtain 
all  their  drinking-water,  and  a  heliograph  signal-station  by 
means  of  which  they  maintained  communication  with  Cai- 
manera.  On  the  morning  of  June  14  Captain  Elliott,  with 
two  companies  of  marines  and  about  fifty  Cuban  volunteers, 
was  sent  to  attack  this  place,  drive  the  Spaniards  away,  and 
destroy  the  well  and  signal-station.  The  expeditionary 
force  engaged  the  enemy,  five  hundred  strong,  about  eleven 
o'clock  in  the  morning,  and  fought  with  them  until  three  in 


74  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

the  afternoon,  driving  them  from  their  position  and  inflicting 
upon  them  a  loss  of  sixty  men  killed  and  one  hundred  and 
fifty  wounded.  Then,  after  capturing  the  heliograph  outfit, 
burning  the  station,  and  filling  up  the  well,  the  heroic  little 
detachment  returned,  exhausted  but  triumphant,  to  its 
camp,  with  a  loss  of  only  two  men  killed,  six  wounded,  and 
twenty  or  thirty  overcome  by  heat. 

On  the  fourth  day  of  the  long  struggle  for  the  possession 
of  Guantanamo  Bay,  the  Spaniards  virtually  gave  up  the 
contest  and  abandoned  the  field.  A  few  guerrillas  still 
remained  in  the  chaparral,  firing  occasionally  at  long  range 
either  into  the  camp  or  at  the  vessels  of  the  fleet;  but, 
finally,  even  this  desultory,  long-range  target  practice 
ceased,  and  the  last  of  the  enemy  fled,  either  to  the  fort  at 
Caimanera  or  to  Guantanamo  city,  leaving  the  plucky 
marines  in  undisputed  control  of  the  whole  eastern  coast  of 
the  lower  bay.  Our  total  loss  in  the  series  of  engagements 
was  only  six  men  killed  and  twelve  or  fifteen  wounded;  but 
among  the  killed  was  the  lamented  Dr.  Gibbs,  acting  assis 
tant  surgeon,  United  States  navy,  who  was  shot  at  one 
o'clock  on  the  night  of  the  llth. 

After  the  four  days  of  fighting  were  over,  Captain 
McCalla,  with  the  Marblehead,  the  auxiliary  cruiser  St. 
Louis,  and  the  battle-ship  Texas,  steamed  up  the  bay  to  the 
little  village  of  Caimanera,  demolished  the  fort  there  with  a 
few  well-directed  shots,  and  drove  the  garrison  back  into  the 
woods.  In  the  course  of  this  expedition  the  Marblehead  and 
the  Texas  ran  into  a  number  of  submarine  contact  mines,  or 
fouled  them  with  their  screws;  but,  fortunately,  none  of 
them  exploded.  The  firing-pins  had  becomo  so  incrusted 
with  barnacles  and  other  marine  growths  during  their  long 
immersion  that  the  force  of  the  blow  when  the  ships  struck 
them  did  not  drive  them  in  far  enough  to  explode  the 
charges.  When  we  reached  Guantanamo  in  the  State  of 


THE   FIGHT  AT   GUANTANAMO  75 

Texas,  Captain  McCalla's  boats  and  launches  had  thoroughly 
explored  and  dragged  the  lower  bay,  and  had  taken  out 
safely  no  less  than  thirteen  contact  mines,  each  containing 
about  one  hundred  pounds  of  guncotton.  The  upper  bay  was 
still  in  the  possession  of  the  Spaniards;  but  its  control  was 
not  a  matter  of  any  particular  importance.  What  Admiral 
Sampson  wanted  was  a  safe  and  sheltered  coaling-  and 
repairing-station  for  the  vessels  of  his  fleet,  and  this  he 
obtained  when  his  war-ships  and  marines,  after  four  days  of 
almost  incessant  fighting,  drove  the  Spanish  troops  from  the 
whole  eastern  coast  of  the  lower  bay. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
THE   LANDING   AND    ADVANCE    OF   THE    ARMY 

"TpARLY  Sunday  morning,  at  the  little  zinc-walled  tele- 
I  'J  graph  office  under  the  camp  of  the  marines  at  Guanta- 
namo,  I  happened  to  meet  two  war  correspondents— one  of 
them,  if  I  remember  rightly,  Mr.  Howard  of  the  New  York 
"  Journal  "—who  had  just  come  from  the  front  with  a  detailed 
account  of  the  fight  at  Guasimas.  This  light,  they  said,  was  not 
a  mere  insignificant  skirmish,  as  Admiral  Sampson  supposed 
when  I  saw  him  on  Saturday,  but  a  serious  battle,  in  which  a 
part  of  General  Wheeler's  division  was  engaged,  for  several 
hours,  with  a  force  of  Spanish  regulars  estimated  at  two  or 
three  thousand  men.  More  than  one  hundred  officers  and 
men  on  our  side  had  been  killed  or  wounded,  among  them 
Captain  Capron  and  Sergeant  Hamilton  Fish,  both  of  whom 
were  dead.  The  wounded,  Mr.  Howard  said,  had  been 
brought  back  to  Siboney  and  put  into  one  of  the  abandoned 
Spanish  houses  on  the  beach,  where,  only  the  night  before, 
he  had  seen  them  lying,  in  their  blood-stained  clothing,  on 
the  dirty  floor,  without  blankets  or  pillows,  and  without  any 
thing  that  seemed  to  him  like  adequate  attendance  or  care. 
At  my  request  the  two  correspondents  went  on  board  the 
State  of  Texas  and  repeated  their  statement  to  Miss  Barton, 
who,  after  consultation  with  the  officers  of  her  staff,  decided 
to  take  the  steamer  back  at  once  to  Siboney.  We  could  do 

76 


LANDING  AND  ADVANCE  OF  THE  ARMY  77 

nothing  more  at  Guantanamo  until  General  Perez  should 
furnish  transportation  and  an  escort  for  the  food  that  we 
intended  to  send  to  the  refugees  north  of  the  bay,  and, 
meanwhile,  we  might,  perhaps,  render  some  service  to  the 
wounded  soldiers  of  General  Wheeler's  command  whom  Mr. 
Howard  had  seen  lying,  without  blankets  or  pillows,  on  the 
floor.  We  had  on  board  the  State  of  Texas,  at  that  time,  one 
hundred  or  more  cots,  with  plenty  of  bedding,  and  if  the 
medical  officers  of  the  army  could  not  get  hospital  supplies 
ashore,  we  thought  that  we  could.  At  any  rate,  we  would 
try.  Calling  again  upon  Captain  McCalla,  I  explained  to 
him  the  reasons  for  our  sudden  change  of  plan,  and  told  him 
that,  although  we  had  decided  to  go  to  Siboney,  we  should 
try  to  get  back  in  time  to  meet  the  pack-train  and  escort  to 
be  furnished  by  General  Perez.  I  then  returned  to  the 
State  of  Texas,  and  we  sailed  for  Siboney  at  two  o'clock. 

In  order  to  follow  intelligently  the  course  of  the  Santiago 
campaign,  and  to  understand  and  appreciate  the  difficulties 
with  which  the  medical  department  of  the  army  had  to  con 
tend,  one  must  know  something  of  the  coast  upon  which  that 
army  landed  and  the  nature  of  the  environment  by  which  it 
was  surrounded.  The  southeastern  coast  of  Cuba,  between 
the  entrance  to  Santiago  harbor  and  the  Bay  of  Guantanamo, 
is  formed  by  three  parallel  ranges  of  hills  and  mountains 
which  may  be  roughly  characterized  as  follows:  first,  what  I 
shall  call  the  rampart— a  high,  flat-topped  ridge,  or  narrow 
table,  very  steep  on  the  sea  side,  and  broken  into  long  ter 
races  by  outcropping  ledges  of  limestone;  second,  the  foot 
hills,  which  rise  out  of  a  wooded  valley  or  valleys  behind  the 
rampart;  and,  third,  the  high  mountains  of  the  coast,  or 
Sierra  del  Cobre,  range,  which  lie  back  of  the  foot-hills,  at  a 
distance  of  five  or  six  miles  from  the  sea.  This  is  not  a 
strictly  accurate  topographical  description  of  the  coast,  but 
it  is  roughly  and  generally  true  and  will  answer  my  purpose. 


78  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

In  the  vicinity  of  Santiago  the  rampart,  or  mesa-like  eleva 
tion  which  borders  the  sea,  has  a  height  of  two  or  three 
hundred  feet,  and  stretches  eastward  and  westward,  like  a 
stone  wall,  for  a  distance  of  nearly  twenty  miles.  At  three 
points  it  is  cut  down  to  the  sea-level  in  narrow,  V-shaped 
clefts,  or  notches,  which  have  a  width  at  the  bottom  of  from 
seventy-five  to  two  hundred  yards,  and  which  serve  as  out 
lets  for  three  small  streams.  The  first  of  these  notches,  as 
one  goes  eastward  from  Morro  Castle,  is  that  formed  by  the 
mouth  of  the  Aguadores  ravine,  where  the  Juragua  Railroad, 
on  its  way  from  Siboney  to  Santiago,  crosses  the  Aguadores 
or  Guamo  River,  and  where  the  iron  railroad-bridge  and  the 
approach  to  the  city  are  guarded  by  a  wooden  blockhouse 
and  an  old  stone  fort.  In  the  second  notch,  about  six  miles 
from  Aguadores  and  ten  from  Morro  Castle,  are  the  hamlet 
and  railroad-station  of  Siboney;  and  in  the  third,  five  miles 
farther  to  the  eastward,  lies  the  somewhat  larger  and  more 
important  mining  village  of  Daiquiri,  which,  before  the  war, 
was  the  shipping-port  of  the  Spanish-American  Iron  Com 
pany.  There  is  no  harbor,  shelter  for  vessels,  or  safe 
anchorage  at  any  of  these  places;  but  as  the  rampart,  every 
where  else,  presents  an  almost  insurmountable  barrier,  an 
invading  force  must  either  disembark  in  these  notches,  or 
go  eastward  to  the  Bay  of  Guantanamo  and  march  forty 
miles  to  Santiago  through  the  foot-hills.  General  Shafter, 
after  inspecting  the  coast,  decided  to  land  in  the  notches 
occupied  by  the  villages  of  Daiquiri  and  Siboney.  He  could 
then  advance  on  Santiago  either  along  the  strip  of  beach 
under  the  rampart,  by  way  of  Aguadores  and  Morro  Castle, 
or  over  a  rough  wagon-road  running  through  the  valleys  and 
across  the  foot-hills  of  the  interior,  three  or  four  miles  back 
of  the  rampart. 

The  first  difficulty  which  confronted  him  was  that  due  to 
the  lack  of  landing  facilities.     Not  anticipating,  apparently, 


LANDING   AND   ADVANCE   OF   THE   ARMY    79 

that  he  might  be  forced  to  disembark  on  an  unsheltered 
coast,  he  had  neglected  to  provide  himself  with  suitable 
surf -boats,  and  was  wholly  dependent  upon  the  small  boats 
of  the  transports  and  a  single  scow,  or  lighter,  which  he  had 
brought  with  him  from  Tampa.  Seeing  that  it  would  be 
impossible  to  land  sixteen  thousand  men  safely  and  expedi- 
tiously  with  such  facilities,  he  applied  for  help  to  Admiral 
Sampson,  and  was  furnished  by  the  latter  with  fifty-two 
small  boats  and  a  number  of  steam-launches,  all  manned  by 
officers  and  sailors  from  the  fleet.  Thus  provided,  he  began 
the  work  of  disembarkation  on  the  morning  of  June  22  at 
Daiquiri,  the  vessels  of  the  fleet,  meanwhile,  making  feigned 
attacks  at  several  other  points  along  the  coast,  and  shelling 
the  notches  and  villages  of  both  Siboney  and  Daiquiri,  in 
order  to  drive  the  enemy  back  and  cover  the  advance  of  the 
loaded  boats. 

Fortunately  for  General  Shafter  and  for  his  troops,  the 
Spaniards  did  not  attempt  to  oppose  the  landing.  If  the 
sides  of  the  notches  and  the  foot-hills  back  of  them  had 
been  fortified  with  earthworks  and  held  by  a  daring  enemy 
with  a  battery  or  two  of  light  guns,  it  would  have  been 
extremely  difficult,  if  not  absolutely  impossible,  to  get 
the  troops  ashore.  Even  without  artillery,  ten  or  fifteen 
hundred  men  armed  with  Mausers  on  the  heights  which 
command  the  notches  and  the  approaches  to  them  might 
have  held  off  a  landing  force  for  days,  if  not  weeks.  The 
war-ships  might  have  shelled  them,  or  swept  the  heights 
with  machine-guns,  but  it  would  have  been  easy  for  them  to 
find  shelter  under  the  crest  of  the  rampart  on  the  land  side, 
and  I  doubt  whether  a  force  so  sheltered  could  have  been 
dislodged  or  silenced  by  Admiral  Sampson's  whole  fleet.  In 
order  to  drive  them  out  it  would  have  been  necessary  to  land 
in  the  surf  under  fire,  and  storm  the  heights  by  scaling  the 
precipitous  terraced  front  of  the  rampart  on  the  sea  side. 


80  CAMPAIGNING  IN   CUBA 

This  might,  perhaps,  have  been  done,  but  it  would  have 
involved  a  great  sacrifice  of  life.  The  Spanish  officers  in 
Cuba,  however,  were  not  skilful  tacticians.  Instead  of 
anticipating  General  Shafter's  movements  and  occupying, 
with  an  adequate  force,  the  only  two  places  in  the  vicinity 
of  Santiago  where  he  could  possibly  land,  they  overlooked 
or  neglected  the  splendid  defensive  positions  that  nature 
herself  had  provided  for  them,  and  allowed  the  army  of 
invasion  to  come  ashore  without  firing  a  shot.  It  was  great 
luck  for  us,  but  it  was  not  war. 

Before  night  on  the  22d,  General  Lawton's  division, 
consisting  of  about  six  thousand  men  with  a  Gatling-gun 
battery,  had  landed  at  Daiquiri,  and  on  the  morning  of  the 
23d  it  marched  westward  along  the  wagon-road  to  Siboney. 
The  Spanish  garrison  at  the  latter  place  retreated  in  the 
direction  of  Santiago  as  General  Lawton  appeared,  and  the 
village  fell  into  our  hands  without  a  struggle.  Disembar 
kation  continued  throughout  the  23d  and  24th,  at  both 
Daiquiri  and  Siboney,  and  before  dark  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  24th  nine  tenths  of  the  army  of  invasion  had  landed, 
with  no  other  accident  than  the  loss  of  two  men  drowned. 

In  the  meantime,  General  Linares,  the  Spanish  commander 
at  Santiago,  had  marched  out  of  the  city,  with  a  force  of 
about  three  thousand  men,  to  meet  the  invaders,  and  had 
occupied  a  strong  defensive  position  on  the  crest  of  a  wooded 
hill  at  Guasimas,  three  or  four  miles  northwest  of  Siboney, 
where  the  two  roads  from  the  latter  place— one  up  the 
valley  of  the  stream  and  the  other  over  the  end  of  the  mesa 
—come  together.  He  did  not  know  certainly  which  of  these 
two  roads  the  invading  force  would  take,  and  therefore 
posted  himself  on  the  hill  at  their  junction,  where  he  could 
command  both. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  23d,  Cuban  scouts  reported  the 
position  of  the  enemy  to  General  Wheeler,  who  was  then  in 


LANDING  AND  ADVANCE  OF  THE  ARMY  81 

command  of  our  advance,  and,  after  a  council  of  war,  it  was 
decided  to  attack  simultaneously  by  both  roads.  Early  on 
the  morning  of  Friday,  June  24,  therefore,  General  Young, 
with  the  First  and  Tenth  dismounted  cavalry,  marched  out 
of  Siboney  on  the  main  road  to  Santiago,  and  proceeded  up 
the  valley  of  the  little  stream  which  empties  into  the  sea 
through  the  Siboney  notch ;  while  Colonel  Wood,  at  the  head 
of  the  Rough  Riders,  climbed  the  end  of  the  rampart,  on  the 
western  side  of  the  notch,  and  advanced  toward  Guasimas  by 
the  mesa  trail,  which  is  considerably  higher  than  the  main 
road  and  lies  half  a  mile  to  a  mile  farther  west. 

The  two  columns  encountered  the  enemy  at  about  the 
same  time.  The  Rough  Riders,  under  Colonel  Wood,  be 
gan  the  attack  on  the  mesa  trail,  and  a  few  moments  later 
General  Young's  command,  on  the  Siboney-Santiago  road, 
opened  fire  with  three  Hotchkiss  mountain  guns  and  began 
the  ascent  of  the  hill  from  the  valley.  The  whole  country 
was  so  overgrown  with  trees,  shrubs,  and  tropical  vines 
that  it  was  almost  impossible  to  see  an  object  fifty  yards 
away,  and  as  the  Spaniards  used  smokeless  powder,  it  was 
extremely  difficult  to  ascertain  their  position,  or  even  to 
know  exactly  where  our  own  troops  were.  Colonel  Wood 
deployed  his  regiment  to  the  right  and  left  of  the  trail,  and 
endeavored,  as  he  advanced,  to  extend  his  line  so  as  to  form 
a  junction  with  General  Young's  command  on  the  right,  and 
at  the  same  time  outflank  the  enemy  on  the  left;  but  the 
tropical  undergrowth  was  so  dense  and  luxuriant  that 
neither  of  the  attacking  columns  could  see  the  other,  and 
all  that  they  could  do,  in  the  way  of  mutual  support  and 
cooperation,  was  to  push  ahead  toward  the  junction  of  the 
two  roads,  firing,  almost  at  random,  into  the  bushes  and 
vine-tangled  thickets  from  which  the  Mauser  bullets  seemed 
to  come.  Colonel  Roosevelt  told  me  that  once  he  caught 
a  glimpse  of  the  Spaniards,  drawn  up  in  line  of  battle;  but 


82  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

during  the  greater  part  of  the  engagement  they  were  con 
cealed  in  the  chaparral,  and  could  be  seen  only  when  they 
broke  from  cover  and  fled,  to  escape  the  searching  fire  of  our 
steadily  advancing  line.  While  Colonel  Wood,  on  the  left, 
was  driving  the  enemy  out  of  the  jungles  intersected  by  the 
mesa  trail,  General  Young,  with  a  part  of  the  Tenth  Cavalry 
(colored)  supported  by  four  troops  of  the  First,  was  engaged 
in  storming  the  hill  up  which  ran  the  valley  road;  and  at  the 
end  of  an  hour  and  a  half,  after  a  stubborn  defense,  the 
Spaniards  were  forced  to  abandon  their  chosen  position  and 
retreat  in  the  direction  of  Santiago,  leaving  the  junction  of 
the  two  roads  in  our  possession.  The  battle  of  Guasimas— 
the  first  fight  of  the  Santiago  campaign— had  been  won. 

The  number  of  men  engaged  in  this  affair,  on  our  side, 
was  nine  hundred  and  sixty-four,  and  our  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  was  sixty-six,  including  Captain  Capron  and 
Hamilton  Fish,  both  of  whom  died  on  the  field.  The  Span 
iards,  according  to  the  statement  of  Mr.  Ramsden,  British 
consul  in  Santiago,  had  a  force  of  nearly  three  thousand  men 
and  reported  a  loss  of  seven  killed  and  fourteen  wounded. 
It  seems  probable,  however,  that  their  loss  was  much  greater 
than  this.  General  Linares  would  hardly  have  abandoned  a 
strong  position  and  fallen  back  on  the  city  after  a  loss  of 
only  twenty-one  men  out  of  three  thousand. 

Two  war  correspondents,  Mr.  Richard  Harding  Davis  and 
Mr.  Edward  Marshall,  took  an  active  part  in  this  engage 
ment,  and  the  latter  was  so  severely  wounded  by  a  Mauser 
bullet,  which  passed  through  his  body  near  the  spine,  that 
when  he  was  carried  from  the  field  he  was  supposed  to  be 
dying.  He  rallied,  however,  after  being  taken  to  Siboney, 
and  has  since  partially  recovered. 

The  effect  of  General  Wheeler's  victory  at  Guasimas  was 
to  open  up  the  Santiago  road  to  a  point  within  three  or  four 
miles  of  the  city;  and  when  we  returned  in  the  State  of  Texas 


LANDING  AND   ADVANCE   OP  THE   ARMY    S3 

from  Guantanamo,  the  Rough  Riders  were  in  camp  beyond 
Sevilla,  and  a  dozen  other  regiments  were  hurrying  to  the 
front. 

We  reached  Siboney  after  dark  on  Sunday  evening,  and 
found  the  little  cove  and  the  neighboring  roadstead  filled 
with  transport  steamers,  whose  twinkling  anchor-lights— or 
rather  adrift  lights,  for  there  was  no  anchorage — swung 
slowly  back  and  forth  in  long  curves  as  the  vessels  rolled  and 
wallowed  in  the  trough  of  the  sea.  As  soon  as  a  boat  could 
be  lowered,  the  medical  officers  of  Miss  Barton's  staff  went 
on  shore  to  investigate  the  state  of  affairs  and  to  ascertain 
whether  the  Red  Cross  could  render  any  assistance  to  the 
hospital  corps  of  the  army.  They  returned  in  the  course  of 
an  hour  and  reported  that  in  two  of  the  abandoned  Spanish 
houses  on  the  beach  they  had  found  two  hastily  extemporized 
and  wholly  unequipped  hospitals,  one  of  which  was  occupied 
by  the  Cuban  sick  and  wounded,  and  the  other  by  our  own. 
No  attempt  had  been  made  to  clean  or  disinfect  either  of 
the  buildings,  both  were  extremely  dirty,  and  in  both  the 
patients  were  lying,  without  blankets  or  pillows,  on  the 
floor.  The  state  of  affairs,  from  a  medical  and  sanitary  point 
of  view,  was  precisely  as  the  correspondents  had  described 
it  to  us,  except  that  some  of  the  wounded  of  General 
Wheeler's  command  had  been  taken  on  board  the  transports 
Saratoga  and  Olivette  during  the  day,  so  that  the  American 
hospital  was  not  so  crowded  as  it  had  been  when  Mr. 
Howard  saw  it  the  night  before.  The  army  surgeons  and 
attendants  were  doing,  apparently,  all  that  they  could  do  to 
make  the  sick  and  wounded  comfortable;  but  the  high  surf, 
the  absence  of  landing  facilities,  the  neglect  or  unwilling 
ness  of  the  quartermaster's  department  to  furnish  boats, 
and  the  confusion  and  disorder  which  everywhere  prevailed, 
made  it  almost  impossible  to  get  hospital  supplies  ashore. 
All  that  the  surgeons  could  do,  therefore,  was  to  make  the 


84  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

best  of  the  few  medicines  and  appliances  that  they  had 
taken  in  their  hands  and  pockets  when  they  disembarked. 
The  things  that  seemed  to  be  most  needed  were  cots, 
blankets,  pillows,  brooms,  soap,  scrubbing-brushes,  and  dis 
infectants.  All  of  these  things  we  had  on  board  the  State 
of  Texas,  and  the  officers  of  Miss  Barton's  staff  spent  a  large 
part  of  the  night  in  breaking  out  the  cargo  and  getting  the 
required  articles  on  deck. 

Early  the  next  morning,  Dr.  Lesser,  with  four  or  five 
trained  nurses,  all  women,  and  a  boat-load  of  hospital  sup 
plies,  landed  at  the  little  pier  which  had  been  hastily  built 
by  the  engineer  corps,  and  walking  along  the  beach  through 
the  deep  sand  to  the  American  hospital,  offered  their  ser 
vices  to  Dr.  Winter,  the  surgeon  in  charge.  To  their 
great  surprise  they  were  informed  that  the  assistance  of  the 
Red  Cross— or  at  least  their  assistance— was  not  desired. 
What  Dr.  Winter's  reasons  were  for  declining  aid  and  sup 
plies  when  both  were  so  urgently  needed  I  do  not  know. 
Possibly  he  is  one  of  the  military  surgeons,  like  Dr.  Appel 
of  the  Olivette,  who  think  that  women,  even  if  they  are 
trained  nurses,  have  no  business  with  an  army,  and  should 
be  snubbed,  if  not  browbeaten,  until  they  learn  to  keep 
their  place.  I  hope  this  suggestion  does  not  do  Dr.  Winter 
an  injustice;  but  I  can  think  of  no  other  reason  that  would 
lead  him  to  decline  the  assistance  of  trained  young  women 
who,  although  capable  of  rendering  the  highest  kind  of  pro 
fessional  service,  were  ready  and  willing  to  scrub  floors,  if 
necessary,  and  who  asked  nothing  more  than  to  help  him 
make  a  clean,  decent  hospital  out  of  an  empty,  dirty,  aban 
doned  Spanish  house. 

WThen  told  by  Dr.  Winter  that  they  were  not  wanted,  the 
nurses  went  to  the  Cuban  hospital,  in  a  neighboring  build 
ing,  where  their  services  were  accepted  not  only  with  eager 
ness,  but  with  grateful  appreciation.  Before  night  they  had 


LANDING   AND   ADVANCE   OF   THE   ARMY    85 

swept,  disinfected,  and  scrubbed  out  that  hospital  with  soap 
and  water,  and  had  bathed  the  Cuban  patients,  fed  them,  and 
put  them  into  clean,  fresh  cot-beds.  Our  own  soldiers,  at 
the  same  time,  were  lying,  without  blankets  or  pillows,  on 
the  floor,  in  a  building  which  Dr.  Winter  and  his  assistants 
had  neither  cleaned  nor  attempted  to  clean. 

Dr.  Appel  of  the  hospital  steamer  Olivette,  in  an  official 
report  to  the  surgeon-general  of  the  army,  published,  in 
part,  in  the  New  York  "  Herald  "  of  November  4,  1898,  says: 

"There  was,  at  that  time  [the  time  when  we  arrived  off 
Siboney],  a  number  of  surgeons  on  board  the  State  of  Texas, 
and  four  trained  nurses;  but,  although  we  were  working 
night  and  day,  taking  care  of  our  sick  and  wounded,  no 
assistance  was  given  by  them  until  some  days  afterward, 
when  our  own  men  were  ready  to  drop  from  fatigue." 

The  idea  conveyed  by  this  ungenerous  and  misleading 
statement  is  that  the  surgeons  and  Red  Cross  nurses  on  the 
State  of  Texas  neglected  or  evaded  the  very  duty  that  they 
went  to  Cuba  to  perform,  and  remained,  idle  and  useless,  on 
their  steamer,  while  Dr.  Appel  and  his  associates  worked 
themselves  into  a  state  of  complete  physical  exhaustion. 
So  far  as  the  statement  contains  this  implication,  it  is  wholly 
and  absolutely  false.  The  State  of  Texas  arrived  off  Siboney 
at  eight  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  Sunday,  June  26.  In 
less  than  an  hour  the  Red  Cross  surgeons  had  offered  their 
services  to  Major  Havard,  chief  surgeon  of  the  cavalry 
division,  and  as  early  as  possible  on  the  following  morning 
Dr.  Lesser  and  four  or  five  Red  Cross  nurses  reported  at  the 
American  hospital,  offered  the  surgeon  in  charge  the  cots, 
blankets,  and  hospital  supplies  which  they  had  brought,  or 
were  ready  to  bring,  on  shore,  and  asked  to  be  set  to  work. 
When,  on  account  of  some  prejudice  or  misapprehension, 
Dr.  Winter  declined  to  let  them  help  him  in  taking  care  of 
our  own  sick  and  wounded  soldiers,  what  more  could  they 


86  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

do  than  devote  themselves  to  the  Cubans?  Two  days  later, 
fortunately,  Major  Lagarde,  chief  surgeon  at  Siboney,  over 
ruled  the  judgment  of  his  subordinate,  accepted  the  services 
of  the  nurses,  and  set  them  at  work  in  a  branch  of  the  mili 
tary  hospital,  under  the  direction  of  Dr.  Lesser.  There  they 
all  worked,  almost  without  rest  or  sleep,  until  Dr.  Lesser, 
Mrs.  Lesser,  Mrs.  White  (a  volunteer),  and  three  of  the  Red 
Cross  nurses  were  stricken  with  fever,  and  four  of  them 
were  carried  on  flat-cars  to  the  yellow-fever  camp  in  the  hills 
two  miles  north  of  the  village.  The  surgeon  of  the  Olivette 
would  have  shown  a  more  generous  and  more  manly  spirit 
if,  in  his  report  to  the  surgeon-general,  he  had  mentioned 
these  facts,  instead  of  adroitly  insinuating  that  the  Red 
Cross  surgeons  and  nurses  were  loafing  on  board  the  State 
of  Texas  when  they  should  have  been  at  work  in  the  hospitals. 

But  Dr.  Appel  further  says,  in  the  report  from  which  I 
have  quoted,  that  at  the  time  when  the  State  of  Texas  reached 
Siboney — two  days  after  the  fight  at  Guasimas — "there  was 
no  lack  whatever  of  medical  and  surgical  supplies." 

If  Major  Lagarde,  Dr.  Munson,  Dr.  Donaldson,  and  other 
army  surgeons  who  worked  so  heroically  to  bring  order  out 
of  the  chaos  at  Siboney,  are  to  be  believed,  Dr.  AppePs 
statement  concerning  hospital  supplies  is  as  false  as  his 
statement  with  regard  to  the  Red  Cross  surgeons  and  nurses. 
In  an  official  report  to  the  surgeon-general,  dated  July  29 
and  published  in  the  New  York  papers  of  August  9,  Cap 
tain  Edward  L.  Munson,  assistant  surgeon  commanding  the 
reserve  ambulance  company,  says:  "After  the  fight  at  Las 
Guasimas  there  were  absolutely  no  dressings,  hospital 
tentage,  or  supplies  of  any  kind,  on  shore,  within  reach  of 
the  surgeons  already  landed."  Dr.  Munson  was  the  adjutant 
of  Colonel  Pope,  chief  surgeon  of  the  Fifth  Army-Corps, 
and  he  probably  knew  a  good  deal  more  about  the  state  of 
affairs  at  Siboney  after  the  battle  of  Guasimas  than  Dr. 


LANDING   AND   ADVANCE   OF   THE   ARMY    87 

Appel  did.  Be  that,  however,  as  it  may;  I  know  from  my 
own  observation  and  experience  that  there  was  a  lack  of 
medical  and  hospital  supplies  at  Siboney,  not  only  when  we 
arrived  there,  but  for  weeks  afterward.  Dr.  Frank  Donaldson, 
surgeon  of  the  Rough  Riders,  in  a  letter  from  Siboney,  pub 
lished  in  the  Philadelphia  "  Medical  Journal"  of  July  23,  says: 
"The  condition  of  the  wounded  on  shore  here  is  beyond 
measure  wretched,  and  excites  the  lively  indignation  of 
every  one." 

The  neglect  of  our  soldiers,  both  at  Siboney  and  at  the 
front,  in  the  early  days  of  the  campaign,  was  discreditable 
to  the  army  and  to  the  country;  and  there  is  no  reason  why 
military  surgeons  should  not  frankly  admit  it,  because  it  was 
not  their  fault,  and  they  cannot  justly  be  held  accountable 
for  it.  The  blame  should  rest,  and  eventually  will  rest,  upon 
the  officer  or  department  that  sent  thirty-five  loaded  trans 
ports  and  sixteen  thousand  men  to  the  Cuban  coast  without 
suitable  landing  facilities  in  the  shape  of  surf-boats,  steam- 
launches,  and  lighters. 

In  criticizing  the  condition  of  our  hospitals,  I  cast  no 
reflection  upon  the  zeal,  ability,  and  devotion  to  duty  of  such 
men  as  Colonel  Pope,  Major  Lagarde,  Major  Wood,  and  the 
surgeons  generally  of  the  Fifth  Army-Corps.  They  made 
the  best  of  a  bad  situation  for  which  they  were  not  primarily 
responsible;  and  if  the  hospitals  were  in  unsatisfactory  con 
dition,  it  was  simply  because  the  supplies  furnished  in 
abundance  by  the  medical  department  were  either  left  in 
Tampa  for  lack  of  water  transportation,  or  held  on  board  the 
transports  because  no  adequate  provision  had  been  made  by 
the  commanding  general  or  the  quartermaster's  department 
for  landing  them  on  a  surf-beaten  coast  and  transporting 
them  to  the  places  where  they  were  needed. 


CHAPTER  IX 
A  WALK  TO  THE  FRONT 

~TT7~HEN  I  went  on  deck,  the  morning  after  our  return  to 
VV  Siboney,  I  found  that  the  State  of  Texas  had  drifted, 
during  the  night,  half-way  to  the  mouth  of  the  Aguadores 
ravine,  and  was  lying  two  or  three  miles  off  the  coast,  within 
plain  sight  of  the  blockading  fleet.  The  sun  was  just  rising 
over  the  foot-hills  beyond  Daiquiri,  and  on  the  higher  slopes 
of  the  Cobre  range  it  was  already  day;  but  the  deep  notch 
at  Siboney  was  still  in  dark-blue  shadow,  and  out  of  it  a  faint 
land-breeze  was  blowing  a  thin,  hazy  cloud  of  smoke  from 
the  recently  kindled  camp-fires  of  the  troops  on  the  beach. 
There  was  no  wrind  where  we  lay,  and  the  sea  seemed  to  be 
perfectly  smooth;  but  the  languid  rolling  of  the  steamer,  and 
a  gleam  of  white  surf  here  and  there  along  the  base  of  the 
rampart,  showed  that  the  swell  raised  by  the  fresh  breeze  of 
the  previous  afternoon  had  not  wholly  subsided.  Fifteen  or 
twenty  transport-steamers  were  lying  off  the  coast,  some 
close  in  under  the  shadow  of  the  cliffs,  where  the  smoke  from 
the  soldiers'  camp-fires  drifted  through  their  rigging;  some 
five  or  six  miles  out  in  the  open  roadstead;  and  a  few  hull 
down  beyond  the  sharply  drawn  line  of  the  eastern  horizon. 
Three  miles  away  to  the  northwest  the  red-and-yellow  flag 
of  Spain  was  blowing  out  fitfully  in  the  land-breeze  over  the 
walls  of  the  stone  fort  at  Aguadores,  and  four  or  five  miles 


A  WALK   TO   THE   FRONT  89 

farther  to  the  westward,  at  the  end  of  the  long,  terraced 
rampart,  I  could  make  out,  with  a  glass,  the  lighthouse,  the 
tile-roofed  barracks,  and  the  gray  battlements  of  the  old  cas 
tle  at  the  entrance  to  Santiago  harbor. 

About  seven  o'clock  the  State  of  Texas  got  under  way, 
steamed  back  to  Siboney,  and  succeeded  in  finding  an  an 
chorage,  in  what  looked  like  a  very  dangerous  position,  close 
to  the  rocks,  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  cove.  From  this 
point  of  view  the  picture  presented  by  the  village  and  its 
environment  was  novel  and  interesting,  if  not  particularly 
beautiful.  On  the  right  and  left  of  the  slightly  curved  strip 
of  sand  which  formed  the  landing-place  rose  two  steep  bluffs 
to  a  height  of  perhaps  two  hundred  and  fifty  feet.  The 
summit  of  the  one  on  the  right,  which  was  the  steeper  of  the 
two,  seemed,  at  first  glance,  to  be  inaccessible;  but  there 
must  have  been  a  hidden  path  up  to  it  through  the  trees, 
bushes,  and  vines  which  clothed  its  almost  precipitous  face, 
because  it  was  crowned  with  one  of  the  small,  square,  un- 
painted  log  blockhouses  which  are  a  characteristic  feature  of 
almost  every  east-Cuban  landscape.  The  western  bluff,  from 
which  the  trees  had  been  cut  away,  sloped  backward  a  little 
more  than  the  other,  and  about  half-way  up  it,  in  a  network 
of  yellow  intersecting  paths,  stood  another  blockhouse, 
surrounded  by  a  ditch  and  a  circular  "entanglement"  of 
barbed-wire  fencing.  At  the  foot  of  this  bluff,  and  extend 
ing  westward  under  the  precipitous  declivity  of  the  rampart, 
were  two  lines  of  unpainted,  one-story  wooden  houses,  which 
stood  gable  to  gable  at  intervals  of  fifty  or  sixty  feet,  and 
looked,  in  their  architectural  uniformity,  like  buildings 
erected  by  a  manufacturing  company  to  shelter  the  families 
of  its  employees.  The  boundary  of  the  village,  at  this  end, 
was  marked  by  still  another  small,  square  blockhouse,  which 
was  set,  at  a  height  of  twenty  feet,  on  a  huge  fragment  of 
rock  which  had  caved  away  and  fallen  from  the  cliff  above. 


90  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

Across  the  bottom  of  the  ravine,  between  the  two  bluffs, 
extended  a  thickly  planted  strip  of  cocoamit-palms,  whose 
gray  trunks  and  drooping,  feathery  foliage  served  as  a  back 
ground  for  half  a  dozen  leaf-thatched  Cuban  huts,  an  iron 
railway-bridge  painted  red,  and  a  great  encampment  of  white 
shelter-tents  through  which  roamed  thousands  of  blue-shirted 
soldiers,  Cuban  insurgents  from  the  army  of  Garcia,  and 
dirty,  tattered  refugees  from  all  parts  of  the  country,  at 
tracted  to  the  beach  by  the  landing  of  the  army  and  the 
prospect  of  getting  food.  On  the  eastern  side  of  the  cove, 
near  the  ruins  of  an  old  stone  fort,  the  engineer  corps  had 
built  a  rude  pier,  thirty  or  forty  feet  in  length,  and  on  either 
side  of  it  scores  of  naked  soldiers,  with  metallic  identification 
tags  hanging  around  their  necks,  were  plunging  with  yells, 
whoops,  and  halloos  into  the  foaming  surf,  or  swimming 
silently,  like  so  many  seals,  in  the  smoother  water  outside. 

As  the  sun  rose  above  the  foot-hills  and  began  to  throw 
its  scorching  rays  into  the  notch,  the  whooping  and  yelling 
ceased  as  the  bathers  came  out  of  the  water  and  put  on  their 
clothes;  the  soldiers  of  the  Second  Infantry  struck  and 
shouldered  their  shelter-tents,  seized  their  rifles,  and  formed 
by  companies  in  marching  order;  the  Cubans  of  Garcia's 
command  climbed  the  western  bluff,  in  a  long,  ragged,  dis 
orderly  line,  on  their  way  to  the  front  by  the  mesa  trail; 
small  boats,  laden  with  food  and  ammunition  from  the  trans 
ports,  appeared,  one  after  another,  and  made  their  way 
slowly  under  oars  to  the  little  pier;  and  the  serious  work  of 
the  day  began. 

In  order  to  ascertain  what  progress  our  forces  were  mak 
ing  in  their  march  on  Santiago,  and  to  get  an  idea  of  the 
difficulties  with  which  they  were  contending  or  would  have 
to  contend,  I  determined,  about  nine  o'clock,  to  go  to  the 
front.  It  was  impossible  to  get  a  horse  or  mule  in  Siboney, 
for  love  or  money;  but  if  our  soldiers  could  march  to  the 


A  WALK  TO   THE   FRONT  91 

front  under  the  heavy  burden  of  shelter-tent,  blanket  roll, 
rifle,  rations,  and  ammunition,  I  thought  I  could  do  it  with 
no  load  at  all,  even  if  the  sunshine  were  hot.  Mr.  Elwell, 
who  had  lived  some  years  in  Santiago  and  was  thoroughly 
acquainted  with  the  country,  agreed  to  go  with  me  in  the 
capacity  of  guide  and  interpreter,  and,  just  before  we  were 
ready  to  start,  Dr.  Lesser,  who  had  returned  to  the  ship  after 
setting  the  nurses  at  work  in  the  Cuban  hospital,  said  that 
he  would  like  to  go. 

"All  right,"  I  replied.     "Get  on  your  togs." 

He  went  to  his  state-room,  and  in  ten  minutes  returned 
dressed  in  a  neat  black  morning  suit,  with  long  trousers,  low 
shoes,  a  fresh  white-linen  shirt,  and  a  high,  stiffly  starched, 
standing  collar. 

"Good  heavens,  doctor!"  I  exclaimed,  as  he  made  his  ap 
pearance  in  this  Fifth  Avenue  costume.  "Where  do  you 
think  you  are  going?  To  church?" 

"No,"  replied  the  doctor,  imperturbably;  "to  the  front." 

"In  that  dress?" 

"Certainly;  what 's  the  matter  with  it?" 

"  Oh,  nothing  in  particular.  As  a  dress  it  is  a  very  good 
dress,  and  reflects  credit  on  your  tailor;  but  for  a  tramp  of 
ten  or  fifteen  miles  over  a  muddy  trail  and  through  a  tropi 
cal  jungle,  would  n't  a  neat,  simple  undershirt,  with  canvas 
trousers  and  a  pair  of  waterproof  leggings,  be  better?  Your 
starched  collar,  in  this  heat,  won't  last  ten  minutes." 

The  doctor  demurred,  and  protested  that  the  clothes  he 
was  wearing  were  the  oldest  he  had;  but  I  finally  persuaded 
him  to  take  off  his  waistcoat  and  collar,  tie  a  handkerchief 
around  his  neck,  and  put  on  a  pair  of  my  leggings;  and  in 
this  slightly  modified  costume  he  went  ashore  with  us  for  a 
march  to  the  camp  of  the  Rough  Riders. 

About  fifteen  hundred  Cubans,  of  General  Garcia's  com 
mand,  had  been  brought  to  Siboney  the  day  before  on  one 


92  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

of  our  transports;  and  although  most  of  them  had  started 
for  the  front,  several  hundred  were  still  roaming  through 
the  village,  or  standing  here  and  there  in  groups  on  the 
beach.  They  did  not,  at  first  sight,  impress  me  very  favor 
ably.  Fully  four  fifths  of  them  were  mulattoes  or  blacks; 
the  number  of  half-grown  boys  was  very  large;  there  was 
hardly  a  suggestion  of  a  uniform  in  the  whole  command; 
most  of  the  men  were  barefooted,  and  their  coarse,  droop 
ing  straw  hats,  cotton  shirts,  and  loose,  flapping  cotton 
trousers  had  been  torn  by  thorny  bushes  and  stained  with 
Cuban  mud  until  they  looked  worse  than  the  clothes  that  a 
New  England  farmer  hangs  on  a  couple  of  crossed  sticks  in 
his  corn-field  to  scare  away  the  crows.  If  their  rifles  and 
cartridge-belts  had  been  taken  away  from  them  they  would 
have  looked  like  a  horde  of  dirty  Cuban  beggars  and  raga 
muffins  on  the  tramp.  I  do  not  mean  to  say,  or  even  to 
suggest,  that  these  ragamuffins  were  not  brave  men  and 
good  soldiers.  They  may  have  been  both,  in  spite  of  their 
disreputable  appearance.  When,  for  months  together,  a 
man  has  lived  the  life  of  an  outlaw  in  the  woods,  scrambling 
through  tropical  jungles,  wading  marshy  rivers,  and  sleeping, 
without  tent  or  blankets,  on  the  ground,  he  cannot  be  ex 
pected  to  look  like  a  veteran  of  the  regular  army  on  dress- 
parade  in  a  garrison  town.  Many  of  our  own  men,  in  the 
later  weeks  of  the  Santiago  campaign,  were  almost  as  ragged 
and  dirty  as  the  poorest  of  the  soldiers  who  came  with  Gen 
eral  Garcia  to  Siboney.  The  Cubans  disappointed  me,  I 
suppose,  because  I  had  pictured  them  to  myself  as  a  better 
dressed  and  better  disciplined  body  of  men,  and  had  not 
made  allowance  enough  for  the  hardships  and  privations  of 
an  insurgent's  life. 

Turning  our  backs  on  the  cove,  the  pier,  the  white  tents 
of  the  quartermasters,  the  tarpaulin-covered  piles  of  provi 
sion-boxes,  and  the  throng  of  soldiers,  insurgents,  and  refn- 


A  WALK   TO   THE   FRONT  93 

gees  on  the  beach,  we  climbed  a  steep  bank,  crossed  the 
railroad-track  just  west  of  the  red-iron  bridge,  and  joined  a 
company  of  the  Second  Infantry  on  its  way  to  the  front. 

The  Santiago  road,  after  leaving  the  village  of  Siboney, 
runs  up  a  wide  marshy  valley,  full  of  stagnant  ponds  and 
lagoons,  and  sparsely  set  with  clumps  of  cocoanut  and  royal 
palm.  Although  this  valley  heads  in  the  mountains  of  the 
Cobre  range,  and  opens  on  the  sea  through  the  Siboney 
notch,  its  atmosphere  seems  hot  and  close,  and  is  pervaded 
by  a  foul,  rank  odor  of  decaying  vegetation,  which  is  un 
pleasantly  suggestive  of  malaria  and  Cuban  fever,  and  makes 
one  wish  that  one  could  carry  air  as  one  carries  water,  and 
breathe,  as  well  as  drink,  out  of  a  canteen.  But  one  soon 
escapes  from  it.  A  mile  or  two  from  the  village  the  road 
leaves  the  valley,  turns  to  the  left,  and  begins  to  ascend  a 
series  of  densely  wooded  ridges,  or  foot-hills,  which  rise,  one 
above  another,  to  the  crest  of  the  watershed  just  beyond 
Sevilla.  From  the  point  where  we  left  the  valley  to  the 
summit  of  the  divide,  we  never  had  an  unobstructed  outlook 
in  any  direction.  Dense  tropical  forests,  almost  impenetrable 
to  the  eye,  closed  in  upon  the  road,  and  when  the  sea-breeze 
was  cut  off  and  the  sun  stood  vertically  overhead,  we  lost  all 
means  of  orientation  and  could  hardly  guess  in  what  direc 
tion  we  were  going.  Now  and  then,  at  the  bottom  of  a  val 
ley  or  on  a  sloping  hillside,  we  passed  a  small,  grassy  open 
ing,  which  would  be  called,  in  West  Virginia,  a  glade  or  an 
interval;  but  during  most  of  the  time  we  plodded  along  in 
the  fierce  heat,  between  walls  of  dark-green  foliage  which 
rose  out  of  an  impenetrable  jungle  of  vines,  pinon-bushes,  and 
Spanish  bayonet.  I  saw  no  flowers  except  the  clustered 
heads  of  a  scarlet-and-orange  blossom  which  I  heard  some 
one  call  the  "Cuban  rose,"  and  I  did  not  see  a  bird  of  any 
kind  until  we  approached  the  battle-field  of  Guasimas,  where 
scores  of  vultures  were  soaring  and  circling  above  the  tree- 


94  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

tops,  as  if  aware  of  the  fact  that  in  the  leafy  depths  of  the 
jungle  below  were  still  lying  the  unburied  and  undiscovered 
bodies  of  Spanish  dead. 

Nothing  surprised  me  more,  as  I  walked  from  Siboney  to 
the  front,  than  the  feebleness  of  the  resistance  offered  by 
the  Spaniards  to  our  advance.  The  road,  after  it  enters  the 
hills,  abounds  in  strong  defensive  positions,  and  if  General 
Chaffee  or  General  Wood,  with  five  thousand  American  regu 
lars,  had  held  it,  as  General  Linares  attempted  to  hold  it  at 
Guasimas,  a  Spanish  army  would  not  have  fought  its  way 
through  to  Santiago  in  a  month.  There  are  at  least  half 
a  dozen  places,  between  the  Siboney  valley  and  the  crest  of 
the  divide  beyond  Sevilla,  where  a  few  simple  intrenchments 
in  the  shape  of  rifle-pits  and  barricades  would  have  enabled 
even  a  small  force,  fighting  as  General  Vara  del  Key's  com 
mand  afterward  fought  at  Caney,  to  detain  our  army  for 
days,  if  not  to  check  its  advance  altogether.  The  almost 
impenetrable  nature  of  the  undergrowth  on  either  side 
would  have  made  flanking  movements  extremely  difficult, 
and  a  direct  attack  along  the  narrow  road,  in  the  face  of 
such  a  fire  as  might  have  been  delivered  from  intrenched 
positions  in  front  and  at  the  sides,  would  almost  certainly 
have  been  disastrous  to  the  advancing  column.  Even  if  the 
Spaniards  had  been  driven  from  their  first  line  of  defense, 
they  could  have  fallen  back  a  mile  or  two  to  a  second  posi 
tion,  equally  strong,  and  then  to  a  third,  and  by  thus  fighting, 
falling  back,  and  then  fighting  again,  they  might  have  in 
flicted  great  loss  upon  the  attacking  force  long  before  it  got 
within  sight  of  Santiago. 

I  can  think  of  only  two  reasons  for  their  failure  to  adopt 
this  method  of  defense.  The  first  is  that  they  did  not  know 
certainly  whether  General  Shafter  would  make  his  main  at 
tack  byway  of  Guasimas  and  Sevilla,  or  along  the  sea-coast 
by  way  of  Aguadores;  and  they  feared  that  if  they  sent  the 


A  WALK  TO   THE   FRONT  95 

greater  part  of  their  small  army  to  check  an  advance  by  the 
former  route,  the  city,  which  would  be  left  almost  unde 
fended,  might  be  attacked  suddenly  by  a  column  moving 
rapidly  along  the  sea-coast  and  up  the  Aguadores  ravine,  or, 
possibly,  by  a  force  which  should  land  at  Cabanas  and  march 
around  the  bay.  This  reason,  however,  seems  to  me  to  have 
little  force,  because  from  the  signal-station  at  Morro  Castle 
they  could  watch  and  report  all  our  movements  along  the 
coast,  and  a  march  of  three  or  four  hours  would  bring  the 
army  on  the  Siboney  road  back  to  the  city,  in  ample  time  to 
meet  an  attacking  column  from  either  Aguadores  or  Cabanas. 

The  second  reason  is  that,  for  lack  of  adequate  means  of 
transportation,  they  were  unable  to  keep  a  large  force  sup 
plied  with  food  and  ammunition  at  a  distance  from  its  base. 
I  doubt  whether  this  reason  has  any  greater  force  than 
the  other.  I  saw  a  large  number  of  native  horses  and  mules 
in  Santiago  after  the  surrender,  and  as  the  distance  from 
the  city  to  the  strong  positions  on  the  Siboney  road  is  only 
six  or  eight  miles,  it  would  not  have  required  extraordinary 
transportation  facilities  to  carry  thither  food  and  ammuni 
tion  for  three  or  four  thousand  men.  But  even  half  that 
number,  if  they  fought  as  the  San  Luis  brigade  afterward 
fought  at  Caney,  might  have  held  General  Shafter's  advance 
in  check  for  days,  and  made  the  capture  of  Santiago  a  much 
more  serious  and  costly  business  than  it  was. 

The  truth  probably  is  that  General  Linares  was  intimi 
dated  by  the  great  show  made  by  our  fleet  and  transports- 
sixty  steam-vessels  in  all;  that  he  credited  us  with  a  much 
larger  army  than  we  really  had;  and  that  it  seemed  to  him 
better  to  make  the  decisive  fight  at  once  on  the  command 
ing  hills  just  east  of  Santiago  than  to  lose  perhaps  one  third 
of  his  small  available  force  in  the  woods  on  the  Siboney  road, 
and  then  be  driven  back  to  the  city  at  last  with  wearied  and 
discouraged  troops.  But  it  was  a  mistaken  calculation.  If 


96  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

he  had  delayed  General  Shafter's  column,  by  obstinately  re 
sisting  its  advance  through  the  woods  on  the  Siboney  road, 
he  would  have  given  Colonel  Escarrio  time  enough  to  reach 
Santiago  with  the  reinforcements  from  Manzanillo  before 
the  decisive  battle,  and  would  also  have  given  the  climate 
and  the  Cuban  fever  more  time  to  sap  the  strength  and  de 
press  the  spirits  of  our  badly  equipped  and  improperly  fed 
troops.  The  final  struggle  on  the  hills  east  of  the  city 
might  then  have  had  a  very  different  termination. 

The  policy  that  General  Linares  should  have  adopted  was 
the  Fabian  policy  of  obstruction,  harassment,  and  delay. 
Every  hour  that  he  could  detain  General  Shafter's  advan 
cing  army  on  the  Siboney  road  increased  his  own  chances 
of  success  and  lessened  those  of  his  adversary;  because  the 
army  of  defense,  already  acclimated,  could  stand  exposure 
to  sun,  rain,  and  miasma  much  better  than  the  army  of 
invasion  could.  Besides  that,  a  column  of  five  thousand 
regulars  from  Manzanillo  was  hurrying  to  his  assistance,  and 
it  was  of  the  utmost  importance  that  these  reinforcements 
should  reach  him  before  he  should  be  forced  into  a  decisive 
battle.  Instead  of  resisting  General  Shafter's  advance, 
however,  with  obstinate  pertinacity  on  the  Siboney  road,  he 
abandoned  his  strong  position  at  Guasimas,  after  a  single 
sharp  but  inconclusive  engagement,  and  retreated  almost  to 
Santiago  without  striking  another  blow.  As  I  have  already 
said  with  regard  to  the  unopposed  landing  at  Daiquiri  and 
Siboney,  it  was  great  luck  for  General  Shafter,  but  it  was 
not  war. 

We  passed  the  battle-field  of  Guasimas  about  noon,  with 
out  stopping  to  examine  it,  and  pushed  on  toward  Sevilla 
with  a  straggling,  disorderly  column  of  soldiers  belonging  to 
the  Second  and  Twenty-first  Infantry,  who  were  following  a 
battery  of  light  artillery  to  the  front.  The  men  seemed  to 
be  suffering  intensely  from  the  heat,  and  every  few  hundred 


A  WALK   TO   THE   FRONT  97 

yards  we  would  find  one  of  them  lying  unconscious  in  the 
bushes  by  the  roadside,  where  he  had  been  carried  by  his 
comrades  after  he  had  fainted  and  fallen  under  the  fierce, 
scorching  rays  of  the  tropical  sun.  In  one  place,  where  the 
road  was  narrow  and  sunken,  we  met  a  pack-train  of  mules 
returning  from  the  front.  Frightened  at  something,  just 
before  they  reached  the  artillery,  they  suddenly  broke  into 
a  wild  stampede,  and  as  they  could  not  escape  on  either  side, 
owing  to  the  height  of  the  banks  and  the  denseness  of  the 
undergrowth,  they  jumped  in  among  the  guns  and  caissons 
and  floundered  about  until  the  whole  battery  was  involved  in 
an  almost  inextricable  tangle,  which  blocked  the  road  for 
more  than  an  hour.  I  tried  to  get  around  the  jam  of  mules, 
horses,  and  cannon  by  climbing  the  bank  and  forcing  my  way 
through  the  jungle;  but  I  was  so  torn  by  thorns  and  pricked 
by  the  sharp  spines  of  the  Spanish  bayonet  that  I  soon  gave 
up  the  attempt,  and,  returning  to  the  road,  sat  down,  in  the 
shadiest  place  I  could  find,  to  rest,  take  a  drink  from  my 
canteen,  and  await  developments.  If  General  Linares,  when 
he  retreated,  had  left  behind  a  squad  or  two  of  sharp 
shooters  and  bushwhackers  to  harass  our  advance  at  narrow 
and  difficult  places  in  the  road,  what  a  chance  they  would 
have  had  when  the  pack-mules  jumped  into  that  battery! 
With  the  help  given  by  a  detachment  of  engineers,  who  were 
working  on  the  road  a  short  distance  ahead,  the  mules  were 
finally  extricated,  and  the  procession  moved  on. 

Six  or  eight  miles  from  Siboney  we  passed  a  solitary,  and 
of  course  empty,  house,  standing  back  a  little  from  the  road, 
in  a  farm-like  opening,  or  clearing.  This  house,  Mr.  Elwell 
informed  me,  was  Sevilla.  I  had  supposed,  before  I  left  the 
ship,  that  Guasimas  and  Sevilla  were  villages— as,  indeed, 
they  are  represented  to  be  on  all  the  Spanish  maps  of 
the  country.  But  I  soon  learned  not  to  put  my  trust  in 
Spanish  maps.  Most  of  them  have  not  been  revised  or  cor- 


98  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

reeled  in  half  a  century,  and  they  were  full  of  errors  in  the 
first  place.  There  is  not  a  village,  nor  a  hamlet,  on  this 
whole  road  from  Siboney  to  Santiago;  and  the  only  two 
houses  I  saw  had  been  abandoned  for  weeks,  if  not  months. 
The  road  runs,  almost  everywhere,  through  a  tangled,  tropi 
cal  wilderness;  and  if  there  ever  were  any  villages  on  it,  they 
have  long  since  disappeared. 

The  Sevilla  house  seems  to  stand  on  or  near  the  crest  of 
the  highest  ridge  that  the  road  crosses;  and  a  short  distance 
beyond  it,  through  an  opening  in  the  trees,  we  caught  sight, 
suddenly  and  unexpectedly,  of  the  city  of  Santiago  itself— 
a  long,  ragged  line  of  pink  barracks,  thatched  houses,  church 
steeples,  and  wide-spreading  trees,  standing  upon  a  low  hill 
on  the  other  side  of  what  looked  like  a  green,  slightly  rolling 
meadow,  which  was  five  or  six  hundred  feet  below  the  position 
that  we  occupied,  and  perhaps  three  miles  away.  This 
meadow,  as  I  subsequently  ascertained,  was  itself  made  up 
of  hills,  among  them  El  Pozo  and  the  high,  bare  ridge  of  San 
Juan ;  but  from  our  elevated  point  of  view  the  hills  and  val 
leys  seemed  to  blend  into  a  gently  rolling  and  slightly  inclined 
plain,  which  was  diversified,  here  and  there,  by  patches  of 
chaparral  or  clumps  of  royal  palm,  but  which  presented, 
apparently,  no  obstacles  at  all  to  the  advance  of  an  attacking 
force.  I  could  not  discover  anything  that  looked  like  a  fort 
or  an  extensive  earthwork;  but  I  counted  sixteen  Red  Cross 
flags  flying  over  large  buildings  on  the  side  of  the  city  next 
to  us,  and  with  the  aid  of  a  good  field-glass  I  could  just  see, 
in  front  of  the  long  pink  barrack,  or  hospital,  two  or  three 
faint  brown  lines  which  might  possibly  be  embankments  or 
lines  of  rifle-pits.  The  houses  on  the  El  Pozo  and  San  Juan 
heights  ought  to  have  been  well  within  the  limits  of  vision 
from  that  point  of  view,  but,  as  I  did  not  notice  them,  I 
presume  they  were  hidden  by  the  forest  on  one  side  or  the 
other  of  the  opening  through  which  we  looked. 


A   WALK   TO   THE   FRONT  99 

After  studying  the  city  for  ten  minutes,  and  wondering  a 
little  at  its  apparent  defenselessness,  we  pushed  on  down  the 
western  slope  of  the  ridge  to  the  camp  of  the  Rough  Riders, 
which  we  found  about  half  a  mile  from  the  Sevilla  house,  in 
an  open  glade,  or  field,  on  the  right-hand  side  of  the  road. 
The  long  grass  had  been  beaten  down  into  such  trails  as  a 
bear  would  make  in  wandering  hither  and  thither  among  the 
dirty  shelter-tents;  and  following  one  of  these  devious  paths 
across  the  encampment,  we  found  Lieutenant-Colonel  Roose 
velt  standing  with  two  or  three  other  officers  in  front  of  a 
white-cotton  rain-sheet,  or  tent-fly,  stretched  across  a  pole 
so  as  to  protect  from  rain,  or  at  least  from  vertical  rain,  a 
little  pile  of  blankets  and  personal  effects.  There  was  a 
camp-chair  under  the  tree,  and  near  it,  in  the  shade,  had  been 
slung  a  hammock;  but,  with  these  exceptions,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Roosevelt's  quarters  were  no  more  comfortable  than 
those  of  his  men.  He  was  dressed  in  the  costume  which 
he  wore  throughout  the  Santiago  campaign— a  coarse  blue- 
flannel  shirt,  wide  open  at  the  throat;  brown-canvas  trousers 
and  leggings;  and  a  broad-brimmed  felt  hat  put  on  over  a 
blue  polka-dot  handkerchief  in  such  a  way  that  the  kerchief 
hung  down,  like  a  havelock,  over  the  nape  of  his  neck.  As 
he  cordially  shook  hands  with  me  there  flashed  into  the 
field  of  my  mental  vision  a  picture  of  him  as  I  had  seen  him 
last— in  full  evening  dress,  making  a  speech  at  the  Fellow- 
craft  Club  in  New  York,  and  expressing,  in  a  metaphor  almost 
pictorially  graphic,  his  extremely  unfavorable  opinion  of  the 
novels  of  Edgar  Saltus.  In  outward  appearance  there  was 
little  resemblance  between  the  Santiago  Rough  Rider  and 
the  orator  of  the  Fellowcraft  Club;  but  the  force,  vigor,  and 
strength  of  the  personality  were  so  much  more  striking  than 
the  dress  in  which  it  happened,  for  the  moment,  to  be  clothed, 
that  there  seemed  to  be  really  no  difference  between  my 
latest  recollection  and  my  present  impression  of  the  man. 


100  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

We  were  presented  to  Colonel  (now  General)  Wood,  who 
seemed  to  me  to  be  a  man  of  quiet  manner  but  great  reserve 
power,  and  for  twenty  minutes  we  discussed  the  fight  at 
Guasimas,— which  Roosevelt  said  he  would  not  have  missed 
for  the  best  year  in  his  life,— the  road,  the  campaign,  and  the 
latest  news  from  the  United  States.  Then,  as  it  was  getting 
late  in  the  afternoon  and  we  had  eight  or  nine  miles  to  walk 
before  dark,  we  refreshed  ourselves  with  a  hasty  lunch  of 
hard  bread  and  water,  took  a  number  of  letters  from  officers 
of  the  Rough  Riders  to  post  at  the  first  opportunity,  and 
started  back  for  the  ship. 

The  Siboney-Santiago  road,  at  that  time  and  for  several 
days  thereafter,  was  comparatively  dry  and  in  fairly  good 
condition.  It  had  to  be  widened  a  little  in  some  places,  and 
a  company  or  two  of  soldiers  from  the  Tenth  Cavalry  were 
working  on  it  just  beyond  the  Rough  Riders'  camp;  but,  as 
far  as  we  went,  loaded  army  wagons  could  get  over  it  with 
out  the  least  difficulty.  Supplies  at  the  front,  nevertheless, 
were  very  short.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Roosevelt  told  me  that 
his  command  had  only  enough  hard  bread  and  bacon  for  that 
night's  supper,  and  that  if  more  did  not  come  before  dark 
there  would  be  no  breakfast  for  them  in  the  morning.  I 
cannot  now  remember  whether  we  met  a  supply-train  on  our 
way  back  to  Siboney,  or  not;  but  I  think  not. 

At  the  intersection  of  the  road  with  the  mesa  trail,  we 
stopped  for  a  few  moments  to  look  over  the  battle-field  of 
Guasimas.  Evidences  and  traces  of  the  fight,  in  the  shape 
of  cartridge-shells  and  -clips,  bullet-splintered  trees,  impro 
vised  stretchers,  and  blood-soaked  clothes  and  bandages, 
were  to  be  seen  almost  everywhere,  and  particularly  on  the 
trail  along  which  the  Rough  Riders  had  advanced.  At  one 
spot,  in  a  little  hollow  or  depression  of  the  trail,  from  which 
one  could  see  out  into  an  open  field  about  one  hundred  yards 
distant,  the  ground  was  completely  covered  with  cartridge- 


A  WALK  TO1 'THE''1- FRONT  'lOl 

shells  and  -clips  from  both  Mauser  and  Krag-Jorgensen  rifles. 
A  squad  of  Spaniards  had  apparently  used  the  hollow  as  a 
place  of  shelter  first,  and  had  fired  two  or  three  hundred 
shots  from  it,  strewing  the  ground  with  the  clips  and  brass 
shells  of  their  Mauser  cartridges.  Then  the  Rough  Riders 
had  evidently  driven  them  out  and  occupied  the  hollow  them* 
selves,  firing  two  or  three  hundred  more  shots,  and  covering 
the  yellow  cartridge-shells  of  the  Mauser  rifles  with  a  silvery 
layer  of  empty  tubes  from  the  Krag-Jorgensens.  It  looked 
as  if  one  might  pick  up  a  bushel  or  two  of  these  shells  in  an 
area  ten  or  fifteen  feet  square. 

A  short  distance  from  the  intersection  of  the  trail  with 
the  road  was  a  large  grave-shaped  mound  of  fresh  earth, 
under  which  had  been  buried  together  eight  of  the  men  killed 
on  our  side  during  the  fight.  There  had  been  no  time,  ap 
parently,  to  prepare  and  put  up  an  inscribed  headboard  to 
show  who  the  dead  men  were,  but  some  of  their  comrades 
had  carefully  collected  two  or  three  hundred  stones  and 
pebbles— things  not  easy  to  find  in  a  tropical  jungle— and 
had  laid  them  close  together  on  the  burial-mound  in  the 
form  of  a  long  cross. 

Near  this  mound,  and  on  the  trail  leading  to  it  from  Sibo- 
ney,  I  saw,  for  the  first  time,  Cuban  land-crabs,  and  formed 
the  opinion,  which  subsequent  experience  only  confirmed, 
that  they,  with  the  bloody-necked  Cuban  vultures,  are  the 
most  disgusting  and  repellent  of  all  created  things.  Taran 
tulas,  rattlesnakes,  and  some  lizards  are  repulsive  to  the  eye 
and  unpleasantly  suggestive  to  the  imagination;  but  the 
ugliest  of  them  all  is  not  half  so  uncanny,  hideous,  and  loath 
some  to  me  as  the  Cuban  land-crab.  It  resembles  the  com 
mon  marine  crab  in  form,  and  varies  in  size  from  the  diam 
eter  of  a  small  saucer  to  that  of  a  large  dinner-plate.  Instead 
of  being  gray  or  brown,  however,  like  its  aquatic  relative,  it 
is  highly  colored  in  diversified  shades  of  red,  scarlet,  light 


102  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

yeflow,  orange,  and  black.  Sometimes  one  tint  prevails, 
sometimes  another,  and  occasionally  all  of  these  colors  are 
fantastically  blended  in  a  single  specimen.  The  creature 
has  two  long  fore  claws,  or  pincers;  small  eyes,  mounted  like 
round  berries  on  the  ends  of  short  stalks  or  pedicels;  and  a 
mouth  that  seems  to  be  formed  by  two  horny,  beak-like 
mandibles.  It  walks  or  runs  with  considerable  rapidity  in  any 
direction,— backward,  sidewise,  or  straight  ahead,— and  is 
sure  to  go  in  the  direction  that  you  least  expect.  If  you 
approach  one,  it  throws  itself  into  what  seems  to  be  a  de 
fensive  attitude,  raises  aloft  its  long  fore  claws,  looks  at 
you  intently  for  a  moment,  and  then  backs  or  sidles  away  on 
its  posterior  legs,  gibbering  noiselessly  at  you  with  the  horny 
mandibles  of  its  impish  mouth,  and  waving  its  arms  dis 
tractedly  in  the  air  like  a  frightened  and  hysterical  woman 
trying  to  keep  off  some  blood-chilling  apparition. 

All  of  these  crabs  are  scavengers  by  profession  and  night- 
prowlers  by  habit,  and  they  do  not  emerge  from  their  lurk 
ing-places  in  the  jungle  and  make  their  appearance  on  the 
trails  until  the  sun  gets  low  in  the  west.  Then  they  come 
out  by  the  hundred,  if  not  by  the  thousand;  and  as  it  begins 
to  grow  dark,  the  still  atmosphere  of  the  deep,  lonely  forest 
is  filled  with  the  rustling,  crackling  noise  that  they  make  as 
they  scramble  through  the  bushes  or  climb  over  the  stiff, 
dry  blades  of  the  Spanish  bayonet.  I  think  it  is  not  an  ex 
aggeration  to  say  that  at  almost  any  point  on  the  Cuban  trail 
between  Guasimas  and  Siboney  I  could  stand  still  for  a 
moment  and  count  from  fifty  to  one  hundred  of  them,  crawl 
ing  out  of  the  forest  and  across  the  path.  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Roosevelt  told  me  that  nothing  interfered  so  much 
at  first  with  his  sleep  in  the  field  as  the  noise  made  by  these 
crabs  in  the  bushes.  It  is  so  like  the  noise  that  would  be 
made  by  a  party  of  guerrillas  or  bushwhackers,  stealing  up 
to  the  camp  under  cover  of  darkness,  that  it  might  well 


A  WALK   TO   THE   FRONT  103 

keep  awake  even  a  man  who  was  neither  nervous  nor 
imaginative. 

Cuban  land-crabs,  like  Cuban  vultures,  are  haunters  of 
battle-fields;  but  they  seek  the  dead  at  night,  while  the  vul 
tures  drink  the  eyes  and  tear  off  the  lips  of  an  unburied 
corpse  in  the  broad  light  of  day.  On  the  battle-field  of  Gua- 
simas,  however,  while  the  sun  was  still  above  the  horizon,  I 
saw,  crawling  over  a  little  pile  of  bloody  rags,  or  bandages, 
a  huge  crab  whose  pale,  waxy-yellow  body  suggested  the 
idea  that  he  had  been  feeding  on  a  yellow-fever  corpse  and 
had  absorbed  its  color.  At  my  approach  he  backed  slowly 
off  the  rags,  opening  and  shutting  his  mouth  noiselessly, 
and  waving  his  fore  claws  toward  me  in  the  air  with  what 
seemed  like  impish  intelligence,  as  if  he  were  saying:  "Go 
away!  What  business  have  you  here?  Blood  and  the  dead 
are  mine." 

There  may  be  something  more  repulsive  and  uncanny  than 
such  a  performance  by  a  huge  corpse-colored  land-crab;  but, 
if  so,  I  have  never  happened  to  see  it.  It  made  me  feel  as 
if  I  should  like  to  do  as  the  Russian  peasant  does  in  similar 
cases— spit  and  cross  myself. 

We  reached  Siboney  about  half-past  five,  and  happening 
to  find  a  boat  from  the  State  of  Texas  waiting  at  the  pier,  we 
got  on  board  in  time  for  dinner,  after  a  walk  of  sixteen  or 
eighteen  miles. 


CHAPTER   X 
SIBONEY   ON   THE   EVE   OF   BATTLE 

DURING  my  absence  at  the  front  on  Monday,  the  auxil 
iary  cruiser  Yale,  with  two  or  three  regiments  of  Michi 
gan  troops  on  board,  arrived  off  Siboney,  and  when  I  went 
on  deck  on  Tuesday  morning  these  reinforcements  were  just 
beginning  to  go  ashore  in  a  long  line  of  small  boats,  towed 
by  a  steam-launch  from  one  of  the  war-ships  of  the  block 
ading  fleet. 

The  landing  of  troops  and  supplies  on  the  Cuban  coast 
was  the  first  serious  difficulty  with  which  General  Shafter 
had  to  contend.  The  little  cove  at  Siboney  was  wholly  un 
sheltered;  there  was  no  wharf  or  pier  at  which  a  steamer 
might  lie;  a  gale,  or  even  a  fresh  breeze,  from  the  southeast 
raised  a  heavy  surf  on  the  strip  of  sand  in  front  of  the  vil 
lage;  the  water  deepened  so  suddenly  and  abruptly,  at  a  dis 
tance  of  fifty  yards  from  the  shore,  that  there  was  practically 
no  anchorage;  and  all  men  and  stores  had  to  be  landed  by 
putting  them  into  small  boats  and  running  them  up  on  the 
beach  through  the  breakers.  At  Daiquiri,  where  General 
Lawton's  division  disembarked,  the  situation  was  a  little 
better,  for  the  reason  that  the  Spanish- American  Iron  Com 
pany  had  built  there  a  substantial  pier,  of  which  the  army 
of  invasion  could  make  use.  At  that  place,  therefore,  Gen 
eral  Shafter  disembarked  a  large  part  of  his  command,  and 

104 


SIBONEY   ON   THE   EVE   OF   BATTLE       105 

unloaded  all  his  wagons,  siege-guns,  light  artillery,  etc.  The 
mules  and  horses  were  put  ashore— or  rather  pitched  over 
board  with  the  expectation  that  they  would  swim  ashore— at 
Siboney;  but,  owing  to  unskilful  management  and  lack  of 
guidance,  twelve  per  cent,  of  the  mules— fifty  out  of  four 
hundred  and  fifteen— perished.  Some,  instead  of  making 
for  the  shore,  swam  directly  out  to  sea  until  they  became 
exhausted  and  sank;  while  others  attempted  to  land  on  the 
eastern  side  of  the  cove,  where  there  was  no  beach,  and  were 
drowned  under  the  rocks.  Inasmuch  as  the  total  number  of 
draft-  and  pack-animals  loaded  at  Tampa  was  wholly  in 
adequate  to  meet  the  necessities  of  such  an  expedition,  the 
drowning  of  twelve  per  cent,  of  them,  after  they  had  reached 
their  destination,  was  a  serious  and,  it  seems  to  me,  unneces 
sary  loss. 

In  the  disembarkation  of  his  troops,  General  Shafter  had 
the  assistance  of  skilled  officers  and  well-drilled  sailors  from 
the  blockading  fleet,  to  say  nothing  of  half  a  dozen  steam- 
launches  and  fifty-two  good  boats;  but  when  it  came  to  un 
loading  and  landing  stores,  he  had  to  rely  on  his  own  men 
and  his  own  facilities,  and  it  soon  became  painfully  evident 
that  they  were  not  equal  to  the  requirements  of  the  situa 
tion.  I  watched  the  landing  of  supplies  all  day  Tuesday,  and 
formed  the  opinion  that  it  was  disorderly,  unskilful,  and  un 
intelligent.  In  the  first  place,  many  of  the  steamers  from 
which  supplies  were  being  taken  lay  too  far  from  the  beach; 
and  there  seemed  to  be  no  one  who  had  authority  or  power 
enough  to  compel  them  to  come  nearer.  As  a  result  of  this, 
the  boats  and  lighters  were  unable  to  make  as  quick  and 
frequent  trips  as  they  might  have  made  if  the  transports  had 
been  within  one  hundred  yards  of  the  beach,  instead  of  half 
a  mile  away. 

In  the  second  place,  most  of  the  boats  and  lighters  seemed 
to  be  directed  and  handled  by  men  who  had  had  little  ex- 


106  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

perience  in  boating  and  no  experience  whatever  in  landing 
through  heavy  surf.  As  a  result  of  this,  boats  were  often 
stove  against  the  timbers  of  the  little  pier  which  the  engineer 
corps  had  hastily  built;  while  the  lighters,  instead  of  being 
held  by  an  anchor  and  stern-line  as  they  went  into  the  break 
ers,  were  allowed  to  swing  around  into  the  trough  of  the  sea, 
where  they  either  filled  and  sank,  or  drifted  ashore,  broad 
side  to  the  beach,  in  such  a  position  that  fifty  men  could 
hardly  turn  them  around  and  get  them  off. 

Finally,  the  soldiers  and  Cubans  who  acted  as  stevedores, 
carrying  the  boxes  from  the  boats  and  piling  them  on  the 
pier,  were  not  intelligently  directed,  and,  consequently,  la 
bored  without  method  or  judgment— getting  in  one  another's 
way;  allowing  the  pier  to  become  so  blocked  up  with  stuff 
that  nobody  could  move  on  it,  much  less  work;  and  wasting 
more  energy  in  talking,  shouting,  and  bossing  one  another 
than  they  utilized  in  doing  the  thing  that  was  to  be  done. 

If  I  had  ever  had  any  doubt  with  regard  to  the  expediency 
of  giving  to  the  navy  full  and  absolute  control  of  the  army 
and  its  supplies  while  at  sea,  such  doubt  would  have  been 
removed  by  one  day's  observation  at  Siboney.  Army  officers, 
as  a  rule,  know  nothing  of  water  transportation,  and  cannot 
reasonably  be  expected  to  know  anything  about  it;  and  to 
put  them  in  charge  of  transports,  lighters,  and  surf -boats  is 
almost  as  inconsiderate  as  to  put  a  sailor  in  charge  of  a  farm 
and  expect  him,  without  any  previous  training,  to  run  reap 
ing-,  binding-,  and  threshing-machines,  take  proper  care  of  his 
live  stock,  and  get  as  much  out  of  the  soil  as  an  agricultural 
expert  would.  Every  man  to  his  trade;  and  the  landing  of 
supplies  from  thirty  or  forty  transports,  in  small  boats,  on 
an  unsheltered,  surf -beaten  coast,  is  not  the  trade  of  an  army 
quartermaster.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Humphrey  and  Major 
Jacobs  undoubtedly  did  all  that  they  could  do,  with  their 
knowledge  and  experience,  and  with  the  limited  facilities 


SIBONEY   ON   THE   EVE   OF   BATTLE       107 

that  General  Shafter  had  provided  for  them,  to  get  supplies 
ashore;  but  the  results  were  not  gratifying,  either  to  ob 
servers  at  Siboney,  or  to  soldiers  at  the  front.  If  officers  of 
the  navy  had  directed  the  loading  of  stores  on  the  transports 
at  Tampa,  and  the  unloading  and  landing  of  them  at  Daiquiri 
and  Siboney,  there  would  have  been  a  properly  equipped 
hospital  at  the  latter  place  five  days  sooner  than  there  was; 
there  would  have  been  forty  or  fifty  more  mules  in  the  army's 
pack-train;  the  beach  would  not  have  been  strewn  with  the 
wrecks  of  mismanaged  boats  and  lighters;  and  the  transport- 
steamers  Alamo,  Breakwater,  Iroquois,  Vigilancia,  and  La 
Grande  Duchesse  would  not  have  brought  back  to  the  United 
States  hundreds  of  tons  of  supplies  intended  for,  and  ur 
gently  needed  by,  our  soldiers  at  the  front. 

On  the  afternoon  of  Tuesday,  June  28,  one  of  the  small 
vessels  of  the  mosquito  fleet  arrived  from  Guantanamo  Bay 
with  a  letter  from  Captain  McCalla  in  which  he  said  that 
General  Perez  had  furnished  a  pack-train  and  an  escort  for 
the  food  that  the  Red  Cross  had  promised  to  send  to  the  Guan 
tanamo  refugees,  and  that  he  would  like  to  have  us  return 
there  as  soon  as  possible  and  land  five  thousand  rations.  As 
our  hospital  work  on  shore  was  well  under  way,  and  Dr. 
Lesser  and  the  nurses  had  been  supplied  with  everything 
that  they  would  need  for  a  day  or  two,  Miss  Barton  decided 
to  fill  Captain  McCalla's  requisition  at  once.  Late  Tuesday 
evening,  therefore,  the  State  of  Texas  left  Siboney,  and  after 
a  quiet  and  peaceful  run  down  the  coast  entered  Guantanamo 
Bay  about  six  o'clock  Wednesday  morning.  At  half-past  six 
Captain  McCalla  came  on  board  to  make  arrangements  for 
the  landing,  and  in  less  than  two  hours  there  was  a  large 
lighter  alongside,  with  a  steam-launch  to  tow  it  to  the  place 
where  an  officer  of  General  Perez's  command  was  waiting  for 
it  with  a  pack-train  and  an  escort.  Before  noon  ten  or  fifteen 
thousand  pounds  of  supplies,  consisting  principally  of  beans, 


108  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

rice,  hard  bread,  and  South  American  jerked  beef,  had  been 
safely  landed  on  the  western  side  of  the  entrance  to  the  lower 
harbor;  and  as  we  passed  the  point,  on  our  return,  we  saw 
a  large  party  of  Cubans  carrying  the  boxes  and  barrels  up 
the  bank. 

We  reached  Siboney  early  that  evening,  drifted  and  rolled 
all  night  on  a  heavy  swell,  a  mile  or  two  off  the  coast,  and 
at  daybreak  on  the  following  morning  ran  close  in  to  the 
beach  and  began  landing  supplies  for  several  thousand  desti 
tute  Cuban  refugees  who  had  assembled  at  the  little  village 
of  Firmeza,  three  miles  back  of  Siboney  in  the  hills.  In  get 
ting  provisions  ashore  at  Siboney,  we  encountered  precisely 
the  same  difficulties  that  the  army  had  to  meet;  but  we  for 
tunately  had  with  us,  as  chief  of  transportation,  a  man  who 
was  familiar  with  boats  and  who  had  had  large  experience 
in  handling  them  in  circumstances  and  under  conditions  simi 
lar  to  those  that  prevailed  on  the  Cuban  coast.  In  proportion 
to  our  facilities,  therefore,  we  got  more  stuff  ashore  in  a 
given  time  than  the  army  quartermasters  did,  and  with  fewer 
accidents.  Mr.  Warner,  I  think,  was  the  first  man  to  use, 
at  Siboney,  an  anchor  and  a  stern-line  to  prevent  a  boat  or 
a  lighter  from  broaching  to  in  the  surf.  It  was  a  simple 
enough  expedient,  but  nobody,  apparently,  had  thought  of 
it.  By  dropping  an  anchor  astern,  just  before  the  lighter 
reached  the  outer  edge  of  the  breakers,  and  then  slacking 
off  the  line  until  the  boat  was  near  enough  so  that  thirty 
Cubans  could  rush  into  the  water,  seize  it,  and  run  it  up  on 
the  beach,  a  landing  was  effected  without  difficulty  or  risk. 
Then,  when  the  supplies  had  been  unloaded,  the  stern-anchor 
line  could  be  used  again  as  a  means  of  pulling  the  lighter 
off  through  the  surf  into  smooth  water  and  preventing  it  from 
swinging  around  broadside  to  the  sea  while  being  launched. 
The  best  time  for  this  work  was  between  five  and  ten  o'clock 
in  the  morning.  After  ten  o'clock  there  was  almost  always 


SIBONEY   ON   THE   EVE   OF   BATTLE       109 

a  fresh  breeze  from  the  southeast,  which  raised  such  a  surf 
on  the  beach  that  unless  the  landing  of  supplies  was  a  matter 
of  extreme  urgency  it  had  to  be  temporarily  suspended.  We 
succeeded  in  getting  ashore  on  Wednesday  food  enough  to 
satisfy  the  wants  of  the  refugees  at  Firmeza,  and  Mr.  Elwell 
was  sent  there  to  superintend  its  distribution. 

Wednesday  evening,  as  there  seemed  to  be  no  prospect  of 
an  immediate  engagement  at  the  front,  I  decided  to  go  to 
Port  Antonio,  Jamaica,  with  Mr.  Trumbull  White,  on  the  Chi 
cago  "  Record's  "  despatch-boat  Hercules,  to  post  my  letters 
and  the  letters  that  had  been  intrusted  to  me  by  Colonel  Wood 
and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Roosevelt,  and  to  get  some  articles 
of  camp  equipment  which  I  had  ordered  in  New  York,  but 
which  had  failed  to  reach  me  before  the  State  of  Texas  sailed 
from  Key  West. 

We  reached  Port  Antonio  at  eight  o'clock  on  Thursday, 
spent  the  day  there,  and  returned  the  next  night  to  Siboney. 
Early  Friday  morning,  as  we  were  approaching  the  Cuban 
coast,  the  captain  of  the  Hercules  came  down  into  the  cabin 
with  the  astounding  news  that  the  blockading  fleet  had  dis 
appeared.  "The  jig  is  up,  boys!"  he  exclaimed  excitedly. 
"  They  Ve  taken  the  city,  and  the  fleet  is  inside  the  harbor. 
I  can't  see  a  sign  of  a  ship  anywhere  along  the  coast." 

We  all  rushed  on  deck  and  gazed  with  sinking  hearts  at 
the  long  black  line  of  the  rampart  and  the  high  blue  moun 
tains  beyond  it.  If  Santiago  had  been  taken  in  our  absence, 
it  would  be  the  cruelest  blow  that  fortune  had  ever  dealt 
us!  Although  the  sun  was  still  below  the  horizon,  the  atmo 
sphere  was  crystal-clear,  and  we  could  see  without  a  glass  the 
step-like  outline  of  Morro  Castle,  and  even  the  hazy  blue  smoke 
rising  from  the  camp-fires  on  the  beach  at  Siboney;  but  of 
the  war-ships— the  New  York,  the  Brooklyn,  the  Indiana,  and 
the  Texas— there  was  not  a  sign.  I  do  not  know  what  Mr. 
White  thought,— he  seemed  to  be  as  cool  and  imperturbable 


110  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

as  ever,— but  when  I  fully  realized  that  the  fleet  was  not 
there,  and  drew  from  that  fact  the  inevitable  conclusion  that 
the  city  had  been  captured,  I  was  ready  to  anathematize  the 
British  West  Indies,  Port  Antonio,  the  Hercules,  and  the 
cruel  ill  luck  which  had  taken  me  a  hundred  miles  away  at 
the  decisive  moment  of  the  Santiago  campaign. 

As  the  sun  rose  over  the  level  plain  of  the  Caribbean,  and 
the  swift  ocean-going  tug  bore  us  nearer  and  nearer  to  the 
dark  line  of  the  still  distant  coast,  the  captain,  who  had  been 
sweeping  the  base  of  the  rampart  with  a  long  marine  tele 
scope,  suddenly  shouted:  "Aha!  I  think  I  can  see  the  Brook 
lyn,  boys.  It  may  be  all  right  yet."  I  looked  eagerly  toward 
the  position  that  Commodore  Schley's  flagship  usually  occu 
pied  on  the  western  side  of  the  harbor  entrance,  but  could 
see  nothing  that  even  suggested  the  Brooklyn's  familiar 
outline.  If  there  were  any  vessels  of  the  blockading  fleet 
between  us  and  the  land,  they  certainly  were  off  their  sta 
tions  and  very  close  in  under  the  shadow  of  the  land.  But 
the  captain's  eyesight  was  better  than  mine.  In  five  minutes 
more  he  announced  that  he  could  see  the  Brooklyn,  the  New 
York,  and  the  Iowa.  "  They  're  all  there,"  he  added  after  an 
other  look,  "  but  some  of  them  seem  to  be  away  out  of  posi 
tion.  The  New  York  is  off  Aguadores,  and  the  Brooklyn  is 
half-way  down  to  Aserraderos." 

In  fifteen  minutes  more  it  became  apparent  to  us  all  that 
the  height  of  the  rampart  and  the  mountains  back  of  it, 
together  with  the  crystalline  clearness  of  the  atmosphere, 
had  led  us  to  underestimate  the  distance,  and  that,  when  we 
first  took  alarm  at  the  apparent  absence  of  the  blockading 
fleet,  the  war-ships  were  at  least  fifteen  miles  away,  although 
the  coast  did  not  seem  to  be  five.  At  such  a  distance  the 
dull  gray  hulls  of  the  vessels  could  hardly  be  seen,  even  if 
they  were  not  below  our  horizon.  With  much  lighter  hearts, 
but  with  a  feeling,  nevertheless,  that  something  of  impor- 


SIBONEY   ON   THE   EVE   OF   BATTLE       111 

tance  had  occurred  or  was  about  to  occur,  we  ran  down 
alongside  the  Iowa,  hailed  her  through  a  megaphone,  and 
asked  if  there  was  any  news.  "  It 's  reported  that  they  are 
fighting  over  there,"  replied  the  officer  of  the  deck,  waving 
his  hand  toward  Santiago,  "  but  we  have  n't  any  particulars." 
There  was  no  smoke  rising  above  the  rampart  in  the  direction 
of  the  city,  we  could  hear  no  sound  of  cannonading,  and  I 
was  more  than  half  inclined  to  believe  that  the  report  of 
fighting  at  the  front  was  premature;  but  whether  this  were 
so  or  not,  the  Iowa,  the  Texas,  the  New  York,  and  all  the  war 
ships  near  us  were  cleared  for  action;  their  officers  seemed 
to  be  eagerly  awaiting  orders;  Admiral  Sampson's  flagship 
was  exchanging  wigwag  flag-signals  with  a  man  on  the  beach 
beyond  the  mouth  of  the  Aguadores  ravine,  and  it  was  per 
fectly  evident  that  something  was  expected  to  happen.  Under 
such  circumstances,  the  thing  for  us  to  do  was  to  get  back, 
as  speedily  as  possible,  to  Siboney.  Turning  in  a  great  circle 
around  the  Iowa,WQ  steamed  swiftly  eastward  along  the  coast, 
passing  the  New  York,  the  Suwanee,  and  the  Gloucester,  which 
were  lying,  cleared  for  action,  close  under  the  walls  of  the 
Aguadores  fort;  exchanging  greetings  with  the  New  York 
"  Sun's  "  graceful  despatch-boat  Kanapaha,  which  came  hur 
rying  westward  as  if  bound  for  some  important  field  of  ex 
pected  activity;  and  finally  rounding  to  alongside  the  State 
of  Texas  in  the  Siboney  cove. 

There  was  nothing  in  the  appearance  of  the  village  to  in 
dicate  that  a  battle  was  in  progress,  or  even  in  anticipation. 
Boats  were  going  to  and  fro  between  the  transports  and  the 
pier  as  usual;  there  was  the  usual  crowd  of  Cuban  raga 
muffins  and  tatterdemalions  on  the  beach,  with  a  sprinkling 
of  soldiers  in  the  streets;  everything  seemed  to  be  quiet  on 
board  the  State  of  Texas,  and  I  said  to  Mr.  White,  as  I  bade 
him  good-by,  that  I  did  not  believe  we  had  missed  anything 
after  all. 


112  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

We  soon  had  evidence,  however,  that  there  was  an  engage 
ment  in  progress  off  the  coast,  if  not  at  the  front.  Between 
nine  and  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  heavy  cannonading  could 
be  heard  in  the  direction  of  Morro  Castle,  and  great  clouds 
of  white  smoke  began  to  rise  over  a  projecting  point  of  the 
rampart  which  hid,  from  our  point  of  view,  the  mouth  of  the 
Aguadores  ravine.  Anxious  to  see  what  was  going  on,  I  per 
suaded  Miss  Barton  to  let  the  State  of  Texas  run  out  of  the 
cove  and  take  some  position  from  which  we  might  witness 
the  bombardment.  Getting  under  way  at  once,  we  steamed 
out  four  or  five  miles  in  a  west-southwest  direction  to  a  point 
•about  three  miles  off  Aguadores,  from  which  we  could  see  the 
whole  line  of  the  coast.  A  column  of  infantry— the  Thirty- 
third  Michigan,  I  think,  under  command  of  General  Duffield 
—had  moved  westward  along  the  railroad  under  the  rampart 
to  the  mouth  of  the  Aguadores  ravine,  and  was  apparently 
engaged  in  attacking  the  enemy's  position  there  under  cover 
of  Admiral  Sampson's  guns.  We  could  not  clearly  follow  the 
movements  of  the  troops,  for  the  reason  that  they  were  hid 
den,  or  partially  hidden,  by  the  bushes  and  trees,  but  we 
could  see  every  movement  made  and  every  shot  fired  by  the 
war-ships.  The  Gloucester,  on  the  western  side  of  the  notch, 
was  knocking  to  pieces  the  old  stone  fort  half-way  up  the 
hill;  the  New  York,  from  a  position  directly  in  front  of  the 
railroad-bridge,  was  enfilading  the  ravine  with  four-  and 
eight-inch  shells;  while  the  Suwanee,  completely  hidden  most 
of  the  time  in  a  great  cloud  of  smoke,  was  close  in  to  the 
mouth  of  the  river,  sweeping  the  whole  adjacent  region  with 
a  storm  of  projectiles  from  her  rapid-fire  and  machine  guns. 
I  do  not  know  whether  the  old  Aguadores  fort  had  any 
armament  or  not.  Its  sea  face  had  been  reduced  to  a  heap 
of  crumbled  masonry  before  we  reached  the  scene  of  action, 
and  I  did  not  afterward  see  a  shot  fired  from  it,  nor  a  single 
soldier  in  or  about  it.  Its  offensive  power— if  it  ever  had 


SIBONEY   ON   THE   EVE   OF   BATTLE       113 

any— was  so  completely  destroyed  that  I  momentarily  ex 
pected  General  Duffield's  troops  to  ford  the  river  above  the 
railroad-bridge  and  take  undisputed  possession  of  it.  But 
the  Michigan  men  were  apparently  prevented  from  doing  so 
by  the  fire  from  some  rifle-pits  up  the  ravine,  which  the  guns 
of  the  war-ships  could  not,  or  did  not,  wholly  silence.  We 
were  not  in  a  position,  perhaps,  to  form  a  trustworthy  judg 
ment  with  regard  to  the  strength  of  the  Spaniards'  defense; 
but  it  seemed  to  me  that  if  the  attack  had  been  vigorously 
made  and  persistently  followed  up,  the  enemy  might  have 
been  driven  from  the  ravine.  Admiral  Sampson,  in  his  re 
port  of  the  engagement,  says  that  the  Spaniards  had  no 
artillery  except  one  small  field-piece,  which  they  fired  only 
four  or  five  times,  and  that  not  more  than  fifteen  or  twenty 
of  them  could  be  seen,  at  any  time,  in  or  about  the  rifle-pits. 
General  Duffield,  on  the  other  hand,  reports  that  they  num 
bered  five  hundred,  and  that  their  artillery  shelled  the  railroad- 
track  and  the  woods  where  his  troops  were  until  3  P.M.— 
about  five  hours.  That  their  fire  was  not  very  destructive 
sufficiently  appears  from  the  fact  that,  in  half  a  day  of  more 
or  less  continuous  skirmishing,  General  Duffield  lost  only  two 
men  killed  and  six  wounded. 

Between  three  and  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the  Michi 
gan  troops  returned  by  rail  to  Siboney;  the  war-ships  withdrew 
to  their  blockading  stations;  and  the  field,  as  well  as  the 
honors.,  remained  in  possession  of  the  Spaniards.  After  the 
engagement  the  State  of  Texas  ran  close  in  to  the  shore,  and 
we  saw  perhaps  a  dozen  Spanish  soldiers  standing  or  walking 
on  the  hillside  west  of  the  ravine.  There  may  have  been  more 
of  them  in  the  concealment  of  the  woods;  but  my  impression 
is  that  their  force  was  very  small,  and  that  General  Duffield, 
with  the  aid  and  support  of  the  war-ships,  should  have  been 
able  to  clear  the  ravine  and  take  possession  not  only  of  the 
abandoned  fort  but  of  the  commanding  heights  above  it. 


114  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

When  we  got  back  to  Siboney,  late  in  the  afternoon,  the 
village  was  full  of  rumors  of  heavy  fighting  in  front  of  San 
tiago;  and,  an  hour  or  two  after  dark,  wounded  men,  some  on 
foot  and  some  in  army  wagons,  began  to  arrive  at  the  Sibo 
ney  hospital  from  the  distant  field  of  battle.  As  they  had 
all  been  disabled  and  sent  to  the  rear  in  the  early  part  of  the 
day,  they  could  give  us  no  information  with  regard  to  the 
result  of  the  engagement.  Many  of  them  had  been  wounded 
before  they  had  seen  a  Spanish  intrenchment,  or  even  a 
Spanish  soldier;  and  all  they  knew  about  the  fight  was  that 
the  army  had  moved  forward  at  daybreak  and  they  them 
selves  had  been  shot  in  the  woods  by  an  enemy  whom  they 
could  neither  locate  nor  see. 

The  Siboney  hospital,  thanks  to  the  devotion  and  unwearied 
energy  of  Major  Lagarde  and  his  assistants,  was  by  this  time 
in  fairly  good  working  order.  There  was  a  lack  of  blankets, 
pillows,  and  tentage,  and  the  operating  facilities,  perhaps, 
were  not  as  ample  as  they  might  have  been;  but  in  view  of 
the  extraordinary  difficulties  with  which  the  surgeons  had 
had  to  contend,  the  results  were  highly  creditable  to  them, 
even  if  not  wholly  satisfactory  to  an  observer.  As  fast  as 
the  wounded  arrived,  they  walked,  or  were  carried  on  stretch 
ers,  to  two  or  three  large  tents,  pitched  end  to  end  and  open 
ing  into  one  another,  where  hospital  stewards  and  nurses 
placed  them  on  the  tables,  and  the  surgeons,  some  of  them 
stripped  naked  to  the  waist,  examined  their  injuries  by  candle 
light,  and  performed  such  operations  as  were  necessary  to 
give  them  relief.  They  were  then  taken  or  led  away,  and, 
as  far  as  possible,  furnished  with  blankets  and  shelter;  but 
as  the  supply  of  blankets  was  very  short,  and  all  the  avail 
able  houses  and  tents  were  soon  filled,  the  wounded  who  came 
in  after  midnight  were  laid  in  a  row  on  the  ground  and  cov 
ered  with  a  long  strip  of  canvas.  Fortunately,  the  night  was 
clear,  still,  and  warm,  and  a  nearly  full  moon  made  it  almost 


SIBONEY   ON   THE   EVE   OF   BATTLE       115 

as  light  as  day,  so  that  it  was  not  so  cheerless  and  uncom 
fortable  to  lie  out  on  the  ground  without  a  blanket  as  it  would 
have  been  if  the  night  had  been  dark  and  cold,  or  rainy;  but 
it  was  bad  enough. 

Most  of  our  Red  Cross  surgeons  and  nurses  were  assisting 
in  the  operating-tents,  and  I  remained  on  shore  until  after 
three  o'clock  in  the  morning.  There  was  little  that  I  could 
do  beyond  looking  up  the  wounded,  who  frequently  came  into 
the  village  on  foot,  after  a  painful  march  of  ten  or  twelve 
miles,  and  were  so  weak,  hungry,  and  exhausted  that,  instead 
of  coming  to  the  hospital,  they  lay  down  anywhere  in  the 
street  or  under  the  wall  of  a  house.  Some  of  these  men  I 
found,  with  the  assistance  of  a  friendly  and  sympathetic 
Cuban,  and  had  them  carried  on  litters  to  the  operating- 
tents.  All  of  the  wounded  who  came  back  from  the  front 
that  night  ought  to  have  had  hot  tea  or  coffee,  and  some 
such  easily  digested  food  as  malted  milk,  as  most  of  them 
had  eaten  nothing  since  the  early  morning  and  were  worn 
out  with  pain  and  fatigue.  But  of  course  no  provision  had 
been  made  for  supplying  them  even  with  hard  bread  and 
water,  and  when  taken  from  the  operating-tables  they  were 
simply  laid  on  the  ground,  to  get  through  the  night  as  best 
they  could  without  nourishment  or  drink.  We  all  under 
stand,  of  course,  that,  in  the  oft-quoted  words  of  General 
Sherman,  "war  is  hell";  but  it  might  be  made  a  little  less 
hellish  by  adequate  preparation  for  the  reception  and  care  of 
the  wounded. 

I  went  off  to  the  State  of  Texas  between  three  and  four 
o'clock,  and  threw  myself  into  my  berth  just  as  day  was 
beginning  to  break  over  the  hills  east  of  the  cove. 


CHAPTER  XI 
THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN 


ENERAL  SHAPTER  went  to  the  front  to  take  personal 
command  of  the  army  on  Wednesday,  June  29.  At 
that  time  the  divisions  of  Generals  Kent,  Wheeler,  and  Law- 
ton  were  encamped  on  the  Siboney-Santiago  road,  between 
the  high  ridge  of  Sevilla,  from  which  I  had  seen  the  city 
two  days  before,  and  a  half-ruined  house  and  plantation,  two 
or  three  miles  farther  on,  known  as  El  Pozo.  Most  of  the 
troops  were  in  the  valley  of  a  small  stream  which  rises  on 
the  western  slope  of  the  Sevilla  watershed,  runs  for  a  short 
distance  in  the  direction  of  Santiago,  and  then,  after  receiv 
ing  a  number  of  tributaries,  turns  southward,  just  beyond 
the  Pozo  farm-house,  and  fal  s  into  the  sea  through  the  notch 
in  the  rampart  at  Aguadores.  Although  the  bottom  of  this 
valley,  in  general,  was  densely  wooded,  there  was  a  series  of 
grassy  openings,  or  glades,  on  the  northern  side  of  the  stream 
just  east  of  El  Pozo,  and  in  one  of  these  openings  General 
Lawton,  who  led  the  advance,  had  established  his  head 
quarters. 

About  three  miles  due  north  from  El  Pozo,  and  between 
three  and  four  miles  in  a  northeasterly  direction  from  San 
tiago,  there  was  a  small  village  called  Caney,1  which,  on 

1  I  never  heard  this  village  called  El  Caney  by  any  Spaniard  or  any  resi 
dent  of  Santiago.  Mr.  Ramsden,  British  consul  for  many  years  at  the  latter 
place,  always  refers  to  it  in  his  diary  as  "Caney,"  without  the  definite 

116 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN  117 

account  of  its  geographical  position,  was  regarded  as  a  place 
of  considerable  strategic  importance.  It  was  connected  by 
roads  or  practicable  trails  with  Santiago  on  the  west,  Guan- 
tanamo  on  the  east,  and  El  Pozo  on  the  south;  and  an  enem^ 
holding  it  would  not  only  outflank  us  on  that  side  as  soon  as 
we  should  pass  the  Pozo  farm-house,  but,  by  means  of  a  rapid 
cross-march  in  our  rear,  might  cut  or  seriously  imperil  our 
only  line  of  communication  with  our  base  of  supplies  at 
Siboney.  The  fact  was  well  known,  furthermore,  that  there 
was  a  strong  division  of  Spanish  regulars  (about  six  thousand 
men)  at  Guantanamo;  and  if  this  division  should  undertake 
to  reinforce  the  garrison  at  Santiago,  Caney  would  be  directly 
on  its  line  of  march.  In  view  of  these  considerations,  Gen 
eral  Shafter,  after  a  survey  of  the  country  from  the  sum 
mit  of  the  hill  at  El  Pozo,  determined  to  seize  Caney,  and, 
having  thus  cut  off  reinforcements  from  Guantanamo  and 
protected  himself  from  a  flanking  movement  on  the  right, 
advance  directly  upon  the  city.  The  plan  was  good  enough, 
as  far  as  it  went;  but  General  Shafter  had  made  no  recon 
naissance  on  the  Siboney-Santiago  road  beyond  El  Pozo,  and 
was  wholly  ignorant  not  only  of  the  strength  of  the  enemy's 
position  there,  but  of  the  nature  of  the  country  to  be  trav 
ersed.  It  is  true  that  he  had  superficially  looked  over  the 
ground,  once,  from  the  top  of  the  Pozo  hill;  but  he  could 
get,  in  that  way,  very  little  accurate  knowledge  of  the  topog 
raphy  of  the  region,  and  still  less  of  the  Spaniards'  defensive 
strength. 

Our  only  possible  line  of  advance,  in  the  center,  was  the 
Siboney-Santiago  road,  which  ran,  through  a  dense  jungle, 
down  the  valley  of  the  Aguadores  River,  crossed  a  small 
stream  flowing  into  that  river  from  the  north,  then  crossed 

article,  and  this  was  the  name  given  it  by  every  one  in  Santiago  with  whom 
I  talked.  The  use  of  "El"  in  connection  with  Pozo  seems  to  be  correct,  as 
Mr.  Ramsden  invariably  calls  it,  in  English,  "the  Pozo." 


118  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

the  San  Juan  River,  another  tributary  of  the  Aguadores, 
and  finally  emerged  from  the  forest  directly  in  front  of  the 
San  Juan  heights.  The  enemy,  of  course,  knew  exactly 
where  this  road  lay,  and  where  it  came  out  of  the  woods  into 
the  open  country;  and  they  had  so  disposed  their  batteries 
and  rifle-pits  that  they  could  not  only  concentrate  their  fire 
upon  the  lower  stretches  and  the  mouth  of  the  road,  but 
sweep  with  a  hail-storm  of  projectiles  the  whole  margin  of 
the  forest  where  we  should  have  to  deploy  and  form  our 
attacking  line.  General  Shafter  had  not  ascertained  these 
facts  by  means  of  a  reconnaissance,  nor  had  he,  apparently, 
considered  such  a  state  of  affairs  as  a  contingency  to  be 
guarded  against;  but  Mr.  Richard  Harding  Davis  asserts 
that  General  Chaffee,  commander  of  a  brigade  in  General 
Lawton's  division,  anticipated  precisely  this  situation,  and 
predicted,  five  days  before  the  battle,  that  if  our  men  marched 
down  this  trail  into  the  open  country  they  would  be  "  piled 
up  so  high  that  they  would  block  the  road."  He  thought 
that  it  would  be  much  better  to  keep  away  from  the  road 
altogether;  cut  trails  parallel  with  the  entire  front  of  the 
forest  and  hidden  by  it,  with  innumerable  little  trails  leading 
into  the  open;  and  then  march  the  whole  army  out  upon  the 
hills  through  these  trails  at  the  same  moment.  Whether 
this  suggestion  was  ever  made  to  the  commanding  general 
or  not,  I  do  not  know;  but  if  it  was,  it  failed  to  commend 
itself  to  his  judgment.  I  refer  now— perhaps  prematurely 
—to  a  state  of  affairs  in  our  immediate  front  which  was  not 
fully  disclosed  until  much  later;  but  I  do  so  because  know 
ledge  of  it  is  absolutely  essential  to  a  clear  understanding 
of  the  way  in  which  the  battle  of  San  Juan  was  fought. 

General  Shafter's  plan  of  operations,  as  outlined  by  Cap 
tain  Lee,  British  military  attache,  was  substantially  as  fol 
lows:  General  Lawton's  division  was  to  attack  Caney  at 
daylight,  July  1,  and  was  expected  to  drive  the  enemy  quickly 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN  119 

out  of  that  post,  which  then  menaced  our  right  flank.  Mean 
while  the  remainder  of  the  Fifth  Corps  was  to  advance  along 
the  main  trail  toward  Santiago,  pushing  back  the  Spanish 
outposts,  and  occupy  the  line  of  the  San  Juan  River.  There 
it  was  to  deploy  and  await  Lawton,  who,  having  taken  Caney, 
was  to  wheel  to  his  left  and  form  up  on  the  right  of  the  main 
line.  All  these  movements  were  to  be  completed  by  the 
evening  of  the  1st,  and  then  the  whole  army  would  combine 
for  the  assault  of  San  Juan  on  the  2d. 

The  advance  began  on  the  afternoon  of  Thursday,  June 
30.  General  Lawton's  division,  accompanied  by  Capron's 
battery  of  four  field-guns,  marched  out  on  the  Caney  road, 
without  meeting  any  opposition,  and  bivouacked  for  the  night 
behind  a  ridge,  or  hill,  about  a  mile  southeast  of  the  village. 
At  the  same  time  the  remainder  of  the  corps,  consisting  of 
General  Wheeler's  cavalry  division,  the  division  of  General 
Kent,  and  three  batteries  of  light  artillery,  moved  down  the 
Siboney-Santiago  road,  and  went  into  camp  near  the  Pozo 
farm-house.  At  daybreak  on  Friday,  July  1,  both  columns 
were  in  position,  within  striking  distance  of  the  enemy's 
intrenched  line.  As  the  fighting  at  Caney  was  wholly  inde 
pendent  of  the  fighting  at  San  Juan,  it  will  be  more  con 
venient  to  regard  the  two  engagements  as  separate  battles, 
although  they  were  carried  on  simultaneously.  I  shall  not 
attempt,  however,  to  do  more  than  describe  the  tactics  on 
the  two  widely  separated  fields,  and  briefly  state  the  results. 

The  defenses  of  Caney  consisted  of  a  strong  stone  fort  on 
a  steep  conical  hill  at  the  southeastern  corner  of  the  village, 
and  four  or  five  substantial  log  blockhouses,  so  placed  as 
to  command  every  possible,  or  at  least  every  practicable, 
avenue  of  approach.  The  blockhouses  were  connected  one 
with  another  by  deep,  narrow  trenches;  the  stone  fort  was 
surrounded  by  a  network  of  outlying  rifle-pits;  there  was  a 
barbed-wire  entanglement  along  the  whole  eastern  front  of 


120  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

the  enemy's  position;  and  the  large  trees  in  the  village,  as 
well  as  the  houses  and  the  old  stone  church,  were  full  of 
sharp-shooters.  The  garrison  of  the  place,  not  including  the 
inhabitants,  who,  of  course,  participated  to  a  greater  or  less 
extent  in  the  fighting,  consisted  of  three  companies  of  in 
fantry  belonging  to  the  San  Luis  brigade  and  forty-seven 
guerrillas— a  total  force  of  five  hundred  and  fourteen  men. 
The  regulars  were  armed  with  the  Mauser  magazine-rifle, 
while  the  guerrillas  used  a  .45-caliber  Remington,  carrying 
a  large  and  very  destructive  brass-jacketed  ball.  They  had 
neither  artillery  nor  machine-guns,  and  relied  wholly  upon 
their  small  arms,  their  rifle-pits,  and  the  great  natural 
strength  of  their  position.  The  officer  in  command  was 
Brigadier-General  Joaquin  Vara  del  Key.  The  attacking 
force,  under  direction  of  General  Lawton,  consisted  of  four 
brigades,  numbering  about  forty-five  hundred  men,  and  was 
made  up  wholly  of  regulars  with  the  exception  of  the  Second 
Massachusetts. 

The  battle  began  at  half-past  six  o'clock  in  the  morning. 
General  Chaffee's  brigade  took  up  a  position  six  or  eight 
hundred  yards  from  the  fort  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  vil 
lage;  Ludlow's  brigade  marched  around  on  the  western  side, 
so  as  to  seize  the  Caney-Santiago  road  and  thus  cut  off  the 
enemy's  escape;  while  the  brigade  of  General  Miles  closed  in 
on  the  south.  Capron's  battery,  from  the  summit  of  a  hill  a 
little  more  than  a  mile  southeast  of  the  fort,  fired  the  first 
shot  at  6:35  A.  M.  Our  infantry  on  General  Chaffee's  side 
then  opened  fire;  the  Spaniards  replied  from  their  fort, 
blockhouses,  and  rifle-pits;  and  the  engagement  soon  became 
general.  For  the  next  three  or  four  hours  the  battle  was 
little  more  than  a  rifle  duel  at  about  six  hundred  yards'  range. 
Capron's  battery,  from  the  top  of  the  distant  hill,  continued 
to  bombard  the  fort  and  the  village  at  intervals,  but  its  fire 
was  slow  and  not  very  effective.  Our  infantry,  meanwhile, 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN    121 

were  suffering  far  more  loss  than  they  were  able  to  inflict, 
for  the  reason  that  they  could  find  little  or  no  shelter,  while 
the  Spaniards  were  protected  by  loopholed  walls  and  deep 
rifle-pits,  and  were  firing  at  ranges  which  had  been  previously 
measured  and  were  therefore  accurately  known.  In  spite  of 
their  losses,  however,  our  men  continued  to  creep  forward, 
and  about  eleven  o'clock  General  Chaffee's  brigade  reached 
and  occupied  the  crest  of  a  low  ridge  not  more  than  three 
hundred  yards  from  the  northeastern  side  of  the  village. 
The  fire  of  the  Spanish  sharp-shooters,  at  this  short  range, 
was  very  close  and  accurate,  and  before  noon  more  than  one 
hundred  of  General  Chaffee's  men  lay  dead  or  wounded  in 
a  sunken  road  about  fifty  yards  back  of  the  firing  line.  The 
losses  in  the  brigades  of  Generals  Ludlow  and  Miles,  on  the 
western  and  southern  sides  of  the  village,  were  almost  as 
great,  and  at  1:30  P.M.  the  attacking  force  seemed  to  be 
barely  holding  its  own.  At  this  critical  moment,  when  the 
chances  of  success  or  defeat  seemed  to  be  almost  evenly 
balanced,  General  Lawton  received  an  order  from  General 
Shafter  to  abandon  the  attack  on  Caney  and  hurry  to  the 
relief  of  Generals  Kent  and  Sumner,  who  were  hotly  engaged 
in  front  of  the  San  Juan  heights.  Believing  that  a  retreat  at 
this  juncture  would  be  disastrous,  and  that  the  demoralizing 
effect  of  a  repulse  at  Caney  would  more  than  counterbalance 
the  support  that  he  could  give  the  center  of  the  line  in  front 
of  San  Juan,  General  Lawton  disregarded  this  order  and 
pressed  the  attack  with  renewed  vigor.  Capron's  battery, 
about  this  time,  got  the  range  of  the  stone  fort,  shot  away 
its  flagstaff,  amid  vociferous  cheers  from  our  men,  and  soon 
began  to  make  great  breaches  in  its  massive  walls.  General 
Chaffee,  who  had  been  directed  to  make  a  final  assault  on 
the  fort  when,  in  his  judgment,  the  proper  time  had  come, 
then  gave  the  order  to  charge;  and  the  Twelfth  Infantry, 
closely  followed  by  several  regiments  from  General  Miles's 


122  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

brigade,  and  the  brigade  of  General  Bates,  which  had  just 
arrived  from  Siboney,  swarmed  up  the  steep  slope  of  the  hill, 
drove  the  Spaniards  out  of  their  rifle-pits,  and  took  the  fort 
by  storm.  The  first  man  inside  its  walls  was  Mr.  James 
Creelman,  a  war  correspondent,  who  was  shot  through  the 
shoulder  while  recovering  the  Spanish  flag.  Although  the 
fire  from  the  village  and  the  blockhouses  still  continued,  it 
gradually  slackened,  and  in  less  than  half  an  hour  the  Span 
iards  who  remained  alive  gave  up  the  struggle  and  retreated 
by  the  northern  Santiago  road,  suffering  considerable  loss 
from  the  fire  of  General  Ludlow's  brigade  as  they  passed. 
At  4  P.  M.  village,  fort,  and  blockhouses  were  all  in  undisputed 
possession  of  General  Lawton's  gallant  division.  The  battle 
had  lasted  about  nine  hours,  and  in  that  time  seven  hundred 
men  had  been  killed  or  wounded.  Our  own  loss  was  four 
officers  and  eighty-four  men  killed,  and  twenty-four  officers 
and  three  hundred  and  thirty-two  men  wounded;  total,  four 
hundred  and  forty-four.  The  loss  of  the  Spaniards,  as  re 
ported  by  themselves,  was  two  hundred  and  forty-eight,— 
about  one  half  their  entire  strength,— not  including  inhabi 
tants  of  the  village  killed  in  their  houses  and  in  the  streets. 
General  Vara  del  Key,  their  commander,  was  shot  through 
both  legs  as  he  stood  in  the  square  opposite  the  village  church 
after  the  storming  of  the  fort,  and  then,  as  his  men  were 
placing  him  on  a  stretcher,  he  was  instantly  killed  by  a 
bullet  through  the  head.  Our  loss,  in  this  obstinately  fought 
battle,  was  numerically  much  greater  than  that  of  the 
Spaniards;  but  their  percentage  of  loss,  based  on  the 
number  of  men  engaged,  was  nearly  five  times  as  great 
as  ours.  When  they  retreated,  they  left  forty-eight  per 
cent,  of  their  whole  force  dead  or  wounded  in  the  intrench- 
ments  that  they  had  so  gallantly  defended,  and  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Punet  was  able  to  collect  and  take  back  to  Santiago 
that  night  only  one  hundred  and  three  of  the  five  hundred 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN  123 

and  fourteen  officers  and  men  who  originally  composed  the 
garrison. 

The  loss  on  our  side  in  this  engagement  was  far  greater 
than  it  probably  would  have  been  if  General  Lawton  had  had 
artillery  enough  to  destroy  the  fort  and  blockhouses  and  drive 
the  Spaniards  out  of  their  rifle-pits  before  he  pushed  forward 
his  infantry;  but  it  was  not  expected,  of  course,  that  the  tak 
ing  of  a  small  and  comparatively  insignificant  village  would 
be  so  serious  and  difficult  a  matter;  and  as  General  Shafter 
had  only  sixteen  light  field-guns  in  all,  he  doubtless  thought 
that  he  could  not  spare  more  than  four  for  the  attack  on 
Caney. 

The  moral  effect  of  this  battle  was  to  give  each  of  the 
combatants  a  feeling  of  sincere  respect  for  the  bravery  of  the 
other.  Our  men  never  doubted,  after  July  1,  that  the  Span 
iards  would  fight  stubbornly— at  least,  behind  intrenchments; 
while  the  Spaniards,  in  turn,  were  greatly  impressed  by  the 
dash,  impetuosity,  and  unflinching  courage  of  General  Law- 
ton's  regulars.  A  staff -officer  of  General  Vara  del  Key  said 
to  a  correspondent  after  the  battle:  "I  have  never  seen  any 
thing  to  equal  the  courage  and  dash  of  those  Americans,  who, 
stripped  to  the  waist,  offering  their  naked  breasts  to  our 
murderous  fire,  literally  threw  themselves  on  our  trenches— 
on  the  very  muzzles  of  our  guns.  We  had  the  advantage  in 
position,  and  mowed  them  down  by  the  hundreds;  but  they 
never  retreated  or  fell  back  an  inch.  As  one  man  fell,  shot 
through  the  heart,  another  would  take  his  place,  with  grim 
determination  and  unflinching  devotion  to  duty  in  every  line 
of  his  face.  Their  gallantry  was  heroic."  There  could 
hardly  be  a  more  generous  or  a-  better  deserved  encomium. 

The  battle  on  the  Siboney-Santiago  road,  in  the  center  of 
our  line,  began  nearly  two  hours  later  than  the  battle  at 
Caney.  Grimes's  battery,  which  had  taken  position  on  a  hill 
near  the  Pozo  farm-house,  opened  fire  on  the  heights  of  San 


124  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

Juan  about  eight  o'clock.  A  few  moments  later  the  Span 
iards,  who  evidently  had  the  range  of  the  Pozo  hill  perfectly 
from  the  beginning,  returned  the  fire  with  shrapnel,  killing 
two  men  and  wounding  a  number  of  others  at  the  first  shot, 
striking  the  house  at  the  third,  and  driving  from  the  hill  in 
disorder  some  of  the  soldiers  of  the  cavalry  division  who  had 
been  stationed  there,  as  well  as  a  few  war  correspondents  and 
non-combatants  who  had  gathered  to  witness  the  bombard 
ment.  For  three  quarters  of  an  hour,  or  an  hour,  there  was 
an  artillery  duel  between  Grimes's  battery  on  the  Pozo  hill  and 
a  Spanish  battery  situated  somewhere  on  the  heights  to  the 
westward.  In  this  interchange  of  shots  the  enemy  had  all 
the  advantage,  for  the  reason  that  the  smoke  from  Grimes's 
black  powder  revealed  the  position  of  his  guns,  while  the 
smokeless  powder  of  the  Spaniards  gave  no  clue  to  the  loca 
tion  of  theirs. 

About  nine  o'clock  the  order  was  given  to  advance;  and 
the  divisions  of  Generals  Kent  and  Wheeler  began  to  move 
down  the  narrow,  jungle-skirted  trail,  toward  the  open  coun 
try  which  was  supposed  to  lie  beyond  the  crossing  of  the 
second  stream,  under  the  heights  of  San  Juan.  General 
Kent's  orders  were  to  move  ahead  to  a  green  knoll  on  the 
western  side  of  the  San  Juan  River  (the  second  stream),  and 
there  deploy  to  the  left  in  what  was  believed  to  be  the  mar 
gin  of  the  dense  forest  which  covered  the  bottom  of  the 
valley.  At  the  same  time  the  cavalry  division,  which,  owing 
to  the  illness  of  General  Wheeler,  was  temporarily  under 
command  of  General  Sumner,  was  directed  to  advance  along 
the  same  trail,  cross  the  San  Juan  River,  deploy  to  the 
right  in  the  margin  of  the  woods,  and  there  await  further 
orders.  The  attempt  of  two  divisions  to  march  simultane 
ously  down  a  forest  trail  which  in  places  was  not  more  than 
twelve  feet  wide  resulted,  naturally,  in  crowding,  disorder, 
and  delay;  and  when  the  head  of  the  column,  after  crossing 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN  125 

the  first  stream,  came  within  the  zone  of  the  enemy's  fire,  the 
confusion  was  greatly  increased.  The  Spaniards,  as  General 
Chaffee  predicted,  had  taken  the  bearing  and  range  of  the 
road,  between  the  first  stream  and  the  western  edge  of  the 
forest,  and  before  the  cavalry  division  reached  the  ford  of 
the  San  Juan,  on  the  other  side  of  which  it  was  to  deploy  and 
await  orders,  it  was  receiving  a  heavy  fire,  not  only  from  the 
batteries  and  rifle-pits  on  the  San  Juan  heights,  but  from 
hundreds  of  trees  along  the  trail,  in  which  the  enemy  had 
posted  sharp-shooters. 

So  far  as  I  know,  riflemen  had  never  before  been  posted 
in  trees  to  check  the  advance  of  an  army  through  a  broken 
and  forest-clad  country;  but  the  scheme  was  a  good  one,  and 
it  was  carried  out  with  thoughtful  attention  to  every  detail. 
The  sharp-shooters  were  generally  hidden  in  carefully  pre 
pared  nests  of  leaves;  some  of  them  had  tunics  of  fresh  palm- 
leaves  tied  around  their  bodies  from  the  shoulders  down,  so 
that  at  a  little  distance  they  could  not  be  distinguished  from 
the  foliage  of  the  trees  in  which  they  were  concealed;  and  in 
a  few  cases  that  were  reported  to  me  they  wore  under  their 
leafy  tunics  double  canvas  jackets  filled  with  sand  and  care 
fully  quilted,  as  a  partial  protection  from  bullets.  This  swarm 
of  tree-men  formed  the  Spanish  skirmish-line,  and  a  most 
dangerous  and  effective  line  it  was,  for  the  reason  that  it 
could  be  neither  seen,  driven  in,  nor  dislodged.  The  hidden 
marksmen  used  Mauser  rifles  with  smokeless  powder,  and 
although  our  men  heard  the  reports  and  were  killed  or  dis 
abled  by  the  projectiles,  they  had  no  guide  or  clue  whatever  to 
the  location  of  their  assailants.  A  skirmish-line  in  thickets  or 
clumps  of  chaparral  on  the  ground  might  have  been  driven 
back  as  our  army  advanced,  and  thus  our  rear  would  have 
been  all  the  time  secure  from  attack;  but  a  skirmish-line 
hidden  in  tree-tops  was  as  dangerous  to  the  rear  as  to  the 
front,  and  a  soldier  pressing  forward  toward  what  he  sup- 


126  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

posed  to  be  the  enemy's  position  was  just  as  likely  to  get  a 
Mauser  bullet  in  his  back  as  in  his  breast.  Scores  of  wounded 
men  who  were  brought  into  the  First  Division  field-hospital 
on  Friday  and  Saturday  had  never  seen  a  Spanish  intrench- 
ment,  or  had  even  so  much  as  a  glimpse  of  a  Spanish  soldier. 

In  spite  of  the  deadly  fire  to  which  they  were  subjected 
from  front,  sides,  and  rear,  our  troops  pushed  on,  as  rapidly 
as  the  congested  state  of  the  trail  would  permit,  toward  the 
ford  of  the  San  Juan  River.  The  loss  which  our  advance 
sustained  at  this  point  was  greatly  increased  by  the  sending 
up  of  an  observation  balloon,  which  hung  over  the  road,  just 
above  the  trees,  and  not  only  attracted  the  fire  of  the 
Spaniards  in  front,  but  served  their  artillerymen  as  a  target 
and  a  range-finder.  It  was  an  even  better  firing  guide  than 
the  sheets  of  iron  or  zinc  roofing  which  they  had  put  up  in 
some  of  the  openings  through  which  the  trail  ran;  and  until 
it  was  finally  torn  by  shrapnel  so  that  it  slowly  sank  into  the 
forest,  the  men  under  and  behind  it  were  exactly  in  the  focus 
of  the  converging  streams  of  bullets  which  it  attracted 
from  all  parts  of  the  San  Juan  heights.  The  only  useful  dis 
covery  made  by  it  was  the  fact  that  there  was  a  second  or 
branch  trail  leading  to  a  lower  ford  of  the  San  Juan  River 
which  General  Kent's  division  might  take,  and  thus  relieve 
the  crowding  on  the  main  road. 

Parts  of  the  divisions  of  Generals  Kent  and  Sumner  crossed 
the  San  Juan  shortly  after  noon,  and  made  an  attempt  to 
deploy  on  its  western  bank  and  form  in  line  of  battle;  but  the 
jungle  was  so  dense,  and  the  fire  which  swept  the  whole  mar 
gin  of  the  forest  between  them  and  the  heights  of  San  Juan 
was  so  destructive,  that  they  could  do  little  more  than  seek 
such  cover  as  could  be  had  and  await  orders.  So  far  as  I 
have  been  able  to  ascertain,  no  orders  were  received  at  this 
critical  time  by  either  of  the  division  commanders.  The 
narrow  road,  for  a  distance  of  a  mile  back  of  the  firing  line, 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN    127 

was  crowded  with  troops  pressing  forward  to  the  San  Juan 
ford;  General  Shafter,  at  his  headquarters  two  miles  in  the 
rear,  had  little  knowledge  of  the  situation,  and  no  adequate 
means  of  getting  orders  to  his  subordinates  at  the  front;  and 
meanwhile  our  advanced  line,  almost  lost  in  the  jungle,  was 
being  decimated  by  a  fire  which  the  men  could  not  effectively 
return,  and  which  it  was  impossible  long  to  endure.  Exactly 
what  happened  at  this  turning-point  of  the  battle,  who  took 
the  lead,  and  what  orders  were  given,  I  do  not  certainly 
know;  but  the  troops  nearest  the  edge  of  the  forest,  includ 
ing  the  Rough  Riders,  two  regiments  of  General  Hawkins's 
brigade  (the  Sixth  and  Sixteenth),  a  few  men  from  the 
Seventy-first  New  York  under  Captain  Rafferty,  and  per 
haps  squads  or  fragments  of  three  or  four  other  commands, 
suddenly  broke  from  cover,  as  if  moved  by  a  general  spon 
taneous  impulse,  and,  with  Colonel  Roosevelt  and  General 
Hawkins  as  their  most  conspicuous,  if  not  their  foremost, 
leaders,  charged  "  Kettle  Hill "  and  the  heights  of  San  Juan. 
The  advancing  line,  at  first,  looked  very  weak  and  thin;  but 
it  was  equal  to  its  task.  In  less  than  fifteen  minutes  it  had 
reached  the  crest,  and  was  driving  the  Spaniards  along  it 
toward  the  blockhouse,  and  down  the  slope  behind  it  into  the 
next  valley.  With  the  aid  of  the  Ninth,  Thirteenth,  and 
Twenty-fourth  Infantry,  and  the  Gatling-gun  battery  of 
Lieutenant  Parker,  which  supported  the  charging  line  by 
enfilading  the  enemy's  trenches  from  a  position  on  the  left, 
the  summit  of  the  long  ridge  was  soon  cleared,  the  block 
house  captured,  and  the  battle  won  before  two  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon. 

Whether  General  Sumner  or  General  Kent  directly  and 
personally  ordered  this  charge  or  not,  I  cannot  say;  but  from 
statements  made  to  me  by  officers  and  men  who  participated 
in  it,  I  am  inclined  to  believe  that  it  really  was— as  it  has 
since  been  called— a  "great  popular  movement,"  the  credit 


128  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

for  which  belongs  chiefly  to  the  regimental  and  company 
officers  and  their  men.  That  General  Shafter  had  nothing  to 
do  with  it  is  evident.  He  might  have  ordered  it  if  he  had 
been  there;  but  he  was  not  there.  One  of  the  wounded  men 
in  the  field-hospital  told  me  a  story  of  a  sergeant  in  one  of 
the  colored  regiments,  who  was  lying,  with  his  comrades,  in 
the  woods,  under  the  hot  fire  from  the  San  Juan  heights. 
Getting  no  order  to  advance,  and  tiring  of  the  inaction, 
he  finally  sprang  to  his  feet  and  rushed  out  into  the  open, 
shouting  to  the  men  of  his  company:  "  Come  on,  boys!  Let 's 
knock  h— 1  out  of  the  blankety-blanks! "  whereupon  the  whole 
regiment  rose  like  a  single  man,  and  started,  at  a  dead  run, 
for  the  hill.  The  story  is  doubtless  apocryphal,  but  it  will 
serve  as  an  illustration  of  the  way  in  which  the  charge  up  the 
slope  of  San  Juan  may  have  originated.  Our  men  in  the  edge 
of  the  woods,  in  the  bushes,  and  in  the  grain-fields  had  per 
haps  become  so  tired  of  inaction,  and  so  exasperated  by  the 
deadly  fire  which  was  picking  them  off,  one  by  one,  as  they 
lay,  that  they  were  ready  for  any  desperate  venture;  and 
when  somebody— no  matter  who— started  forward,  or  said, 
"Come  on,  boys!"  they  simply  rose  en  masse  and  charged. 
I  cannot  find,  in  the  official  reports  of  the  engagement,  any 
record  of  a  definite  order  by  any  general  officer  to  storm  the 
heights;  but  the  men  were  just  in  the  mood  for  such  a  move 
ment,  and  either  with  orders  or  without  orders  they  charged 
up  the  hill,  in  the  face  of  a  tremendous  fire  from  batteries, 
trenches,  and  blockhouses,  and,  in  the  words  of  an  English 
officer,  quoted  by  General  Breckenridge  in  his  testimony 
before  the  Investigating  Commission,  they  not  only  covered 
themselves  with  glory,  but  extricated  their  corps  commander 
"  from  a  devil  of  a  fix." 

When  the  divisions  of  Generals  Kent  and  Wheeler  had 
been  distributed  along  the  crest  of  the  San  Juan  ridge,  the  line 
looked  too  weak  and  thin  to  hold  the  position;  but  Skobeleff 


THE  BATTLES  OF  CANEY  AND  SAN  JUAN  129 

once  said  that  a  position  carried  by  attack  can  be  held,  even 
if  seventy-five  per  cent,  of  the  attacking  force  have  perished ; 
and  there  was  no  doubt  in  the  minds  of  the  regulars  and  the 
Rough  Riders  that  there  were  enough  of  them  left  not  only 
to  hold  San  Juan,  but  to  take  the  city.  Mr.  Ramsden,  British 
consul  in  Santiago,  says,  in  his  diary,  that  the  Spaniards  were 
so  disheartened  by  their  defeat  that  "  if  the  Americans  had 
followed  up  their  advantage  and  rushed  the  town,  they  would 
have  carried  it."  But  our  men  were  too  much  exhausted  by 
the  heat,  and  by  their  floundering  in  the  jungle,  to  fight  an 
other  battle  that  day.  When  the  firing  ceased  they  had  to 
pick  up  the  wounded  and  bury  the  dead,  and  then  they  spent 
a  large  part  of  the  night  in  erecting  breastworks,  digging 
trenches,  and  making  preparations  for  a  counter-attack. 


CHAPTER   XII 
THE   FIELD-HOSPITAL 

ON  the  morning  of  Friday,  July  1,  Dr.  Egan  and  I,  with 
three  Cuban  soldiers  put  at  our  service  by  General  Cas 
tillo,  set  out  on  foot  for  the  front,  carrying  on  our  backs  or 
in  our  hands  such  medicines  and  hospital  supplies  as  we 
thought  would  be  most  needed  by  the  wounded,  as  well  as 
hammocks,  blankets,  cooking-utensils,  and  four  or  five  days' 
rations  for  ourselves.  The  march  was  a  long  and  tiresome 
one,  and  it  was  after  noon  before  we  reached  the  glade,  or 
opening,  near  the  Pozo  house  which  had  been  selected  as  the 
site  for  the  first  and  only  field-hospital  of  the  Fifth  Army- 
Corps.  We  reported  at  once  to  Major  Wood,  chief  surgeon 
of  the  First  Division,  who  gave  us  a  hearty  welcome  and  at 
once  granted  our  request  to  be  set  at  work.  The  second 
day's  battle  was  then  in  progress;  the  booming  of  cannon  and 
the  rattle  of  Krag-Jorgensens  could  be  plainly  heard  a  short 
distance  in  advance,  and  wounded  men  by  the  score  were 
coming  back  in  army  wagons  from  the  firing  line. 

The  First  Division  hospital  of  the  Fifth  Army-Corps  was 
established  in  the  field,  about  three  miles  east  of  Santiago, 
Wednesday,  June  29.  At  that  time  it  was  in  advance  of  the 
whole  army,  and  had  no  other  protection  than  a  line  of  pickets 
thrown  out  toward  the  enemy's  intrenchments.  The  site  of 
the  camp  was  a  large,  partly  open  glade,  or  field,  on  the  floor 

130 


THE   FIELD-HOSPITAL  131 

of  a  wooded  valley,  which  was  bounded  on  the  northeast,  at  a 
distance  of  three  miles,  by  a  range  of  mountains,  and  which 
extended  to  within  a  mile  of  Santiago.  Through  this  valley 
ran  the  Siboney-Santiago  road,  nearly  parallel  with  a  brook 
which  had  its  source  in  the  mountains  to  the  northward,  and 
after  being  joined  by  a  number  of  other  brooks  coming 
from  the  same  direction,  fell  into  the  sea  through  a  notch  in 
the  coast  rampart  three  or  four  miles  east  of  Morro  Castle. 
The  glade,  or  field,  in  which  the  hospital  camp  stood  was  one 
of  a  series  of  similar  glades  stretching  away  to  the  northeast 
toward  the  base  of  the  mountains,  and  resembling  a  little  in 
outline  and  topographical  arrangement  the  openings  known 
as  "  barrens  "  in  the  forests  of  Nova  Scotia.  In  every  other 
direction  except  the  one  taken  by  this  line  of  glades  the  camp 
was  bounded  by  a  dense  tropical  jungle  through  which  the 
Siboney-Santiago  road  had  been  cut.  The  opening  occupied 
by  the  hospital  camp  was  covered  with  a  dense  growth  of 
high  wild  grass,  shaded  here  and  there  by  small  clumps  of 
pinon-bushes,  with  a  few  larger  trees  of  kinds  to  me  unknown. 
South  and  southwest  of  the  camp  lay  a  tropical  forest  which 
I  did  not  undertake  to  explore,  but  which  our  pickets  said 
was  so  wild  and  so  tangled  with  vines  and  creepers  as  to  be 
almost  impenetrable.  The  site  of  the  camp  between  the  road 
and  the  brook  was  well  chosen,  and  it  was,  perhaps,  as  satis 
factory  a  place  for  a  hospital  as  could  have  been  found  in 
that  vicinity. 

The  hospital,  when  I  arrived,  consisted  of  three  large  tents 
for  operating-tables,  pharmacy,  dispensary,  etc.;  another  of 
similar  dimensions  for  wounded  officers;  half  a  dozen  small 
wall-tents  for  wounded  soldiers;  and  a  lot  of  "dog-kennels," 
or  low  shelter-tents,  for  the  hospital  stewards,  litter-bearers, 
and  other  attendants.  I  do  not  know  how  many  ambulances 
the  hospital  had  for  the  transportation  of  wounded  from  the 
battle-line,  but  I  saw  only  two,  and  was  informed  by  Dr.  God- 


132  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

frey  that  only  three  had  been  brought  from  Tampa.  Fifty 
or  more  had  been  sent  to  that  port  for  the  use  of  the  Fifth 
Army-Corps,  but  had  been  left  there,  by  direct  order  of  Gen 
eral  Shafter,  when  the  expedition  sailed. 

The  hospital  staff  at  the  beginning  of  the  first  day's  battle 
consisted  of  five  surgeons:  namely,  Major  M.  W.  Wood,  chief 
surgeon  of  the  First  Division ;  Major  R.  W.  Johnson,  in  com 
mand  of  the  First  Division  hospital;  Dr.  Guy  C.  Godfrey, 
Dr.  H.  P.  Jones,  and  Dr.  F.  J.  Combe. 

The  resources  and  supplies  of  the  hospital,  outside  of 
instruments,  operating-tables,  and  medicines,  were  very 
limited.  There  was  tent-shelter  for  only  about  one  hundred 
wounded  men;  there  were  no  cots,  hammocks,  mattresses, 
rubber  blankets,  or  pillows  for  sick  or  injured  soldiers;  the 
supply  of  woolen  army  blankets  was  very  short  and  was  soon 
exhausted;  and  there  was  no  clothing  at  all  except  two  or 
three  dozen  shirts.  In  the  form  of  hospital  food  for  sick  or 
wounded  men  there  was  nothing  except  a  few  jars  of  beef 
extract,  malted  milk,  etc.,  bought  in  the  United  States  by 
Major  Wood,  taken  to  the  field  in  his  own  private  baggage, 
and  held  in  reserve  for  desperate  cases. 

Such  was  the  equipment  of  the  only  field-hospital  in  Cuba 
when  the  attack  on  Santiago  began.  That  it  was  wretch 
edly  incomplete  and  inadequate  I  hardly  need  say,  but  the 
responsibility  for  the  incompleteness  and  inadequacy  cannot 
be  laid  upon  the  field  force.  They  took  to  the  hospital  camp 
from  the  steamers  everything  that  they  could  possibly  get 
transportation  for.  There  was  only  one  line  of  very  bad  road 
from  Daiquiri  and  Siboney  to  the  front,  and  along  that  line 
had  to  be  carried,  with  an  utterly  insufficient  train  of  mules 
and  wagons,  all  the  food  and  ammunition  needed  by  an 
advancing  army  of  more  than  sixteen  thousand  men.  In 
loading  the  mules  and  wagons  preference  was  given  to  stores 
and  supplies  that  could  be  used  in  killing  Spanish  soldiers 


THE   FIELD-HOSPITAL  133 

rather  than  to  stores  and  supplies  that  would  be  needed  in 
caring  for  our  own,  and  the  result  was  the  dreadful  and 
heartrending  state  of  affairs  in  that  hospital  at  the  end  of 
the  second  day's  fight.  If  there  was  anything  more  terrible 
in  our  Civil  War,  I  am  glad  that  I  was  not  there  to  see  it. 

The  battle  before  Santiago  began  very  early  on  Friday 
morning,  July  1,  and  the  wounded,  most  of  whom  had  received 
first  aid  at  bandaging-stations  just  back  of  the  firing  line, 
reached  the  hospital  in  small  numbers  as  early  as  nine 
o'clock.  As  the  hot  tropical  day  advanced,  the  numbers 
constantly  and  rapidly  increased  until,  at  nightfall,  long  rows 
of  wounded  were  lying  on  the  grass  in  front  of  the  operating- 
tents,  without  awnings  or  shelter,  awaiting  examination  and 
treatment.  The  small  force  of  field-surgeons  worked  heroi 
cally  and  with  a  devotion  that  I  have  never  seen  surpassed; 
but  they  were  completely  overwhelmed  by  the  great  bloody 
wave  of  human  agony  that  rolled  back  in  ever-increasing 
volume  from  the  battle-line.  They  stood  at  the  operating- 
tables,  wholly  without  sleep,  and  almost  without  rest  or  food, 
for  twenty-one  consecutive  hours;  and  yet,  in  spite  of  their 
tremendous  exertions,  hundreds  of  seriously  or  dangerously 
wounded  men  lay  on  the  ground  for  hours,  many  of  them  half 
naked,  and  nearly  all  without  shelter  from  the  blazing  tropi 
cal  sun  in  the  daytime,  or  the  damp,  chilly  dew  at  night.  No 
organized  or  systematic  provision  had  been  made  for  feeding 
them  or  giving  them  drink,  and  many  a  poor  fellow  had  not 
tasted  food  or  water  for  twelve  hours,  and  had  been  exposed 
during  all  that  time  to  the  almost  intolerable  glare  of  the 
sun.  I  saw  a  soldier  of  the  Tenth  Cavalry,  who  had  been 
shot  through  the  body,  lie  on  the  ground  in  front  of  the 
operating-tent  for  at  least  three  hours,  naked  to  the  waist, 
and  exposed  to  sunshine  in  which  I  could  hardly  hold  my 
hand.  I  speak  of  this  particular  soldier,  not  because  he  was 
an  exception,  but  rather  because  he  exhibited  such  magnifi- 


134  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

cent  fortitude  and  self-control.  Although  he  must  have  been 
suffering  terrible  agony,  he  lay  there  for  three  hours  without 
a  murmur  or  a  complaint,  and,  so  far  as  I  could  see,  without 
change  of  countenance,  until  his  turn  came  and  he  was  lifted 
upon  the  operating-table. 

At  sunset  the  five  surgeons  had  operated  upon  and  dressed 
the  wounds  of  one  hundred  and  fifty-four  men.  As  night 
advanced  and  the  wounded  came  in  more  rapidly,  no  count 
or  record  of  the  operations  was  made  or  attempted.  Late  in 
the  evening  of  Friday,  division  and  regimental  surgeons  began 
to  come  back  to  the  hospital  from  the  front,  and  the  operat 
ing  force  was  increased  to  ten.  More  tables  were  set  out 
in  front  of  the  tents,  and  the  surgeons  worked  at  them  all 
night,  partly  by  moonlight  and  partly  by  the  dim  light  of 
flaring  candles  held  in  the  hands  of  stewards  and  atten 
dants.  Fortunately,  the  weather  was  clear  and  still,  and  the 
moon  nearly  full.  There  were  no  lanterns,  apparently,  in  the 
camp,— at  least,  I  saw  none  in  use  outside  of  the  operating- 
tent,— and  if  the  night  had  been  dark,  windy,  or  rainy,  four 
fifths  of  the  wounded  would  have  had  no  help  or  surgical 
treatment  whatever  until  the  next  day.  All  the  operations 
outside  of  a  single  tent  were  performed  by  the  dim  light  of 
one  unsheltered  and  flaring  candle,  or  at  most  two.  More 
than  once  even  the  candles  were  extinguished  for  fear  that 
they  would  draw  the  fire  of  Spanish  sharp-shooters  who  were 
posted  in  trees  south  of  the  camp,  and  who  exchanged  shots 
with  our  pickets  at  intervals  throughout  the  night.  These 
cold-blooded  and  merciless  guerrillas  fired  all  day  Friday  at 
our  ambulances  and  at  our  wounded  as  they  were  brought 
back  from  the  battle-line,  and  killed  two  of  our  Red  Cross 
men.  There  was  good  reason  to  fear,  therefore,  that  they 
would  fire  into  the  hospital.  It  required  some  nerve  on  the 
part  of  our  surgeons  to  stand  beside  operating-tables  all 
night  with  their  backs  to  a  dark  tropical  jungle  out  of  which 


THE   FIELD-HOSPITAL  135 

came  at  intervals  the  sharp  reports  of  guerrillas'  rifles.  But 
there  was  not  a  sign  of  hesitation  or  fear.  Finding  that 
they  could  not  work  satisfactorily  by  moonlight,  brilliant 
although  it  was,  they  relighted  their  candles  and  took  the 
risk.  Before  daybreak  on  Saturday  morning  they  had  per 
formed  more  than  three  hundred  operations,  and  then,  as 
the  wounded  had  ceased  to  come  in,  and  all  cases  requiring 
immediate  attention  had  been  disposed  of,  they  retired  to 
their  tents  for  a  little  rest.  The  five  men  who  composed  the 
original  hospital  force  had  worked  incessantly  for  twenty-one 
hours. 

Of  course  the  wounded  who  had  been  operated  upon,  or  the 
greater  part  of  them,  had  to  lie  out  all  night  on  the  water- 
soaked  ground;  and  in  order  to  appreciate  the  suffering  they 
endured  the  reader  must  try  to  imagine  the  conditions  and 
the  environment.  It  rained  in  torrents  there  almost  every 
afternoon  for  a  period  of  from  ten  minutes  to  half  an  hour, 
and  the  ground,  therefore,  was  usually  water-soaked  and  soft. 
All  the  time  that  it  did  not  rain  the  sun  shone  with  a  fierce 
ness  of  heat  that  I  have  seldom  seen  equaled,  and  yet  at  night 
it  grew  cool  and  damp  so  rapidly  as  to  necessitate  the  put 
ting  on  of  thicker  clothing  or  a  light  overcoat.  Many  of  the 
wounded  soldiers,  who  were  brought  to  the  hospital  from  a 
distance  of  three  miles  in  a  jolting  ambulance  or  army 
wagon,  had  lost  their  upper  clothing  at  the  bandaging- 
stations  just  back  of  the  battle-line,  where  the  field-sur 
geons  had  stripped  them  in  order  to  examine  or  treat  their 
wounds.  They  arrived  there,  consequently,  half  naked  and 
without  either  rubber  or  woolen  blankets;  and  as  the  very 
limited  hospital  supply  of  shirts  and  blankets  had  been  ex 
hausted,  there  was  nothing  to  clothe  or  cover  them  with. 
The  tents  set  apart  for  wounded  soldiers  were  already  full 
to  overflowing,  and  all  that  a  litter-squad  could  do  with  a 
man  when  they  lifted  him  from  the  operating-table  on  Friday 


136  CAMPAIGNING  IN   CUBA 

night  was  to  carry  him  away  and  lay  him  down,  half  naked 
as  he  was,  on  the  water-soaked  ground  under  the  stars. 
Weak  and  shaken  from  agony  under  the  surgeon's  knife  and 
probe,  there  he  had  to  lie  in  the  high,  wet  grass,  with  no  one 
to  look  after  him,  no  one  to  give  him  food  and  water  if  he 
needed  them,  no  blanket  over  him,  and  no  pillow  under  his 
head.  What  he  suffered  in  the  long  hours  of  the  damp, 
chilly  night  I  know  because  I  saw  him,  and  scores  more  like 
him;  but  the  reader,  who  can  get  an  idea  of  it  only  through 
the  medium  of  words,  can  hardly  imagine  it. 

When  the  sun  rose  Saturday  morning,  the  sufferings  of 
the  wounded  who  had  lain  out  all  night  in  the  grass  were 
intensified  rather  than  relieved,  because  with  sunshine  came 
intense  heat,  thirst,  and  surgical  fever.  An  attempt  was 
made  to  protect  some  of  them  by  making  awnings  and 
thatched  roofs  of  bushes  and  poles;  but  about  seven  o'clock 
ambulances  and  wagons  loaded  with  wounded  began  again 
to  arrive  from  the  battle-line,  and  the  whole  hospital  force 
turned  its  attention  to  them,  leaving  the  suffering  men  in  the 
grass  to  the  care  of  the  camp  cooks  and  a  few  slightly 
wounded  soldiers,  who,  although  in  pain  themselves,  could 
still  hobble  'about  carrying  hard  bread  and  water  to  their 
completely  disabled  and  gasping  comrades. 

The  scenes  of  Saturday  were  like  those  of  the  previous  day, 
but  with  added  details  of  misery  and  horror.  Many  of  the 
wounded,  brought  in  from  the  extreme  right  flank  of  the  army 
at  Caney,  had  had  nothing  to  eat  or  drink  in  more  than  twenty- 
four  hours,  and  were  in  a  state  of  extreme  exhaustion.  Some, 
who  had  been  shot  through  the  mouth  or  neck,  were  unable 
to  swallow,  and  we  had  to  push  a  rubber  tube  down  through 
the  bloody  froth  that  filled  their  throats,  and  pour  water  into 
their  stomachs  through  that;  some  lay  on  the  ground  with 
swollen  bellies,  suffering  acutely  from  stricture  of  the  urinary 
passage  and  distention  of  the  bladder  caused  by  a  gunshot 


THE   FIELD-HOSPITAL  137 

wound;  some  were  paralyzed  from  the  neck  down  or  the 
waist  down  as  a  result  of  injury  to  the  spine;  some  were  deliri 
ous  from  thirst,  fever,  and  exposure  to  the  sun;  and  some  were 
in  a  state  of  unconsciousness,  coma,  or  collapse,  and  made 
no  reply  or  sign  of  life  when  I  offered  them  water  or  bread. 
They  were  all  placed  on  the  ground  in  a  long,  closely  packed 
row  as  they  came  in;  a  few  pieces  of  shelter-tenting  were 
stretched  over  them  to  protect  them  a  little  from  the  sun, 
and  there  they  lay  for  two,  three,  and  sometimes  four  hours 
before  the  surgeons  could  even  examine  their  injuries. 
A  more  splendid  exhibition  of  patient,  uncomplaining  forti 
tude  and  heroic  self-control  than  that  presented  by  these 
wounded  men  the  world  has  never  seen.  Many  of  them,  as 
appeared  from  their  chalky  faces,  gasping  breath,  and  bloody 
vomiting,  were  in  the  last  extremity  of  mortal  agony;  but  I 
did  not  hear  a  groan,  a  murmur,  or  a  complaint  once  an 
hour.  Occasionally  a  trooper  under  the  knife  of  the  surgeon 
would  swear,  or  a  beardless  Cuban  boy  would  shriek  and  cry, 
"  Oh,  my  mother,  my  mother! "  as  the  surgeons  reduced  a  com 
pound  fracture  of  the  femur  and  put  his  leg  in  splints;  but 
from  the  long  row  of  wounded  on  the  ground  there  came  no 
sound  or  sign  of  weakness.  They  were  suffering,— some  of 
them  were  dying, — but  theylwere  strong.  Many  a  man  whose 
mouth  was  so  dry  and  parched  with  thirst  that  he  could 
hardly  articulate  would  insist  on  my  giving  water  first,  not 
to  him,  when  it  was  his  turn,  but  to  some  comrade  who  was 
more  badly  hurt  or  had  suffered  longer.  Intense  pain  and 
the  fear  of  impending  death  are  supposed  to  bring  out  the 
selfish,  animal  characteristics  of  man;  but  they  do  not  in  the 
higher  type  of  man.  Not  a  single  American  soldier,  in  all 
my  experience  in  that  hospital,  ever  asked  to  be  examined  or 
treated  out  of  his  regular  turn  on  account  of  the  severity, 
painful  nature,  or  critical  state  of  his  wound.  On  the  con 
trary,  they  repeatedly  gave  way  to  one  another,  saying: 


138  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

"  Take  this  one  first— he 's  shot  through  the  body.  I  Ve  only 
got  a  smashed  foot,  and  I  can  wait."  Even  the  courtesies 
of  life  were  not  forgotten  or  neglected  in  that  valley  of  the 
shadow  of  death.  If  a  man  could  speak  at  all,  he  always 
said,  "Thank  you,"  or  "I  thank  you  very  much,"  when  I 
gave  him  hard  bread  or  water.  One  beardless  youth  who 
had  been  shot  through  the  throat,  and  who  told  me  in  a 
husky  whisper  that  he  had  had  no  water  in  thirty-six  hours, 
tried  to  take  a  swallow  when  I  lifted  his  head.  He  strangled, 
coughed  up  a  little  bloody  froth,  and  then  whispered:  "It 's 
no  use;  I  can't.  Never  mind!"  Our  Dr.  Egan  afterward 
gave  him  water  through  a  stomach-tube.  If  there  was  any 
weakness  or  selfishness,  or  behavior  not  up  to  the  highest 
level  of  heroic  manhood,  among  the  wounded  American 
soldiers  in  that  hospital  during  those  three  terrible  days,  I 
failed  to  see  it.  As  one  of  the  army  surgeons  said  to  me, 
with  the  tears  very  near  his  eyes:  "When  I  look  at  those 
fellows  and  see  what  they  stand,  I  am  proud  of  being  an 
American,  and  I  glory  in  the  stock.  The  world  has  nothing 
finer." 

It  was  the  splendid  courage  and  fortitude  of  the  men  that 
made  their  suffering  so  hard  to  see.  As  the  row  of  prostrate 
bodies  on  the  ground  grew  longer  and  longer  Saturday  after 
noon  and  evening,  the  emotional  strain  of  the  situation  be 
came  almost  unbearable,  and  I  would  have  exchanged  all  the 
knowledge  and  ability  I  possessed  for  the  knowledge  and  skill 
even  of  a  hospital  steward,  so  that  I  might  do  something  more 
than  carry  around  food  and  water  to  those  suffering,  uncom 
plaining  American  soldiers. 

Late  Saturday  afternoon  there  was  a  heavy  tropical 
shower,  which  drenched  not  only  the  wounded  who  were 
awaiting  examination  in  front  of  the  operating-tents,  but 
also  the  men  who  had  been  operated  upon  and  carried  away 
into  the  long  grass.  I  doubt,  however,  whether  it  made  their 


THE   FIELD-HOSPITAL  139 

condition  any  worse— at  least  for  a  time.  Most  of  them  had 
been  exposed  for  hours  to  a  tropical  sun,  and  the  rain  must 
have  given  them,  at  first,  a  feeling  of  coolness  and  relief. 

As  the  sun  set  and  darkness  settled  down  upon  the  camp 
after  the  short  tropical  twilight,  candles  were  again  lighted 
around  the  operating-tables,  and  the  surgeons  worked  on 
without  intermission  and  without  rest.  The  rattle  of  rifles 
and  machine-guns  and  the  booming  of  artillery  along  the  line 
of  battle  died  away  into  an  occasional  sputter  after  dark;  the 
full  moon  rose  into  a  cloudless  sky,  and  the  stillness  of  the 
jungle  south  of  the  camp  was  broken  only  by  an  occasional 
shot  from  a  sentry  or  from  a  Spanish  sharp-shooter  hidden 
in  a  tree.  Around  the  operating-tables  there  was  a  sound 
of  half-audible  conversation  as  the  surgeons  gave  directions 
to  their  assistants  or  discussed  the  injuries  of  the  men  upon 
whom  they  were  at  work,  and  now  and  then  a  peremptory 
call  for  "  Litter-squad  here ! "  showed  that  another  man  was 
about  to  be  brought  to  the  operating-table,  or  carried  from 
it  into  the  field  and  laid  on  the  ground. 

At  midnight  Saturday  the  number  of  wounded  men  that 
had  been  brought  into  the  hospital  camp  was  about  eight 
hundred.  All  that  could  walk,  after  their  wounds  had  been 
dressed,  and  all  that  could  bear  transportation  to  the  sea- 
coast  in  an  army  wagon,  were  sent  to  Siboney  to  be  put  on 
board  the  hospital  steamers  and  transports.  There  remained 
in  the  camp  several  hundred  who  were  so  severely  injured 
that  they  could  not  possibly  be  moved,  and  these  were  carried 
to  the  eastern  end  of  the  field  and  laid  on  the  ground  in  the 
high,  wet  grass.  I  cannot  imagine  anything  more  cruelly 
barbarous  than  to  bring  a  severely  wounded  man  back  four 
or  five  miles  to  the  hospital  in  a  crowded,  jolting  army  wagon, 
let  him  lie  from  two  to  four  hours  with  hardly  any  protection 
from  the  blazing  sunshine  in  the  daytime  or  the  drenching 
dew  at  night,  rack  him  with  agony  on  the  operating-table, 


140  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

and  then  carry  him  away,  weak  and  helpless,  put  him  on  the 
water-soaked  ground,  without  shelter,  blanket,  pillow,  food, 
or  drink,  and  leave  him  there  to  suffer  alone  all  night.  And 
yet  I  saw  this  done  with  scores,  if  not  hundreds,  of  men  as 
brave  and  heroic  as  any  that  ever  stood  in  a  battle-line.  It 
might  not  have  been  so,— it  ought  not  to  have  been  so,— but 
so  it  was;  and  in  that  hospital  there  were  no  means  whatever 
of  preventing  it.  The  force  of  surgeons  and  hospital  stewards 
immediately  available  was  altogether  too  small  to  attend 
properly  to  the  great  number  of  wounded  thrown  suddenly 
upon  their  hands,  and  no  men  could  be  spared  to  look  after 
the  wretched  and  suffering  soldiers  in  the  grass  whose  wounds 
had  been  treated,  when  there  were  a  hundred  more  who  had 
not  even  been  looked  at  in  twenty-four  hours,  and  who  were 
lying  in  a  long,  closely  packed  row  on  the  ground,  awaiting 
their  turns  at  the  operating-tables.  When  a  litter-squad 
had  carried  a  man  away  into  the  bushes,  they  had  to  leave 
him  there  and  hurry  back  to  put  another  sufferer  on  a  table 
or  bring  another  from  an  ambulance  or  army  wagon  to  the 
operating-line.  Instead  of  the  force  of  five  surgeons  and 
about  twenty  stewards  and  attendants  with  which  the  hospital 
began  work  on  Friday,  there  should  have  been  a  force  of  fifty 
surgeons  and  at  least  two  hundred  stewards,  attendants,  and 
stretcher-bearers,  so  that  they  might  have  been  divided  into 
two  watches,  or  reliefs,  working  and  resting  alternately.  As 
it  was  on  Friday,  five  surgeons  and  twenty  attendants  had  to 
take  care  of  the  wounded  from  three  whole  divisions.  They 
were  reinforced  by  five  more  surgeons  and  perhaps  twenty 
more  attendants  Friday  evening,  but  even  this  force  was  so 
insufficient  and  inadequate  that  at  midnight  on  Saturday  one 
of  the  highest  medical  officers  in  the  camp  said  to  me:  "  This 
department  is  in  a  state  of  complete  collapse." 

In  nothing  were  the  weakness  and  imperfect  equipment  of 
the  hospital  more  apparent  than  in  the  provision  made— or 


THE   FIELD-HOSPITAL  141 

rather  the  lack  of  provision— for  the  care  of  wounded  after 
their  wounds  had  been  dressed.  It  seems  to  have  been 
expected  that,  when  injured  men  were  brought  back  from 
the  battle-line,  their  blankets,  canteens,  and  rations  would 
be  brought  with  them;  but  in  seventy-five  per  cent,  of  the 
cases  this  was  not  done,  and  it  was  unreasonable  under  the 
circumstances  to  expect  that  it  would  be  done.  The  men 
did  not  go  into  action  carrying  their  blankets  and  rations;  on 
the  contrary,  most  of  them  left  all  unnecessary  impedimenta 
in  their  camps  and  went  into  the  fight  as  lightly  clad  as  possi 
ble,  often  stripped  naked  to  the  waist.  When  they  were  shot, 
their  comrades  picked  them  up  and  carried  them  to  the  rear 
just  as  they  were.  There  was  no  time  to  inquire  for  their 
personal  belongings  or  to  send  to  their  camps  for  their 
blankets;  and  they  came  back  to  the  hospital  not  only  with 
out  blankets  or  ponchos,  but  often  hatless,  shirtless,  and  in 
trousers  ripped  up  by  surgeon's  scissors.  Some  of  them  had 
empty  canteens,  but  I  did  not  see  one  who  had  food.  Ample 
provision  should  have  been  made  in  this  hospital  for  clothing, 
feeding,  and  supplying  the  wants  of  wounded  men  brought 
back  in  this  destitute  condition;  but  such  provision  as  was 
made  proved  to  be  wholly  inadequate.  The  few  dozen  shirts 
and  blankets  that  the  hospital  contained  were  soon-  distrib 
uted,  and  then  the  wounded  men  were  taken  from  the 
operating-tables  and  laid  on  the  ground  in  the  outskirts  of 
the  camp  in  the  same  state,  as  regards  clothing  and  bedding, 
that  they  were  in  when  picked  up  on  the  battle-field.  For 
feeding  them  no  arrangements  whatever  had  been  made,  and, 
indeed,  there  was  no  food  in  the  hospital  suited  to  their 
requirements.  Our  Red  Cross  surgeon,  Dr.  Egan,  and  I 
brought  in  a  few  bottles  of  malted  milk,  maltine,  beef 
extract,  limes,  etc.,  but  as  we  could  not  get  transportation 
for  a  single  pound  of  stuff  and  had  to  march  in  twelve  miles 
over  a  bad  road,  we  could  not  bring  much,  and  our  limited 


142  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

supply  of  invalid  food,  although  administered  only  in  desper 
ate  cases,  was  exhausted  in  two  or  three  hours. 

Major  Wood,  who  superintended  the  bringing  in  and  dispo 
sition  of  the  wounded,  did  everything  that  was  possible  to 
make  them  comfortable,  and  worked  day  and  night  with  tire 
less  energy  and  devotion;  but  there  was  very  little  that  could 
be  done  with  the  resources  at  his  command. 

The  second  day's  battle  in  front  of  Santiago  consisted, 
generally  speaking,  of  a  series  of  attempts  on  the  part  of 
the  Spaniards  to  drive  our  troops  from  the  positions  which 
they  had  taken  by  assault  on  Friday.  The  firing  continued 
throughout  the  day,  and  at  times  was  very  heavy;  but  just 
before  sunset  it  died  away  to  a  faint  sputter  and  crackle  of 
rifles,  and  at  dark  ceased  altogether.  The  moon  rose  in  an 
unclouded  sky  over  the  dark  tree-tops  east  of  the  camp;  the 
crickets  began  to  chirp  in  the  thicket  across  the  brook; 
sounds  like  the  rapid  shaking  of  a  billiard-ball  in  a  resonant 
wooden  box  came  from  nocturnal  birds  or  tree-toads  hidden 
in  the  depth  of  the  forest;  and  the  teeming  life  of  the  tropi 
cal  wilderness,  frightened  into  silence  for  a  time  by  the 
uproar  of  battle,  took  courage  from  the  stillness  of  night, 
and  manifested  its  presence  by  chirps,  croaks,  and  queer, 
unfamiliar  cries  in  all  parts  of  the  encircling  jungle. 

About  ten  o'clock  the  stillness  was  broken  by  the  boom  of 
a  heavy  gun  at  the  front,  followed  instantly  by  the  crash  and 
rattle  of  infantry  fire,  which  grew  heavier  and  heavier,  and 
extended  farther  and  farther  to  the  north  and  south,  until 
it  seemed  to  come  from  all  parts  of  our  intrenched  line  on 
the  crest  of  the  San  Juan  ridge.  For  nearly  half  an  hour 
the  rattle  and  sputter  of  rifles,  the  drumming  of  machine- 
guns,  and  the  intermittent  thunder  of  artillery  filled  the  air 
from  the  outskirts  of  Santiago  to  the  hospital  camp,  drown 
ing  the  murmur  of  the  rippling  brook,  and  silencing  again 
the  crickets,  birds,  and  tree-toads  in  the  jungle  beyond 
it.  Then  the  uproar  ceased,  almost  as  suddenly  as  it  had 


THE   FIELD-HOSPITAL  143 

begun;  the  stillness  of  night  settled  down  again  upon  the 
lonely  tropical  wilderness;  and  if  I  had  not  been  able  to  hear 
the  voices  of  the  surgeons  as  they  consulted  over  an  operat 
ing-table,  and  an  occasional  shot  from  a  picket  or  a  sharp 
shooter  in  the  forest,  I  should  not  have  imagined  that  there 
was  an  army  or  a  battle-field  within  a  hundred  miles.  From 
the  wounded  who  came  back  from  the  firing  line  an  hour  or 
two  later  we  learned  that  the  enemy  made  an  attempt,  about 
ten  o'clock,  to  recapture  the  San  Juan  heights,  but  were 
repulsed  with  heavy  loss. 

Saturday's  fighting  did  not  materially  change  the  relative 
positions  of  the  combatants,  but  it  proved  conclusively  that 
we  could  hold  the  San  Juan  ridge  against  any  attacking  force 
that  the  Spaniards  could  muster.  Why,  after  a  demonstra 
tion  of  this  fact,  General  Shafter  should  have  been  so  dis 
couraged  as  to  "  seriously  consider  the  advisability  of  falling 
back  to  a  position  five  miles  in  the  rear,"  I  do  not  know.  Our 
losses  in  the  fighting  at  Caney  and  San  Juan  were  only  two 
hundred  and  thirty-nine  men  killed  and  thirteen  hundred  and 
sixty-three  wounded,  yet  General  Shafter  was  so  disheart 
ened  that  he  not  only  thought  of  retreating  to  a  position  five 
miles  in  the  rear,  but  seems  to  have  been  upon  the  point  of 
surrendering  the  command  of  the  army  to  General  Brecken- 
ridge.  Ill  health,  doubtless,  had  much  to  do  with  this  feel 
ing  of  discouragement.  It  certainly  was  not  warranted  by 
anything  that  one  could  see  at  the  end  of  the  second  day's 
fight.  We  had  taken  every  position  that  we  had  attacked; 
we  had  lost  only  ten  per  cent,  of  our  available  force;  and  we 
were  strongly  intrenched  on  the  crest  of  a  high  hill  less  than 
a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  eastern  boundary  of  the  city. 
After  General  Lawton's  division  and  the  brigade  of  General 
Bates  had  reinforced  Generals  Kent  and  Wheeler  at  San 
Juan,  there  was  very  little  reason  to  fear  that  the  Spaniards 
would  drive  us  from  our  position. 

The  fighting  of  all  our  soldiers,  both  at  Caney  and  at  San 


144  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

Juan,  was  daring  and  gallant  in  the  extreme;  but  I  cannot 
refrain  from  calling  particular  attention  to  the  splendid 
behavior  of  the  colored  troops.  It  is  the  testimony  of  all 
who  saw  them  under  fire  that  they  fought  with  the  utmost 
courage,  coolness,  and  determination,  and  Colonel  Roosevelt 
said  to  a  squad  of  them  in  the  trenches,  in  my  presence,  that 
he  never  expected  to  have,  and  could  not  ask  to  have,  better 
men  beside  him  in  a  hard  fight.  If  soldiers  come  up  to 
Colonel  Roosevelt's  standard  of  courage,  their  friends  have 
no  reason  to  feel  ashamed  of  them.  His  commendation  is 
equivalent  to  a  medal  of  honor  for  conspicuous  gallantry, 
because,  in  the  slang  of  the  camp,  he  himself  is  "a  fighter 
from  'way  back."  I  can  testify,  furthermore,  from  my  own 
personal  observation  in  the  field-hospital  of  the  Fifth  Army- 
Corps  Saturday  and  Saturday  night,  that  the  colored  regulars 
who  were  brought  in  there  displayed  extraordinary  fortitude 
and  self-control.  There  were  a  great  many  of  them,  but  I 
cannot  remember  to  have  heard  a  groan  or  a  complaint  from 
a  single  man.  I  asked  one  of  them  whether  any  of  his  com 
rades  showed  signs  of  fear  when  they  went  into  action. 
"No,"  he  replied,  with  a  grin,  "not  egzactly;  two  or  three  of 
'em  looked  kindo'  squandered  just  at  first,  but  they  mighty 
soon  braced  up." 

Among  the  volunteer  regiments  that  were  hotly  engaged 
and  lost  heavily  in  Friday's  battle  were  the  Seventy-first 
New  York  and  the  Second  Massachusetts.  Both  were  armed 
with  Springfield  rifles,  and  this  put  them  at  a  great  disad 
vantage  as  compared  with  the  regulars,  all  of  whom  used 
Krag-Jorgensen  rifles  or  carbines  with  smokeless  powder.  In 
a  wooded  and  chaparral-covered  country  like  that  around  San 
tiago,  where  it  was  so  easy  to  find  concealment  and  so  diffi 
cult  to  see  troops  at  a  distance,  the  use  of  smokeless  powder 
was  of  the  utmost  possible  importance.  A  body  of  men  might 
be  perfectly  hidden  in  woods  or  chaparral  within  five  hun- 


THE   FIELD-HOSPITAL  145 

dred  yards  of  the  enemy's  intrenchments,  and  if  they  used 
smokeless  powder  they  might  fire  from  there  for  half  an  hour 
without  being  seen  or  getting  a  return  shot;  but  if  they  were 
armed  with  Springfields,  the  smoke  from  their  very  first  volley 
revealed  to  the  enemy  their  exact  position,  and  the  chaparral 
that  concealed  them  was  torn  to  pieces  by  a  hail-storm  of 
projectiles  from  Mausers  and  machine-guns.  It  was  cruel 
and  unreasonable  to  ask  men  to  go  into  action,  in  such  a  field, 
with  rifles  that  could  be  used  only  with  common  powder.  Our 
men  might  as  well  have  been  required  to  hoist  above  the 
bushes  and  chaparral  a  big  flag  emblazoned  with  the  words, 
"Here  we  are!"  Dr.  Hitchcock,  surgeon  of  the  Second 
Massachusetts,  told  me  that  again  and  again,  when  they 
were  lying  concealed  in  dense  scrub  beside  a  regiment  of 
regulars,  the  latter  would  fire  for  twenty  minutes  without 
attracting  a  single  return  shot  from  the  enemy's  line;  but 
the  moment  the  men  of  the  Second  Massachusetts  began 
to  use  their  Springfields,  and  the  smoke  rose  above  the 
bushes,  the  Spaniards  would  concentrate  their  fire  upon  the 
spot,  and  kill  or  wound  a  dozen  men  in  as  many  minutes.  It 
is  to  be  hoped  that  our  government  will  not  send  any  more 
troops  abroad  with  these  antiquated  guns.  They  were  good 
enough  in  their  day,  but  they  are  peculiarly  unsuited  to  the 
conditions  of  warfare  in  a  tropical  field. 

Wounded  men  from  the  front  continued  to  come  into  the 
hospital  camp  on  Saturday  until  long  after  midnight,  and  the 
exhausted  surgeons  worked  at  the  operating-tables  by  candle 
light  until  3  A.  M.  I  noticed,  carrying  stretchers  and  looking 
after  the  wounded,  two  or  three  volunteer  assistants  from 
civil  life,  among  them  Mr.  Brewer  of  Pittsburg,  who  died  of 
yellow  fever  a  few  days  later  at  Siboney. 

Worn  out  by  sleeplessness,  fatigue,  and  the  emotional 
strain  of  two  nights  and  a  day  of  field-hospital  experience,  I 
stretched  my  hammock  between  two  trees,  about  three  o'clock 


10 


146  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

in  the  morning,  crawled  into  it,  and  slept,  for  two  or  three 
hours,  the  dead,  dreamless  sleep  of  complete  exhaustion. 
Dr.  Egan,  I  think,  did  not  lie  down  at  all.  After  all  the 
other  surgeons  had  gone  to  their  tents,  he  wandered  about 
the  camp,  looking  after  the  wounded  who  lay  shivering  here 
and  there  on  the  bare,  wet  ground,  and  giving  them,  with 
medicines,  stomach-tube,  and  catheter,  such  relief  as  he 
could.  Soon  after  sunrise  I  awoke,  and  after  a  hasty  break 
fast  began  carrying  around  food  and  water.  I  shall  not 
attempt  to  describe  fully  the  terrible  and  heartrending 
experience  of  that  morning;  but  two  or  three  of  the  scenes 
that  I  was  compelled  to  witness  seem,  even  now,  to  be  etched 
on  my  memory  in  lines  of  blood.  About  nine  o'clock,  for 
example,  I  went  into  a  small  wall-tent  which  sheltered  a  dozen 
or  more  dangerously  wounded  Spaniards  and  Cuban  insur 
gents.  Everything  that  I  saw  there  was  shocking.  On  the 
right-hand  side  of  the  tent,  face  downward  and  partly  buried 
in  the  water-soaked,  oozy  ground,  lay  a  half-naked  Cuban  boy, 
nineteen  or  twenty  years  of  age,  who  had  died  in  the  night. 
He  had  been  wounded  in  the  head  and  at  some  time  during 
the  long  hours  of  darkness  between  sunset  and  dawn  the  band 
age  had  partly  slipped  off,  and  hemorrhage  had  begun.  The 
blood  had  run  down  on  his  neck  and  shoulders,  coagulating 
and  stiffening  as  it  flowed,  until  it  had  formed  a  large,  red, 
spongy  mass  around  his  neck  and  on  his  naked  back  between 
the  shoulder-blades.  This,  with  the  coal-black  hair,  the 
chalky  face  partly  buried  in  mud,  and  the  distorted,  agonized 
attitude  of  the  half -nude  body,  made  one  of  the  most  ghastly 
pictures  I  had  ever  seen.  There  was  already  a  stench  of 
decomposition  in  the  hot  air  of  the  tent,  and  the  coagulated 
blood  on  the  half-naked  corpse,  as  well  as  the  bloody  bandage 
around  its  head,  was  swarming  with  noisy  flies.  Just  beyond 
this  terrible  object,  and  looking  directly  at  it,  was  another 
young  Cuban  who  had  been  shot  through  the  body,  and  who 


THE   FIELD-HOSPITAL  147 

was  half  crouching,  half  kneeling,  on  the  ground,  with  his 
hands  pressed  to  his  loins.  He  was  deadly  pale,  had  evidently 
been  in  torment  all  night,  and  was  crying,  over  and  over 
again,  in  a  low,  agonized  tone,  "  Oh,  my  mother,  my  mother, 
my  mother! "  as  he  looked  with  distracted  eyes  at  the  bloody, 
half-naked  body  of  his  dead  comrade  and  saw  in  it  his  own 
impending  fate.  The  stench,  the  buzzing  flies,  the  half-dried 
blood,  the  groans,  and  the  cries  of  "0,  mi  madre!"  "O 
Jesu! "  from  the  half-naked  wretches  lying  in  two  rows  on  the 
bare,  muddy  ground,  came  as  near  making  an  inferno  as 
anything  one  is  ever  likely  to  see. 

In  another  tent,  a  short  distance  away,  I  found  a  smooth* 
faced  American  soldier  about  thirty  years  of  age,  who  had 
been  shot  in  the  head,  and  also  wounded  by  a  fragment  of  a 
shell  in  the  body.  He  was  naked  to  the  waist,  and  his  whole 
right  side,  from  the  armpit  to  the  hip,  had  turned  a  purplish- 
blue  color  from  the  bruising  blow  of  the  shell.  Blood  had 
run  down  from  under  the  bandage  around  his  head,  and  had 
then  dried,  completely  covering  his  swollen  face  and  closed 
eyelids  with  a  dull-red  mask.  On  this  had  settled  a  swarm 
of  flies,  which  he  was  too  weak  to  brush  away,  or  in  too  much 
pain  to  notice.  I  thought,  at  first,  that  he  was  dead;  but 
when  I  spoke  to  him  and  offered  him  water,  he  opened  his 
bloodshot,  fly-encircled  eyes,  looked  at  me  for  a  moment  in 
a  dull,  agonized  way,  and  then  closed  them  and  faintly  shook 
his  head.  Whether  he  lived  or  died,  I  do  not  know.  When 
I  next  visited  the  tent  he  was  gone. 

As  soon  as  possible  after  my  arrival  at  the  hospital  I  had 
obtained  an  order  from  Lieutenant-Colonel  Pope,  chief  sur 
geon  of  the  Fifth  Army-Corps,  for  wagons,  and  on  Saturday 
afternoon  I  telephoned  Miss  Barton  from  General  Shafter's 
headquarters  to  send  us  blankets,  clothing,  malted  milk,  beef 
extract,  tents,  tent-flies,  and  such  other  things  as  were  most 
urgently  needed.  Sunday  afternoon,  less  than  twenty-four 


148  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

hours  after  my  message  reached  her,  she  rode  into  the  hos 
pital  camp  in  an  army  wagon,  with  Mrs.  Gardner,  Dr.  Gard 
ner,  Dr.  Hubbell,  and  Mr.  McDowell.  They  brought  with 
them  a  wagon-load  of  supplies,  including  everything  necessary 
for  a  small  Red  Cross  emergency  station,  and  in  less  than  two 
hours  they  were  refreshing  all  the  wounded  men  in  the  camp 
with  corn-meal  gruel,  hot  malted  milk,  beef  extract,  coffee, 
and  a  beverage  known  as  "  Red  Cross  cider,"  made  by  stew 
ing  dried  apples  or  prunes  in  a  large  quantity  of  water,  and 
then  pouring  off  the  water,  adding  to  it  the  juice  of  half  a 
dozen  lemons  or  limes,  and  setting  it  into  the  brook  in  closed 
vessels  to  cool.  After  that  time  no  sick  or  wounded  man  in 
the  camp,  I  think,  ever  suffered  for  want  of  suitable  food  and 
drink. 

On  Monday  Miss  Barton  and  Dr.  Hubbell  went  back  to 
the  steamer  at  Siboney  for  additional  supplies,  and  in  twenty- 
four  hours  more  we  had  blankets,  pillows,  and  hospital  deli 
cacies  enough  to  meet  all  demands.  We  should  have  had 
them  there  before  the  battle  began,  if  we  could  have  ob 
tained  transportation  for  them  from  the  sea-coast.  As  fast 
as  possible  the  wounded  were  taken  in  army  wagons  from  the 
field-hospital  to  Siboney,  where  they  were  put  on  board  the 
transports,  and  at  eight  o'clock  on  Tuesday  evening  Major 
Johnson  was  able  to  report  to  Major  Wood  that  every 
wounded  man  left  in  the  hospital  was  in  a  tent,  with  a 
rubber  poncho  or  tarpaulin  under  him  and  a  blanket  over 
him. 

In  spite  of  unfavorable  conditions,  the  percentage  of  recov 
eries  among  the  wounded  treated  in  this  hospital  was  much 
greater  than  in  any  other  war  in  which  the  United  States 
has  ever  been  engaged.  This  was  due  partly  to  improved 
antiseptic  methods  of  treatment,  and  partly  to  the  nature  of 
the  wound  made  by  the  Mauser  bullet.  In  most  cases  this 
wound  was  a  small,  clean  perforation,  with  very  little  shat- 


THE   FIELD-HOSPITAL  149 

tering  or  mangling,  and  required  only  antiseptic  bandaging 
and  care.  All  abdominal  operations  that  were  attempted  in 
the  field  resulted  in  death,  and  none  were  performed  after  the 
first  day,  as  the  great  heat  and  dampness,  together  with  the 
difficulty  of  giving  the  patients  proper  nursing  and  care, 
made  recovery  next  to  impossible. 


CHAPTER  XIII 
SIBONEY   DURING   THE   ARMISTICE 

ON  the  morning  of  July  3,  General  Shaf  ter,  who  had  re 
covered  confidence,  demanded  the  immediate  surren 
der  of  Santiago,  threatening,  in  case  of  refusal,  to  bombard  the 
city;  and  negotiations  under  a  flag  of  truce  continued  there 
after  for  a  period  of  ten  days.  Meanwhile,  on  the  evening 
of  Friday,  July  8,  Miss  Barton,  Dr.  Egan,  Dr.  Hubbell,  and 
I  returned  to  the  State  of  Texas  to  meet  Mrs.  J.  Addison 
Porter,  wife  of  the  President's  secretary,  who  had  just  arrived 
on  the  hospital  steamer  Relief,  and  to  get  some  ice  and  other 
hospital  supplies  of  which  we  were  in  need.  We  left  the  field- 
hospital  in  an  army  wagon  about  seven  o'clock  and  reached 
Siboney  soon  after  ten.  The  surf  raised  by  a  strong  south 
easterly  wind  was  rolling  so  high  on  the  strip  of  beach  behind 
which  the  village  stood  that  we  could  not  get  off  on  board 
the  State  of  Texas,  nor  even  communicate  with  her.  It  was 
extremely  tantalizing  to  us,  tired,  hungry,  and  camp-soiled 
as  we  were,  to  see  the  lights  of  our  steamer  only  a  quarter 
of  a  mile  away,  to  know  that  almost  within  reach  were  a  cool 
bath,  a  good  supper,  a  clean  bed,  and  all  the  comforts,  if  not 
the  luxuries,  of  life,  and  yet  to  feel  that,  so  far  as  we  were 
concerned,  they  were  as  unattainable  as  if  the  ship  were  in 
the  Bay  of  San  Francisco. 

150 


SIBONEY  DURING   THE   ARMISTICE        151 

Siboney  at  that  time  was  a  wretched  little  hamlet  contain 
ing  only  ten  or  fifteen  abandoned  and  incredibly  dirty  Span 
ish  houses,  most  of  which  were  in  use  either  as  hospitals  or 
for  government  offices.  None  of  them  contained  sleeping 
accommodations,  even  of  the  most  primitive  kind;  all  of 
them  were  crowded;  and  if  one  arrived  in  the  village,  as  we 
did,  at  a  late  hour  of  the  night,  there  was  nothing  to  be  done 
but  bivouac  somewhere  on  the  dirty,  flea-infested  floor  of  an 
open  piazza,  or  lie  out  on  the  ground.  One  of  the  largest 
and  most  commodious  buildings  in  the  village,  a  one-story 
house  with  a  high  front  stoop  or  porch,  had  been  used, 
apparently,  during  the  Spanish  occupation  of  the  place,  as  a 
store  or  shop.  At  the  time  of  our  return  from  the  front  it 
sheltered  the  "  United  States  Post-Office,  Military  Station 
No.  1,"  which  had  been  transferred  from  Daiquiri  to  Siboney 
two  or  three  days  before.  In  front  of  this  building  our  army 
wagon  stopped,  and  we  men  went  in  to  inquire  for  mail  and 
to  see  if  we  could  find  a  decently  clean  place  for  Miss  Barton 
to  sleep.  She  was  quite  ready  to  bivouac  in  the  army  wagon; 
but  we  hoped  to  get  something  better  for  her.  Mr.  Brewer, 
the  postmaster,  whom  I  had  met  in  one  of  my  lecture  trips 
through  the  West  and  more  recently  in  the  field,  received  us 
cordially,  and  at  once  offered  Miss  Barton  his  own  cot,  in  a 
room  that  had  not  yet  been  cleaned  or  swept,  back  of  the 
general  delivery  department.  By  the  light  of  a  single  candle 
it  seemed  to  be  a  gloomy,  dirty,  and  barn-like  apartment;  but 
the  cot  was  the  only  thing  in  the  shape  of  a  bed  that  I  had 
seen  in  Siboney,  outside  of  the  hospitals,  and  we  accepted  it 
for  Miss  Barton  with  grateful  hearts.  The  employees  of  the 
post-office  were  all  sleeping  in  camp-chairs  or  on  the  counters 
and  floors.  Where  Mr.  Brewer  went  when  he  had  given  his 
own  bed  to  Miss  Barton,  I  do  not  know.  I  left  her  writing 
orders  and  telegrams  by  the  light  of  a  flaring,  guttering 
candle  at  about  eleven  o'clock,  and  went  out  on  the  piazza  to 


152  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

take  a  more  careful  survey  of  the  premises  and  make  up  my 
mind  where  I  would  sleep. 

Lying  across  the  high  stoop  was  a  long  white  object, 
which  appeared,  in  the  darkness,  to  be  a  woman  in  her 
nightgown,  with  her  head  raised  a  little  on  the  sill  of  a 
disused  door.  I  stepped  over  her  once  in  going  down-stairs 
to  the  street,  and  wondered  what  calamity  of  war  had  reduced 
a  woman  to  the  necessity  of  sleeping  in  such  a  place  and  in 
circumstances  of  such  hardship  and  privation.  I  was  just 
discussing  with  Dr.  Hubbell  the  possibility  of  getting  the 
United  States  Signal  Corps  man  in  the  telegraph  office  to 
signal  our  steamer  for  a  boat,  regardless  of  the  high  surf, 
when  the  long  white  figure  on  the  floor  rose,  with  an  unmis 
takably  masculine  grunt,  and  remarked,  with  a  slight  Eng 
lish  accent,  that  he  did  not  think  there  was  any  possibility 
of  getting  off  to  a  ship  in  a  small  boat,  inasmuch  as  he  had 
been  trying  for  twenty-four  hours  to  get  on  board  of  his  own 
vessel  and  had  not  succeeded  yet.  The  figure  proved  to  be 
that  of  Lord  Alfred  Paget,  naval  observer  for  the  British 
government,  and  what  I  had  taken  in  the  darkness  for  the 
white  gown  of  a  woman  was  his  white-duck  uniform.  After 
discussing  the  situation  for  a  few  moments,  and  declaring 
discontentedly  that  our  engineer  corps  had  had  time  enough 
to  build  six  piers  and  yet  had  not  finished  one,  he  lay  down 
on  the  floor  again,  without  blanket,  pillow,  or  overcoat,  rested 
his  head  on  the  sill  of  the  disused  door,  and  apparently  went 
to  sleep,  while  I  debated  in  my  mind  the  question  whether  I 
had  better  sleep  with  him  on  the  floor  of  the  piazza,  and  take 
the  chance  of  getting  yellow  fever  from  a  possibly  infected 
building,  or  lie  out  on  the  ground,  where  I  might  be  stepped 
on  by  prowling  Cuban  refugees,  or  run  over  by  a  mule-team 
coming  in  from  the  front.  I  finally  decided  that  sleeping 
accommodations  which  were  good  enough  for  Lord  Alfred 
were  good  enough  for  me,  and,  just  as  the  moon  was  rising 


SIBONEY  DURING  THE   ARMISTICE        153 

over  the  high,  rocky  rampart  east  of  the  village,  I  rolled 
myself  up  in  my  blanket  and  lay  down  on  the  floor  against 
the  piazza  rail.  Dr.  Hubbell  slept  on  the  counter  of  the 
money-order  division  of  the  post-office,  while  Dr.  Egan,  with 
out  blanket  or  pillow,  stretched  himself  out  on  the  dirty 
planks  below. 

We  were  all  up  at  daybreak,  and  making  my  toilet  by 
tightening  my  belt  and  putting  on  my  mud-spattered  pith 
helmet,  I  went  down  to  the  water's  edge  to  try  to  find  some 
means  of  communicating  with  the  ship.  During  my  absence 
at  the  front  there  had  evidently  been  strong  winds  and  heavy 
seas,  for  the  strip  of  beach  was  covered  with  the  wrecks  of 
lighters  which  had  been  smashed  while  trying  to  land  supplies 
in  the  surf,  and  a  large  steam  lighter-launch,  loaded  with 
twenty  tons  or  more  of  hard  bread,  beans,  etc.,  was  lying  on 
the  bottom,  half  submerged,  about  fifty  yards  from  shore,  with 
the  sea  breaking  over  her.  The  small  temporary  pier  at 
which  I  landed  when  I  went  to  the  front  had  been  completely 
demolished  and  swept  away,  but  another  stronger  one  was  in 
process  of  construction. 

The  most  serious  embarrassments  with  which  the  army  of 
invasion  had  to  contend  after  it  reached  the  coast  and  began 
its  march  on  Santiago  were:  first,  the  extreme  difficulty  of 
landing  supplies  in  a  place  like  Siboney,  where  there  was 
neither  pier  nor  shelter,  and  where  the  beach  was  lashed  a 
large  part  of  the  time  by  a  high  and  dangerous  surf;  and, 
second,  the  difficulty  of  getting  such  supplies  to  the  front  over 
a  single  line  of  very  bad  road,  with  an  insufficient  number  of 
mules  and  army  wagons.  If  these  two  difficulties  had  been 
foreseen  and  provided  for  there  would  not  have  been  so  many 
smashed  lighters  and  launches  on  the  beach,  and  the  soldiers 
at  the  front  would  not  have  lived  so  much  of  the  time  on 
short  rations,  nor  have  been  compelled  to  boil  water  and  cook 
their  rations  in  coffee-cups  and  tomato-cans,  as  they  had  to  do 


154  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

throughout  the  campaign.  The  difficulty  of  landing  supplies 
on  that  exposed  and  surf-beaten  coast  might  have  been 
anticipated,  it  seems  to  me,  and  provided  for.  The  war 
ships  of  Sampson's  and  Schley's  fleets  were  there  long  before 
General  Shafter's  army  left  Tampa,  and  their  commanders 
must  have  seen,  I  think,  that  to  get  supplies  ashore  through 
the  surf  at  any  point  between  Santiago  and  Guantanamo  Bay 
would  be  extremely  difficult  and  hazardous,  and  would  proba 
bly  require  the  use  of  special  engineering  devices  and  appli 
ances.  The  prevailing  winds  there  are  from  the  east  and 
southeast,  and  from  such  winds  the  little  indentations  of  the 
coast  at  Siboney  and  Daiquiri  afforded  no  protection  what 
ever.  A  strong  breeze  raised  a  sea  which  might  amount  to 
nothing  outside,  but  which  was  very  troublesome,  if  not 
dangerous,  to  loaded  boats  and  lighters  as  soon  as  they 
reached  the  line  where  it  began  to  break  in  surf.  The  water 
was  very  deep  close  to  shore;  it  was  difficult,  therefore, 
to  construct  a  pier  of  any  great  length ;  and  even  if  there  had 
been  a  long  and  solid  pier,  small  boats  and  lighters  could  not 
have  discharged  cargo  upon  it  with  any  safety  while  they 
were  being  tossed  up  and  down  and  dashed  against  it  by  a 
heavy  sea. 

I  do  not  pretend  to  be  an  expert  in  such  matters,  but  in 
watching  the  landing  of  supplies  here,  both  from  our  own 
steamer  and  from  the  army  transports,  it  seemed  to  me  that 
what  is  known,  I  believe,  as  a  "  cable  hoist "  might  have  been 
used  to  advantage  if  it  had  been  provided  in  time.  It  is  a 
contrivance  resembling  the  cable  and  car  employed  by  life- 
saving  crews  on  our  coasts  to  bring  shipwrecked  sailors 
ashore  under  similar  conditions;  or,  to  use  a  comparison  that 
is  more  familiar,  it  is  a  reproduction  on  a  large  scale  of  the 
traveling  cash-boxes  on  wires  used  in  large  department 
stores.  If  a  suitable  transport  had  been  anchored  outside 
the  line  of  surf,  fifty  or  seventy-five  yards  from  the  beach, 


SIBONEY  DURING   THE   ARMISTICE        155 

and  a  steel  cable  stretched  from  it  to  a  strong  mast  on  shore, 
I  do  not  see  any  reason  why  cargo  might  not  have  been  car- 
ride  over  the  cable  in  a  suspended  car  or  cars  with  much 
greater  rapidity  and  safety  than  it  was  carried  in  lighters. 
Such  devices  are  used,  I  think,  at  several  points  on  the  west 
ern  coast  of  South  America  for  putting  guano  and  phos 
phates  on  board  of  vessels  where  communication  with  the 
shore  is  hazardous  and  uncertain  on  account  of  swell  or  surf. 

The  second  difficulty,  namely,  that  of  transportation  to  the 
front,  might  have  been  avoided  by  taking  to  Cuba  a  larger 
number  of  wagons  and  mules.  Our  army  before  Santiago 
suffered  for  want  of  a  great  many  things  that  the  soldiers 
had  with  them  on  the  transports,  but  that  were  not  landed 
and  carried  promptly  forward.  Among  such  things  were 
large  tents,  rubber  blankets,  camp-kettles,  and  large  cooking- 
utensils  generally.  "What 's  the  use  of  telling  us  to  drink 
only  boiled  water,"  said  an  officer  of  the  Seventh  Infantry  to 
me,  "when  we  have  n't  anything  bigger  than  a  coffee-cup  or 
an  old  tomato-can  to  boil  it  in,  or  to  keep  it  in  after  it  has 
been  boiled?  They  tell  us  also  that  we  must  sleep  in  ham 
mocks,  not  get  wet  if  we  can  help  it,  and  change  our  under 
clothes  whenever  we  do  get  wet.  That 's  all  very  well,  but 
there  is  n't  a  hammock  in  my  company.  I  have  n't  any 
rubber  blanket  or  spare  underclothes  myself,  and  I  don't 
believe  any  of  my  soldiers  have.  They  made  us  leave  at 
Tampa  everything  that  we  coul  1  possibly  dispense  with,  and 
then,  when  we  got  here,  they  did  n't  land  and  send  with  us 
even  the  indispensable  things  that  we  had  on  the  transports." 

The  complaint  of  the  officer  was  a  perfectly  just  one,  and 
I  heard  many  more  like  it.  The  insufficient  and  inadequate 
provision  for  the  care  and  feeding  of  the  wounded  at  the  field- 
hospital  of  the  Fifth  Army-Corps,  which  I  have  tried  to 
describe  in  the  preceding  chapter,  was  due  largely  to  the  in 
ability  of  General  Shafter's  commissaries  and  quartermasters 


156  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

to  cope  successfully  with  the  two  great  difficulties  above 
indicated,  namely,  landing  from  the  steamers  and  transporta 
tion  to  the  front.  The  hospital  corps  had  supplies  on  the 
vessels  at  Siboney,  but  as  everything  could  not  possibly  be 
landed  and  carried  forward  at  once,  preference  was  given  to 
ammunition  and  rations  for  able-bodied  soldiers  rather  than 
to  tents,  blankets,  and  invalid  food  for  the  wounded.  I  do 
not  mean  to  be  understood  as  saying  that  the  hospital-corps 
men  had  even  on  the  transports  everything  that  they  needed 
in  order  to  enable  them  to  take  proper  care  of  the  eight  hundred 
or  one  thousand  wounded  who  were  thrown  on  their  hands 
in  the  course  of  forty-eight  hours.  I  do  not  know  whether 
they  had  or  not.  Neither  do  I  mean  to  say  that  the  com 
missaries  and  quartermasters  did  not  do  all  that  they  possi 
bly  could  to  land  and  forward  supplies  of  all  kinds.  I  mean 
only  that,  as  a  result  of  our  inability  to  surmount  diffi 
culties  promptly,  our  army  at  the  front  was  not  properly 
equipped  and  our  wounded  were  not  adequately  cared  for. 
The  hospital  corps  and  quartermaster's  and  commissary 
departments  of  the  army,  however,  were  not  alone  in  their 
failure  to  anticipate  and  fully  provide  for  these  difficulties. 
The  Red  Cross  itself  was  in  no  better  case.  There  was  per 
haps  more  excuse  for  us,  because  when  we  fitted  out  we  did 
not  know  where  the  army  was  going  nor  what  it  proposed  to 
do,  and  we  had  been  assured  by  the  surgeon-general  and  by 
General  Shafter  that,  so  far  as  the  care  of  sick  and  wounded 
soldiers  was  concerned,  our  services  would  not  be  required. 
We  expected,  however,  that  they  would  be,  and  could  we 
have  known  in  what  field  and  under  what  conditions  our 
army  was  going  to  move  and  fight,  we  should  probably  have 
had,  in  some  directions,  a  better,  or  at  least  a  more  suitable, 
equipment.  If  we  had  had  at  Siboney  on  June  26  half  a 
dozen  army  wagons,  an  equal  number  of  saddle-horses,  and 
forty  or  fifty  mules  of  our  own,  we  should  have  been  in  much 


SIBONEY  DURING   THE   ARMISTICE        157 

better  condition  than  we  were  to  cope  with  the  difficulties  of 
the  situation.  But  for  the  assistance  of  the  army,  which 
helped  us  out  with  transportation,  notwithstanding  its  own 
limited  resources,  we  should  not  have  been  able  to  establish 
a  Red  Cross  station  at  the  front  in  time  to  cooperate  with 
the  hospital  corps  after  the  battle  of  July  1-2,  nor  should  we 
have  been  able  to  send  food  to  the  fifteen  thousand  refugees 
from  Santiago  who  fled,  hungry  and  destitute,  to  the  right 
wing  of  our  army  at  Caney  when  General  Shaf  ter  threatened 
to  bombard  the  city.  For  the  opportunity  to  get  into  the  field 
we  were  indebted  to  the  general  in  command,  to  his  hospital 
corps,  and  to  the  officers  of  his  army;  and  we  desire  most 
gratefully  to  acknowledge  and  thank  them  for  the  helping 
hand  that  they  extended  to  us  when  we  had  virtually  no 
transportation  whatever  of  our  own. 

When  we  returned  to  the  State  of  Texas  on  July  9,  the 
situation,  so  far  as  Red  Cross  relief -work  on  the  southeast 
ern  coast  of  Cuba  is  concerned,  was  briefly  as  follows:  We 
had  a  station  in  the  field-hospital  of  the  Fifth  Army-Corps 
at  the  front,  and  a  hospital  of  our  own  in  Siboney,  with 
twenty-five  beds  attended  by  six  trained  nurses  under  direc 
tion  of  Dr.  Lesser.  We  also  had  entire  charge  of  one  ward 
of  thirty  beds  in  the  general  hospital  directed  by  General 
Lagarde.  We  were  feeding  refugees  at  several  points  on  a 
line  extending  east  and  west  nearly  sixty  miles  from  the  right 
wing  of  our  army  at  Caney  to  the  naval  station  at  Guan- 
tanamo  Bay,  and  at  the  latter  place  we  had  landed  fifteen 
thousand  rations  to  be  distributed  under  the  general  direc 
tion  of  Captain  McCalla,  of  the  cruiser  Marblehead,  and  Gen 
eral  Perez,  commanding  the  Cuban  forces  in  the  Guantanamo 
district.  To  the  refugees  from  Santiago  at  Caney— about 
fifteen  thousand  in  number  and  mostly  women  and  children 
—we  had  forwarded,  chiefly  in  army  wagons  furnished  by 
General  Shafter,  six  or  eight  tons  of  food,  and  were  sending 


158  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

more  as  fast  as  we  could  land  it  in  lighters  through  the  surf. 
Mr.  Elwell,  of  Miss  Barton's  staff,  was  taking  care  of  two  or 
three  thousand  refugees  at  Firmeza,  a  small  village  in  the 
hills  back  of  Siboney,  and  we  hoped  soon  to  enter  the  harbor 
of  Santiago,  discharge  the  cargo  of  the  State  of  Texas  at  a 
pier,  assort  it  in  a  warehouse,  and  prosecute  the  work  of 
relief  upon  a  more  extensive  scale.  Our  sanguine  anticipa 
tions,  however,  were  not  to  be  realized  as  soon  as  we  hoped 
they  would  be,  and  our  relief-work  was  practically  suspended 
on  July  10,  as  the  result  of  an  outbreak  of  yellow  fever. 

The  circumstances  in  which  this  fever  first  made  its  ap 
pearance  were  as  follows:  When  the  army  landed  at  Siboney 
it  found  there  a  dirty  little  Cuban  village  of  from  twelve  to 
twenty  deserted  houses,  situated  at  the  bottom  of  a  wedge- 
shaped  cleft  in  the  long,  rocky  rampart  which  forms  the 
coast-line  between  Siboney  and  Morro  Castle,  and  at  the 
mouth  of  a  low,  swampy,  malarious  ravine  or  valley  extend 
ing  back  into  the  foot-hills,  and  opening  upon  the  sea  through 
the  notch.  The  site  of  the  village,  from  a  sanitary  point  of 
view,  was  a  very  bad  one,  not  only  because  it  was  low  and 
confined,  but  because  in  the  valley  immediately  back  of  it 
there  were  a  number  of  stagnant,  foul-smelling  ponds  and 
pools,  half  overgrown  with  rank  tropical  vegetation,  and  so 
full  of  decaying  organic  matter  that  when  I  passed  them 
for  the  first  time  on  my  way  to  the  front  I  instinctively  held 
my  breath  as  much  as  possible  because  the  very  air  from 
them  seemed  poisonous.  The  houses  of  the  village,  as  a 
result  of  long  neglect,  had  become  as  objectionable  from  a 
sanitary  point  of  view  as  the  location  in  which  they  stood. 
They  were  rather  large,  well-built,  one-story  frame  houses 
with  zinc  roofs,  and  were  erected,  if  I  mistake  not,  by  the 
Spanish-American  Iron  Company  for  the  accommodation  of 
its  native  employees.  Originally  they  must  have  been  very 
commodious  and  comfortable  buildings,  but  through  the 


SIBONEY  DURING   THE   ARMISTICE         1~9 

neglect  and  untidiness  of  their  later  occupants  they  had 
become  so  dirty  that  no  self-respecting  human  being  would 
be  willing  to  live  in  them. 

Such  were  the  village  and  the  houses  of  Siboney  when  the 
army  landed  there  on  June  23.  In  view  of  the  nature  of  the 
Cuban  climate  during  the  rainy  season,  and  the  danger  of 
infection  from  abandoned  houses  whose  history  was  entirely 
unknown,  and  within  whose  walls  there  might  have  been 
yellow  fever,  it  was  obviously  somebody's  duty  not  only  to 
clean  up  the  place  as  far  as  possible,  but  to  decide  whether 
the  houses  should  be  burned  to  the  ground  as  probable 
sources  of  infection,  or,  on  the  other  hand,  washed  out, 
fumigated,  and  used.  The  surgeons  of  the  blockading  fleet 
recommended  that  the  buildings  be  destroyed,  for  the  reason 
that  if  Siboney  were  to  be  the  army's  base  of  supplies  it 
would  be  imprudent  to  run  the  risk  of  infection  by  allowing 
them  to  be  used.  Instead  of  acting  upon  this  advice,  how 
ever,  the  army  officers  in  command  at  Siboney  not  only 
allowed  the  houses  to  be  occupied  from  the  very  first,  but 
put  men  into  them  without  either  disinfecting  them  or  clean 
ing  their  dirty  floors.  Chlorid  of  lime  was  not  used  any 
where,  and  the  foul  privies  immediately  back  of  and  adjoin 
ing  the  houses  were  permitted  to  stand  in  the  condition  in 
which  they  were  found,  so  that  the  daily  rains  washed  the 
excrement  from  them  down  under  the  floors  to  saturate  fur 
ther  the  already  contaminated  soil. 

When  we  returned  from  the  front  on  July  9,  we  found 
the  condition  of  the  village  worse  than  ever.  No  attempt, 
apparently,  had  been  made  to  clean  or  disinfect  it;  no  sani 
tary  precautions  had  been  taken  or  health  regulations 
enforced;  hundreds  of  incredibly  dirty  and  ragged  Cubans 
— some  of  them  employed  in  discharging  the  government 
transports  and  some  of  them  merely  loafers,  camp-followers, 
and  thieves— thronged  the  beach,  evacuating  their  bowels  in 


160  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

the  bushes  and  throwing  remnants  of  food  about  on  the 
ground  to  rot  in  the  hot  sunshine;  there  was  a  dead  and 
decomposing  mule  in  one  of  the  stagnant  pools  behind  the 
village,  and  the  whole  place  stank.  If,  under  such  conditions, 
an  epidemic  of  fever  had  not  broken  out,  it  would  have  been 
so  strange  as  to  border  on  the  miraculous.  Nature  alone 
would  probably  have  brought  it  about,  but  when  nature  and 
man  cooperated  the  result  was  certain.  On  July  8  the  army 
surgeons  reported  three  cases  of  yellow  fever  among  the  sick 
in  the  abandoned  Spanish  houses  on  shore.  On  the  10th  the 
number  of  cases  had  increased  to  thirty,  and  included  Dr. 
Lesser,  chief  surgeon  of  the  Red  Cross,  and  his  wife,  two  Red 
Cross  nurses,  and  Mrs.  Trumbull  White,  wife  of  the  corre 
spondent  of  the  Chicago  "  Record,"  who  had  been  working  as 
a  nurse  in  the  Red  Cross  hospital. 

On  the  llth  General  Miles  arrived  from  Washington,  and 
on  ascertaining  the  state  of  affairs  ordered  the  burning  of 
every  house  in  the  village.  I  doubt  very  much  whether  this 
step  was  necessary  or  judicious,  for  the  reason  that  it  was 
taken  too  late.  If  there  was  any  reason  to  believe,  when  the 
army  first  began  to  disembark  at  Siboney,  that  the  houses 
of  the  village  were  likely  to  become  sources  of  infection,  they 
should  have  been  burned  or  fumigated  at  once.  To  burn 
them  after  they  had  set  yellow  fever  afloat  in  that  malarious 
and  polluted  atmosphere  was  like  locking  the  stable  door  after 
the  horse  has  been  stolen.  But  it  is  very  questionable  whether 
they  should  have  been  burned  at  any  time.  In  a  country  like 
eastern  Cuba,  where  at  intervals  of  two  or  three  days  through 
out  the  wet  season  there  is  a  tropical  downpour  of  rain  which 
deluges  the  ground  and  beats  through  the  most  closely 
woven  tent,  a  house  with  a  tight  zinc  roof  and  a  dry  floor  is 
a  most  valuable  possession,  and  it  should  not  be  destroyed  if 
there  is  any  way  of  disinfecting  it  and  making  it  a  safe  place 
of  human  habitation.  All  the  evidence  obtainable  in  Santi- 


SIBONEY  DURING   THE   ARMISTICE        161 

ago  was  to  the  effect  that  these  houses  were  not  infected 
with  yellow  fever;  but  even  if  they  had  been,  it  was  quite 
possible,  I  think,  to  save  them  and  make  them  useful.  If, 
when  the  army  landed,  the  best  of  the  buildings  had  been 
thoroughly  cleaned  and  then  fumigated  by  shutting  them 
up  tightly  and  burning  sulphur  and  other  suitable  chemical 
substances  in  them,  the  disease-germs  that  they  contained 
might  have  been  destroyed.  Convict  barges  saturated  with 
the  germs  of  smallpox,  typhus,  dysentery,  and  all  sorts  of 
infectious  and  contagious  diseases  are  treated  in  this  way 
in  Siberia,  and  there  is  no  reason  why  houses  should  not  be 
so  purified  in  Cuba.  General  Miles  and  his  chief  surgeon 
decided,  however,  that  the  whole  village  should  be  burned, 
and  burned  it  was.  The  postal,  telegraph,  and  signal-service 
officers  were  turned  out  of  their  quarters  and  put  into  tents; 
a  yellow-fever  camp  was  established  in  the  hills  about  two 
miles  north  of  Siboney;  more  hospital  tents  and  tent-flies 
were  pitched  along  the  sea-coast  west  of  the  notch;  and  as 
fast  as  sick  and  wounded  soldiers  could  be  removed  from  the 
condemned  houses  and  put  under  canvas  or  sent  to  the 
yellow-fever  camp,  the  houses  were  destroyed. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  yellow  fever  had  made  its  appear 
ance  in  the  army  before  Santiago  as  well  as  at  Siboney, 
Miss  Barton,  acting  under  the  advice  and  direction  of  Major 
Wood,  chief  surgeon  of  the  First  Division  hospital,  aban 
doned  the  Red  Cross  station  at  the  front,  brought  all  its 
equipment  and  supplies  back  to  the  sea-coast,  and  put  them 
again  on  board  the  State  of  Texas.  She  also  decided  not  to 
allow  fever-stricken  employees  of  the  Red  Cross  to  be  cared 
for  on  board  the  steamer,  and  Dr.  and  Mrs.  Lesser  and  two 
nurses  were  therefore  carried  on  their  cots  to  a  railroad-train 
and  transported  to  the  yellow-fever  camp  two  miles  away. 
I  went  through  the  fever  hospital  where  they  lay  just  before 

they  were  removed,  and  made  up  my  mind— very  ignorantly 
11 


162  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

and  presumptuously,  perhaps— that  neither  they  nor  any  of 
the  patients  whom  I  saw  had  yellow  fever,  either  in  a  mild 
form  or  in  any  form  whatever.  They  seemed  to  me  to  have 
nothing  more  than  calenture,  brought  on  by  overwork,  a 
malarious  atmosphere,  and  a  bad  sanitary  environment. 
Mrs.  White,  who  was  also  said  to  have  yellow  fever,  recov 
ered  in  three  days,  just  in  time  to  escape  being  sent  to  the 
yellow-fever  camp  with  Dr.  and  Mrs.  Lesser.  I  have  no 
doubt  that  there  were  some  yellow-fever  cases  among  the 
sick  who  were  sent  to  the  camp  at  the  time  when  the  village 
of  Siboney  was  burned,  but  I  did  not  happen  to  see  any  of 
them,  and  it  is  the  opinion  of  many  persons  who  are  far 
better  qualified  to  judge  than  I,  that  yellow-fever  cases  and 
calenture  cases  were  lumped  together  without  much  dis 
crimination,  and  that  the  latter  greatly  outnumbered  the 
former. 

On  July  15  the  number  of  so-called  yellow-fever  cases 
exceeded  one  hundred,  and  the  most  energetic  measures 
were  being  taken  by  the  medical  authorities  on  shore  to 
prevent  the  further  spread  of  the  disease.  Everything  that 
could  possibly  hold  or  transmit  infection  was  burned,  includ 
ing  my  blankets,  mackintosh-cape,  etc.,  which  I  had  acciden 
tally  left  in  the  post-office  overnight,  as  well  as  all  the  baggage 
and  personal  eifects  of  the  postal  clerks.  Mr.  Brewer,  the 
postmaster,  died  of  the  fever,  Mr.  Kempner,  the  assistant 
postmaster,  was  reduced  to  sleeping  in  a  camp-chair  out 
of  doors  without  overcoat  or  blanket,  and  the  telegraph  and 
telephone  operators  worked  night  and  day  in  a  damp,  badly 
ventilated  tent,  with  their  feet  literally  in  pools  of  mud  and 
water. 

On  July  15  we  heard  at  Siboney  that  Santiago  had  sur 
rendered,  and  on  the  following  day  we  steamed  down  to  the 
mouth  of  Santiago  harbor,  with  a  faint  hope  that  we  might 
be  permitted  to  enter.  Admiral  Sampson,  however,  informed 


SIBONEY  DURING   THE   ARMISTICE         163 

us  that  the  surrender,  although  agreed  upon,  had  not  yet 
taken  place,  and  that  it  would  be  impossible  for  us  to  enter 
the  harbor  until  after  Morro  Castle  and  the  shore  batteries 
had  been  evacuated.  We  then  sailed  for  Guantanamo  Bay, 
with  the  intention  of  landing  more  supplies  for  the  refugees 
in  that  district;  but  inasmuch  as  we  had  been  lying  in  the 
fever-infected  port  of  Siboney,  Captain  McCalla,  who  came 
out  to  the  mouth  of  the  bay  in  a  steam-launch  to  meet  us, 
refused  to  take  the  supplies,  and  would  not  let  us  communi 
cate  with  the  shore.  On  the  night  of  July  16,  therefore,  we 
returned  to  Siboney,  and  at  noon  on  the  17th  we  were  again 
off  Morro  Castle,  waiting  for  an  opportunity  to  enter  the 
harbor. 


CHAPTER  XIV 
ENTERING   SANTIAGO  HARBOR 

AS  soon  as  possible  after  our  return  from  Guantanamo, 
JLJL.  Miss  Barton  sent  a  note  to  Admiral  Sampson,  on  board 
the  flagship  New  York,  saying  that,  as  the  inhabitants  of  the 
city  were  reported  to  be  in  a  starving  condition,  she  hoped 
that  food  would  be  allowed  to  go  in  with  the  forces.  The 
admiral  promptly  replied :  "  The  food  shall  enter  in  advance 
of  the  forces;  you  may  go  in  this  afternoon."  Almost  any 
other  naval  commander,  after  destroying  a  hostile  fleet  and 
reducing  all  the  batteries  that  defended  a  hostile  city,  would 
have  wished  to  crown  his  victory  and  enjoy  his  triumph  by 
entering  the  harbor  in  advance  of  all  other  vessels  and  on 
one  of  his  own  ships  of  war;  but  Admiral  Sampson,  with  the 
modesty  and  generosity  characteristic  of  a  great  and  noble 
nature,  waived  his  right  to  be  the  first  to  enter  the  city,  and 
sent  in  the  State  of  Texas,  flying  the  flag  of  the  Red  Cross  and 
carrying  food  and  relief  for  the  wounded,  the  starving,  and  the 
dying. 

An  officer  from  the  New  York  had  been  at  work  all  day 
locating  and  removing  the  submarine  mines  in  the  narrow 
part  of  the  channel  just  north  of  Morro  Castle;  but  there 
were  still  four  that  had  not  been  exploded.  As  they  were 
electrical  mines,  however,  and  as  the  cables  connecting  them 
with  the  shore  had  been  cut,  they  were  no  longer  dangerous, 

164 


ENTERING   SANTIAGO   HARBOR  165 

and  there  was  nothing  to  prevent  the  entrance  of  the  State 
of  Texas  except  the  narrowness  of  the  unobstructed  part  of 
the  channel.  The  collier  Merrimac,  sunk  by  Lieutenant 
Hobson  and  his  men,  was  not  in  a  position  to  interfere  seri 
ously  with  navigation.  Cervera's  fleet  ran  out  without  any 
serious  trouble  on  the  western  side  of  her,  and  there  was  no 
reason  why  Admiral  Sampson,  if  he  decided  to  force  an 
entrance,  should  not  run  in,  following  the  same  course.  In 
order  to  prevent  this,  the  Spaniards,  on  the  night  of  July  4, 
attempted  to  sink  the  old  war-ship  Eeina  Mercedes  in  such  a 
position  that  she  would  close  the  channel  at  a  point  where  it 
is  very  narrow,  between  the  Merrimac  and  the  entrance  to 
the  harbor.  The  ships  of  the  blockading  fleet,  however,  saw 
her  coming  out  about  midnight,  turned  their  big  guns  upon 
her,  and  sank  her  with  six-  and  eight-inch  projectiles  before 
she  could  get  into  position.  She  drifted  around  parallel  with 
the  shore,  and  lay  half  submerged  on  the  eastern  side  of  the 
channel,  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards  from  the  entrance 
and  three  hundred  or  three  hundred  and  fifty  yards  from  the 
Merrimac. 

At  four  o'clock  Admiral  Sampson  sent  Lieutenant  Cape- 
hart  on  board  the  State  of  Texas  to  give  Captain  Young  all 
necessary  information  with  regard  to  the  channel  and  the 
mines,  and  a  few  moments  later,  under  the  guidance  of  a 
Cuban  pilot,  we  steamed  slowly  in  under  the  gray,  frowning 
battlements  of  Morro  Castle.  As  we  approached  it  I  had  an 
opportunity  to  see,  for  the  first  time,  the  nature  and  extent 
of  the  damage  done  to  it  by  the  guns  of  Admiral  Sampson's 
fleet,  and  I  was  glad  to  find  that,  although  it  had  been  some 
what  battered  on  its  southern  or  sea  face,  its  architectural 
picturesqueness  had  not  been  destroyed  or  even  seriously 
impaired.  To  an  observer  looking  at  it  from  the  south,  it 
has,  in  general  outline,  the  appearance  of  three  huge  cubes 
or  rectangular  masses  of  gray  masonry,  put  together  in  such 


166  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

a  way  that  the  largest  cube  occupies  the  crest  of  the  bold, 
almost  precipitous  bluff  which  forms  the  eastern  side  of  the 
entrance  to  the  harbor,  while  the  other  two  descend  from  it 
in  colossal  steps  of  diminishing  size  toward  an  escarpment 
in  the  hillside  seventy-five  or  a  hundred  feet  below,  where 
appear  five  or  six  square,  grated  doors,  leading,  apparently, 
to  a  row  of  subterranean  ammunition-vaults.  Underneath 
the  escarpment  is  a  zigzag  flight  of  steps,  screened  at  exposed 
points  by  what  seem  to  be  comparatively  recent  walls,  or  cur 
tains  of  masonry,  much  lighter  in  color  than  the  walls  of  the 
castle  itself.  Still  lower  down,  at  the  base  of  the  bluff,  are 
two  or  three  huge,  dark  caves  into  which  the  swell  of  the 
Caribbean  Sea  rolls  with  a  dull,  reverberating  roar.  The 
height  of  the  castle  above  the  water  appears  to  be  one  hun 
dred  and  fifty  or  two  hundred  feet.  There  are  very  few 
embrasures,  or  port-holes,  in  the  gray,  lichen-stained  walls  of 
the  old  fortification,  and,  so  far  as  I  could  see,  it  had  no 
•  armament  whatever  except  two  or  three  guns  mounted  en 
barbette  on  the  parapet  of  the  uppermost  cube,  or  bastion. 
As  a  defensive  work  the  Morro  Castle  of  Santiago  has  no 
importance  or  significance  whatever,  and  its  complete  de 
struction  would  not  have  made  it  any  easier  for  Admiral 
Sampson  to  force  an  entrance  to  the  harbor.  It  is  the  oldest 
Morro,  however,  in  Cuba;  and  as  a  relic  of  the  past,  and  an 
interesting  and  attractive  feature  in  a  landscape  already 
picturesque,  it  has  the  highest  possible  value,  and  I  am  more 
than  glad  that  it  was  not  destroyed.  There  was  no  reason, 
really,  for  bombarding  it  at  all,  because  it  was  perfectly  harm 
less.  The  defenses  of  Santiago  that  were  really  dangerous 
and  effective  were  the  submarine  mines  in  the  channel  and 
the  earthwork  batteries  east  and  west  of  the  entrance  to  the 
harbor.  Morro  was  huge,  formidable-looking,  and  impressive 
to  the  eye  and  the  imagination,  but  the  horizontal  reddish 
streaks  of  freshly  turned  earth  along  the  crests  of  the  hills 
east  and  west  of  it  had  ten  times  its  offensive  power.  I  saw 


ENTERING   SANTIAGO   HARBOR  167 

the  last  Spanish  soldier  leave  the  castle  at  noon  on  Sunday, 
and  when  we  passed  it,  soon  after  four  o'clock,  its  flag  was 
gone,  its  walls  were  deserted,  and  buzzards  were  soaring  in 
circles  about  its  little  corner  turrets. 

About  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards  inside  the  entrance  to 
the  harbor  we  passed  the  wreck  of  the  Reina  Mercedes,  lying 
close  to  the  shore,  on  the  right-hand  side  of  the  channel, 
with  her  port  rail  under  water  and  her  masts  sloping  at  an 
angle  of  forty-five  degrees  to  the  westward.  Two  brass- 
bound  sea-chests  and  a  pile  of  signal-flags  were  lying  on  her 
deck  aft,  and  she  had  not  been  touched,  apparently,  since  she 
was  sunk  by  the  guns  of  our  battle-ships  on  the  night  of 
July  4. 

Three  hundred  or  three  hundred  and  fifty  yards  farther 
in  we  passed  what  the  sailors  of  the  fleet  call  "Hobson's 
choice,"  the  steam-collier  Merrimac.  She  lay  in  deep  water, 
about  midway  from  shore  to  shore,  and  all  that  could  be  seen 
of  her  were  the  tops  of  her  masts  and  about  two  feet  of  her 
smoke-stack.  If  the  channel  were  narrow  and  wTere  in  the 
middle  of  the  passage,  she  would  have  blocked  it  completely; 
but  apparently  it  is  wider  than  her  length,  and  vessels  draw 
ing  twenty  feet  or  more  of  water  could  go  around  her  with 
out  touching  bottom.  It  is  a  little  remarkable  that  both 
combatants  should  have  tried  to  obstruct  this  channel  and 
that  neither  should  have  succeeded.  The  location  chosen  by 
the  Spaniards  seemed  to  me  to  be  a  better  one  than  that 
selected  by  Hobson;  but  it  is  so  near  the  mouth  of  the  har 
bor  that  the  chance  of  reaching  it  with  a  vessel  in  the  glare 
of  our  search-lights  and  under  the  fire  of  our  guns  was  a  very 
slight  one.  The  Reina  Mercedes  reached  it,  but  was  disabled 
before  she  could  get  into  position.1 

1  The  point  where  the  Merrimac  was  sunk  was  not  the  point  selected  by 
Lieutenant  Hobson,  who  aimed  to  sink  her  farther  out,  and  more  nearly  in 
the  position  reached  by  the  Reina  Mercedes,  but  was  prevented  from  doing 
so,  as  described  in  his  article  in  "  The  Century"  for  January,  1899.— EDITOR. 


168  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

Beyond  the  Merrimac  the  entrance  to  the  harbor  widens  a 
little,  but  the  shores  continue  high  and  steep  for  a  distance 
of  a  mile  or  more.  At  intervals  of  a  few  hundred  yards, 
however,  beautiful  deep  coves  run  back  into  the  high  land 
on  either  side,  and  at  the  head  of  every  one  the  eye  catches 
a  glimpse  of  a  little  settlement  of  half  a  dozen  houses  with 
red-tiled  roofs,  or  a  country  villa  shaded  by  palms  and  half 
hidden  in  shrubbery  and  flowers.  One  does  not  often  see,  in 
the  tropics  or  elsewhere,  a  harbor  entrance  that  is  more 
striking  and  picturesque  than  the  watery  gateway  which 
leads  from  the  ocean  to  the  spacious  upper  bay  of  Santiago. 
It  does  not  look  like  an  inlet  of  the  sea,  but  suggests  rather 
a  tranquil,  winding  river,  shut  in  by  high,  steep  ramparts  of 
greenery,  with  here  and  there  an  opening  to  a  beautiful 
lateral  cove,  where  the  dark  masses  of  chaparral  are  relieved 
by  clumps  of  graceful,  white-stemmed  palms  and  lighted  up 
by  the  solid  sheets  of  bright-red  flowers  which  hide  the 
foliage  of  the  flamboyant,  or  flame-tree. 

As  ours  was  the  first  vessel  that  had  entered  the  harbor  in 
nearly  two  months,  and  as  we  were  flying  the  Red  Cross  flag, 
our  arrival  naturally  caused  great  excitement  in  all  the 
little  settlements  and  at  all  the  villas  along  the  shores. 
Men,  women,  and  children  ran  down  to  the  water's  edge,  wav 
ing  their  hats  and  handkerchiefs  or  brandishing  their  arms 
in  joyous  welcome,  and  even  old,  gray-haired,  and  feeble 
women,  who  could  not  get  as  far  as  the  shore,  stood  in  front 
of  their  little  houses,  now  gazing  at  us  in  half-incredulous 
amazement,  and  then  crossing  themselves  devoutly  with 
bowed  heads,  as  if  thanking  God  that  siege  and  starvation 
were  over  and  help  and  food  at  hand. 

About  half-way  between  Morro  Castle  and  Santiago  there 
is  a  high,  bare,  flat-topped  hill,  or  mesa,  called  the  Behia,  on 
which  there  is  a  signal-station  with  a  mast  for  the  display  of 
flags.  Just  before  this  hill  is  reached  the  channel  widens, 


ENTERING   SANTIAGO   HARBOR  169 

and,  as  the  steamer  rounds  a  high,  bold  promontory,  the 
beautiful  upper  bay  comes  into  view,  like  a  great  placid  lake 
framed  in  a  magnificent  amphitheater  of  mountains,  with  a 
fringe  of  cocoanut-palms  here  and  there  to  break  the  level 
shore-line,  and  a  few  splashes  of  vivid  red  where  flame-trees 
stand  out  in  brilliant  relief  against  the  varied  green  of  the 
mountain  background.  Two  miles  away,  on  the  eastern  side 
of  the  harbor,  appeared  the  city  of  Santiago— a  sloping 
expanse  of  red-tiled  roofs,  green  mango-trees,  and  twin- 
belfried  Spanish  churches,  rising  from  the  water's  edge  to 
the  crest  of  a  range  of  low  hills  which  bound  the  bay  on  that 
side.  A  week  or  ten  days  earlier  I  had  seen  the  town  from 
the  rifle-pits  of  the  Rough  Riders  at  the  front  of  our  army; 
but  its  appearance  from  the  harbor  was  so  different  that  I 
could  hardly  recognize  it  as  the  same  place.  Seen  from  the 
intrenched  hill  occupied  by  General  Wheeler's  brigade,  it 
appeared  to  consist  mainly  of  barracks,  hospitals,  and  shed- 
like  buildings  flying  the  flag  of  the  Red  Cross,  and  had  no 
beauty  or  picturesqueness  whatever;  but  from  the  water  it 
seemed  to  be  rather  an  interesting  and  attractive  Spanish- 
American  town. 

As  we  entered  the  upper  bay  and  caught  sight  of  the  city, 
some  of  our  Red  Cross  nurses  who  were  standing  with  Miss 
Barton  in  a  little  group  at  the  bow  of  the  steamer  felt 
impelled  to  give  expression  to  their  feelings  in  some  way, 
and,  acting  upon  a  sudden  impulse  and  without  premedita 
tion,  they  began  to  sing  in  unison  "  Praise  God,  from  whom 
all  blessings  flow."  Never  before,  probably,  had  the  doxology 
been  heard  on  the  waters  of  Santiago  harbor,  and  it  must 
have  been  more  welcome  music  to  the  crowds  assembling  on 
shore  than  the  thunder  of  Admiral  Sampson's  cannon  and  the 
jarring  rattle  of  machine-guns  from  the  advance  line  of  our 
army.  The  doxology  was  followed  by  "  My  country,  't  is  of 
thee,"  in  which  the  whole  ship's  company  joined  with  a  thrill 


170  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

of  patriotic  pride ;  and  to  this  music  the  State  of  Texas  glided 
swiftly  up  the  harbor  to  her  anchorage.  It  was  then  about 
half -past  five.  The  daily  afternoon  thunder-shower  had  just 
passed  over  the  city,  and  its  shadow  still  lay  heavy  on  the 
splendid  group  of  peaks  west  of  the  bay;  but  the  light-green 
slopes  of  the  grassy  mountains  to  the  eastward^  as  well  as 
the  red  roofs  and  gray  church  steeples  of  the  city,  were 
bathed  in  the  warm  yellow  light  of  the  sinking  sun. 

Before  we  had  fairly  come  to  anchor,  a  great  crowd  had 
assembled  on  the  pier  nearest  to  us,  and  in  less  than  five 
minutes  half  a  dozen  small  boats  were  alongside,  filled  with 
people  anxious  to  know  whether  we  had  brought  food  and 
when  we  would  begin  to  distribute  it.  Many  of  them  said  that 
they  had  not  tasted  bread  in  weeks,  and  all  agreed  that  there 
was  nothing  to  eat  in  the  city  except  rice,  and  very  little  of 
that.  We  told  them  that  we  should  begin  discharging  the 
cargo  of  the  State  of  Texas  early  on  the  following  morning 
and  should  be  in  a  position  to  feed  ten  thousand  people  within 
the  next  twenty-four  hours.  The  normal  population  of  the 
city  at  that  time  was  about  fifty  thousand,  but  a  large  part 
of  it  had  fled  to  Caney  and  other  suburban  villages  to  escape 
the  bombardment,  and  more  than  half  the  houses  were  closed 
and  deserted.  General  Shafter  had  entered  the  city  with  a 
single  regiment— the  Ninth  Infantry— at  noon,  and  had 
raised  the  American  flag  over  the  palace  of  the  Spanish 
governor. 


CHAPTER  XV 
THE  CAPTURED  CITY 

"TYTE  lay  at  anchor  all  Sunday  night  off  the  foot  of  the 
V  V  street  known  as  Calle  Baja  de  la  Marina,  and  early  on 
Monday  morning  steamed  up  to  the  most  spacious  and  conve 
nient  pier  in  the  city,  made  fast  our  lines,  and  began  to  dis 
charge  cargOo  The  dock  and  warehouse  facilities  of  Santiago 
are  fairly  goodo  They  are  not  so  extensive  as  those  of  an 
American  seaport  of  equal  importance,  but  so  far  as  they  go 
they  leave  little  to  be  desiredo  The  pier  at  which  the  State  of 
Texas  lay  was  spacious  and  well  built;  an  iron  tramway  ran 
from  it  to  the  customs  warehouse,  and,  with  the  help  of  one 
hundred  stevedores,  Mr.  Warner,  of  Miss  Barton's  staff, 
found  it  possible  to  unload  and  store  from  three  hundred  and 
twenty-five  to  three  hundred  and  fifty  tons  of  foodstuffs  per 
daya  As  soon  as  the  steamer  had  made  fast  her  lines  a 
great  crowd  of  forlorn-looking  men  and  children,  clothed  in 
the  loose,  dirty  white-cotton  shirts  and  trousers  and  battered 
straw  hats  which  make  up  the  costume  of  the  lower  classes, 
assembled  on  the  pier  to  stare  at  the  newcomers  and  watch 
the  unloading  of  the  ship.  They  were  of  all  ages  and  com 
plexions,  from  coal-black,  grizzle-headed  old  negroes  leaning 
on  canes  to  half-starved  and  half-naked  Cuban  children, 
whose  tallowy  faces  and  distended  abdomens  were  unmis 
takable  evidences  of  fever  and  famine.  They  were  not,  as 

171 


172  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

a  rule,  emaciated,  nor  did  they  seem  to  be  in  the  last  stages 
of  starvation;  but  the  eagerness  with  which  they  crowded 
about  the  open  ports  of  the  steamer,  and  watched  the  bags 
of  beans,  rice,  and  corn-meal  as  they  were  brought  out  by  the 
stevedores  and  placed  on  the  little  flat-cars  of  the  tramway, 
showed  that  at  least  they  were  desperately  hungry.  Now 
and  then  a  few  beans,  or  a  few  grains  of  rice,  would  escape 
from  one  of  the  bags  through  a  small  rip  or  tear,  and  in  an 
instant  half  a  dozen  little  children  would  be  scrambling  for 
them,  collecting  them  carefully  one  by  one,  and  putting  them 
into  their  hats  or  tying  them  up  in  their  shirt-tails  and  the 
hems  of  their  tattered  frocks.  In  one  instance  half  a  bushel 
or  more  of  corn-meal  escaped  from  a  torn  bag  and  lay  in  a 
heap  on  the  dirty  pier.  One  of  the  prowling  Cuban  boys 
espied  it,  gathered  up  a  hatful  of  it,  and  then  looked  around 
for  something  in  which  he  could  put  the  remainder.  Failing 
to  see  anything  that  could  be  utilized  as  a  receptacle,  he 
seemed  for  a  moment  to'be  in  despair;  but  presently  a  bright 
thought  flashed  into  his  mind,  and  was  reflected  in  his  thin, 
eager,  street- Arab  face.  Taking  out  of  his  pocket  two  bits 
of  dirty  string,  he  tied  his  loose  cotton  trousers  tightly  around 
his  ankles,  and  then,  unbuttoning  his  waist-band,  he  began 
scopping  up  the  corn-meal  from  the  filthy  planks  and  shovel 
ing  it  into  his  baggy  breeches.  Five  minutes  later  he  wad 
dled  off  the  pier  in  triumph,  looking,  so  far  as  his  legs  wrere 
concerned,  like  a  big,  badly  stuffed  sawdust  doll,  or  a  half- 
starved  gamin  suffering  from  elephantiasis. 

As  the  day  advanced,  the  number  of  men  and  children  who 
crowded  about  the  steamer  watching  for  opportunities  to 
pilfer  or  pick  up  food  became  so  great  that  it  was  necessary 
to  clear  the  pier  and  put  a  guard  of  soldiers  there  to  exclude 
the  public  altogether.  Then  the  hungry  people  formed  in  a 
dense  mass  in  the  street  opposite  the  steamer,  and  stood  there 
in  the  blazing  sunshine  for  hours,  watching  the  little  flat-cars 


THE   CAPTURED   CITY  173 

loaded  with  provisions  as  they  were  rolled  past  to  the  ware 
house.  From  an  English  cable-operator,  who  came  down  to 
the  pier,  we  learned  that  for  weeks  there  had  been  nothing 
in  the  city  to  eat  except  rice,  and  that  the  supply  even  of 
that  was  limited.  Hard-bread  crackers  had  sold  as  high  as 
one  dollar  apiece  and  canned  meat  at  four  dollars  a  can,  and 
many  well-to-do  families  had  not  tasted  bread,  meat,  or  milk 
in  more  than  a  month. 

Although  there  was  said  to  be  little  or  no  yellow  fever  in 
Santiago,  the  captain  of  the  State  of  Texas  decided  to  quar 
antine  the  steamer  against  the  shore,  and  gave  notice  to  all 
on  board  that  if  any  person  left  the  ship  he  could  not  return 
to  it.  This  made  going  ashore  a  serious  matter,  because 
there  was  virtually  nothing  to  eat  in  the  city,  and  no  place 
for  a  stranger  to  stay,  and  if  one  cut  loose  from  the  steamer 
he  might  find  himself  without  shelter  and  without  any  means 
whatever  of  subsistence.  We  had  on  board,  fortunately,  a 
young  American  named  Elwell,  who  had  lived  several  years 
in  Santiago,  and  was  well  acquainted  not  only  with  its 
resources,  but  with  a  large  number  of  its  citizens.  He  said 
that  there  was  a  club  there  known  as  the  Anglo-American 
Club,  organized  and  supported  by  the  foreign  merchants  of 
the  city  and  the  English  cable-operators.  Of  this  club  he 
was  one  of  the  organizers  and  charter  members,  and  although 
it  had  been  closed  during  the  blockade  and  siege,  it  would 
probably  be  reopened  at  once,  and  with  an  introduction  from 
him  I  could  get  a  room  in  it.  He  doubted  whether  the  steward 
could  give  me  anything  to  eat,  but  I  could  take  food  enough 
with  me  to  last  for  a  day  or  two,  and  as  soon  as  possible 
arrangements  would  be  made  to  supply  the  club  with  provi 
sions  from  the  State  of  Texas.  Encouraged  by  this  statement 
of  the  possibilities,  I  decided  on  Tuesday  morning  to  abandon 
the  steamer  and  trust  myself  to  the  tender  mercies  of  the 
city  and  the  Anglo-American  Club.  Hastily  packing  up  a 


174  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

couple  of  hand-bags,  and  hiring  a  ragged,  dirty  Cuban  to 
carry  them  and  act  in  the  capacity  of  guide,  I  left  the  ship, 
elbowed  my  way  through  the  crowd  of  people  at  the  head  of 
the  pier,  and  entered  one  of  the  narrow,  ill-paved,  and  in 
credibly  dirty  streets  which  lead  upward  from  the  water 
front  to  the  higher  part  of  the  city. 

The  first  impression  made  by  Santiago  upon  the  newcomer 
in  July,  1898,  was  one  of  dirt,  disorder,  and  neglect.  It 
always  had  the  reputation  of  being  the  dirtiest  city  in  Cuba, 
and  at  the  time  of  the  surrender  it  was  at  its  worst.  I  hardly 
know  how  to  give  an  adequate  idea  of  it  to  one  who  is  not 
familiar  with  Spanish-American  cities  and  architecture,  but 
I  will  try.  In  the  first  place,  the  site  of  the  city  is  the 
slope  of  a  hill  which  falls  rather  steeply  to  the  water  on 
the  eastern  side  of  the  bay.  The  most  important  streets, 
such  as  Enramadas  and  Calle  Baja  de  la  Marina,  extend 
up  and  down  the  slope  at  right  angles  to  the  water-front, 
and  are  crossed  at  fairly  regular  intervals  by  narrower  streets 
or  alleys  running  horizontally  along  the  hillside,  following 
its  contour  and  dipping  down  here  and  there  into  the  gullies 
or  ravines  which  stretch  from  the  crest  of  the  hill  to  the 
shore  of  the  bay.  As  a  result  of  the  natural  configuration 
of  the  ground  there  is  hardly  a  street  in  the  city  that  is  even 
approximately  level  except  the  wide  boulevard  which  forms 
the  water-front.  The  east  and  west  streets  climb  a  rather 
steep  grade  from  this  boulevard  to  the  crest  of  the  elevation, 
and  the  north  and  south  streets  run  up  and  down  over  the 
ridges  and  into  the  gullies  of  the  undulating  slope,  so  that 
wherever  one  goes  one  finds  one's  self  either  ascending  or 
descending  a  hill.  The  widest  streets  in  the  city— exclusive 
of  the  Cristina  Boulevard— are  hardly  more"than  thirty  feet 
from  curb  to  curb,  and  the  narrowest  do  not  exceed  fifteen. 
The  pavements  at  the  time  of  my  visit  were  made  of  unbroken 
stones  and  rocks  from  the  size  of  one's  fist  to  the  size  of  a 


THE   CAPTURED   CITY  175 

bushel-basket;  the  sidewalks  averaged  from  two  to  three  and 
a  half  feet  in  width,  and  the  gutters  were  open  drains,  broken 
here  and  there  by  holes  and  pockets  filled  with  decaying 
garbage  and  dirty,  foul-smelling  water.  Piles  of  mango-skins, 
ashes,  old  bones,  filthy  rags,  dung,  and  kitchen  refuse  of  all 
sorts  lay  here  and  there  on  the  broken  and  neglected  pave 
ments,  poisoning  the  air  with  foul  exhalations  and  affording 
sustenance  to  hundreds  of  buzzards  and  myriads  of  flies;  little 
rills  of  foul,  discolored  water  trickled  into  the  open  gutters 
at  intervals  from  the  kitchens  and  cesspools  of  the  adjoining 
houses;  every  hole  and  crevice  in  the  uneven  pavement  was 
filled  with  rotting  organic  matter  washed  down  from  the 
higher  levels  by  the  frequent  rains,  and  when  the  sea-breeze 
died  away  at  night  the  whole  atmosphere  of  the  city  seemed 
to  be  pervaded  by  a  sickly,  indescribable  odor  of  corruption 
and  decay.  I  had  expected,  as  a  matter  of  course,  to  find 
Santiago  in  bad  sanitary  condition,  but  I  must  confess  that 
I  felt  a  little  sinking  of  the  heart  when  I  first  breathed  that 
polluted  air  and  realized  that  for  me  there  was  no  return  to 
the  ship  and  that  I  must  henceforth  eat,  work,  and  sleep  in 
that  fever-breeding  environment.  In  a  long  and  tolerably 
varied  experience  in  Russia,  the  Caucasus,  Asia  Minor,  and 
European  Turkey,  I  have  never  seen  streets  so  filthy  as  in 
some  parts  of  this  Cuban  city,  nor  have  I  ever  encountered 
such  a  variety  of  abominable  stenches  as  I  met  with  in  the 
course  of  my  short  walk  from  the  steamer  to  the  Anglo- 
American  Club. 

The  houses  and  shops  which  stood  along  these  narrow, 
dirty  streets  were  generally  one  story  in  height,  with  red- 
tiled  roofs,  high,  blank  walls  of  stuccoed  or  plastered  brick 
covered  with  a  calcimine  wash  of  pale  blue  or  dirty  yellow, 
large,  heavy  plank  doors,  and  equally  large,  unglazed  windows 
protected  by  prison  gratings  of  iron  bars  and  closed  with 
tight  inner  shutters.  There  were  no  trees  in  the  streets,— 


176  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

at  least,  in  the  business  part  of  the  city,— no  yards  in  front 
of  the  houses,  no  shop-windows  for  the  display  of  goods,  and 
no  windows  of  glass  even  in  the  best  private  houses.  I 
cannot  remember  to  have  seen  a  pane  of  window-glass  in 
this  part  of  Cuba.  The  windows  of  both  shops  and  houses 
were  mere  rectangular  openings  in  the  wall,  six  feet  by  ten 
or  twelve  feet  in  size,  filled  with  heavy  iron  gratings  or  pro 
tected  by  ornamental  metal  scrollwork  embedded  all  around 
in  the  solid  masonry  0  These  barred  windows,  with  the  heavy 
plank  doors,  thick  stuccoed  walls,  and  complete  absence  of 
architectural  ornament,  made  the  narrow,  muddy  streets  look 
almost  as  gloomy  and  forbidding  as  if  they  were  shut  in  by 
long  rows  of  Russian  prisons.  The  natural  gloominess  of 
the  city,  due  to  the  narrowness  of  the  streets  and  the  char 
acter  of  the  architecture,  was  heightened  at  the  time  of  the 
surrender  by  the  absence  of  a  large  part  of  the  population 
and  the  consequent  shutting  up  of  more  than  half  the  houses. 
Thousands  of  men,  women,  and  children  had  fled  to  Caney 
and  other  suburban  villages  to  escape  the  bombardment,  and 
the  long  rows  of  closed  and  empty  houses  in  some  of  the 
streets  suggested  a  city  stricken  by  pestilence  and  abandoned. 
At  the  time  when  we  landed  there  was  not  a  shop  or  a  store 
open  in  any  part  of  Santiago.  Here  and  there  one  might 
see  a  colored  woman  peering  out  through  the  grated  window 
of  a  private  house,  or  two  or  three  naked  children  with  tal 
lowy  complexions  and  swollen  abdomens  playing  in  the 
muddy  gutter,  but  as  a  rule  the  houses  were  shut  and  barred 
and  the  streets  deserted. 

The  first  pleasant  impression  that  I  received  in  Santiago 
was  made  by  the  Anglo-American  Club.  It  was  situated  on 
a  narrow,  dirty  street  behind  the  Spanish  theater,  in  a  very 
low,  disreputable  part  of  the  city,  and  did  not  impress  me, 
at  first  sight,  as  being  likely  to  afford  even  the  ordinary 
necessaries  and  comforts  of  life,  much  less  the  luxuries  and 


THE   CAPTURED   CITY  177 

conveniences  suggested  to  the  mind  of  a  city  man  by  the 
word  u  club."  But  external  appearance  in  a  Spanish- Ameri 
can  city  is  often  deceptive,  and  it  was  so  in  this  case.  Oppo 
site  the  rear  or  stage  entrance  of  the  theater,  where  half  a 
dozen  soldiers  of  the  Ninth  Infantry  were  cooking  breakfast 
in  the  street,  my  ragged  Cuban  guide  turned  into  a  dark 
vaulted  passage  which  looked  as  if  it  might  be  one  of  the 
approaches  to  a  jail.  "  It  can't  be  possible,"  I  said  to  myself, 
"that  this  damp,  gloomy  tunnel  is  the  entrance  to  a  club; 
the  guide  must  have  misunderstood  the  directions  given 
him." 

But  the  guide  was  right.  At  a  distance  of  thirty-five 
or  forty  feet  from  the  street  the  vaulted  passage  opened 
into  a  paved  patio,  or  court,— a  sort  of  large,  square  well, 
—in  the  center  of  which  stood  a  green,  thrifty,  broad-leaved 
banana-tree,  fifteen  or  twenty  feet  in  height.  From  the 
corners  of  this  court,  on  the  side  opposite  the  street  entrance, 
two  broad  flights  of  steps  led  up  to  what  seemed  to  be  a 
hanging  garden  of  greenery  and  flowers,  shut  in  on  all  sides 
by  piazzas  and  galleries.  Climbing  one  of  these  flights  of 
steps,  I  found  myself  in  a  second  and  higher  patio,  shaded  by 
large  mango-  and  mamonilla-trees,  brightened  by  borders  of 
flowering  shrubs  and  plants,  and  filled  with  the  fragrance  of 
roses,  geraniums,  and  pomegranate  blossoms.  The  transition 
from  the  heat,  filth,  and  sickening  odors  of  the  narrow  street 
to  the  seclusion  and  shady  coolness  of  this  flower-scented 
patio  was  as  delightful  as  it  was  sudden  and  unexpected.  I 
could  hardly  have  been  more  surprised  if  I  had  entered  what 
I  supposed  to  be  a  Siberian  forwarding  prison,  and  found 
myself  in  a  conservatory  of  tropical  plants  and  flowers. 
Around  three  sides  of  the  patio  were  spacious  piazzas  in 
two  tiers,  and  upon  these  piazzas  opened  the  living-rooms  of 
the  club,— about  twenty  in  number,— like  the  boxes  or  stalls 
in  the  galleries  of  a  European  theater.  On  the  southern  side 

12 


178  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

of  the  patio  was  a  large  dining-room,  and  beyond  this,  oc 
cupying  the  whole  width  of  the  building  and  overlooking  the 
street  from  a  projecting  balcony,  was  the  reading-room. 
This  was  a  high,  cool,  spacious  apartment  comfortably 
furnished  with  easy-chairs,  pictures,  maps,  hanging  book 
cases,  a  big  library  table  covered  with  periodicals,  and  an 
American  piano.  The  periodicals  were  not  of  very  recent 
date,  and  the  piano  was  somewhat  out  of  tune,  but  I  was  so 
delighted  with  the  shady,  flower-bordered  courtyard  and  the 
comfort  and  apparent  cleanliness  of  the  club  as  a  whole  that 
I  felt  no  disposition  to  be  hypercritical.  To  find  such  a  haven 
of  refuge  at  all  in  a  city  like  Santiago  was  unexpected  good 
fortune. 

To  one  who  is  unfamiliar  with  the  distinctive  peculiar 
ities  of  Spanish-American  architecture,  nothing,  at  first,  is 
more  surprising  than  the  contrast  between  the  gloomy  and  un 
promising  exterior  of  a  Cuban  residence  and  the  luxury  and 
architectural  beauty  which  one  often  finds  hidden  behind 
its  grated  windows  and  thick  stuccoed  walls.  It  is  more 
surprising  and  striking  in  Santiago,  perhaps,  than  in  most 
Spanish-American  cities,  on  account  of  the  narrowness  and 
filthiness  of  the  streets  on  which  the  houses  even  of  the 
wealthiest  citizens  stand.  In  the  course  of  the  first  week 
that  I  spent  in  the  city  I  had  occasion  to  enter  a  number  of 
Spanish  houses  of  the  better  class,  and  I  never  failed  to  ex- 
r°rience  a  little  shock  of  surprise  when  I  went  from  what 
j  'oked  like  a  dirty  and  neglected  back  alley  into  what  seemed 
t )  be  a  jail,  and  found  myself  suddenly  in  a  beautiful  Moor 
ish  court,  paved  with  marble,  shaded  by  graceful,  feathery 
palms,  cooled  by  a  fountain  set  in  an  oasis  of  greenery  and 
flowers,  and  surrounded  by  rows  of  slender  stone  "columns, 
and  piazzas  twenty-five  feet  in  width.  The  wealthy  Spaniard 
or  Cuban  wastes  no  money  in  beautifying  the  outside  of  his 
house,  because,  standing  as  it  does  on  a  narrow,  dirty  street, 
it  cannot  be  made  attractive  or  imposing  by  any  possible 


THE   CAPTURED   CITY  179 

method  of  architectural  treatment;  but  upon  the  ornamen 
tation  and  embellishment  of  the  patio,  or  interior  court,  he 
lavishes  all  his  taste  and  skill.  The  patio  of  the  Anglo- 
American  Club  was  not  nearly  as  large  and  attractive  as  the 
courtyards  of  private  residences  on  Heredia  Street,  to  which 
I  gained  access  later,  but  as  it  was  the  first  house  of  the  kind 
that  I  had  seen  in  Cuba,  it  made  a  very  pleasant  impression 
upon  me. 

Upon  presentation  of  my  introduction  from  Mr.  Elwell, 
the  steward  gave  me  one  of  the  best  rooms  in  the  club,  but 
said  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  furnish  me  with  food  until 
he  could  get  a  cook  and  servants.  The  club  had  been  closed 
for  weeks;  all  of  its  employees  had  fled  from  the  city,  and  he 
had  been  left  entirely  alone.  I  told  him  that  I  would  try  to 
forage  for  myself,— at  least,  for  the  present,— and  that,  if 
worst  should  come  to  worst,  I  could  live  two  or  three  days 
on  the  hard  bread  and  baked  beans  that  I  had  brought  with 
me  from  the  ship.  Refreshing  myself  with  a  bath,  a  cracker 
of  hard  bread,  and  a  drink  of  lukewarm  tea  from  my  canteen, 
I  left  my  baggage  in  the  steward's  care  and  set  out  to  ex 
plore  the  city. 

The  only  part  of  Santiago  which  then  presented  anything 
like  a  clean  and  civilized  appearance  is  that  which  adjoins 
the  so-called  "  palace  "  of  the  Spanish  governor,  on  the  crest 
of  the  hill  at  the  head  of  Marina  Street.  There,  around  a 
small,  dusty,  bush-planted  plaza,  or  park,  stand  the  governor's 
residence,  the  old  twin-belfried  cathedral,  the  San  Carlos  or 
Cuban  Club,  the  "  Venus  "  restaurant,  the  post-office,  and  a 
few  other  public  or  semi-public  buildings  which  make  some 
pretensions  to  architectural  dignity.  With  the  exception  of 
the  massive  stone  cathedral,  however,  they  are  all  low,  one- 
story  or  two-story  brick  houses  covered  with  dirty  white 
stucco,  and  would  be  regarded  anywhere  except  in  Santiago 
as  cheap,  ugly,  and  insignificant. 

In  the  course  of  my  walk  from  the  club  to  the  plaza  I  met 


180  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

a  few  Cuban  negroes  in  dirty  white-cotton  shirts  and  trousers, 
and  half  a  dozen  or  more  pale-faced  Spanish  soldiers,  but 
the  streets  in  that  part  of  the  city  seemed  to  be  almost 
wholly  deserted.  Beyond  the  plaza,  however,  on  Enramadas 
Street,  I  began  to  meet  the  stream  of  destitute  refugees  re 
turning  to  the  city  from  Caney,  and  a  more  dirty,  hungry, 
sick,  and  dejected-looking  horde  of  people  I  had  never  seen. 
When  General  Shafter  gave  notice  to  the  Spanish  military 
authorities  that  if  Santiago  were  not  surrendered  it  would 
be  bombarded,  fifteen  thousand  men,  women,  and  children 
abandoned  their  homes  and  fled,  most  of  them  on  foot,  to 
various  suburban  villages  north  of  the  city.  Most  of  these 
fugitives  went  to  Caney,  where,  for  nearly  two  weeks,  they 
camped  out  in  the  streets,  suffering  everything  that  human 
beings  can  suffer  from  hunger,  sickness,  and  exposure.  Both 
General  Shafter  and  the  Red  Cross  made  every  possible  effort 
to  relieve  them  by  sending  provisions  to  them  from  Siboney; 
but  the  distance  from  that  base  of  supplies  was  fifteen  miles 
or  more  over  a  terrible  road,  the  number  of  horses  and  mules 
available  for  transportation  was  hardly  adequate  to  supply 
even  our  own  army  with  ammunition  and  food,  and  the  most 
that  could  be  done  for  the  refugees  at  Caney  was  to  keep 
them  from  actually  starving  to  death.  Hundreds  of  them 
perished,  but  they  died  from  exposure,  exhaustion,  and  sick 
ness,  rather  than  from  starvation.  As  soon  as  Santiago 
surrendered,  these  fugitives  began  to  stream  back  into  the 
•.city,  and  it  was  the  advance-guard  of  them  that  I  met  on  En- 
:ramadas  Street  on  Tuesday  morning.  They  represented  both 
sexes,  all  ages,  all  complexions,  and  all  classes  of  the  popula 
tion,  from  poor  Cuban  or  negro  women  carrying  huge  bundles 
on  their  heads  and  leading  three  or  four  half-naked  children, 
•to  cultivated,  delicately  nurtured,  English-speaking  ladies, 
wading  through  the  mud  in  bedraggled  white  gowns,  carrying 
nothing,  perhaps,  except  a  kitten  or  a  cage  of  pet  birds. 


THE   CAPTURED   CITY  181 

Many  of  them  were  so  ill  and  weak  from  dysentery  or  ma 
larial  fever  that  they  could  hardly  limp  along,  even  with  the 
support  of  a  cane,  and  all  of  them  looked  worn,  exhausted, 
and  emaciated  to  the  last  degree.  Hundreds  of  these  refugees 
died,  after  their  return  to  Santiago,  from  diseases  contracted 
in  Caney,  and  if  it  had  not  been  for  the  prompt  relief  given 
them  by  the  Red  Cross  as  soon  as  they  reached  the  city,  they 
would  have  perished  by  the  thousand.  With  the  aid  and 
cooperation  of  Mr.  Ramsden,  son  of  the  British  consul,  Mr. 
Michelson,  a  wealthy  resident  merchant,  and  two  or  three 
other  foreign  residents  of  Santiago,  Miss  Barton  opened  a 
soup-kitchen  on  shore,  as  soon  as  provisions  enough  had  been 
landed  from  the  State  of  Texas  to  make  a  beginning,  and  be 
fore  Tuesday  night  the  representatives  of  the  Red  Cross  had 
given  bread  and  hot  soup  to  more  than  ten  thousand  sick 
and  half-starved  people,  most  of  them  returned  refugees 
from  Caney,  who  could  not  get  a  mouthful  to  eat  elsewhere 
in  the  city,  and  who  were  literally  perishing  from  hunger 
and  exhaustion. 


CHAPTER  XVI 
THE   FEEDING   OP  THE   HUNGRY 

problem  of  supplying  myself  with  food  and  drink  in 
-J-  the  half -starved  city  of  Santiago,  after  the  steamer  had 
been  quarantined  against  me,  proved  to  be  even  more  serious 
than  I  had  anticipated.  In  my  walk  up  Marina  and  Enra- 
madas  streets  and  out  to  the  Caney  road  on  Tuesday  forenoon 
I  passed  two  or  three  restaurants  bearing  such  seductive 
and  tantalizing  names  as  "Venus,"  "  Nectar,"  and  "  Delicias," 
etc.,  but  they  were  all  closed,  and  in  a  stroll  of  two  miles 
through  the  heart  of  the  city  I  failed  to  discover  any  food 
more  "  delicious  "  than  a  few  half-ripe  mangoes  in  the  dirty 
basket  of  a  Cuban  fruit-peddler,  or  any  "  nectar  "  more  drink 
able  than  the  water  which  ran  into  the  gutter,  here  and 
there,  from  the  broken  or  leaky  pipes  of  the  city  water-works. 
Hot,  tired,  and  dispirited,  I  returned  about  noon  to  the  Anglo- 
American  Club,  took  another  drink  of  lukewarm  tea  from 
my  canteen,  nibbled  a  piece  of  hard  bread,  and  opened  a  can 
of  baked  beans.  The  beans  proved  to  be  flavored  with  tomato 
sauce,  which  I  dislike;  the  hard  bread  was  stale  and  tasted 
of  the  haversack  in  which  I  had  brought  it  ashore;  and  the 
tea  was  neither  strong  enough  to  inebriate  nor  yet  cool 
enough  to  cheer.  There  did  not  seem  to  be  any  encouraging 
probability  that  I  should  be  fed  by  Cuban  ravens  or  nourished 
by  manna  from  the  blazing  Cuban  skies,  and  in  the  absence 

182 


THE   FEEDING   OF   THE   HUNGRY          183 

of  some  such  miraculous  interposition  of  Providence  I  should 
evidently  have  either  to  go  with  a  tin  cup  to  the  Red  Cross 
soup-kitchen  and  beg  for  a  portion  of  soup  on  the  ground 
that  I  was  a  destitute  and  starving  reconcentrado,  or  else 
return  to  the  pier  where  the  State  of  Texas  lay,  hail  somebody 
on  deck,  and  ask  to  have  food  lowered  to  me  over  the  ship's 
side,  I  could  certainly  drink  a  cup  of  coffee  and  eat  a  plate 
of  corned-beef  hash  on  the  dock  without  serious  danger  of 
infecting  the  ship  with  yellow  fever,  typhus,  cholera,  or 
smallpox;  and  if  the  captain  should  object  to  my  being  fed 
in  that  way  on  the  ground  that  the  ship's  dishes  might  be 
contaminated  by  my  feverish  touch,  I  was  fully  prepared  to 
put  my  pride  in  my  pocket  and  meekly  receive  my  rations  in 
an  old  tomato-can  or  a  paper  bag  tied  to  the  end  of  a  string. 
With  all  due  respect  for  Red  Cross  soup,  and  the  most 
implicit  confidence  in  Red  Cross  soup-kitchens,  I  inclined  to 
the  belief  that  I  should  fare  better  if  I  got  my  nourishment 
from  the  State  of  Texas — even  at  the  end  of  a  string — than 
if  I  went  to  the  Cuban  soup-kitchen  and  claimed  food  as  a 
reconcentrado,  a  refugee,  or  a  repentant  prodigal  son.  In 
the  greasy,  weather-stained  suit  of  brown  canvas  and  mud- 
bespattered  pith  helmet  that  I  had  worn  at  the  front,  I  might 
play  any  one  of  these  roles  with  success,  and  my  forlorn  and 
disreputable  appearance  would  doubtless  secure  for  me  at 
least  two  tincupfuls  of  soup;  but  what  I  longed  for  most 
was  coffee,  and  that  beverage  was  not  to  be  had  in  the  Cuban 
soup-kitchen.  I  resolved,  therefore,  to  go  to  the  pier,  affirm 
with  uplifted  hand  that  I  was  not  suffering  from  yellow  fever, 
typhus  fever,  remittent  fever,  malarial  fever,  pernicious  fever, 
cholera,  or  smallpox,  and  beg  somebody  to  lower  to  me  over 
the  ship's  side  a  cup  of  coffee  in  an  old  tomato-can  and  a 
mutton-chop  at  the  end  of  a  fishing-line.  I  was  ready  to 
promise  that  I  would  immediately  fumigate  the  fishing-line 
and  throw  the  empty  tomato-can  into  the  bay,  so  that  the 


184  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

State  of  Texas  should  not  run  the  slightest  risk  of  becoming 
infected  with  the  diseases  that  I  did  not  have. 

About  half -past  one,  when  I  thought  Miss  Barton  and  her 
staff  would  have  finished  their  luncheon,  I  walked  down  Gallo 
Street  to  the  pier  where  the  steamer  was  discharging  her 
cargo,  hailed  a  sailor  on  deck,  and  asked  him  if  he  would 
please  tell  Mrs.  Porter  (wife  of  the  Hon.  J.  Addison  Porter, 
secretary  to  the  President)  that  a  Cuban  refugee  in  distress 
would  like  to  speak  to  her  at  the  ship's  side.  In  two  or  three 
minutes  Mrs.  Porter's  surprised  but  sympathetic  face  appeared 
over  the  steamer's  rail  twenty-five  or  thirty  feet  above  my 
head.  Raising  my  voice  so  as  to  make  it  audible  above  the 
shouting  of  the  stevedores,  the  snorting  of  the  donkey-engine, 
and  the  rattle  of  the  hoisting-tackle,  I  told  her  that  I  had 
not  been  able  to  find  anything  to  eat  in  the  city,  and  asked 
her  if  she  would  not  please  get  my  table-steward  "  Tommy  " 
to  lower  to  me  over  the  ship's  side  a  few  slices  of  bread  and 
butter  and  a  cup  of  coffee.  A  half-shocked  and  half -indig 
nant  expression  came  into  her  face  as  she  mentally  grasped 
the  situation,  and  she  replied  with  emphasis:  "  Certainly!  just 
wait  a  minute."  She  rushed  back  into  the  cabin  to  call 
Tommy,  while  I  sat  down  on  a  bag  of  beans  with  the  com 
forting  assurance  that  if  I  did  not  get  something  to  eat  that 
afternoon  there  would  be  a  fracas  on  the  State  of  Texas.  Mrs. 
Porter  evidently  regarded  it  as  an  extraordinary  state  of 
affairs  which  forced  the  vice-president  of  the  Red  Cross  to 
go  hungry  in  a  starving  city  because  a  ship  flying  the  Red 
Cross  flag  refused  to  allow  him  on  board. 

In  five  minutes  more  Tommy  appeared  in  the  starboard 
gangway  of  the  main-deck,  and  lowered  down  to  me  on  a 
tray  a  most  appetizing  lunch  of  bread  and  butter,  cold 
meats,  fried  potatoes,  preserved  peaches,  ice-water,  and 
coffee.  I  resumed  my  seat  on  the  bag  of  beans,  holding 
the  tray  on  my  knees,  and  gave  myself  up  to  the  enjoyment 


THE    FEEDING  OF  THE   HUNGRY          185 

of  the  first  meal  I  had  had  in  Santiago,  and  the  best  one, 
it  seemed  to  me,  that  ever  gladdened  the  heart  of  a  hungry 
human  being  in  any  city.  The  temperature  in  the  fierce 
sunshine  which  beat  down  on  my  back  was  at  least  130°  F.; 
the  cold  meats  were  immediately  warmed  up,  the  butter 
turned  to  a  yellowish  fluid  which  could  have  been  applied  to 
bread  only  with  a  paint-brush,  and  perspiration  ran  off  my 
nose  into  my  coffee-cup  as  I  drank;  but  the  coffee  and  the 
fried  potatoes  kept  hot  without  the  aid  of  artificial  appli 
ances,  and  I  emptied  the  glass  of  ice-water  in  two  or  three 
thirsty  gulps  before  it  had  time  to  come  to  a  boil.  Mrs. 
Porter  watched  me  with  sympathetic  interest,  as  if  she  were 
enjoying  my  lunch  even  more  than  she  had  enjoyed  her  own, 
and  when  I  had  finished  she  said:  "It  is  absurd  that  you 
should  have  to  take  your  meals  on  that  hot,  dirty  pier;  but 
if  you  '11  come  down  every  day  and  call  for  me,  I  '11  see  that 
you  get  enough  to  eat,  even  if  they  don't  allow  you  on  board." 
All  the  rest  of  that  week  I  slept  in  the  Anglo-American 
Club  and  took  my  meals  on  the  pier  of  the  Juragua  Iron 
Company,  Mrs.  Porter  keeping  me  abundantly  supplied  with 
food,  while  I  tried  to  make  my  society  an  equivalent  for  my 
board  by  furnishing  her,  three  times  a  day,  with  the  news  of 
the  city.  Getting  my  meals  in  a  basket  or  on  a  tray  over 
the  ship's  side  and  eating  them  alone  on  the  pier  was  rather 
humiliating  at  first,  and  made  me  feel,  for  a  day  or  two,  like 
a  homeless  tramp  subsisting  on  charity;  but  when  General 
Wood,  the  military  governor  of  the  city,  and  Dr.  Van  De 
Water,  chaplain  of  the  Seventy-first  New  York,  came  down 
to  the  State  of  Texas  one  afternoon  to  see  Mrs.  Porter  and 
were  not  allowed  to  go  on  board,  even  for  a  drink  of  water, 
my  self-respect  was  measurably  restored.  Dr.  Van  De  Water 
had  walked  into  the  city  from  the  camp  of  his  regiment,  a 
distance  of  two  or  three  miles,  in  the  fierce  tropical  sunshine, 
and  was  evidently  suffering  acutely  from  fatigue  and  thirst; 


186  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

but  the  State  of  Texas,  where,  under  the  Red  Cross  flag,  he 
naturally  expected  to  find  rest  and  refreshment,  was  barred 
against  him,  and  he  had  to  get  his  drink  of  water,  as  I  got 
my  daily  bread,  over  the  ship's  side.  The  quarantine  of  the 
steamer  against  the  shore  would  perhaps  have  been  a  little 
more  consistent,  as  well  as  more  effective,  if  the  officers 
who  superintended  the  unloading  and  storing  of  the  cargo 
had  not  been  permitted  to  visit  every  day  the  lowest  and 
dirtiest  part  of  the  city  and  then  return  to  the  steamer  to 
eat  and  sleep,  and  if  the  crew  had  not  been  allowed  to  roam 
about  the  streets  in  search  of  adventures  at  night;  but  I 
suppose  it  was  found  impracticable  to  enforce  the  quarantine 
against  everybody,  and  the  most  serious  and  threatening 
source  of  infection  was  removed,  of  course,  when  General 
Wood,  Dr.  Van  De  Water,  and  the  vice-president  of  the 
Red  Cross  were  rigidly  excluded  from  the  ship. 

While  I  was  living  at  the  Anglo-American  Club  and  board 
ing  on  the  pier  of  the  Juragua  Iron  Company  the  deserted 
and  half-dead  city  of  Santiago  was  slowly  awakening  to  life 
and  activity.  The  empty  streets  filled  gradually  with  Ameri 
can  soldiers,  paroled  Spanish  prisoners,  and  returning  fugi 
tives  from  Caney;  shops  that  had  long  been  shut  and  barred 
were  thrown  open  under  the  assurance  of  protection  given 
by  the  American  flag;  kerosene-lamps  on  brackets  fastened 
to  the  walls  of  houses  at  the  corners  of  the  narrow  streets 
were  lighted  at  nigh  If  so  that  pedestrians  could  get  about 
without  danger  of ]tumbling  into  holes  or  falling  over  garbage- 
heaps;  government  transports  suddenly  made  their  appear 
ance  in  the  bay,  and  as  many  of  them  as  could  find  accom 
modation  at  the  piers  began  to  discharge  cargo;  six-mule 
army  wagons  rumbled  and  rattlecfover  the  rough  cobblestone 
pavements  as  they  came  in  from  the  camps  after  supplies; 
hundreds  of  hungry  and  destitute  Cubans  were  set  at  work 
cleaning  the  filthy  streets;  and  in  less  than  a  week  Santiago 


THE   FEEDING   OF   THE   HUNGRY          1ST 

had  assumed  something  like  the  appearance  that  it  must  have 
presented  before  the  siege  and  capture.  The  thing  that  it 
needed  most  in  the  first  fortnight  after  the  surrender  was  a 
hotel,  and  a  hotel  it  did  not  have.  Newspaper  correspon 
dents,  officers  who  had  come  into  the  city  from  the  camps, 
and  passengers  landed  from  the  steamers  had  no  place  to 
go  for  food  or  shelter,  and  many  of  them  were  forced  to 
bivouac  in  the  streets.  Captain  William  Astor  Chanler,  for 
example,  tied  his  saddle-horse  to  his  leg  one  night  and  lay 
down  to  sleep  on  the  pavement  of  the  plaza  in  front  of  the 
old  cathedral. 

The  urgent  need  of  a  hotel  finally  compelled  the  steward 
of  the  Anglo-American  Club  to  throw  open  its  twenty  or 
more  rooms  to  army  officers,  cable-operators,  and  news 
paper  correspondents  who  had  no  other  place  to  stay,  and 
to  make  an  attempt,  at  least,  to  supply  them  with  food.  A 
few  cases  of  canned  meat  and  beans  and  a  barrel  of  hard 
bread  were  obtained  from  the  storehouse  of  the  Red  Cross ; 
a  cook  and  three  or  four  negro  waiters  were  hired;  and  be 
fore  the  end  of  the  first  week  after  the  capture  of  the  city 
the  club  was  furnishing  two  meals  a  day  to  as  many  guests 
as  its  rooms  would  accommodate,  and  had  become  the  most 
interesting  and  attractive  place  of  social  and  intellectual 
entertainment  to  be  found  on  the  island.  One  might  meet 
there,  almost  any  night,  English  war  correspondents  who 
had  campaigned  in  India,  Egypt,  and  the  Sudan;  Cuban 
sympathizers  from  the  United  States  who  had  served  in  the 
armies  of  Gomez  and  Garcia;  old  Indian  fighters  and  ranch 
men  from  our  Western  plains  and  mountains;  wealthy  New 
York  club-men  in  the  brown-linen  uniform  of  Roosevelt's 
Rough  Riders;  naval  officers  from  the  fleet  of  Admiral  Samp 
son;  and  speculators,  coffee-planters,  and  merchant  adven 
turers  from  all  parts  of  the  western  hemisphere.  One 
could  hardly  ask  a  question  with  regard  to  any  part  of  the 


188  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

habitable  globe  or  any  event  of  modern  times  that  somebody 
in  the  club  could  not  answer  with  all  the  fullness  of  personal 
knowledge,  and  the  conversation  around  the  big  library  table 
in  the  evening  was  more  interesting  and  entertaining  than 
any  talk  that  I  had  heard  in  months.  But  the  evenings  were 
not  always  given  up  wholly  to  conversation.  Sometimes  Mr. 
Cobleigh  of  the  New  York  "  World,"  who  had  a  very  good 
tenor  voice,  would  seat  himself  at  the  piano  and  sing  "  White 
Wings,"  "  Say  au  revoir,  but  not  good-by,"  or  "  The  Banks 
of  the  Wabash,"  and  then  Mr.  Cox,  resident  manager  of  the 
Spanish- American  iron-mines,  would  take  Cobleigh's  place  at 
the  instrument  and  lead  the  whole  assembled  company  in 
"John  Brown's  Body,"  "  My  country,  't  is  of  thee,"  and  "  The 
Star-Spangled  Banner,"  until  the  soldiers  of  the  Ninth  Infan 
try,  quartered  in  the  old  theater  across  the  way,  would  join  in 
the  chorus,  and  a  great  wave  of  patriotic  melody  would  roll 
down  Gallo  Street  to  the  bay,  and  out  over  the  tranquil  water 
to  the  transports  lying  at  anchor  half  a  mile  away.  Sitting 
in  that  cheerful,  comfortably  furnished  club-room  under  the 
soft  glow  of  incandescent  electric  lights,  and  listening  to 
the  bright,  animated  conversation,  the  laughter,  and  the  old 
familiar  music,  I  found  it  almost  impossible  to  realize  that  I 
was  in  the  desperately  defended  and  recently  captured  city 
of  Santiago,  where  the  whole  population  was  in  a  state  of 
semi-starvation,  where  thousands  of  sick  or  wounded  were 
languishing  in  crowded  hospitals  and  barracks,  and  where, 
within  a  few7  days,  I  had  seen  destitute  and  homeless  Cubans 
dying  of  fever  in  the  streets. 

Miss  Barton  began  the  work  of  relieving  the  wide-spread 
distress  and  destitution  in  Santiago  with  characteristic 
promptness  and  energy.  To  feed  twenty  or  thirty  thousand 
people  at  once,  with  the  limited  facilities  and  the  small 
working  force  at  her  command,  and  to  do  it  systematically 
and  economically,  without  wastefulness  and  without  confu- 


THE   FEEDING   OF  THE   HUNGRY          189 

sion,  was  a  herculean  task;  but  it  was  a  task  with  which  ex 
perience  and  training  in  many  fields  had  made  her  familiar, 
and  she  set  about  it  intelligently  and  met  the  difficulties  of 
the  situation  with  admirable  tact  and  judgment.  Her  first 
step  was  to  ask  the  ablest,  most  influential,  and  most  re 
spected  citizens  of  Santiago  to  consult  with  her  with  regard 
to  ways  and  means  and  to  give  her  the  benefit  of  their  local 
knowledge  and  experience.  The  object  of  this  was  to  secure 
the  cooperation  and  support  of  the  best  elements  of  the 
population,  and  strengthen  the  working  force  of  the  Red 
Cross  by  adding  to  it  a  local  contingent  of  volunteer  assis 
tants  who  were  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  city  and  its 
inhabitants  and  who  would  be  able  to  detect  and  prevent 
fraud  or  imposition.  There  was  danger,  of  course,  that 
people  who  did  not  need  food,  or  were  not  entitled  to  it, 
would  seek  to  obtain  it  on  false  pretenses,  and  that  others, 
who  perhaps  were  really  in  distress,  would  try  to  get  more 
food  than  they  actually  required  in  order  that  they  might 
make  a  little  money  by  selling  the  surplus.  In  anticipation 
of  this  danger,  Miss  Barton  decided  to  put  the  distribution 
of  food  largely  under  local  control.  In  the  first  place,  a  cen 
tral  committee  of  three  was  appointed  to  exercise  general 
supervision  over  the  whole  work.  The  members  of  this 
committee  were  Mr.  Ramsden,  son  of  the  British  consul; 
Mr.  Michelson,  a  wealthy  and  philanthropic  merchant  en 
gaged  in  business  in  Santiago;  and  a  prominent  Cuban 
gentleman  whose  name  I  cannot  now  recall.  This  committee 
divided  the  city  into  thirty  districts,  and  notified  the  resi 
dents  of  each  district  that  they  would  be  expected  to  elect 
or  appoint  a  commissioner  who  should  represent  them  in  all 
dealings  with  the  Red  Cross,  who  should  make  all  applications 
for  relief  in  their  behalf,  and  who  should  personally  super 
intend  the  distribution  of  all  food  allotted  to  them  on  requisi 
tions  approved  by  the  central  committee.  This  scheme  of 


190  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

organization  and  distribution  was  intelligently  and  judiciously 
devised,  and  it  worked  to  the  satisfaction  of  all.  Every  com 
missioner  was  instructed  to  make  a  requisition  for  food  in 
writing,  according  to  a  prescribed  form,  stating  the  number 
and  the  names  of  heads  of  families  needing  relief  in  his 
district,  the  number  of  persons  in  each  family,  and  the 
amount  of  food  required  for  the  district  as  a  whole  and  for 
each  family  or  individual  in  detail.  The  commissioner  then 
appended  to  the  requisition  a  certificate  to  the  effect  that 
the  petitioners  named  therein  were  known  to  him  and  that 
he  believed  they  were  really  in  need  of  the  quantities  of  food 
for  which  they  respectively  made  application.  The  requisi 
tion  then  went  to  the  central  committee,  and  when  approved 
by  it  was  filled  at  the  Red  Cross  warehouse  and  retained  there 
as  a  voucher. 

I  heard  it  asserted  in  Santiago  more  than  once  that  food 
issued  by  the  Red  Cross  to  people  who  were  supposed  to  be 
starving  had  afterward  been  sold  openly  on  the  street  by 
hucksters,  and  had  even  been  carried  on  pack-mules  in  com 
paratively  large  quantities  to  suburban  villages  and  sold  there; 
but  I  doubt  very  much  the  truth  of  this  assertion.  Miss  Bar 
ton  caused  an  investigation  to  be  made  of  several  such  cases 
of  alleged  fraud,  and  found  in  every  instance  that  the  food 
said  to  have  been  obtained  from  the  Red  Cross  had  really 
come  from  some  other  source,  chiefly  from  soldiers  and 
government  transports,  whose  provisions,  of  course,  could 
not  be  distinguished  from  ours  after  they  had  been  taken 
out  of  the  original  packages.  Be  this,  however,  as  it  may, 
the  checks  upon  fraud  and  imposition  in  the  Red  Cross 
scheme  of  distribution  were  as  efficient  as  the  nature  of  the 
circumstances  would  allow,  and  I  doubt  whether  the  loss 
through  fraudulent  applications  or  through  collusion  be 
tween  commissioners  and  applicants  amounted  to  one  tenth 
of  one  per  cent.  The  Red  Cross  furnished  food  in  bulk  to 


THE    FEEDING   OF   THE   HUNGRY          101 

thirty-two  thousand  half -starved  people  in  the  first  five  days 
after  Santiago  surrendered,  and  in  addition  thereto  fed  ten 
thousand  people  every  day  in  the  soup-kitchens  managed  by 
Mr.  Michelson.  I  do  not  wish  to  make  any  unjust  or  in 
vidious  comparisons,  but  I  cannot  refrain  from  saying, 
nevertheless,  that  I  did  not  happen  to  see  any  United  States 
quartermaster  in  Cuba  who,  in  the  short  space  of  five  days, 
had  unloaded  and  stored  fourteen  hundred  tons  of  cargo, 
given  hot  soup  daily  to  ten  thousand  soldiers,  and  supplied 
an  army  of  thirty-two  thousand  men  with  ten  days'  rations. 
It  is  a  record,  I  think,  of  which  Miss  Barton  has  every  reason 
to  be  proud. 

But  her  beneficent  work  was  not  confined  to  the  mere 
feeding  of  the  hungry  in  Santiago.  She  sent  large  quantities 
of  cereals,  canned  goods,  and  hospital  supplies  to  our  own 
soldiers  in  the  camps  on  the  adjacent  hills;  she  furnished 
medicines  and  food  for  sick  and  wounded  to  the  Spanish 
prison  camp  as  well  as  to  the  Spanish  army  hospital,  the 
civil  hospital,  and  the  children's  hospital  in  the  city;  she 
directed  Dr.  Soyoso  of  her  medical  staff  to  open  a  clinic  and 
dispensary,  where  five  surgeons  and  two  nurses  gave  medical 
or  surgical  aid  to  more  than  three  thousand  sick  or  sickening 
people  every  day;  she  sent  hundreds  of  tons  of  ice  from  the 
schooner  Morse  to  the  hospitals,  the  camps,  and  the  trans 
ports  going  North  with  sick  and  wounded  soldiers;  she  put 
up  tents  to  shelter  fever-stricken  Spanish  prisoners  from  the 
tropical  sunshine  while  they  were  waiting  to  be  taken  on 
board  the  vessels  that  were  to  carry  them  back  to  Spain; 
and  in  every  way  possible,  and  with  all  the  facilities  that  she 
had,  she  tried  to  alleviate  the  suffering  caused  by  neglect, 
incompetence,  famine,  and  war. 


CHAPTER   XVII 
MORRO   CASTLE 

IN  the  course  of  the  first  week  after  I  landed  in  Santiago, 
I  made  a  number  of  interesting  excursions  to  points  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  harbor,  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining 
the  real  nature  and  strength  of  the  Spanish  fortifications 
and  intrenchments.  From  the  front  of  our  army,  after  the 
battle  of  July  1-2,  I  had  carefully  examined,  with  a  strong 
glass,  the  blockhouses  and  rifle-pits  which  defended  the  city 
on  the  land  side;  and  from  the  bridge  of  the  State  of  Texas, 
two  weeks  later,  I  had  obtained  a  general  idea  of  the  appear 
ance  of  Morro  Castle  and  the  batteries  at  the  mouth  of  the 
harbor  which  protected  the  city  from  an  attack  by  water; 
but  I  was  not  satisfied  with  this  distant  and  superficial  in 
spection.  External  appearances  are  often  deceptive,  and 
forts  or  earthworks  that  look  very  formidable  and  threaten 
ing  from  the  front,  and  at  a  distance  of  half  a  mile,  may 
prove  to  have  little  real  strength  when  seen  from  the  other 
side  and  at  a  distance  of  only  a  few  yards.  I  wished,  there 
fore,  to  get  into  these  forts  and  batteries  before  any  changes 
had  been  made  in  them,  and  before  their  guns  had  been  re 
moved  or  touched,  so  that  I  might  see  how  strong  they  really 
were  and  how  much  damage  had  been  done  to  them  by  the 
repeated  bombardments  to  which  they  had  been  subjected. 
The  first  excursion  that  I  made  was  to  Morro  Castle  and 

192 


MORRO  CASTLE  193 

the  fortifications  at  the  entrance  to  the  harbor.  It  was  my 
intention  to  start  at  4  A.  M.,  so  as  to  reach  the  castle  before 
it  should  get  uncomfortably  hot;  but  as  I  had  no  alarm-clock, 
and  as  no  one  in  the  club  ever  thought  of  getting  up  before 
six,  I  very  naturally  overslept  myself,  and  by  the  time  I  had 
dressed,  eaten  a  hasty  breakfast  of  oatmeal,  hard  bread,  and 
tea,  and  filled  my  canteen  with  boiled  water,  it  was  after 
seven.  The  air  ought  to  have  been  fresh  and  cool  even 
then;  but  on  the  southeastern  coast  of  Cuba  the  change  from 
the  damp  chilliness  of  night  to  the  torrid  heat  of  the  tropical 
day  is  very  rapid,  and  if  there  is  no  land-breeze,  the  rays  of 
the  unclouded  sun,  even  as  early  as  seven  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  have  a  fierce,  scorching  intensity  that  is  hardly  less 
trying  than  the  heat  of  noon.  The  only  really  cool  part  of 
the  day  is  from  four  to  six  o'clock  in  the  morning. 

I  put  a  can  of  baked  beans  and  a  few  crackers  of  hard 
bread  into  my  haversack  for  lunch,  threw  the  strap  of  my 
field-glass  over  my  shoulder,  took  my  canteen  in  my  hand, 
and  hurried  down  Gallo  Street  to  the  pier  of  the  Juragua 
Iron  Company,  where  I  had  engaged  a  colored  Cuban  fisher 
man  to  meet  me  with  a  sail-boat  at  4  A.  M.  He  had  been 
waiting  for  me,  patiently  or  impatiently,  more  than  three 
hours;  but  he  merely  looked  at  me  reproachfully,  and  pointed 
to  the  sun,  as  if  to  say,  "  You  agreed  to  be  here  at  daybreak, 
and  now  see  where  the  sun  is."  I  laid  my  head  down  side- 
wise  on  the  palm  of  my  hand,  shut  my  eyes,  snored  vocifer 
ously,  and  explained  to  him  in  Russian  that  I  had  overslept 
myself.  I  was  gratified  to  see  that  he  understood  my  Russian 
perfectly.  In  communicating  with  Cubans  and  Spaniards  I 
have  always  made  it  a  practice  to  address  them  in  Russian, 
for  the  obvious  reason  that,  as  they  are  foreigners,  and  Rus 
sian  is  a  foreign  tongue,  they  must  necessarily  understand 
that  language  a  little  better  than  they  could  possibly  under 
stand  English.  It  may  seem  like  an  absurd  idea,  but  I  have 

13 


194  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

no  hesitation  in  saying  that  a  skilful  and  judicious  combi 
nation  of  Russian  with  the  sign-language  is  a  good  deal  more 
intelligible  to  a  Cuban  fisherman  than  either  Pidgin-English 
or  Volapiik.  Voltaire  once  cynically  remarked  that  "  pater 
nosters  will  shave  if  said  over  a  good  razor."  So  Russian 
will  convey  a  perfectly  clear  idea  to  a  Cuban  fisherman  if 
accompanied  by  a  sufficiently  pictorial  pantomime.  I  tried 
it  repeatedly  on  my  boatman,  and  became  convinced  that 
if  I  only  spoke  Russian  a  little  more  grammatically,  and 
gesticulated  the  sign-language  a  little  more  fluently,  I  could 
explain  to  him  the  outlines  of  cosmic  philosophy  and  instruct 
him  in  the  doctrines  of  esoteric  Buddhism.  I  never  should 
have  got  to  Morro  Castle  and  back  with  him  if  I  had  not 
been  able  to  draw  diagrams  in  the  air  with  both  hands  and 
my  head  simultaneously,  and  then  explain  them  to  him  in 
colloquial  Russian. 

The  surface  of  the  bay,  as  we  pushed  off  from  the  pier, 
was  almost  as  smooth  and  glassy  as  an  expanse  of  oil ;  and 
although  my  negro  boatman  whistled  persuasively  for  a 
breeze,  after  the  manner  of  sailors,  and  even  ejaculated 
something  that  sounded  suspiciously  like  "Come  up'leven!" 
as  he  bent  to  his  clumsy  oars,  he  could  not  coax  the  Cuban 
^Eolus  to  unloose  the  faintest  zephyr  from  the  cave  of  the 
winds  in  the  high  blue  mountains  north  of  the  city.  He 
finally  suspended  his  whistling  to  save  his  breath,  wiped  his 
sweaty  face  on  his  shirt-sleeve,  and  made  a  few  cursory 
remarks  in  Spanish  to  relieve  his  mind  and  express  his  un 
favorable  opinion  of  the  weather.  I  shared  his  feelings,  even 
if  I  could  not  adopt  his  language,  and,  pantomimically  wring 
ing  the  perspiration  out  of  my  front  hair,  I  remarked  in 
Russian  that  it  was  zharko  (hot).  Encouraged  by  what 
he  took  for  sympathetic  and  responsive  profanity  on  my 
side,  he  scowled  fiercely  and  exclaimed,  "  Mucha  sol— damn! " 
whereupon  we  smiled  reciprocally  and  felt  much  cooler. 


MORRO   CASTLE  195 

We  crept  slowly  down  the  eastern  side  of  the  bay,  past 
the  conical  hill  crowned  with  a  cubical  blockhouse  which 
marks  the  southern  boundary  of  the  city,  around  the  end  of 
the  long  iron  trestle  of  the  Juragua  Iron  Company,  past  the 
flat-topped  rnesa  on  which  stands  the  harbor  signal-station, 
and  finally  into  the  narrow  neck  of  the  Santiago  water-bottle 
which  Hobson  vainly  tried  to  cork  with  the  collier  Merrimac. 
From  this  point  of  view  we  could  see,  between  the  steep 
bluffs  which  form  the  entrance  to  the  bay,  a  narrow  strip  of 
blue,  sunlit  ocean,  and  on  its  left  the  massive  gray  bastions 
of  Morro  Castle,  projecting  in  a  series  of  huge  steps,  like 
ledges  or  terraces  of  natural  rock,  from  the  crest  of  the 
eastern  promontory. 

All  the  maps  of  Santiago  harbor  that  I  have  seen  show 
another  castle,  called  Socapa,  nearly  opposite  Morro  on  the 
western  side  of  the  channel;  but  I  have  never  been  able  to 
discover  it.  If  it  still  exists,  it  must  be  in  ruins  and  so 
overgrown  with  vegetation  as  to  be  completely  hidden.  The 
only  fortification  I  could  find  on  that  side  of  the  bay  is  the 
so-called  "western  battery,"  a  recently  constructed  earth 
work  situated  on  the  crest  of  the  long,  flat-topped  hill  which 
forms  the  outer  coast-line.  This  earthwork  could  never 
have  been  known  as  a  "castle";  it  is  at  least  three  hundred 
yards  west  of  the  point  indicated  on  the  map  as  the  site  of 
Socapa,  and  it  cannot  be  seen  at  all  from  the  channel,  or 
even  from  the  highest  parapet  of  Morro.  Unless  Socapa 
Castle,  therefore,  is  so  small  and  inconspicuous  as  to  have 
escaped  my  notice,  it  must  have  fallen  into  ruins  or  been 
destroyed.  There  is  no  castle  on  the  \vestern  side  of  the 
entrance  now  that  can  be  seen  from  the  water,  from  the 
Estrella  battery,  or  from  Morro. 

After  passing  Cayo  Smith,  the  sunken  collier  Merrimac, 
and  the  dismantled  wreck  of  the  Reina  Mercedes,  we  turned 
abruptly  to  the  left,  opposite  the  Estrella  battery,  and  entered 


196  CAMPAIGNING  IN   CUBA 

a  deep,  sheltered  cove,  directly  behind  the  Morro  promontory 
and  almost  under  the  massive  walls  of  the  castle  itself.  Land 
ing  at  a  little  wooden  pier  on  the  northern  side  of  the  minia 
ture  bay,  I  walked  up  to  the  road  leading  to  the  Estrella 
battery,  and  there  stopped  and  looked  about  me.  The  cove 
was  completely  shut  in  by  high  hills,  and  the  only  road  or 
path  leading  out  of  it,  so  far  as  I  could  see,  was  the  one  on 
which  I  stood.  This  began,  apparently,  at  the  Estrella  bat 
tery,  ran  around  the  head  of  the  cove,  and  then,  turning  to 
the  right,  climbed  the  almost  precipitous  side  of  the  Morro 
promontory,  in  a  long,  steep  slant,  to  a  height  of  one  hundred 
and  fifty  feet.  There  it  made  another  turn  which  carried  it 
out  of  sight  behind  a  buttress  of  rock  under  the  northwestern 
corner  of  the  castle.  Near  the  mouth  of  the  cove,  on  my 
right,  rose  the  white,  crenellated,  half-ruined  wall  of  the 
Estrella  battery— a  dilapidated  open  stone  fort  of  the  eigh 
teenth  century,  which  contained  no  guns,  and  which,  judging 
from  its  appearance,  had  long  been  abandoned.  It  occupied, 
however,  a  very  strong  position,  and  if  the  Spaniards  had  had 
any  energy  or  enterprise  they  would  have  put  it  in  repair 
and  mounted  in  it  a  modern  mortar  which  lay  on  a  couple  of 
skids  near  the  pier,  and  two  or  three  small  rapid-fire  guns 
which  they  might  have  obtained  from  one  of  Admiral  Cer- 
vera's  cruisers.  Antiquated  and  obsolete  as  it  was,  it  might 
then  have  been  of  some  use. 

Near  the  head  of  the  cove  was  an  old  ordnance  storehouse, 
or  magazine,  which  proved  upon  examination  to  contain 
nothing  more  interesting  than  a  few  ancient  gun-carriages, 
a  lot  of  solid  six-inch  projectiles,  an  assortment  of  rammers 
and  spongers  for  muzzle-loading  cannon,  and  a  few  wooden 
boxes  of  brass-jacketed  cartridges  for  Remington  rifles. 
Three  long  smooth-bore  iron  culverins  lay  on  the  ground 
between  this  magazine  and  the  pier,  but  they  had  not  been 
fired,  apparently,  in  a  century,  and  were  so  eaten  and  pitted 


MORRO   CASTLE  197 

by  rust  that  I  could  not  find  on  them  any  trace  of  inscrip 
tion  or  date.  There  was  nothing  really  useful,  effective,  or 
modern,  either  in  the  Estrella  battery  or  in  the  magazine, 
except  the  Remington  rifle-cartridges  and  the  unmounted 
mortar. 

Finding  nothing  else  of  interest  in  the  vicinity  of  the  cove, 
I  started  up  the  road  that  led  to  the  front  or  western  face 
of  Morro  Castle.  I  call  it  a  "  road  "  by  courtesy,  because  it 
did  show  some  signs  of  labor  and  engineering  skill;  but  it 
was  broken  every  few  yards  into  rude  steps  by  transverse 
ledges  of  tough,  intractable  rock,  and  how  any  wheeled 
vehicle  could  ever  have  been  drawn  up  it  I  cannot  imagine. 
The  fringe  of  plants,  bushes,  and  low  trees  that  bordered 
this  road  was  bright  with  flowers,  among  which  I  noticed  the 
white  spider-lily  (apparently  a  variety  of  Cleome  pungens), 
the  so-called  "  Cuban  rose  "  (a  flower  that  flaunts  the  scarlet 
and  yellow  of  the  Spanish  flag  and  looks  a  little  like  Poien- 
tilla  la  Vesuve),  and  a  beautiful  climbing  vine  with  large 
violet  blossoms  which  resembled  in  shape  and  color  the  but 
terfly-pea  (Centrosema). 

In  and  out  among  these  plants  and  bushes  ran  nimble 
lizards  of  at  least  half  a  dozen  different  kinds:  lizards  that 
carried  their  tails  curled  up  over  their  backs  like  pug-dogs; 
lizards  that  amused  themselves  by  pushing  out  a  whitish, 
crescent-shaped  protuberance  from  under  their  throats  and 
then  drawing  it  in  again;  lizards  that  changed  color  while  I 
watched  them;  and  big  gray  iguanas,  two  or  three  feet  in 
length,  which,  although  perfectly  harmless,  looked  ugly  and 
malevolent  enough  to  be  classed  with  Cuban  land-crabs  and 
tarantulas.  I  saw  no  animals  except  these  lizards,  and  no 
birds  except  the  soaring  vultures,  which  are  never  absent 
from  Cuban  skies,  and  which  hang  in  clouds  over  every 
battle-field,  fort,  city,  and  village  on  the  island. 

The  road  from  the  head  of  the  Estrella  cove  to  the  crest 


198  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

of  the  Morro  promontory  forks  at  a  distance  of  seventy-five 
or  one  hundred  yards  from  the  cable-house,  one  branch  of  it 
turning  to  the  left  and  climbing  a  steep  grade  to  the  summit 
of  the  ridge  east  of  the  castle,  where  stand  the  lighthouse 
and  the  barracks,  while  the  other  branch  goes  straight  on  in  a 
rising  slant  to  a  rocky  buttress  situated  almost  perpendicu 
larly  over  the  point  where  the  southern  shore  of  the  cove  in 
tersects  the  eastern  margin  of  the  harbor  channel.  Turning 
to  the  left  around  this  buttress,  it  runs  horizontally  southward 
along  a  shelf-like  cornice  in  the  face  of  the  precipice  until 
it  reaches  a  spacious  terrace,  or  esplanade,  cut  out  of  the 
solid  rock,  at  a  height  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  feet  above 
the  water.  This  terrace,  which  is  on  the  western  face  of 
the  castle  and  directly  under  its  lower  bastions,  seems  to 
have  been  intended  originally  for  a  gun-platform,  but  there 
is  nothing  there  now  to  indicate  that  guns  were  ever  mounted 
on  it.  It  has  no  parapet,  or  battlement,  and  is  merely  a  wide, 
empty  shelf  of  rock,  overhanging  the  narrow  entrance  to  the 
harbor,  and  overhung,  in  turn,  by  the  walls  of  the  fortress. 
In  the  mountain-side  back  of  it  are  four  or  five  quadrangular 
apertures,  which  look  from  a  distance  like  square  port-holes, 
or  embrasures,  for  heavy  cannon,  but  which  prove  upon 
closer  examination  to  be  doors  leading  to  huge  subterranean 
chambers,  designed,  I  presume,  for  the  safekeeping  of  am 
munition  and  explosives.  At  the  time  when  I  went  through 
them  they  contained  nothing  more  dangerous  than  con 
demned  shovels  and  pickaxes,  empty  bottles,  old  tin  cans, 
metal  lamps,  dirty  straw  hats,  discarded  hammocks,  and  cast- 
off  shoes.  I  found  nothing  in  the  shape  of  ammunition  except 
two  or  three  dozen  spherical  iron  cannon-balls,  which  lay 
scattered  over  the  rocky  floor  of  the  esplanade,  as  if  the 
soldiers  of  the  garrison  had  been  accustomed  to  play  croquet 
with  them  there,  just  to  pass  away  the  time  in  the  intervals 
between  Admiral  Sampson's  bombardments. 


MORRO   CASTLE  199 

After  looking  about  the  esplanade  and  exploring  the  dim 
recesses  of  the  gloomy  ammunition-vaults,  I  climbed  a  crooked 
flight  of  disintegrating  stone  steps  and  entered,  between  two 
massive  quadrangular  bastions,1  the  lower  story— if  I  may  so 
call  it— of  the  castle  proper.  As  seen  from  the  ocean  out 
side  of  the  harbor,  this  ancient  fortress  appears  to  consist 
of  three  huge  cubes  of  gray  masonry,  superimposed  one  upon 
another  in  such  a  manner  as  to  present  in  profile  the  outline 
of  three  rocky  terraces;  but  whether  this  profile  view  gives 
anything  like  a  correct  idea  of  the  real  shape  of  the  building 
I  am  unable  to  say.  From  the  time  when  I  entered  the 
gateway  at  the  head  of  the  flight  of  stone  steps  that  led  up 
from  the  esplanade,  I  was  lost  in  a  jumbled  aggregation  of 
intercommunicating  corridors,  bastions,  grated  cells,  stair 
ways,  small  interior  courtyards,  and  huge,  gloomy  chambers, 
which  I  could  not  mentally  group  or  combine  so  as  to  reduce 
them  to  intelligible  order  or  bring  them  into  anything  like 
architectural  harmony.  The  almost  complete  absence  of 
windows  made  it  impossible  to  orient  one's  self  by  glancing 
occasionally  at  some  object  of  known  position  outside;  the 
frequent  turns  in  the  passages  and  changes  of  level  in  the 
floors  were  very  confusing;  the  small  courtyards  which  ad 
mitted  light  to  the  interior  afforded  no  outlook,  and  I  simply 
roamed  from  bastion  to  bastion  and  from  corridor  to  corridor, 
without  knowing  where  I  was,  or  what  relation  the  place  in 
which  I  stood  bore  to  the  castle  as  a  whole.  Now  and  then 
I  would  ascend  a  flight  of  stone  steps  at  the  side  of  a  court 
yard  and  come  out  unexpectedly  upon  what  seemed  to  be  a 
flat  roof,  from  which  I  could  see  the  entrance  to  the  harbor 

1  I  use  the  word  "  bastion  "  in  a  very  loose,  untechnical  way  to  designate 
projecting  parts  or  semi-detached  wings  of  the  main  building.  I  doubt 
whether  the  castle  contains  anything  that  would  be  called  a  bastion  by  a 
military  engineer;  but  I  cannot  think  of  any  other  word  to  describe  the 
cubical  masses  of  masonry  that  are  joined  to  the  main  work  only  on  one  side. 


200  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

and  the  white  walls  of  the  Estrella  battery  hundreds  of  feet 
below;  but  as  soon  as  I  went  back  into  the  maze  of  passages, 
chambers,  and  bastions  on  that  level,  I  lost  all  sense  of 
direction,  and  five  minutes  later  I  could  not  tell  whether  I 
was  on  the  northern  side  of  the  castle  or  the  southern  side, 
nor  whether  I  was  in  the  second  of  the  three  cubes  of  ma 
sonry  or  the  third. 

The  most  surprising  thing  about  the  castle,  to  me,  was 
its  lack  of  offensive  power.  Its  massive  stone  walls  gave  it, 
of  course,  a  certain  capacity  for  endurance,  and  even  for 
resistance  of  a  passive  kind;  but  it  was  almost  as  incapable 
of  inflicting  injury  on  an  enemy  as  a  Dutch  dike  or  a  hillock 
of  the  mound-builders  would  be.  Until  I  reached  what,  for 
want  of  a  better  name,  I  shall  have  to  call  the  roof  of  the 
uppermost  cube,  I  did  not  find  anywhere  a  single  round  of 
ammunition,  nor  a  gun  of  any  caliber,  nor  a  casemate  intended 
for  a  gun,  nor  an  embrasure  from  which  a  gun  could  have 
been  fired.  So  far  as  architectural  adaptation  to  the  condi 
tions  of  modern  warfare  is  concerned,  it  was  as  harmless  as 
an  old  Norman  keep,  and  might  have  been  planned  and  built 
two  centuries  before  guns  were  used  or  gunpowder  invented. 
I  have  been  unable  to  ascertain  the  date  of  its  erection;  but 
the  city  of  Santiago  was  founded  by  Diego  Velasquez  in  1514, 
and  all  the  evidence  furnished  by  the  castle  itself  would  seem 
to  indicate  that  it  dates  back  to  the  sixteenth,  or  at  latest 
to  the  seventeenth,  century.  There  is  certainly  nothing  in 
its  plan  or  in  its  appearance  to  show  that  the  engineers  who 
designed  it  were  acquainted  even  with  the  art  of  fortification 
as  developed  in  the  seventeenth  century  by  Vauban.  It  is 
simply  an  old  feudal  castle,  with  moat,  drawbridge,  and  port 
cullis,  built  after  the  model  of  medieval  strongholds  before 
heavy  siege-ordnance  came  into  general  use.  The  idea  that 
it  could  have  done  any  serious  damage  to  Admiral  Sampson's 
fleet  seems  absolutely  ludicrous  when  one  has  explored  the 


MORRO   CASTLE  201 

interior  of  it  and  taken  stock  of  its  antiquated,  not  to  say 
obsolete  and  useless,  armament. 

After  wandering  about  for  half  an  hour  in  the  two  lower 
stories,  I  climbed  a  crooked  flight  of  stone  steps,  half  blocked 
up  with  debris  from  a  shattered  parapet  above,  and  came 
out  on  the  flat  roof  of  the  highest  and  largest  of  the  three 
cubes  that  together  make  up  the  fortress.  It  was  a  spacious 
battlemented  floor,  of  rectangular  but  irregular  outline, 
having  an  extreme  length  of  perhaps  one  hundred  and  fifty 
feet,  with  an  average  width  of  seventy-five  to  one  hundred.1 
On  its  eastern  side  it  overlooked  a  deep,  wide  moat,  intended 
to  protect  the  wall  from  an  assault  made  along  the  crest  of 
the  promontory,  while  on  the  other  three  sides  one  might 
look  down  hundreds  of  feet  to  the  wide  blue  plain  of  the 
ocean,  the  narrow  mouth  of  the  harbor,  and  the  deep  shel 
tered  cove  of  the  Estrella  battery.  The  city  of  Santiago 
was  hidden  behind  the  flat-topped  hill  on  which  the  signal- 
station  stands;  but  I  could  see  a  part  of  the  beautiful  bay, 
with  the  bare  green  mountains  behind  it,  while  eastward  and 
westward  I  could  follow  the  surf -whitened  coast-line  to  the 
distant  blue  capes  formed  by  the  forest-clad  slopes  of  Tur- 
quino  on  one  side  and  the  billowy  foot-hills  of  the  Gran 
Piedra  on  the  other.  The  fleet  of  Admiral  Sampson  had 
disappeared;  but  its  place  had  already  been  taken  by  a  little 
fleet  of  fishing-smacks  from  Santiago,  whose  sun-illumined 
sails  looked  no  larger,  on  the  dark-blue  expanse  of  the  Carib 
bean,  than  the  wings  of  white  Cuban  butterflies  that  had 
fallen  into  the  sea. 

For  ten  minutes  after  I  reached  the  aerial  platform  of  the 
bastion  roof  I  had  no  eyes  for  anything  except  the  magnifi 
cent  natural  cyclorama  of  blue  water,  rolling  foot-hills,  deep 
secluded  valleys,  and  palm-fringed  mountains  that  surrounded 

1  I  neglected  to  ascertain  the  dimensions  of  this  foof  or  gun-platform  by 
pacing  it,  and  the  estimates  given  above  are  from  memory. 


202  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

me;  but,  withdrawing  my  gaze  reluctantly  at  last  from  the 
enchanting  scenery,  I  turned  my  attention  again  to  the  castle 
and  its  armament.  Scattered  about  here  and  there  on  the 
flat  roof  of  the  bastion  were  five  short  bronze  mortars  of 
various  calibers  and  two  muzzle-loading  smooth-bore  cannon, 
mounted,  like  field-pieces,  on  clumsy  wooden  carriages  with 
long  "trails"  and  big,  heavy  wheels.  It  was  evident  at  a 
glance  that  neither  of  the  cannon  would  be  likely  to  hit 
a  battle-ship  at  a  distance  of  five  hundred  yards  without  a 
special  interposition  of  Providence;  and  as  the  mortars  had 
no  elevating,  training,  or  sighting  gear,  and  could  be  dis 
charged  only  at  a  certain  fixed  angle,  it  is  doubtful  whether 
they  could  drop  a  shell  upon  a  floating  target  a  mile  in  diam 
eter—and  yet  these  five  mortars  and  two  eighteen-pounder 
muzzle-loading  guns  were  all  the  armament  that  Morro  Castle 
had. 

After  looking  the  pieces  over  superficially  and  forming 
from  mere  inspection  a  judgment  as  to  their  value,  I  pro 
ceeded  to  examine  them  closely  for  dates.  The  larger  of 
the  two  cannon,  which  was  trained  over  the  northern  parapet 
as  if  to  bombard  the  city  of  Santiago,  bore  the  following 
inscription: 

MARS 
PLURIBUS   NEC  IMPAR  l 

12  lun  1748 
PAR  IEAN  MARITZ 

ULTIMO  RATIO  REGUM  2 

LOUIS  CHARLES  DE  BOURBON 

COMPTE  D'EU 

DUG  D'AUMALE 

The  other  cannon,  which  was  trained  over  the  western 

1  "A  fair  match  for  numbers." 

2  "The  last  argument  of  kings."     Words  engraved  or  cast  on  French 
cannon  by  order  of  Louis  XIV. 


MORRO   CASTLE  203 

parapet  and  aimed  at  the  place  where  Socapa  Castle  ought  to 
have  been,  was  inscribed: 

LE  COMPTE  DE  PROVENCE 
ULTIMO  RATIO  REGUM 

LOUIS  CHARLES  DE  BOURBON 

COMPTE  D'EU 

DUG  D'AUMALE 

1755 

The  mortars,  which  were  embellished  with  Gorgons'  heads 
and  were  fine  specimens  of  bronze  casting,  bore  inscriptions 
or  dates  as  follows: 

NO.  1.  EL   MANTICORA 

1733 

STRVXITDVCTOREXERC 
ITM   REGISBENTVE  (sic) 


PHIL  II   HISPAN   REX1 
ELISA   FAR   HIS   REGINA 

No.  2.  VOTE  ABET   FECIT 

SEVILLE  ANO   D 

1724 

No.  3.  EL  COMETA 

1737 

No.  4.  1780 

No.  5.  1781 

From  the  above  inscriptions  and  dates  it  appears  that  the 
most  modern  piece  of  ordnance  in  the  Morro  Castle  battery 
was  cast  one  hundred  and  seventeen  years  ago,  and  the  old 
est  one  hundred  and  seventy-four  years  ago.  It  would  be 
interesting  to  know  the  history  of  the  two  French  cannon 
which,  in  obedience  to  the  order  of  Louis  XIV,  were  marked 

1  Evidently  an  error;  it  should  be  Philip  V 


204  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

"  ULTIMO  RATIO  REGUM."  lean  Maritz,  their  founder,  doubt 
less  regarded  them,  a  century  ago,  with  as  much  pride  as 
Herr  Krupp  feels  now  when  he  turns  out  a  fifteen-inch  steel 
breech-loader  at  Essen;  but  the  ultimo  ratio  regum  does 
not  carry  as  much  weight  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic  in  the 
nineteenth  century  as  it  carried  on  the  other  side  in  the 
eighteenth,  and  the  recent  discussions  between  Morro  Castle 
and  Admiral  Sampson's  fleet  proved  conclusively  that  the 
"  last  argument  of  kings  "  is  much  less  cogent  and  convincing 
than  the  first  argument  of  battle-ships.  It  is  doubtful, 
however,  whether  these  antiquated  guns  were  ever  fired  at 
Admiral  Sampson's  fleet.  They  were  not  pointed  toward  the 
sea  when  the  castle  was  evacuated;  I  could  not  find  any 
ammunition  for  them,  either  on  the  bastion  roof  where  they 
stood  or  in  the  vaults  of  the  castle  below;  there  were  no 
rammers  or  spongers  on  or  about  the  gun-platforms,  where 
they  would  naturally  have  been  left  when  the  guns  were 
abandoned;  and  there  was  nothing  whatever  to  show  that 
they  had  been  fired  in  fifty  years.  But  it  could  have  made 
little  difference  to  the  blockading  fleet  whether  they  were 
fired  or  not.  They  were  hardly  more  formidable  than  the 
"  crakys  of  war  "  used  by  Edward  III  against  the  French  at 
the  battle  of  Crecy.  As  for  the  mortars,  they  were  fit  only 
for  a  museum  of  antiquities,  or  a  collection  of  obsolete  im 
plements  of  war  like  that  in  the  Tower  of  London.  I  hope 
that  Secretary  Alger  or  Secretary  Long  will  have  "  El  Man- 
ticora  "  and  "  El  Cometa  "  brought  to  the  United  States  and 
placed  at  the  main  entrance  of  the  War  Department  or  the 
Navy  Department  as  curiosities,  as  fine  specimens  of  artistic 
bronze  casting,  and  as  trophies  of  the  Santiago  campaign. 
When  I  had  finished  copying  the  inscriptions  on  the  cannon 
and  the  mortars,  I  went  down  into  the  interior  of  the  castle  • 
to  examine  some  pictures  and  inscriptions  that  I  had  noticed 
on  the  walls  of  a  chamber  in  the  second  story,  which  had 


MORRO   CASTLE  205 

been  used,  apparently,  as  a  guard-room  or  barrack.  It  was 
a  large,  rectangular,  windowless  apartment,  with  a  wide  door, 
a  vaulted  ceiling,  and  smooth  stone  walls  which  had  been 
covered  with  plaster  and  whitewashed.  Among  the  Spanish 
soldiers  who  had  occupied  this  room  there  was  evidently  an 
amateur  artist  of  no  mean  ability,  who  had  amused  himself 
in  his  hours  of  leisure  by  drawing  pictures  and  caricatures 
on  the  whitewashed  walls.  On  the  left  of  the  door,  at  a 
height  of  five  or  six  feet,  was  a  life-sized  and  very  cleverly 
executed  sketch  of  a  Spaniard  in  a  wide  sombrero,  reading  a 
Havana  newspaper.  His  eyes  and  mouth  were  wide  open,  as 
if  he  were  amazed  and  shocked  beyond  measure  by  the  news 
of  some  terrible  calamity,  and  his  attitude,  as  well  as  the 
horror-stricken  expression  of  his  elongated  face,  seemed  to 
indicate  that,  at  the  very  least,  he  had  just  found  in  the 
paper  an  announcement  of  the  sudden  and  violent  death  of 
all  his  family.  Below,  in  quotation-marks,  were  the  words: 
" !  !  !  Que  BARBARIDAD.  !  !  !  Han  apresado  UN  VIVERO." 
("What  BARBARITY  !  !  !  They  have  captured  A  FISHING- 
SMACK  III") 

This  is  evidently  a  humorous  sneer  at  the  trifling  value 
of  the  prizes  taken  by  the  vessels  of  our  blockading  fleet  off 
Havana  in  the  early  days  of  the  war.  But  there  is  more  in 
the  Spanish  words  than  can  well  be  brought  out  in  a  trans 
lation,  for  the  reason  that  vivero  means  a  vessel  in  which 
fish  are  brought  from  the  Yucatan  banks  alive,  in  large  salt 
water  tanks.  We  had  been  accusing  the  Spaniards  of  cruelty 
and  barbarity  in  their  treatment  of  the  insurgents.  The 
artist  "  gets  back  at  us,"  to  use  a  slang  phrase,  by  exclaim 
ing,  in  pretended  horror,  "What  barbarous  cruelty!  They 
have  captured  a  boat-load  of  living  fish!" 

For  a  Spanish  soldier,  that  is  not  bad;  and  the  touch  is 
as  delicate  in  the  sneer  of  the  legend  as  in  the  technic  of 
the  cartoon. 


206  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

A  little  farther  along  and  higher  up,  on  the  same  wall, 
was  a  carefully  executed  and  beautifully  finished  life-sized 
portrait  of  a  tonsured  Roman  Catholic  monk— a  sketch  that 
I  should  have  been  glad  to  frame  and  hang  in  my  library,  if 
it  had  only  been  possible  to  get  it  off  the  wall  without  break 
ing  the  plaster  upon  which  it  had  been  drawn.  I  thought  of 
trying  to  photograph  it;  but  the  light  in  the  chamber  was 
not  strong  enough  for  a  snap  shot,  and  I  had  no  tripod  to 
support  my  camera  during  a  time-exposure. 

There  were  several  other  sketches  and  caricatures  on  the 
left-hand  wall;  but  none  of  them  was  as  good  as  were  the 
two  that  I  have  described,  and,  after  examining  them  all  care 
fully,  I  cast  my  eyes  about  the  room  to  see  what  I  could  find 
in  the  shape  of  "loot"  that  would  be  worth  carrying  away 
as  a  memento  of  the  place.  Apart  from  old  shoes,  a  modern 
kerosene-lamp  of  glass,  a  dirty  blanket  or  two,  and  a  cot-bed, 
there  seemed  to  be  nothing  worth  confiscating  except  a  couple 
of  Spanish  newspapers  hanging  against  the  right-hand  wall 
on  a  nail.  One  was  "  El  Imparcial,"  a  sheet  as  large  as  the 
New  York  "Sun";  and  the  other,  "La  Saeta,"an  illustrated 
comic  paper  about  the  size  of  "Punch."  They  had  no  in 
trinsic  value,  of  course,  and  as  "  relics  "  they  were  not  par 
ticularly  characteristic;  but  "newspapers  from  a  bastion  in 
Morro  Castle  "  would  be  interesting,  I  thought,  to  some  of 
my  journalistic  friends  at  home,  so  I  decided  to  take  them. 
I  put  up  my  hand  to  lift  them  off  the  nail  without  tearing 
them,  and  was  amazed  to  discover  that  neither  nail  nor  news 
papers  had  any  tangible  existence.  They  had  been  drawn 
on  the  plaster,  by  that  confounded  soldier-artist,  with  a  lead- 
pencil!  I  felt  worse  deceived  and  more  chagrined  than  the 
Greek  pony  that  neighed  at  the  painted  horse  of  Apelles! 
But  I  need  not  have  felt  so  humiliated.  Those  newspapers 
would  have  deceived  the  elect;  and  I  am  not  sure  that  the 
keenest-sighted  proof-reader  of  the  "  Imparcial "  would  not 


MORRO   CASTLE  207 

have  read  and  corrected  a  whole  column  before  he  discovered 
that  the  paper  was  plaster  and  that  the  letters  had  been 
made  with  a  pencil.  Major  Greene  of  the  United  States 
Signal-Service,  to  whom  I  described  these  counterfeit  news 
papers,  went  to  the  castle  a  few  days  later,  and,  notwith 
standing  the  fact  that  he  had  been  forewarned,  he  tried  to 
take  "La  Saeta"  off  the  nail.  He  trusted  me  enough  to 
believe  that  one  of  the  papers  was  deceptive;  but  he  felt 
sure  that  a  real  copy  of  "  La  Saeta  "  had  been  hung  over  a 
counterfeit  "Imparcial"  in  order  to  make  the  latter  look 
more  natural.  If  the  soldier  who  drew  the  caricatures,  por 
traits,  and  newspapers  in  that  guard-room  escaped  shot,  shell, 
and  calenture,  and  returned  in  safety  to  Spain,  I  hope  that  he 
may  sometime  find  in  a  Spanish  journal  a  translation  of  this 
chapter,  and  thus  be  made  aware  of  the  respectful  admiration 
that  I  shall  always  entertain  for  him  and  his  artistic  talents. 

In  all  the  rooms  of  the  castle  that  had  been  occupied  by 
soldiers  I  found,  scratched  or  penciled  on  the  walls,  checker 
board  calendars  on  which  the  days  had  been  successively 
crossed  off;  rude  pictures  and  caricatures  of  persons  or 
things;  individual  names;  and  brief  reflections  or  remarks  in 
doggerel  rhyme  or  badly  spelled  prose,  which  had  been  sug 
gested  to  the  writers,  apparently,  by  their  unsatisfactory 
environment.  One  man,  for  example,  has  left  on  record  this 
valuable  piece  of  advice: 

"  Unless  you  have  a  good,  strong  '  pull '  [mucha  influential, 
don't  complain  that  your  rations  are  bad.  If  you  do,  you 
may  have  to  come  and  live  in  Morro  Castle,  where  they  will 
be  much  worse." 

Another,  addressing  a  girl  named  "  Petenera,"  who  seems 
to  have  gotten  him  into  trouble,  exclaims: 

Petenera,  my  life!    Petenera,  my  heart! 
It  is  all  your  fault 
That  I  lie  here  in  Morro 


208  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

Suffering  pain  and  writing  my  name 
On  the  plastered  wall. 

JOSE. 

Probably  "  Jose  "  went  to  see  "  Petenera  "  without  first  ob 
taining  leave  of  absence,  and  was  shut  up  in  one  of  the  gloomy 
guard-rooms  of  Morro  Castle  as  a  punishment. 

Another  wall-writer,  in  a  philosophic,  reflective,  and  rather 
melancholy  mood,  says: 

Tu  me  sobreviviras. 
Que  vale  el  ser  del  hombres 
Cuando  un  escrito  vale  mas! 

You  [my  writing]  will  survive  me. 

What  avails  it  to  be  a  man,  when  a  scrap  of  writing  is  worth  more! 

It  is  a  fact  which,  perhaps,  may  not  be  wholly  unworthy 
of  notice  that,  among  the  sketches  I  saw  and  the  mural 
inscriptions  I  copied  in  all  parts  of  Morro  Castle,  there  was 
not  an  indecent  picture  nor  an  improper  word,  sentence,  or 
line.  Spanish  soldiers  may  be  cruel,  but  they  do  not  appear 
to  be  vicious  or  corrupt  in  the  way  that  soldiers  often  are. 

In  wandering  through  the  corridors  and  gloomy  chambers 
of  the  castle,  copying  inscriptions  on  walls  and  cannon,  and 
exploring  out-of-the-way  nooks  and  corners,  I  spent  a  large 
part  of  the  day.  I  found  that  the  masonry  of  the  fortress 
had  suffered  even  less  from  the  guns  of  Admiral  Sampson's 
fleet  than  I  had  supposed.  The  eastern  and  southeastern 
faces  of  the  upper  cube  had  been  damaged  a  little;  the 
parapet,  or  battlement,  of  the  gun-floor  had  been  shattered 
in  one  place,  and  the  debris  from  it  had  fallen  over  and 
partly  blocked  up  the  steps  leading  to  that  floor  from  the 
second  story;  two  or  three  of  the  corner  turrets  had  been 
injured  by  small  shells;  and  there  was  a  deep  scar,  or  cir 
cular  pit,  in  the  face  of  the  eastern  wall,  over  the  moat, 


MORRO   CASTLE  209 

where  the  masonry  had  been  struck  squarely  by  a  heavy 
projectile;  but,  with  the  exception  of  these  comparatively 
trifling  injuries,  the  old  fortress  remained  intact.  News 
paper  men  described  it  as  "  in  ruins  "  or  "  almost  destroyed  " 
half  a  dozen  times  in  the  course  of  the  summer;  and  the  cor 
respondent  of  a  prominent  metropolitan  journal,  who  entered 
the  harbor  on  his  despatch-boat  just  behind  the  State  of 
Texas  the  day  that  Santiago  surrendered,  did  not  hesitate 
to  say:  "The  old  fort  is  a  mass  of  ruins.  The  stone  foun 
dation  has  been  weakened  by  the  shells  from  the  fleet,  caus 
ing  a  portion  of  the  castle  to  settle  from  ten  to  twenty  feet. 
Only  the  walls  on  the  inner  side  remain.  The  terraces 
have  been  obliterated  and  the  guns  dismounted  and  buried 
in  the  debris.  There  are  great  crevices  in  the  supporting 
walls,  and  the  fort  is  in  a  general  state  of  collapse." 

How  any  intelligent  man,  with  eyes  and  a  field-glass,  could 
get  such  an  erroneous  impression,  or  make  such  wild  and 
reckless  statements,  I  am  utterly  unable  to  imagine.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  fleet  never  tried  .or  intended  to  injure 
the  castle,  and  all  the  damage  done  to  it  was  probably  acci 
dental.  I  have  no  doubt  that  Admiral  Sampson  might  have 
reduced  the  fortress  to  the  condition  that  the  correspondent 
so  graphically  describes,— I  saw  him  destroy  the  stone  fort 
of  Aguadores  in  a  few  hours,  with  only  three  ships,— but  he 
discovered,  almost  as  soon  as  he  reached  Santiago,  that  the 
old  castle  was  perfectly  harmless,  and,  with  the  cool  self- 
restraint  of  a  thoughtful  and  level-headed  naval  officer,  he 
determined  to  save  it  as  a  picturesque  and  interesting  relic 
of  the  past.  Most  of  the  projectiles  that  struck  it  were 
aimed  at  the  eastern  battery,  the  lighthouse,  or  the  barracks 
on  the  crest  of  the  bluff  behind  it;  and  all  the  damage  acci 
dentally  done  to  it  by  these  shots  might  easily  be  repaired 
in  two  or  three  days.  If  Cuba  ever  becomes  a  part  of  the 
United  States,  the  people  of  this  country  will  owe  a  debt  of 


210  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

gratitude  to  Admiral  Sampson  for  resisting  the  temptation 
to  show  what  his  guns  could  do,  and  for  preserving  almost 
intact  one  of  the  most  interesting  and  striking  old  castles 
in  the  world. 

Leaving  the  fortress  through  the  eastern  gateway  and 
crossing  the  dry  moat  on  a  wooden  trestle  which  had  taken 
the  place  of  the  drawbridge,  I  walked  along  the  crest  of  the 
bluff  toward  the  eastern  battery.  It  was  evident,  from  the 
appearance  of  the  lighthouse  and  the  one-story,  tile-roofed 
buildings  on  the  crest  of  the  hill,  that  if  Morro  Castle 
escaped  serious  injury  it  was  not  because  the  gunners  of 
our  fleet  were  unable  to  hit  it.  Every  other  structure  in  its 
vicinity  had  been  shattered,  riddled,  or  smashed.  The  light 
house,  which  was  a  tapering  cylinder  of  three-quarter-inch 
iron  twelve  feet  in  diameter  at  the  base  and  perhaps  thirty 
feet  high,  had  been  struck  at  least  twenty  or  thirty  times. 
The  western  half  of  it,  from  top  to  bottom,  had  been  carried 
away  bodily;  there  were  eleven  shot-holes  in  the  other  half; 
the  lantern  had  been  completely  demolished;  and  the  ground 
everywhere  in  the  vicinity  was  strewn  with  fragments  of 
iron  and  glass.  The  flagstaff  of  the  signal-station  had  been 
struck  twice,  slender  and  difficult  to  hit  as  it  was,  and  the 
walls  and  roofs  of  the  barracks  and  ammunition  storehouses 
had  been  pierced  and  torn  by  shot  and  shell  in  a  dozen  dif 
ferent  places.  It  is  not  likely,  of  course,  that  all  this  damage 
was  done  at  any  one  time  or  in  any  single  bombardment. 
The  gunners  of  our  fleet  probably  used  these  buildings  as 
targets,  and  fired  at  them,  every  time  they  got  a  chance, 
just  for  amusement  and  practice.  The  white  cylinder  of 
the  lighthouse  made  a  particularly  good  mark,  and  the  eleven 
shot-holes  in  the  half  of  it  that  remained  standing  showed 
that  Admiral  Sampson's  gunners  found  no  difficulty  in  hitting 
a  target  ten  feet  by  thirty  at  a  distance  of  more  than  a  mile. 
The  captain  of  the  Spanish  cruiser  Vizcaya  told  Lieutenant 


MORRO   CASTLE  211 

Van  Duzer  of  the  battle-ship  Iowa  that,  at  the  height  of 
the  naval  engagement  off  the  mouth  of  the  harbor  on 
July  3,  his  vessel  was  struck  by  a  shell,  on  an  average,  once 
a  second.  He  spoke  as  if  he  had  been  greatly  surprised  by 
the  extraordinary  accuracy  of  our  gunners'  fire;  but  if  he  had 
taken  one  look  at  that  Morro  lighthouse  before  he  ran  out 
of  the  harbor  he  would  have  known  what  to  expect. 

After  examining  the  shattered  barracks  and  the  half- 
demolished  lighthouse,  I  walked  on  to  the  so-called  "  eastern 
battery,"  a  strong  earthwork  on  the  crest  of  the  ridge  about 
one  hundred  and  fifty  yards  from  the  castle.  Here,  in  a 
wide  trench  behind  a  rampart  of  earth  strengthened  with 
barrels  of  cement,  I  found  four  muzzle-loading  iron  siege- 
guns  of  the  last  century,  two  modern  mortars  like  the  one 
that  I  had  seen  on  the  skids  near  the  head  of  the  Estrella 
cove,  one  smooth-bore  cannon  dated  1859,  and  two  three-inch 
breech-loading  rifles.  The  eighteenth-century  guns  were 
no  more  formidable  than  those  on  the  roof  of  Morro,  but  the 
mortars  and  three-inch  rifles  were  useful  and  effective.  It 
was  a  shell  from  one  of  these  mortars  that  killed  or  wounded 
eight  sailors  on  the  battle-ship  Texas.  One  gun  had  been 
dismounted  in  this  battery,  but  all  other  damage  to  it  by  the 
fleet  had  been  repaired.  Owing  to  the  fact  that  its  guns 
were  in  a  wide  trench,  six  or  eight  feet  below  the  level  of 
the  hilltop,  it  was  extremely  difficult  to  hit  them;  and  although 
Admiral  Sampson  repeatedly  silenced  this  battery  by  shelling 
the  gunners  out  of  it,  he  was  never  able  to  destroy  it. 

The  only  other  fortifications  that  I  was  able  to  find  in  the 
vicinity  of  Morro  Castle  were  two  earthworks  known  respec 
tively  as  the  "western  battery"  and  the  "Punta  Gorda 
battery."  The  western  battery,  which  was  situated  on  the 
crest  of  the  hill  opposite  Morro,  on  the  other  side  of  the 
harbor  entrance,  contained  seven  guns  of  various  sizes  and 
dates,  but  only  two  of  them  were  modern.  The  Punta  Gorda 


212  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

battery,  which  occupied  a  strong  position  on  a  bluff  inside 
the  harbor  and  behind  the  Estrella  cove,  had  only  two  guns, 
but  both  were  modern  and  of  high  power.  In  the  three  bat 
teries—eastern,  western,  and  Punta  Gorda— there  were  only 
eight  pieces  of  artillery  that  would  be  regarded  as  effective 
or  formidable  in  modern  warfare,  and  two  of  these  were  so 
small  that  their  projectiles  would  have  made  no  impression 
whatever  upon  a  battle-ship,  and  could  hardly  have  done 
much  damage  even  to  a  protected  cruiser.  Six  of  these 
guns  were  so  situated  that,  although  they  commanded  the 
outside  approach  to  the  bay,  they  could  not  possibly  hit  an 
enemy  that  had  once  passed  Morro  and  entered  the  channel. 
The  neck  of  the  bottle-shaped  harbor,  or,  in  other  words, 
the  narrow  strait  between  Morro  Castle  and  the  upper  bay, 
had  absolutely  no  defensive  intrenchment  except  the  Punta 
Gorda  battery,  consisting  of  two  guns  taken  from  the  old 
cruiser  Reina  Mercedes. 

"Why,"  it. may  be  asked,  "did  not  Admiral  Sampson  fight 
his  way  into  the  harbor,  if  its  defenses  were  so  weak?" 

Simply  because  the  channel  was  mined.  He  might  have 
run  past  the  batteries  without  serious  risk;  but  in  so  narrow 
a  strip  of  water  it  was  impossible  to  avoid  or  escape  the 
submarine  mines,  four  of  which  were  very  powerful  and 
could  be  exploded  by  electricity.  He  offered  to  force  an 
entrance  if  General  Shafter  would  seize  the  mine-station 
north  of  Morro;  but  the  general  could  not  do  this  without 
changing  his  plan  of  campaign.  The  cooperation  of  the 
navy,  therefore,  was  limited  to  the  destruction  of  Cervera's 
fleet  and  the  bombardment  of  the  city  from  the  mouth  of 
Aguadores  ravine. 


CHAPTER   XVIII 
FEVER   IN  THE   ARMY 

THE  most  serious  and  threatening  feature  of  the  situa 
tion  at  Santiago  after  the  capture  of  the  city  was  the 
ill  health  of  the  army.  In  less  than  a  month  after  it  began 
its  Cuban  campaign  the  Fifth  Army-Corps  was  virtually  hors 
de  combat.  On  Friday,  July  22, 1  made  a  long  march  around 
the  right  wing  from  a  point  near  the  head  of  the  bay  to  the 
Siboney  road,  and  had  an  opportunity  to  see  what  the  con 
dition  of  the  troops  was  in  that  part  of  our  line.  I  do  not 
think  that  more  than  fifty  per  cent,  of  them  were  fit  for  any 
kind  of  active  duty,  and  if  they  had  been  ordered  to  march 
back  to  Siboney  between  sunrise  and  dark,  or  to  move  a 
distance  of  ten  miles  up  into  the  hills,  I  doubt  whether  even 
forty  per  cent,  of  them  would  have  reached  their  destination. 
There  were  more  than  a  thousand  sick  in  General  Kent's 
division  alone,  and  a  surgeon  from  the  First  Division  hospi 
tal—the  only  field-hospital  of  the  Fifth  Army-Corps— told 
me  that  a  conservative  estimate  of  the  number  of  sick  in  the 
army  as  a  whole  would  be  about  five  thousand.  Of  course 
the  greater  part  of  these  sick  men  were  not  in  the  hospitals. 
I  saw  hundreds  of  them  dragging  themselves  about  the 
camps  with  languid  steps,  or  lying  in  their  little  dog-kennel 
tents  on  the  ground;  but  all  of  them  ought  to  have  been  in 
hospitals,  and  would  have  been  had  our  hospital  space  and 

213 


214  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

facilities  been  adequate.  Inasmuch,  however,  as  our  hospital 
accommodations  were  everywhere  deplorably  inadequate,  and 
inasmuch  as  our  surgeons  sent  to  the  yellow-fever  camps 
many  patients  who  were  suffering  merely  from  malarial 
fever,  a  majority  of  our  sick  soldiers  remained  in  their  own 
tents,  from  necessity  or  from  choice,  and  received  only  such 
care  as  their  comrades  could  give  them. 

Yellow  fever  and  calenture  broke  out  among  the  troops  in 
camp  around  Santiago  about  the  same  time  that  they  ap 
peared  in  Siboney.  Calenture  soon  became  epidemic,  and 
in  less  than  a  fortnight  there  were  thousands  of  cases,  and 
nearly  one  half  of  the  army  was  unfit  for  active  service,  if 
not  completely  disabled. 

The  questions  naturally  arise,  Was  this  state  of  affairs  in 
evitable,  or  might  it  have  been  foreseen  as  a.  possibility  and 
averted?  Is  the  climate  of  eastern  Cuba  in  the  rainy  sea 
son  so  deadly  that  Northern  troops  cannot  be  subjected  to 
it  for  a  month  without  losing  half  their  effective  force  from 
sickness,  or  was  the  sickness  due  to  other  and  preventable 
causes?  In  trying  to  answer  these  questions  I  shall  say  not 
what  I  think,  nor  what  I  suppose,  nor  what  I  have  reason  to 
believe,  but  what  I  actually  know,  from  personal  observa 
tion  and  from  the  testimony  of  competent  and  trustworthy 
witnesses.  I  was  three  different  times  at  the  front,  spent  a 
week  in  the  field-hospital  of  the  Fifth  Army-Corps,  and  saw 
for  myself  how  our  soldiers  ate,  drank,  slept,  worked,  and 
suffered.  I  shall  try  not  to  exaggerate  anything,  but,  on  the 
other  hand,  I  shall  not  suppress  or  conceal  anything,  or 
smooth  anything  over.  Poultney  Bigelow  was  accused  of 
being  unpatriotic,  disloyal,  and  even  seditious  because  he 
told  what  I  am  now  convinced  was  the  truth  about  the  state 
of  affairs  at  Tampa;  but  it  seems  to  me  that  when  the  lives 
of  American  soldiers  are  at  stake  it  is  a  good  deal  more 
patriotic  and  far  more  in  accordance  with  the  duty  of  a  good 


FEVER   IN  THE   ARMY  215 

citizen  to  tell  a  disagreeable  and  unwelcome  truth  that  may 
lead  to  a  reform  than  it  is  to  conceal  the  truth  and  pretend 
that  everything  is  all  right  when  it  is  not  all  right. 

The  truth,  briefly  stated,  is  that,  owing  to  bad  management, 
lack  of  foresight,  and  the  almost  complete  breakdown  of  the 
commissary  and  medical  departments  of  the  army,  our  sol 
diers  in  Cuba  suffered  greater  hardships  and  privations,  in 
certain  ways,  than  were  ever  before  endured  by  an  Ameri 
can  army  in  the  field.  They  were  not  half  equipped,  nor 
half  fed,  nor  half  cared  for  when  they  were  wounded  or  sick; 
they  had  to  sleep  in  dog-kennel  shelter-tents,  which  afforded 
little  or  no  protection  from  tropical  rains;  they  had  to  cook 
in  coffee-cups  and  old  tomato-cans  because  they  had  no  camp- 
kettles;  they  never  had  a  change  of  underclothing  after 
they  landed;  they  were  forced  to  drink  brook- water  that  was 
full  of  disease-germs  because  they  had  no  suitable  vessels  in 
which  to  boil  it  or  keep  it  after  it  had  been  boiled;  they  lived 
a  large  part  of  the  time  on  hard  bread  and  bacon,  without 
beans,  rice,  or  any  of  the  other  articles  which  go  to  make  up 
the  full  army  ration;  and  when  wounded  they  had  to  wait 
hours  for  surgical  aid,  and  then,  half  dead  from  pain  and 
exhaustion,  they  lay  all  night  on  the  water-soaked  ground, 
without  shelter,  blanket,  pillow,  food,  or  attendance.  To 
suppose  that  an  army  will  keep  well  and  maintain  its  efficiency 
under  such  conditions  is  as  unreasonable  and  absurd  as  to 
suppose  that  a  man  will  thrive  and  grow  fat  in  the  stockaded 
log  pen  of  a  Turkish  quarantine.  It  cannot  be  fairly  urged 
in  explanation  of  the  sickness  in  the  army  that  it  was  due  to 
the  deadliness  of  the  Cuban  climate  and  was  therefore  what 
policies  of  marine  insurance  call  an  "act  of  God."  The 
Cuban  climate  played  its  part,  of  course,  but  it  was  a  subor 
dinate  part.  The  chief  and  primary  cause  of  the  soldiers'  ill 
health  was  neglect,  due,  as  I  said  before,  to  bad  management, 
lack  of  foresight,  and  the  almost  complete  breakdown  of  the 


216  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

army's  commissary  and  medical  departments.  If  there  be 
any  fact  that  should  have  been  well  known,  and  doubtless 
was  well  known,  to  the  higher  administrative  officers  of  the 
Fifth  Army-Corps,  it  is  the  fact  that  if  soldiers  sleep  on  the 
ground  in  Cuba  without  proper  shelter  and  drink  unboiled 
water  from  the  brooks  they  are  almost  certain  to  contract 
malarial  fever;  and  yet  twelve  or  fifteen  thousand  men  were 
sent  into  the  woods  and  chaparral  between  Siboney  and 
Santiago  without  hammocks  or  wall-tents,  and  without  any 
vessel  larger  than  a  coffee-cup  in  which  to  boil  water.  I 
can  hardly  hint  at  the  impurities  and  the  decaying  organic 
matter  that  I  have  seen  washed  down  into  the  brooks  by  the 
almost  daily  rains  which  fall  in  that  part  of  Cuba  in  mid 
summer,  and  yet  it  was  the  unboiled  water  from  these  pol 
luted  brooks  that  the  soldiers  had  to  drink.  One  captain 
whom  I  know  took  away  the  canteens  from  all  the  men  in  his 
company,  kept  them  under  guard,  and  tried  to  force  his 
command  to  boil  in  their  tin  coffee-cups  all  the  water  that 
they  drank;  but  he  was  soon  compelled  to  give  up  the  plan  as 
utterly  impracticable.  In  all  the  time  that  I  spent  at  the 
front  I  did  not  see  a  single  camp-kettle  in  use  among  the 
soldiers,  and  there  were  very  few  even  among  officers.  Late 
in  July  the  men  of  the  Thirty-fourth  Michigan  were  bring 
ing  every  day  in  their  canteens,  from  a  distance  of  two  miles, 
all  the  water  required  for  regimental  use.  They  had  nothing 
else  to  carry  it  in,  nothing  else  to  keep  it  in  after  they  got 
it  to  camp,  and  nothing  bigger  than  a  tin  cup  in  which  to 
boil  it  or  make  coffee. 

In  the  matter  of  tents  and  clothing  the  equipment  of  the 
soldiers  was  equally  deficient.  Dog-kennel  shelter-tents  will 
not  keep  out  a  tropical  rain,  and  when  the  men  got  wet  they 
had  to  stay  wet  for  lack  of  a  spare  suit  of  underclothes. 
The  officers  fared  little  better  than  the  men.  A  young  lieu 
tenant  whom  I  met  in  Santiago  after  the  surrender  told  me 


FEVER   IN   THE   ARMY  217 

that  he  had  not  had  a  change  of  underclothing  in  twenty- 
seven  days.  The  baggage  of  all  the  officers  was  left  on 
board  of  the  transports  when  the  army  disembarked,  and 
little,  if  any,  of  it  was  ever  carried  to  the  front. 

Nothing,  perhaps,  is  more  important,  so  far  as  its  influence 
upon  health  is  concerned,  than  food,  and  the  rations  of  Gen 
eral  Shafter's  army  were  deficient  in  quantity  and  unsatis 
factory  in  quality  from  the  very  first.  With  a  few  exceptions, 
the  soldiers  had  nothing  but  hard  bread  and  bacon  after  they 
left  the  transports  at  Siboney,  and  short  rations  at  that.  A 
general  of  brigade  who  has  had  wide  and  varied  experience 
in  many  parts  of  the  United  States,  and  whose  name  is  well 
and  favorably  known  in  New  York,  said  to  me  in  the  latter 
part  of  July:  "The  whole  army  is  suffering  from  malnutri 
tion.  The  soldiers  don't  get  enough  to  eat,  and  what  they 
do  get  is  not  sufficiently  varied  and  is  not  adapted  to  this 
climate.  A  soldier  can  live  on  hardtack  and  bacon  for  a 
while,  even  in  the  tropics,  but  he  finally  sickens  of  them  and 
craves  oatmeal,  rice,  hominy,  fresh  vegetables,  and  dried 
fruits.  He  gets  none  of  these  things;  he  has  come  to  loathe 
hard  bread  and  bacon  three  times  a  day,  and  he  consequently 
eats  very  little  and  is  n't  adequately  nourished.  Nothing 
would  do  more  to  promote  the  health  of  the  men  than  a 
change  of  diet." 

A  sufficient  proof  that  the  soldiers  were  often  hungry  is 
furnished  by  the  fact  that  men  detailed  from  the  companies 
frequently  marched  from  the  front  to  Siboney  and  back  (from 
eighteen  to  twenty-five  miles,  over  a  bad  road),  in  order  to 
get  such  additional  supplies,  particularly  in  the  shape  of 
canned  vegetables,  as  they  could  carry  in  their  hands  and 
haversacks  or  transport  on  a  rude,  improvised  stretcher. 
Officers  and  men  from"  Colonel  Roosevelt's  Rough  Riders 
repeatedly  came  into  Siboney  in  this  way  on  foot,  and  once 
or  twice  with  a  mule  or  a  horse,  and  begged  food  from  the 


218  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

Red  Cross  for  their  sick  and  sickening  comrades  in  their 
camp  at  the  front. 

It  is  not  hard  to  understand  why  soldiers  contracted  ma 
larial  fever  in  a  country  like  Cuba,  when  they  were  imper 
fectly  sheltered,  inadequately  equipped,  insufficiently  fed  and 
clothed,  forced  to  sleep  on  the  ground,  and  compelled  to 
drink  unboiled  water  from  contaminated  brooks.  But  there 
was  another  reason  for  the  epidemic  character  and  wide 
prevalence  of  the  calenture  from  which  the  army  suffered,  and 
that  was  exposure  to  exhalations  from  the  malarious,  freshly 
turned  earth  of  the  rifle-pits  and  trenches.  All  pioneers  who 
have  broken  virgin  soil  with  a  plow  in  a  warm,  damp,  wooded 
country  will  remember  that  for  a  considerable  time  there 
after  they  suffered  from  various  forms  of  remittent  and  in 
termittent  fever.  Our  soldiers  around  Santiago  had  a  similar 
experience.  The  unexpected  strength  and  fighting  capacity 
shown  by  the  Spaniards  in  the  first  day's  battle,  and  their 
counter-attack  upon  our  lines  on  the  night  of  the  following 
day,  led  our  troops  to  intrench  themselves  by  digging  rifle- 
pits  and  constructing  rude  bomb-proofs  as  places  of  refuge 
from  shrapnel.  During  the  armistice  these  intrenchments 
were  greatly  extended  and  strengthened,  and  before  Santiago 
surrendered  they  stretched  along  our  whole  front  for  a  dis 
tance  of  several  miles.  In  or  near  these  rifle-pits  and 
trenches  our  men  worked,  stood  guard,  or  slept,  for  a  period 
of  more  than  two  weeks,  and  the  exhalations  from  the  freshly 
turned  earth,  acting  upon  organisms  already  weakened  by 
hardships  and  privations,  brought  about  an  epidemic  of 
calenture  upon  the  most  extensive  scale. 

By  August  3  the  condition  of  the  army  had  become  so 
alarming  that  its  general  officers  drew  up  and  sent  to  Gen 
eral  Shafter  the  following  letter: 

We,  the  undersigned  officers,  commanding  the  various  brigades, 
divisions,  etc.,  of  the  army  of  occupation  in  Cuba,  are  of  the  unani- 


FEVER   IN   THE   ARMY  219 

mous  opinion  that  this  army  should  be  at  once  taken  out  of  the  island 
of  Cuba  and  sent  to  some  point  on  the  northern  sea-coast  of  the 
United  States;  that  it  can  be  done  without  danger  to  the  people  of 
the  United  States;  that  yellow  fever  in  the  army  at  present  is  not 
epidemic;  that  there  are  only  a  few  sporadic  cases,  but  that  the  army 
is  disabled  by  malarial  fever,  to  the  extent  that  its  efficiency  is  de 
stroyed,  and  that  it  is  in  a  condition  to  be  practically  entirely  de 
stroyed  by  an  epidemic  of  yellow  fever,  which  is  sure  to  come  in  the 
near  future. 

We  know  from  the  reports  of  competent  officers  and  from  personal 
observation  that  the  army  is  unable  to  move  into  the  interior,  and 
that  there  are  no  facilities  for  such  a  move  if  attempted,  and  that 
it  could  not  be  attempted  until  too  late.  Moreover,  the  best  medi 
cal  authorities  of  the  island  say  that  with  our  present  equipment  we 
could  not  live  in  the  interior  during  the  rainy  season  without  losses 
from  malarial  fever,  which  is  almost  as  deadly  as  yellow  fever. 

This  army  must  be  moved  at  once  or  perish.  As  the  army  can 
be  safely  moved  now,  the  persons  responsible  for  preventing  such  a 
move  will  be  responsible  for  the  unnecessary  loss  of  many  thousands 
of  lives. 

Our  opinions  are  the  result  of  careful  personal  observation,  and 
they  are  also  based  on  the  unanimous  opinion  of  our  medical  officers 
with  the  army,  and  who  understand  the  situation  absolutely. 

This  letter  was  signed  by  Generals  Kent,  Bates,  Chaffee, 
Sumner,  Ludlow,  Ames,  and  Wood,  and  Colonel  Roosevelt. 

In  view  of  such  a  state  of  affairs  as  that  disclosed  by  this 
letter  there  was,  of  course,  only  one  thing  to  be  done.  The 
War  Department  decided  to  remove  the  Fifth  Army-Corps  at 
once  from  Cuba,  and  before  the  middle  of  August  a  large 
part  of  General  Shafter's  command  was  on  its  way  to  Mon- 
tauk  Point. 

As  a  result,  I  presume,  of  sleeping  without  shelter  from 
the  heavy  dew  in  the  field-hospital  at  the  front,  and  over* 
exerting  myself  by  walking  around  the  lines  of  the  army 
in  the  blazing  sunshine  of  midday,  I  was  finally  prostrated 


220  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

with  illness  myself.  At  three  o'clock  on  the  night  of  Tues 
day,  July  26,  I  awoke  in  a  chill,  and  before  morning  I  had 
all  the  symptoms  of  calenture,  with  a  temperature  of  104. 

Calenture,  or  Cuban  malarial  fever,  comes  on  rather  sud 
denly  with  a  chill  of  greater  or  less  severity  and  a  violent 
headache.  The  temperature  frequently  rises  to  105,  and  the 
fever,  instead  of  being  intermittent,  runs  continuously  with 
little,  if  any,  diurnal  variation.  If  the  attack  is  not  a  very 
severe  one  the  headache  gradually  subsides;  the  temperature 
falls  to  102  or  103,  and  in  the  course  of  three  or  four  days 
the  disease  begins  to  yield  to  treatment.  In  some  cases  the 
fever  is  interrupted  by  a  second  chill,  followed  by  another 
rise  of  temperature;  but,  as  a  rule,  there  is  only  one  chill, 
and  the  fever,  after  running  from  four  days  to  a  week, 
gradually  abates.  The  treatment  most  favored  in  Santiago 
consists  of  the  administration  of  a  large  dose  of  sulphate  of 
magnesia  at  the  outset,  followed  up  with  quinine  and  calo 
mel,  or  perhaps  quinine  and  sulphur.  The  patient  is  not 
allowed  to  take  any  nourishment  while  the  fever  lasts,  and  if 
he  keeps  quiet,  avoids  sudden  changes  of  temperature,  and 
does  not  fret,  he  generally  recovers  in  a  week  or  ten  days. 
He  suffers  from  languor  and  prostration,  however,  for  a  fort 
night  or  more,  and  if  he  overeats,  moves  about  in  the  sun 
shine,  or  exposes  himself  to  the  night  air,  he  is  liable  to 
have  another  chill,  with  a  relapse,  in  which  the  fever  is  higher 
and  more  obstinate,  perhaps,  than  at  first.  Under  ordinary 
circumstances  the  fever  is  not  dangerous,  and  the  worst 
thing  about  it  is  the  wretched,  half-dead,  half-alive  condi 
tion  in  which  it  leaves  one.  My  attack  was  not  a  very  severe 
one,  and  in  the  course  of  ten  days  I  was  able  to  walk  about 
again;  but  the  first  time  I  went  out  into  the  sunshine  I  had 
a  relapse,  which  reduced  me  to  such  a  state  of  weakness  and 
helplessness  that  I  could  no  longer  care  for  myself,  and  had 
either  to  leave  the  country  or  go  into  one  of  the  crowded 


FEVER   IN   THE   ARMY  221 

Santiago  hospitals  and  run  the  risk  of  being  sent  as  a  "sus 
pect  "  to  the  yellow-fever  camp  near  Siboney.  Upon  the  ad 
vice  of  Dr.  Egan,  I  decided  to  take  the  first  steamer  for  New 
York,  and  sailed  from  Santiago  on  August  12,  after  a  Cuban 
campaign  of  only  seven  weeks. 


CHAPTER  XIX 
THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN 

IT  is  my  purpose,  in  the  concluding  chapters  of  this  vol 
ume,  to  review  as  fully  and  dispassionately  as  I  can 
the  series  of  military  operations  known  collectively  as  "  the 
Santiago  campaign,"  including,  first,  the  organization  and 
equipment  of  the  expedition  of  General  Shafter  at  Tampa; 
second,  the  disembarkation  of  troops  and  the  landing  of  sup 
plies  at  Daiquiri  and  Siboney;  third,  the  strategic  plan  of  the 
campaign  and  its  execution;  and,  fourth,  the  wrecking  of 
the  army  by  disease  after  the  decisive  battle  of  July  1-2. 
The  point  of  view  from  which  I  shall  regard  this  campaign  is 
not  that  of  a  trained  military  expert  or  critic,  but  merely 
that  of  an  attentive  and  fair-minded  civilian  observer.  I  do 
not  pretend  to  speak  ex  cathedra,  nor  do  I  claim  for  my  judg 
ments  any  other  value  than  that  given  to  them  by  such  in 
herent  reasonableness  and  fairness  as  they  may  seem  to  have. 
I  went  to  Cuba  without  any  prejudice  for  or  against  any 
particular  plan  of  operations;  I  had  very  little  acquaintance 
with  or  knowledge  of  the  officers  of  the  Fifth  Army-Corps; 
and  the  opinions  and  conclusions  that  I  shall  here  set  forth 
are  based  on  personal  observations  made  in  the  field  without 
conscious  bias  or  prepossession  of  any  kind. 

In  reviewing  a  military  campaign,  an  arctic  expedition,  a 
voyage  of  discovery,  or  any  other  enterprise  involving  the 

222 


THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  223 

employment  of  a  certain  force  for  the  accomplishment  of  a 
certain  purpose,  the  first  question  to  be  considered  is  the 
question  of  responsibility.  Who  is  to  be  held  accountable 
for  the  management  and  the  results  of  this  enterprise— the 
leader  who  directed  and  had  charge  of  it,  or  the  superior 
power  which  gave  him  his  orders,  furnished  him  with  his 
equipment,  and  sent  him  into  the  field?  When  General 
Shafter  was  ordered  to  "go  and  capture  the  garrison  at 
Santiago  and  assist  in  capturing  the  harbor  and  the  fleet," 
did  he  become  personally  responsible  for  the  management 
and  the  results  of  the  campaign,  or  did  he  share  that  re 
sponsibility  with  the  War  Department?  Unless  there  is 
some  evidence  to  the  contrary,  the  presumption  in  such  a 
case  is  that  the  general  in  command  of  the  army  is  told  in 
due  time  where  he  is  to  go  and  what  he  is  expected  to  do, 
and  is  then  allowed  to  make  his  own  plan  of  campaign,  and 
to  call  upon  the  War  Department  for  such  supplies  and 
means  of  transportation  as,  in  the  exercise  of  his  individual 
judgment,  he  may  think  necessary  for  the  successful  execu 
tion  of  that  plan.  If  he  is  given  time  enough  to  acquaint 
himself  thoroughly  with  the  field  in  which  he  is  to  operate, 
if  his  plan  of  campaign,  in  its  general  outlines,  is  approved, 
and  if  all  his  requisitions  for  vessels,  horses,  mules,  wagons, 
ambulances,  tents,  guns,  ammunition,  and  miscellaneous 
supplies  are  duly  honored,  there  is  no  reason  that  I  can 
see  why  he  should  not  be  held  to  a  strict  personal  accounta 
bility  for  results,  both  generally  and  in  detail.  He  has  made 
his  own  plan;  he  has  had  everything  that  he  asked  for;  and 
if  the  campaign  does  not  go  as  it  should,  he,  and  not  the 
War  Department,  is  to  blame.  If,  however,  the  depart 
ment,  after  selecting  him  and  approving  his  plan,  does  not 
furnish  him  with  the  transportation  and  the  stores  that  he 
needs  and  has  called  for,  he  ought  to  protect  himself  and 
his  own  reputation  by  referring  respectfully  to  that  fact  in 


224  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

his  report  of  the  campaign,  so  that,  if  any  of  his  bricks  are 
imperfect  for  lack  of  straw,  the  people  may  know  that  he 
was  not  supplied  with  straw  and  had  no  means  whatever  of 
getting  it  in  the  field  to  which  he  was  sent.  The  importance 
of  this  point  will  become  apparent  when  an  attempt  is  made 
to  ascertain  the  causes  and  fix  the  responsibility  for  the 
wrecking  of  the  Fifth  Army-Corps  by  disease  in  the  short 
space  of  one  calendar  month. 

There  is  nothing  in  the  official  documents  thus  far  pub 
lished  to  indicate  that  General  Shafter  was  unreasonably 
hurried,  or  that  he  failed  to  get  from  the  War  Department 
anything  for  which  he  made  timely  requisition.  The  inva 
sion  of  eastern  Cuba  was  planned  as  early  as  the  first  week 
in  May— possibly  much  earlier  than  that,  and,  at  any  rate, 
long  before  Admiral  Cervera's  fleet  took  refuge  in  Santi 
ago  harbor.  Colonel  Babcock,  Shafter's  adjutant-general, 
told  me  on  May  7  that  the  government  had  decided  to 
send  the  army  of  invasion  to  the  eastern  end  of  the  island, 
and  to  leave  Havana  and  the  western  provinces  unmolested 
until  later  in  the  season.  Before  General  Shafter  sailed 
from  Tampa,  therefore,  he  had  nearly  or  quite  six  weeks  in 
which  to  acquaint  himself  with  the  Santiago  field  and  ma 
ture  a  plan  of  operations.  The  question  whether  or  not  he 
was  furnished  with  all  the  means  of  transportation  and  all 
the  supplies  for  which  he  made  requisition  is  in  more  doubt; 
but,  inasmuch  as  he  seems  to  have  made  no  complaint  or 
protest,  and  does  not  refer  in  his  official  reports  to  defi 
ciencies  of  any  kind,  it  may  be  assumed,  for  the  purposes  of 
this  review,  that  he  had  been  furnished  by  the  War  Depart 
ment  with  everything  for  which  he  asked.  Upon  this  as 
sumption  he  was  unquestionably  responsible  for  the  whole 
Santiago  campaign,  and  must  not  only  be  given  credit  for 
the  success  that  crowned  it,  but  be  held  accountable  for  the 
blunders  and  oversights  by  which  it  was  marred.  He  can 


THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  225 

relieve  himself  from  such  accountability  only  by  showing- 
that  his  equipment  was  inadequate  and  that  the  inadequacy 
was  the  result  of  causes  beyond  his  control. 

We  are  now  prepared  to  consider: 

I.  The  organization  and  equipment  of  the  Santiago  ex 
pedition. 

When  a  general  is  appointed  to  lead  and  direct  an  ex 
pedition  in  a  foreign  country,  the  first  questions,  I  think, 
that  he  must  ask  himself  are:  (1)  What  is  the  nature  of  the 
field  in  which  I  am  to  operate,  and  what  are  the  difficulties 
—especially  the  unusual  and  unfamiliar  difficulties— with 
which  I  shall  have  to  contend?  (2)  Can  I  disembark  my  army 
in  a  harbor,  or  shall  I  have  to  land  it  on  an  open,  unprotected 
coast,  and  perhaps  through  surf?  (3)  Are  there  any  roads 
leading  back  into  the  interior,  and,  if  so,  what  is  their  nature, 
and  what  is  likely  to  be  their  condition  at  this  season  of  the 
year?  (4)  Is  the  climate  of  the  country  to  which  I  am  going 
an  unhealthful  one,  and,  if  so,  how  can  I  best  protect  my 
men  from  the  diseases  likely  to  attack  them? 

It  is  not  always  practicable  to  obtain  satisfactory  answers 
to  such  questions  as  these;  but  that  answers  should  be  had, 
if  possible,  and  that  the  equipment  of  the  force  and  the  plan 
of  campaign  should  be  made  to  accord  with  the  information 
obtained  by  means  of  them,  is  unquestionable.  In  the  par 
ticular  case  now  under  consideration  there  was  no  difficulty 
whatever  in  getting  full  and  satisfactory  replies,  not  only  to 
all  of  the  above  questions,  but  to  scores  of  others  of  a  simi 
lar  nature  that  might  have  been  and  ought  to  have  been 
asked.  For  nearly  a  month  before  General  Shafter  sailed 
from  Tampa  the  vessels  of  Admiral  Sampson's  fleet  had  been 
patrolling  the  southeastern  coast  of  Cuba  from  Santiago 
harbor  to  Guantanamo  Bay,  and  their  officers  were  in  a  posi 
tion  to  furnish  all  the  information  that  might  be  desired 
with  regard  to  the  nature  of  the  coast,  the  facilities  for 


226  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

landing  an  army,  the  strength  and  direction  of  the  prevail 
ing  winds,  the  danger  to  be  apprehended  from  heavy  surf, 
and  a  dozen  other  matters  of  vital  importance  to  an  invad 
ing  army.  At  Daiquiri,  Siboney,  and  Santiago  there  were 
stations  of  an  American  iron-mining  company,  and  its  officers 
and  employees,  who  might  easily  have  been  found,  were  in 
a  position  to  furnish  any  amount  of  accurate  and  trustworthy 
information  with  regard  to  climate,  topography,  roads,  rains, 
surf,  and  local  conditions  generally,  in  the  very  field  that 
General  Shafter's  army  was  to  occupy. 

The  sources  of  information  above  indicated  were  not  the 
only  sources  accessible  at  the  time  when  the  Santiago  cam 
paign  was  decided  upon;  but  they  were  the  most  important 
ones,  and  it  is  fair  to  presume  that  General  Shafter  made  use 
of  them  to  the  fullest  possible  extent.  If  so,  he  was  able  to 
answer  the  questions  above  suggested  in  some  such  way  as 
this: 

1.  The  field  to  which  I  am  going  is  a  tropical  field,  and  the 
unusual  and  unfamiliar  difficulties  with  which  I  shall  have  to 
contend  are  probably  those  dependent  upon  climatic  condi 
tions. 

2.  There  are  no  sheltered  harbors  on  the  southeastern  coast 
of  Cuba  between  Cape  Cruz  and  Cape  Maysi  except  the  har 
bor  of  Santiago  and  the  Bay  of  Guantanamo.     The  former 
is  in  possession  of  the  enemy,  and  cannot,  therefore,  be  used, 
while  the  latter  is  too  far  away  from  the  city  of  Santiago, 
which  I  am  ordered  to  capture.     It  is  probable,  therefore, 
that  I  shall  have  to  land  my  army  on  an  unsheltered  part  of 
the  coast.     The  prevailing  winds  in  the  summer  are  from  the 
east  and  southeast,  and  the  swell  that  rolls  in  from  the 
Caribbean  Sea  often  breaks  on  the  exposed  coast-line  in  heavy 
and  dangerous  surf. 

3.  The  roads  leading  back  into  the  interior  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Santiago  are  generally  narrow  and  bad ;  they  traverse 


THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  227 

almost  impenetrable  jungles;  and  they  are  liable,  at  this 
season  of  the  year,  to  be  rendered  impassable  for  wheeled 
vehicles  by  heavy  and  frequent  rains. 

4.  The  climate  is  unhealthful,  and  unless  men  from  the 
North  are  well  fed,  suitably  clothed,  securely  sheltered,  and 
furnished  with  boiled  water  for  drinking  purposes,  they  are 
almost  certain  to  suffer  from  calenture,  the  characteristic 
fever  of  the  region,  as  well  as  from  yellow  fever  and  dys 
entery. 

This,  in  the  briefest  possible  summary,  is  the  information 
that  General  Shafter  had,  or  might  have  had,  before  he  sailed 
from  Tampa.  What  preparation  did  he  make  to  meet  the 
difficulties  suggested  by  this  knowledge,  and  how  far  is  the 
influence  of  it  to  be  traced  in  the  organization  and  equipment 
of  his  command? 

Take,  first,  the  problem  of  disembarking  an  army  of  six 
teen  thousand  men,  with  the  supplies  necessary  for  its  main 
tenance,  on  an  unsheltered  coast. 

In  1847,  when  General  Scott  had  in  contemplation  the 
landing  of  an  army  of  twelve  thousand  men  on  the  open 
beach  at  Vera  Cruz,  he  caused  sixty-seven  surf-boats  to  be 
built  for  that  particular  service,  each  of  them  capable  of 
holding  from  seventy  to  eighty  men.  Every  detail  of  the 
disembarkation  had  been  carefully  considered  and  planned; 
every  contingency  that  could  be  foreseen  had  been  provided 
for;  and  the  landing  was  successfully  made  in  the  course  of 
two  or  three  hours,  without  a  single  error  or  accident. 

When  General  Shafter  sailed  from  Tampa,  on  June  14, 
with  an  army  considerably  larger  than  that  of  General 
Scott,  his  equipment  for  disembarkation  on  an  exposed,  surf- 
beaten  coast  consisted,  according  to  his  own  report,  of  only 
two  scows!  One  of  these  went  adrift  at  sea,  and  the  loss 
of  it,  the  general  says,  "  proved  to  be  very  serious  and  was 
greatly  felt."  I  don't  wonder!  Two  scows,  for  an  army  of 


228  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

sixteen  thousand  men  and  ten  or  fifteen  ship-loads  of  sup 
plies,  was  a  sufficiently  economical  allowance;  and  when 
that  number  was  reduced  by  half,  and  a  whole  army-corps 
became  dependent  upon  one  scow,  I  am  not  surprised  to 
learn  that"  the  disembarkation  was  delayed  and  embarrassed." 
There  is  a  reference  in  the  report  to  certain  "lighters  sent 
by  the  quartermaster's  department,"  and  intended,  appa 
rently,  for  use  on  the  Cuban  coast;  but  when  and  by  what 
route  they  were  "  sent "  does  not  appear,  and  inasmuch  as 
they  were  lost  at  sea  before  they  came  into  General  Shaf- 
ter's  control,  they  can  hardly  be  regarded  as  a  part  of  his 
equipment.  All  that  he  had  with  him  was  this  flotilla  of  two 
scows.  I  heard  vague  reports  of  a  pontoon-train  stowed 
away  under  hundreds  of  tons  of  other  stuff  in  the  hold  of  one 
of  the  transports;  but  whether  it  was  intended  to  supplement 
the  flotilla  of  scows,  or  to  be  employed  in  the  bridging  of 
rivers,  I  am  unable  to  say.  I  do  not  think  it  was  ever  un 
loaded  in  Cuba,  and  I  am  quite  sure  that  it  never  was  used. 

The  almost  complete  absence  of  landing  equipment,  in  the 
shape  of  surf -boats,  lighters,  and  launches,  eventually  proved, 
as  I  shall  hereafter  show,  to  be  disastrous  in  the  extreme; 
and  if  the  navy  had  not  come  to  the  rescue,  at  Daiquiri  and 
Siboney,  it  is  not  at  all  certain  that  General  Shafter  could 
have  landed  his  army.  In  a  telegram  to  the  War  Depart 
ment  dated  "Playa  del  Este,  June  25,"  he  frankly  admits 
this,  and  says:  "Without  them  [the  navy]  I  could  not  have 
landed  in  ten  days,  and  perhaps  not  at  all." 

Now,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  responsibility  for  this  lack 
of  boats,  which  came  near  ruining  the  expedition  at  the 
outset  and  which  hampered  and  embarrassed  it  for  three 
weeks  afterward,  can  be  definitely  fixed.  The  difficulty  to 
be  overcome  was  one  that  might  have  been  foreseen  and  pro 
vided  for.  If  General  Shafter  did  not  foresee  and  provide 
for  it,  as  General  Scott  did  at  Vera  Cruz,  he,  manifestly,  is 


THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  229 

the  person  to  blame;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  if  he  did  fore 
see  it,  but  failed  to  get  from  the  War  Department  the  neces 
sary  boats,  the  department  is  to  blame.  The  committee  of 
investigation  which  is  holding  its  sessions  at  the  time  this 
book  goes  to  press  ought  to  have  no  trouble  in  putting  the 
responsibility  for  this  deficiency  where  it  belongs. 

Boats,  however,  were  not  the  only  things  that  were  lack 
ing  in  the  equipment  of  General  Shafter's  army.  Next  in 
importance  to  landing  facilities  come  facilities  for  moving 
supplies  of  all  kinds  from  the  sea-coast  to  the  front,  or,  in 
other  words,  means  of  land  transportation.  In  his  official 
report  of  the  campaign  General  Shafter  says:  "There  was  no 
lack  of  transportation,  for  at  no  time,  up  to  the  surrender, 
could  all  the  wagons  I  had  be  used."  If  I  were  disposed  to 
be  captious,  I  should  say  that  the  reason  why  the  general  could 
not  use  the  wagons  he  had  was  that  a  large  number  of  them 
lay  untouched  in  the  holds  of  the  transports.  He  might  have 
said,  with  equal  cogency,  that  there  was  no  lack  of  food,  be 
cause  at  no  time  could  all  the  hard  bread  and  bacon  in  his 
ships  be  eaten.  The  usefulness  of  food  and  wagons  is  de 
pendent  to  some  extent  upon  their  location.  A  superfluity 
of  wagons  on  board  a  steamer,  five  miles  at  sea,  is  not  neces 
sarily  a  proof  that  there  are  more  than  enough  wagons  on 
shore. 

When  the  army  began  its  march  in  the  direction  of  Santi 
ago,  without  suitable  tents,  without  hospital  supplies,  with 
out  camp-kettles,  without  hammocks,  without  extra  clothing 
or  spare  blankets,  and  with  only  a  limited  supply  of  food 
and  ammunition,  there  were  one  hundred  and  eighteen  army 
wagons  still  on  board  the  transport  Cherokee.  When  they 
were  unloaded,  if  ever,  I  do  not  know,  but  they  were  not 
available  in  the  first  week  of  the  campaign,  when  the  army 
began  its  advance  and  when  the  roads  were  comparatively 
dry  and  in  fairly  good  condition.  It  must  be  observed,  more- 


230  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

over,  that  transportation  is  not  wholly  a  matter  of  wagons. 
Vehicles  of  any  kind  are  useless  without  animals  to  draw 
them;  and  General  Shafter  does  not  anywhere  say  that  he 
had  a  superfluity  of  mules,  or  that  he  could  not  use  all  the 
horses  he  had.  It  was  in  draft-animals  that  the  weakness 
of  the  quartermaster's  department  became  most  apparent  as 
the  campaign  progressed.  There  were  never  half  enough 
mules  to  equip  an  adequate  supply-train  for  an  army  of  six 
teen  thousand  men,  even  if  that  army  never  went  more  than 
ten  or  twelve  miles  from  its  base.  If  it  had  been  forced  to 
go  fifty  miles  from  its  base,  the  campaign  would  have  col 
lapsed  at  the  outset. 

General  Shafter  seems  disposed  to  attribute  the  difficulty 
that  he  experienced  in  supplying  his  army  with  food  to  the 
condition  of  the  roads  rather  than  to  the  lack  of  mules, 
packers,  teamsters,  and  wagons.  In  an  interview  with  a 
correspondent  of  the  Boston  "  Herald "  at  Santiago  on 
August  25  he  is  reported  as  saying:  "There  has  been 
some  question  concerning  the  transportation  facilities  of  the 
army.  The  facilities  were  all  there,  and  the  transportation 
equipment  provided  was  all  that  it  should  have  been;  but 
our  difficulties  were  enormous.  There  was  only  one  road;  to 
build  another  would  have  taken  two  years.  The  nature  of 
the  country,  the  weather,  all  these  things  helped  to  disor 
ganize  this  department.  The  use  of  wagons  was  almost  im 
possible.  The  pack-train,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  did  the  real 
service.  I  had  not,  at  first,  thought  the  pack-train  would  be 
of  service;  but  if  it  had  not  been  there,  I  do  not  know  what 
the  army  would  have  done  for  food.  The  roads  were  prac 
tically  impassable.  With  the  bridges  down,  the  wagons 
could  not  be  worked.  I  had  a  great  deal  of  concern  when 
we  were  only  able  to  get  up  one  day's  rations  at  a  time,  but 
as  soon  as  we  were  able  to  get  a  few  days'  rations  ahead,  we 
knew  we  were  prepared  for  anything." 


THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  231 

It  is  hardly  accurate  to  say,  without  qualification  and 
without  limitation  as  to  time,  that  the  "  roads  were  practi 
cally  impassable."  They  were  unquestionably  very  bad,  and 
perhaps  impassable,  at  the  last;  but  before  they  became  so 
there  was  ample  time  to  take  over  them,  with  a  suitable  sup 
ply-train,  all  the  tents,  cooking-utensils,  clothing,  medical 
supplies,  and  provisions  that  the  army  so  urgently  needed 
but  did  not  have.  The  road  from  Daiquiri  and  Siboney  to 
the  front  did  not  become  impassable  for  loaded  wagons  until 
the  end  of  the  second  week  in  July.  For  ten  days  after  the 
army  landed  it  was  comparatively  dry  and  good ;  and  for  ten 
days  or  two  weeks  more  it  was  at  least  passable,  and  was 
constantly  traversed,  not  only  by  pack-trains,  but  by  wagons 
with  loads. 

Captain  Henry  L.  Marcotte,  a  retired  officer  of  the  Seven 
teenth  Infantry,  who  went  with  General  Shafter's  army  as 
correspondent  for  the  "  Army  and  Navy  Journal,"  describes 
the  condition  of  the  road  as  follows: 

"  The  road  from  Daiquiri  to  Siboney,  about  seven  miles, 
leads  over  the  foot-hill  slopes  of  the  mountain-ranges  and 
crosses  a  winding  stream  several  times  during  that  distance. 
The  road-bed,  being  mostly  of  rock,  and  well  shaded  by 
tropical  growths,  with  good  water  every  few  hundred  yards, 
made  the  journey  for  the  Gatling  battery  a  picnic  without 
obstacles.  From  Siboney  to  [a  point]  near  El  Pozo  the  road 
was  as  good  as  [from  Daiquiri]  to  Siboney,  with  the  excep 
tion  of  one  part.  This,  with  five  minutes'  work,  was  made 
passable  for  the  battery  and  for  the  three  army  wagons 
which  the  quartermaster's  department  had  ventured  to  send 
out.  In  fact,  the  road,  all  the  way  to  Santiago,  proved  equal 
to  most  country  roads,  and  there  was  not  the  slightest  ex 
cuse  for  not  using  the  hundred  or  more  wagons  stowed  in 
the  hold  of  the  Cherokee  to  transport  tentage,  medical  and 
other  supplies  close  upon  the  heels  of  the  slow-moving  Fifth 


232  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

Corps.  .  .  .  There  is  a  mystery  about  the  '  condition  of  the 
road '  that  may  remain  so  unless  it  is  fixed  upon  as  the  scape 
goat  for  the  lack  of  transportation.  .  .  .  The  condition  of 
the  road  at  no  time  would  have  prevented  a  farmer  from 
taking  a  load  of  hay  to  market.  .  .  .  There  was  no  point 
from  Daiquiri  to  the  trenches  which  could  not  have  been  as 
easily  reached  by  wagons  as  by  pack-mules  between  June  22 
and  July  18." 

Captain  Marcotte,  as  a  retired  officer  of  the  regular  army, 
is  better  qualified  than  I  am  to  express  an  opinion  with  regard 
to  the  availability  of  a  road  for  military  purposes,  and  he 
does  not  hesitate  to  say  that  the  road  from  Daiquiri  and 
Siboney  to  the  front  was  practicable  for  loaded  wagons  up  to 
July  18,  or  for  a  period  of  nearly  a  month  subsequent  to 
the  landing  of  the  army.  During  a  part  of  that  time,  he 
says,  its  condition  was  not  such  as  to  prevent  a  farmer  from 
taking  a  load  of  hay  over  it. 

I  myself  went  over  this  road  from  Siboney  to  the  front 
four  times  between  June  26  and  July  9,— twice  on  foot,  once 
in  an  ambulance,  and  once  in  an  army  wagon,— and  my  own 
judgment  is  that  for  ten  days  after  the  disembarkation  of 
the  army  the  road  was  comparatively  dry  and  good.  After 
that  it  became  muddy  and  bad,  but  was  by  no  means  im 
passable,  even  for  heavily  loaded  wagons,  when  I  traversed 
it  for  the  last  time,  five  days  before  the  surrender  of  Santi 
ago.  With  the  fall  of  that  city  the  army's  base  of  supplies 
was  transferred  from  Siboney  to  Santiago  harbor,  and  the 
condition  of  the  Siboney  road  ceased  to  be  a  factor  in  the 
transportation  problem.  When  a  dozen  steamers,  loaded 
with  supplies  of  all  kinds,  anchored  off  the  Santiago  piers, 
on  July  15,  the  bulk  of  the  army  was  within  two  miles  of 
them,  and  there  ought  to  have  been  no  difficulty  in  getting 
to  the  troops  everything  that  they  needed. 

If  the  road  from  Siboney  to  the  front  was  practicable  for 


THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  233 

both  pack-mules  and  wagons  from  the  time  when  the  army 
landed  to  the  time. when  its  base  of  supplies  was  transferred 
to  Santiago,  and  if,  as  General  Shaf ter  asserts, "  the  facilities 
were  all  there,  and  the  transportation  equipment  provided 
was  all  that  it  should  have  been,"  why  was  the  army  left  for  al 
most  a  month  without  suitable  tents,  without  adequate  hos 
pital  supplies,  without  camp-kettles,  without  cooking-utensils 
other  than  tin  plates,  coffee-cups,  and  old  tomato-cans,  with 
out  hammocks,  without  extra  clothing  or  spare  blankets,  and 
with  only  a  limited  supply  of  food  ?  That  this  was  the  state 
of  the  army  is  beyond  question. 

Lieutenant  John  H.  Parker  of  the  Gatling-gun  battery 
reported  to  Adjutant-General  Corbin,  under  date  of  July  23, 
that  he  and  his  men  had  been  entirely  without  tents  for  a 
period  of  twenty-eight  days. 

John  Henry  of  the  Twenty-first  Infantry  wrote  to  his 
cousin  in  Lowell,  Massachusetts,  that  his  regiment  had  been 
on  the  firing  line  seventeen  days.  For  two  days  they  had 
nothing  at  all  to  eat,  and  no  shelter,  and  lay  on  the  ground 
in  puddles  of  water. 

Ex-Representative  F.  H.  Krebs  of  the  Second  Massachu 
setts  Regiment  says  that  for  twenty-six  consecutive  days  he 
had  only  hard  bread,  bacon,  and  coffee,  and  that  for  three 
days  he  lived  on  one  hardtack  a  day.  The  soldiers  of  his 
regiment  did  all  their  cooking  in  tin  plates  and  coffee-cups, 
and  slept  for  two  months  on  the  wet  ground,  under  what 
are  called  "  shelter  "-tents,  for  the  reason,  I  suppose,— lucus 
a  non  lucendo,—ihak  they  do  not  shelter. 

Dr.  James  S.  Kennedy,  first  assistant  surgeon  of  the 
Second  Division  hospital,  wrote  from  the  hospital  camp 
near  Santiago:  "There  is  an  utter  lack  of  suitable  medi 
cines  with  which  to  combat  disease.  There  has  been  so 
much  diarrhea,  dysentery,  and  fever,  and  no  medicine  at 
all  to  combat  them,  that  men  have  actually  died  for  want  of 


234  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

it.  Four  days  after  my  reporting  here  there  was  not  a  sin 
gle  medicine  in  the  entire  hospital  for  the  first  two  diseases, 
and  nothing  but  quinine  for  the  fever." 

Dr.  Edward  L.  Munson  reported  to  Surgeon-General  Stern- 
berg,  under  date  of  July  29,  that  "  at  the  time  of  the  battle 
of  Las  Guasimas  there  were  absolutely  no  dressings,  hospital 
tentage,  or  supplies  of  any  kind  on  shore,  within  reach  of  the 
surgeons  already  landed.  The  medical  department  was 
compelled  to  rely  upon  its  own  energies  and  improvise  its 
own  transportation.  I  feel  justified  in  saying  that  at  the 
time  of  my  departure  [from  Siboney]  large  quantities  of 
medical  supplies,  urgently  needed  on  shore,  still  remained  on 
the  transports,  a  number  of  which  were  under  orders  to  return 
to  the  United  States.  Had  the  medical  department  carried 
along  double  the  amount  of  supplies,  it  is  difficult  to  see 
how,  with  the  totally  inadequate  land  and  water  transporta 
tion  provided  by  the  quartermaster's  department,  the  lam 
entable  conditions  on  shore  could  have  been  in  any  way 
improved.  The  regimental  medical  officers  had  no  means  of 
transportation  even  for  their  field-chests." 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Senn,  chief  of  the  surgical  operating 
staff,  in  a  letter  to  the  "  Medical  Record,"  dated  "  Siboney, 
August  3,"  disclaimed  responsibility  for  the  want  of  medical 
and  surgical  supplies  in  the  field-hospitals,  and  said:  "The 
lack  of  proper  transportation  from  the  landing  to  the  front 
cannot  be  charged  to  the  medical  department." 

Finally,  General  Shafter  himself,  in  a  telegram  to  Presi 
dent  McKinley,  dated  "Santiago,  August  8,"  reported  as 
follows:  "At  least  seventy-five  per  cent,  of  the  command 
have  been  down  with  malarial  fever,  from  which  they  recover 
very  slowly.  .  .  .  What  put  my  command  in  its  present  con 
dition  was  the  twenty  days  of  the  campaign  when  they  had 
nothing  but  meat,  bread,  and  coffee,  without  change  of 
clothes,  and  without  any  shelter  whatever." 


THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  235 

In  view  of  the  above  statements,  made,  not  by  irrespon 
sible  "newspaper  correspondents  and  camp-followers,"  but 
by  the  officers  and  men  of  the  Fifth  Army-Corps,  and  in 
view  of  the  confirmation  given  to  them  by  the  commanding 
general  himself  in  a  telegram  to  the  President,  it  is  proper, 
I  think,  to  press  once  more  the  question,  Why  was  the  army 
left  for  almost  a  month  without  suitable  tents,  without  ade 
quate  hospital  supplies,  without  camp-kettles,  without  cook 
ing-utensils,  without  hammocks,  without  extra  clothing  or 
spare  blankets,  and  with  only  a  limited  supply  of  food?  The 
answer  to  the  question,  it  seems  to  me,  is  obvious.  The 
army  had  not  half  transportation  enough  to  supply  its  wants. 
General  Miles  discovered  this  fact  when  he  reached  Sibo- 
ney  on  July  11,  and  he  immediately  cabled  the  War  De 
partment  for  more  draft-animals;  but  it  was  then  too  late 
to  make  good  the  deficiency.  The  troops  were  already 
breaking  down,  as  General  Shafter  admitted  in  his  telegram 
to  the  President,  from  "twenty  days  of  meat,  bread,  and 
coffee,  without  change  of  clothes,  and  without  any  shelter 
whatever."  I  do  not  know  how  many  draft-animals  Gen 
eral  Shafter  had;  but  in  four  journeys  over  the  road  between 
Siboney  and  the  front  I  happened  to  see  only  two  pack- 
trains,  one  of  them  going  forward  with  ammunition,  and  the 
other  returning  without  load.  But  whatever  may  have  been 
the  strength  of  the  pack-train  equipment,  it  was  certainly 
inadequate,  and  the  common  practice  of  detailing  soldiers  to 
march  into  Siboney  after  food  and  bring  it  back  to  the  front 
on  their  shoulders  or  on  improvised  hand-litters  showed  the 
urgency  of  the  need.  Many  such  details  or  deputations 
came  on  board  the  State  of  Texas,  obtained  small  quantities 
of  hospital  supplies  or  delicacies  for  the  sick,  and  carried 
them  back  to  the  camps  in  their  hands. 

This  inadequacy  of  transportation  facilities  was  apparent 
to  every  one  who  had  any  knowledge  of  the  condition  of  the 


236  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

army,  and  it  was  a  subject  of  common  talk  in  Siboney,  in 
Daiquiri,  on  board  the  fleet,  and  in  every  one  of  our  hospitals 
and  camps.  I  shall  try,  in  another  chapter,  to  show  how  it 
affected  the  health  and  fighting  efficiency  of  the  troops,  and 
how  near  it  came  to  wrecking  not  only  the  Fifth  Army- 
Corps,  but  the  whole  Cuban  expedition.  Suffice  it  to  say, 
for  the  present,  that  General  Shafter  sailed  from  Tampa 
without  a  sufficient  number  of  mules,  teamsters,  and  packers 
to  supply,  equip,  and  maintain  his  army  in  the  field.  The 
responsibility  for  this  deficiency,  as  well  as  the  responsibility 
for  the  lack  of  boats,  must  rest  either  upon  the  War  Depart 
ment  or  upon  the  general  in  command.  If  the  latter  did  not 
ask  for  adequate  means  of  land  and  water  transportation 
before  he  left  Tampa,  he  is  the  person  to  be  held  accoun 
table.  If  he  asked  and  failed  to  obtain,  the  War  Depart 
ment  must  stand  in  the  gap. 


CHAPTER   XX 
THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN    (Continued) 

WHEN,  on  June  14,  General  Shafter's  army  sailed  for 
the  southeastern  coast  of  Cuba,  without  adequate 
facilities  for  disembarkation,  and  without  a  sufficient  number 
of  mules,  packers,  teamsters,  and  army  wagons  to  insure 
its  proper  equipment,  subsistence,  and  maintenance  in  the 
field,  it  was,  ipso  facto,  predestined  to  serious  embarrass 
ment  and  difficulty,  if  not  to  great  suffering  and  peril.  No 
amount  of  zeal,  energy,  and  ability  on  the  part  of  quar 
termasters  and  commissaries,  after  the  army  had  reached  its 
destination,  could  possibly  make  up  for  deficiencies  that 
should  have  had  attention  before  the  army  sailed.  Boats, 
mules,  and  wagons  were  not  to  be  had  at  Siboney,  and  when 
the  urgent  need  of  them  became  apparent  it  was  too  late  to 
procure  them  from  the  United  States.  General  Shafter 
cabled  the  War  Department  for  lighters  and  steam-tugs  al 
most  as  soon  as  he  reached  the  Cuban  coast,  and  General 
Miles  telegraphed  for  more  draft-animals  before  he  had 
been  in  Siboney  twenty-four  hours;  but  neither  the-  boats 
nor  the  mules  came  in  time  to  be  of  any  avail.  Cuban  fever 
waits  for  no  man,  and  before  the  boats  that  should  have 
landed  more  supplies  and  the  mules  that  should  have  carried 
them  to  the  front  reached  Siboney,  seventy-five  per  cent,  of 
General  Shafter's  command  had  been  prostrated  by  disease, 

237 


238  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

due,  as  he  himself  admits,  to  insufficient  food,  "without 
change  of  clothes,  and  without  any  shelter  whatever." l 

But  the  lack  of  adequate  land  and  water  transportation 
was  not  the  only  deficiency  in  the  equipment  of  the  Fifth 
Army-Corps  when  it  sailed  from  Tampa.  It  was  also  ill 
provided  with  medical  stores  and  the  facilities  and  appliances 
needed  in  caring  for  sick  and  wounded  soldiers.  Dr.  Nicho 
las  Senn,  chief  of  the  operating  staff  of  the  cfrmy,  says  that 
"ambulances  in  great  number  had  been  sent  to  Tampa,  but 
they  were  not  unloaded  and  sent  to  the  front."  I  myself 
passed  a  whole  train-load  of  ambulances  near  Tampa  in  May, 
but  I  never  saw  more  than  three  in  use  at  the  front,  and, 
according  to  the  official  report  of  Dr.  Guy  C.  Godfrey, 
commanding  officer  of  the  hospital-corps  company  of  the 
First  Division,  Fifth  Army-Corps,  "the  number  of  ambu 
lances  for  the  entire  army  was  limited  to  three,  and  it  was 
impossible  to  expect  them  to  convey  the  total  number  of 
wounded  from  the  collecting-stations  to  the  First  Division 
hospital." 2 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Jacobs  of  the  quartermaster's  de 
partment,  who  was  assistant  to  General  Humphreys  in  Cuba, 
testified  before  the  Investigating  Commission  on  November 
16  that  he  had  fifty  ambulances  at  Tampa,  and  that  he 
was  about  to  load  them  on  one  of  the  transports  when 
General  Shafter  appeared  and  ordered  them  left  behind. 

The  surgeon-general  declared,  in  a  letter  to  the  "  Medical 
Record,"  dated  August  6,  that  "  General  Shafter's  army  at 
Tampa  was  thoroughly  well  supplied  with  the  necessary 
medicines,  dressings,  etc.,  for  field-service;  but,  owing  to 
insufficient  transportation,  he  left  behind  at  Tampa  his  re 
serve  medical  supplies  and  ambulance  corps." 

General  Shafter  himself  admits  that  he  had  not  enough 

1  Telegram  of  General  Shafter  to  the  President,  August  8. 

2  Report  to  the  surgeon-general  from  Santiago,  July  28. 


THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  239 

medical  supplies,  but  seems  to  assert,  by  implication,  that  he 
was  not  to  blame  for  the  deficiency.  In  a  telegram  to  Ad 
jutant-General  Corbin,  dated  "  Santiago,  August  3,"  he  said : 
"  From  the  day  this  expedition  left  Tampa  until  to-day  there 
has  never  been  sufficient  medical  attendance  or  medicines 
for  the  daily  wants  of  the  command,  and  three  times  within 
that  time  the  command  has  been  almost  totally  out  of  medi 
cines.  I  say  this  on  the  word  of  the  medical  directors,  who 
have  in  each  instance  reported  the  matter  to  me,  the  last 
time  yesterday,  when  the  proposition  was  made  to  me  to  take 
medicines  away  from  the  Spanish  hospital.  .  .  .  The  sur 
geons  have  worked  as  well  as  any  men  that  ever  lived,  and 
their  complaint  has  been  universal  of  lack  of  means  and 
facilities.  I  do  not  complain  of  this,  for  no  one  could  have 
foreseen  all  that  would  be  required;  but  I  will  not  quietly 
submit  to  having  the  onus  laid  on  me  for  the  lack  of  these 
hospital  facilities." 

The  state  of  affairs  disclosed  by  these  official  reports  and 
telegrams  seems  to  me  as  melancholy  and  humiliating  as 
anything  of  the  kind  ever  recorded  in  the  history  of  Ameri 
can  wars.  Three  ambulances  for  a  whole  corps  of  sixteen 
thousand  men;  an  army  "almost  totally  out  of  medicines" 
three  times  in  seven  weeks;  and  a  proposition  to  make  up 
our  own  deficiencies  by  seizing  and  confiscating  the  medical 
supplies  of  a  Spanish  hospital!  I  do  not  wonder  that  Gen 
eral  Shafter  wishes  to  escape  responsibility  for  such  a  mani 
festation  of  negligence  or  incompetence;  but  I  do  not  see 
how  he  can  be  allowed  to  do  so.  It  is  just  as  much  the 
business  of  a  commanding  general  to  know  that  he  has  medi 
cines  and  ambulances  enough  as  it  is  to  know  that  he  has 
food  and  ammunition  enough.  He  is  the  man  who  plans 
the  campaign,  and,  to  a  certain  extent,  predetermines  the 
number  of  sick  and  wounded;  he  is  the  man  who  makes  req 
uisition  upon  the  War  Department  for  transports,  mules, 


240  CAMPAIGNING  IN   CUBA 

and  wagons  enough  to  carry  the  army  and  its  equipment 
to  the  field  where  it  is  to  operate;  and  he  is  the  man  who 
should  consider  all  contingencies  and  emergencies  likely  to 
arise  as  a  result  of  climatic  or  other  local  conditions,  and 
who  should  see  that  ample  provision  is  made  for  them.  Gen 
eral  Shafter  says  that  "  no  one  could  have  foreseen  all  that 
would  be  required."  That  is  probably  true;  but  any  one,  it 
seems  to  me,  could  have  foreseen  that  an  army  of  sixteen 
thousand  men,  which  was  expected  to  attack  intrenched 
positions,  would  need  more  than  three  ambulances  for  the 
transportation  of  the  wounded,  to  say  nothing  of  the  sick. 
The  same  remark  applies  to  medicines  and  medical  supplies. 
Every  one  knew  that  our  army  was  going  to  a  very  unhealth- 
ful  region,  and  it  was  not  difficult  to  foresee  that  it  would 
require  perhaps  two  or  three  times  the  quantity  of  medical 
supplies  that  would  be  needed  in  a  temperate  climate  and  a 
more  healthful  environment.  The  very  reason  assigned  for 
General  Shafter's  hurried  advance  toward  Santiago  is  that  he 
knew  his  army  would  soon  be  disabled  by  disease,  and  wished 
to  strike  a  decisive  blow  while  his  men  were  still  able  to 
fight.  If  he  anticipated  the  wrecking  of  his  army  by  sick 
ness  that  could  not  be  averted  nor  long  delayed,  why  did  he 
not  make  sure,  before  he  left  Tampa,  that  he  had  medical 
supplies  and  hospital  facilities  enough  to  meet  the  inevita 
ble  emergency?  His  telegram  to  Adjutant-General  Corbin 
seems  to  indicate  that  he  was  not  only  unprepared  for  an 
emergency,  but  unprepared  to  meet  even  the  ordinary  de 
mands  of  an  army  in  the  field,  inasmuch  as  he  declares, 
without  limitation  or  qualification,  that  from  June  14  to 
August  3  he  never  had  medicines  enough  for  the  daily 
wants  of  his  command. 

It  may  be  thought  that  the  view  here  taken  of  the  re 
sponsibility  of  the  commanding  general  for  everything  that 
pertains  to  the  well-being  and  the  fighting  efficiency  of  his 


THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  241 

command  is  too  extreme  and  exacting,  arid  that  he  ought  not 
to  be  held  personally  accountable  for  the  mistakes  or  the 
incompetence  of  his  staff -officers.  Waiving  a  discussion  of 
this  question  on  its  merits,  it  need  only  be  said  that,  inas 
much  as  General  Shafter  has  officially  recommended  all  of 
his  staff -officers  for  promotion  on  account  of  "faithful  and 
meritorious  services  throughout  the  campaign,"  he  is  estopped 
from  saying  now  that  they  did  not  do  their  duty,  or  that  they 
made  errors  of  judgment  so  serious  as  to  imperil  the  lives  of 
men,  if  not  the  success  of  the  expedition.  The  responsibil 
ity  for  the  lack  of  medical  supplies  and  hospital  facilities, 
therefore,  as  well  as  the  responsibility  for  the  lack  of  boats, 
mules,  and  wagons,  must  rest  either  upon  the  War  Depart 
ment  or  upon  the  general  in  command.  If  the  latter  made 
timely  requisition  for  them,  and  for  transports  enough  to 
carry  them  to  the  Cuban  coast,  and  failed  to  obtain  either  or 
both,  the  War  Department  must  be  held  accountable;  while, 
on  the  other  hand,  if  General  Shafter  did  not  ask  for  medi 
cal  supplies  enough  to  meet  the  probable  wants  of  his  army 
in  a  tropical  climate  and  an  unhealthful  environment,  he 
must  shoulder  the  responsibility  for  his  own  negligence  or 
want  of  foresight. 

I  shall  now  try  to  show  how  this  lack  of  boats,  mules, 
wagons,  and  medical  supplies  affected  General  Shafter^ 
command  in  the  field. 

II.   The  landing  at  Daiquiri  and  Siboney. 

The  points  selected  for  the  disembarkation  of  the  army  and 
the  landing  of  supplies  were  the  best,  perhaps,  that  could  be 
found  between  Santiago  harbor  and  Guantanamo  Bay;  but 
they  were  little  more,  nevertheless,  than  shallow  notches  in 
the  coast-line,  which  afforded  neither  anchorage  nor  shelter 
from  the  prevailing  wind.  There  was  one  small  pier  erected 
by  the  Spanish-American  Iron  Company  at  Daiquiri,  but  at 
Siboney  there  were  no  landing  facilities  whatever,  and  the 

16 


242  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

strip  of  beach  at  the  bottom  of  the  wedge-shaped  notch  in 
the  precipitous  wall  of  the  coast  was  hardly  more  than  one 
hundred  yards  in  length.  The  water  deepened  so  suddenly 
and  abruptly  at  a  distance  of  fifty  yards  from  the  shore  that 
there  was  practically  no  anchorage,  and  General  Shafter's 
fleet  of  more  than  thirty  transports  had  to  lie  in  what  was 
virtually  an  open  roadstead  and  drift  back  and  forth  with  the 
currents  and  tides.  The  prevailing  winds  were  from  the  east 
and  southeast,  and  the  long  swell  which  rolled  in  from  the 
Caribbean  Sea  broke  in  heavy  and  at  times  dangerous  surf 
upon  the  narrow  strip  of  unsheltered  beach  where  the  army 
had  to  land.  All  of  these  local  conditions  were  known,  or 
might  have  been  known,  to  General  Shafter  before  he  left 
Tampa;  but  when  he  arrived  off  the  coast  they  seemed  to 
take  him  wholly  by  surprise.  He  had  brought  with  him 
neither  surf -boats,  nor  steam-launches,  nor  suitable  lighters, 
nor  materials  with  which  to  construct  a  pier.  How  he  ever 
would  have  disembarked  his  command  without  the  assistance 
of  the  navy,  I  do  not  know.  I  doubt  whether  a  landing  could 
have  been  effected  at  all.  Fortunately,  the  navy  was  at  hand, 
and  its  small  boats  and  steam-launches,  manned  by  officers 
and  sailors  from  the  fleet,  landed  the  whole  army  through  the 
surf  with  the  loss  of  only  two  men.  The  navy  then  retired 
from  the  scene  of  action,  and  General  Shafter  was  left  to  his 
own  devices— and  deplorably  weak  and  ineffective  they  proved 
to  be. 

The  engineer  corps  found  near  the  railroad  at  Siboney  a 
few  sticks  of  heavy  timber  belonging  to  the  Iron  Company, 
out  of  which  they  improvised  a  small,  narrow  pier;  but  it  was 
soon  undermined  and  knocked  to  pieces  by  the  surf.  The 
chief  quartermaster  discovered  on  or  near  the  beach  three  or 
four  old  lighters,  also  belonging  to  the  Iron  Company,  which 
he  used  to  supplement  the  service  rendered  by  the  single 
scow  attached  to  the  expedition ;  but  as  he  put  them  in  charge 


THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  243 

of  soldiers,  who  had  had  no  experience  in  handling  boats  in 
broken  water,  they  were  soon  stove  against  the  corners  of 
the  pier,  or  swamped  in  the  heavy  surf  that  swept  the  beach. 
All  that  could  be  done  then  was  to  land  supplies  as  fast  as 
possible  in  the  small  rowboats  of  the  transports.  If  General 
Shafter  had  had  competent  and  experienced  officers  to  put  in 
command  of  these  boats,  and  steam-launches  to  tow  them  back 
and  forth  in  strings  or  lines  of  half  a  dozen  each,  and  if  he 
had  made  provision  for  communication  with  the  captains  of 
the  steamers  by  means  of  wigwag  flag-signals,  so  as  to  be 
able  to  give  them  orders  and  control  their  movements,  he 
might  have  landed  supplies  in  this  way  with  some  success* 
But  none  of  the  difficulties  of  the  situation  had  been  fore 
seen,  and  no  arrangements  had  been  made  to  cope  with  them. 
The  captains  of  the  transports  put  their  vessels  wherever 
they  chose,  and  when  a  steamer  that  lay  four  or  five  miles  at 
sea  was  wanted  closer  inshore,  there  was  no  means  of  send 
ing  orders  to  her  except  by  rowboat.  The  captains,  as  a 
rule,  did  not  put  officers  in  charge  of  their  boats,  and  the 
sailors  who  manned  them,  having  no  competent  direction, 
acted  upon  their  own  judgment.  Finally,  boats  which  could 
have  made  a  round  trip  between  the  transports  and  the  shore 
in  half  an  hour  if  towed  by  a  steam-launch  often  used  up  the 
greater  part  of  two  hours  in  toiling  back  and  forth  through 
a  heavy  sea  under  oars. 

It  is  not  a  matter  for  surprise  that,  with  such  facilities  and 
under  such  conditions,  General  Shafter  found  it  almost  im 
possible  to  land  even  food  and  ammunition  enough  to  keep 
his  army  properly  supplied.  In  his  official  report  of  the  cam 
paign  he  says:  "It  was  not  until  nearly  two  weeks  after 
the  army  landed  that  it  was  possible  to  place  on  shore  three 
days'  supplies  in  excess  of  those  required  for  daily  consump 
tion/' 

In  addition  to  all  the  unnecessary  difficulties  and  embar- 


244  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

rassments  above  described,  there  was  another,  almost,  if  not 
quite,  as  serious,  arising  from  the  manner  in  which  the  trans 
ports  had  been  loaded  at  Tampa.  Stores  were  put  into  the 
steamers  apparently  without  any  reference  to  the  circum 
stances  under  which  they  would  be  taken  out,  and  without 
any  regard  to  the  order  in  which  they  would  be  needed  at  the 
point  of  destination.  Medical  supplies,  for  example,  instead 
of  being  put  all  together  in  a  single  transport,  were  scattered 
among  twenty  or  more  vessels,  so  that  in  order  to  get  all  of 
them  it  was  necessary  either  to  bring  twenty  steamers  close 
to  shore,  one  after  another,  and  take  a  little  out  of  each,  or 
send  rowboats  around  to  them  all  where  they  lay  at  dis 
tances  ranging  from  one  mile  to  five.1  Articles  of  equip 
ment  that  would  be  required  as  soon  as  the  army  landed 
were  often  buried  in  the  holds  of  the  vessels  under  hun 
dreds  of  tons  of  stuff  that  would  not  be  needed  in  a  week, 
and  the  army  went  forward  without  them,  simply  because 
they  could  not  be  quickly  got  at.  Finally,  I  am  inclined 
to  believe,  from  what  I  saw  and  heard  of  the  landing  of  sup 
plies  at  Siboney,  that  there  was  not  such  a  thing  as  a  bill  of 
lading,  manifest,  or  cargo  list  in  existence,  and  that  the  chief 
quartermaster  had  no  other  guide  to  the  location  of  a  par 
ticular  article  than  that  furnished  by  his  own  memory  or  the 
memory  of  some  first  mate.  I  do  not  assert  this  as  a  fact;  I 
merely  infer  it  from  the  difficulty  that  there  seemed  to  be  in 
finding  and  getting  ashore  quickly  a  particular  kind  of  stores 
for  which  there  happened  to  be  an  immediate  and  urgent 
demand.  After  the  fight  of  the  Rough  Riders  at  Guasimas, 
for  example,  General  Wood  found  himself  short  of  ammuni 
tion  for  his  Hotchkiss  rapid-fire  guns.  He  sent  Lieutenant 
Kilbourne  back  to  General  Shafter  at  Siboney  with  a  request 
that  a  fresh  supply  be  forwarded  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment.  General  Shafter  said  that  he  had  no  idea  where 
1  Report  of  Dr.  Edward  L.  Munson  to  the  surgeon-general,  dated  July  29. 


THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  245 

that  particular  kind  of  ammunition  was  to  be  found,  and 
referred  the  applicant  to  Quartermaster  Jacobs  at  Daiquiri. 
Lieutenant  Kilbourne  walked  seven  miles  to  Daiquiri,  only 
to  find  that  the  quartermaster  had  no  more  idea  where  that 
ammunition  was  than  the  commanding  general  had.  He 
thereupon  returned  to  Guasimas,  after  a  march  of  more  than 
twenty  miles,  and  reported  to  General  Wood  that  ammuni 
tion  for  the  rapid-fire  guns  could  not  be  had,  because  nobody 
knew  where  it  was.  If  the  commanding  general  and  the 
quartermaster  could  not  put  their  hands  on  ammunition 
when  it  was  needed,  they  could  hardly  be  expected  to  find, 
and  forward  promptly,  articles  of  less  vital  importance,  such 
as  camp-kettles,  hospital  tents,  clothing,  and  spare  blankets. 

It  would  be  easy  to  fill  pages  with  illustrations  and  proofs 
of  the  statements  above  made,  but  I  must  limit  myself  to  a 
typical  case  or  two  relating  to  medical  supplies,  which  seem 
to  have  been  most  neglected. 

In  a  report  to  Surgeon-General  Sternberg  dated  July  29, 
Dr.  Edward  L.  Munson,  commander  of  the  reserve  ambulance 
company,  says  that  for  two  days  after  his  arrival  at  Siboney 
he  was  unable  to  get  any  transportation  whatever  for  medical 
supplies  from  the  ships  to  the  shore.  On  the  third  day  he 
was  furnished  with  one  rowboat,  but  even  this  was  taken 
away  from  him,  when  it  had  made  one  trip,  by  direct  order 
of  General  Shafter,  who  wished  to  assign  it  to  other  duty. 
Some  days  later,  with  the  boats  of  the  Olivette,  Cherokee,  and 
Breakwater,  he  succeeded  in  landing  medical  supplies  from 
perhaps  one  third  of  the  transports  composing  the  fleet.  "  I 
appealed  on  several  occasions,"  he  says,  "  for  the  use  of  a 
lighter  or  small  steamer  to  collect  and  land  medical  supplies, 
but  I  was  informed  by  the  quartermaster's  department  that 
they  could  render  no  assistance  in  that  way.  ...  At  the 
time  of  my  departure  large  quantities  of  medical  supplies, 
urgently  needed  on  shore,  still  remained  on  the  transports,  a 


246  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

number  of  which  were  under  orders  to  return  to  the  United 
States."  "In  conclusion,"  he  adds,  "it  is  desired  to  em 
phasize  the  fact  that  the  lamentable  conditions  prevailing  in 
the  army  before  Santiago  were  due  (1)  to  the  military  neces 
sity  which  threw  troops  on  shore  and  away  from  the  possi 
bility  of  supply,  without  medicines,  instruments,  or  hospital 
stores  of  any  kind;  and  (2)  to  the  lack  of  foresight  on  the 
part  of  the  quartermaster's  department  in  sending  out  such 
an  expedition  without  fully  anticipating  its  needs  as  regards 
temporary  wharfage,  lighters,  tugs,  and  despatch-boats." 

Dr.  Frank  Donaldson,  assistant  surgeon  attached  to 
Colonel  Roosevelt's  Rough  Riders,  states  in  a  letter  to  the 
Philadelphia  "Medical  Journal,"  dated  July  12,  that  "a 
desperate  effort "  was  made  to  secure  a  few  cots  for  the  sick 
and  wounded  in  the  field-hospitals  at  the  front.  There  were 
hundreds  of  these  cots,  he  says,  on  one  of  the  transports  off 
Siboney,  but  it  proved  to  be  utterly  impossible  to  get  any  of 
them  landed.  Whether  they  were  all  carried  back  to  the 
United  States  or  not  I  do  not  know;  but  large  quantities  of 
supplies,  intended  for  General  Shafter's  army,  were  carried 
back  on  the  transports  Alamo,  Breakwater,  Vigilancia,  and 
La  Grande  Duchesse. 

I  do  not  mean  to  throw  any  undeserved  blame  upon  the 
quartermasters  and  commissaries  at  Siboney.  Many  of  them 
worked  day  and  night  with  indefatigable  energy  to  get  sup 
plies  on  shore  and  forward  them  to  the  army;  but  they  were 
hampered  by  conditions  over  which  they  had  no  control,  and 
for  which,  perhaps,  they  were  not  in  any  way  responsible; 
they  were  often  unable  to  obtain  the  assistance  of  steamer 
captains  and  other  officers  upon  whose  cooperation  the  suc 
cess  of  their  own  efforts  depended,  and  they  probably  did 
all  that  could  be  done  by  individuals  acting  as  separate  units 
rather  than  as  correlated  parts  of  an  organized  and  intel 
ligently  directed  whole.  The  trouble  at  Siboney  was  the 


THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  247 

same  trouble  that  became  apparent  at  Tampa.  There  was 
at  the  head  of  affairs  no  controlling,  directing,  and  energiz 
ing  brain,  capable  of  grasping  all  the  details  of  a  complex 
situation  and  making  all  the  parts  of  a  complicated  mech 
anism  work  harmoniously  together  for  the  accomplishment 
of  a  definite  purpose. 

III.  The  strategic  plan  of  campaign  and  its  execution. 

As  this  branch  of  the  subject  will  be  discussed— if  it  has 
not  already  been  discussed— by  better-equipped  critics  than 
I  can  pretend  to  be,  I  shall  limit  myself  to  a  brief  review  of 
the  campaign  in  its  strategic  aspect  as  it  appears  from  the 
standpoint  of  a  civilian. 

I  understand,  from  officers  who  were  in  a  position  to  know 
the  facts,  that  the  original  plan  of  attack  on  the  city  of 
Santiago  provided  for  close  and  effective  cooperation  of  the 
army  with  the  navy,  and  for  a  joint  assault  by  way  of  Agua- 
dores  and  Morro  Castle.  General  Shaf ter  was  to  move  along 
the  line  of  the  railroad  from  Siboney  to  Aguadores,  keeping 
close  to  the  coast  under  cover  of  the  guns  of  the  fleet,  and, 
with  the  assistance  of  the  latter,  was  to  capture  the  old 
Aguadores  fort  and  such  other  intrenchments  as  should  be 
found  at  the  mouth  of  the  Aguadores  ravine.  This,  it  was 
thought,  might  be  accomplished  with  very  little  loss,  because 
the  fleet  could  shell  the  Spaniards  out  of  their  fortifications, 
and  thus  make  it  possible  for  the  army  to  occupy  them 
without  much  fighting.  Having  taken  Aguadores,  General 
Shafter  was  to  continue  his  march  westward  along  the  coast, 
still  under  the  protection  of  Admiral  Sampson's  guns,  until 
he  reached  Morro.  Then,  without  attempting  to  storm  or 
reduce  the  castle,  he  was  to  go  down  through  the  ravine  that 
leads  to  the  head  of  the  EstreHa  cove,  and  seize  the  subma 
rine-mine  station  at  the  mouth  of  Santiago  harbor.  When 
electrical  connection  between  the  station  and  the  mines  had 
been  destroyed,  and  the  mines  had  thus  been  rendered  harm- 


248  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

less,  Admiral  Sampson  was  to  force  an  entrance,  fighting  his 
way  in  past  the  batteries,  and  the  army  and  fleet  were  then 
to  advance  northward  toward  the  city  along  the  eastern  side 
of  the  bay. 

This  plan  had  many  obvious  advantages,  the  most  impor 
tant  of  which  was  the  aid  and  protection  that  would  be  given 
to  the  army,  at  every  stage  of  its  progress,  by  the  guns  of 
perhaps  thirty  or  forty  ships  of  war.  In  the  opinion  of 
naval  officers,  Admiral  Sampson's  cruisers  and  battle-ships 
could  sweep  the  country  ahead  of  our  advance  with  such  a 
storm  of  shot  and  shell  that  the  Spaniards  would  not  be  able 
to  hold  any  position  within  a  mile  of  the  coast.  All  that  the 
army  would  have  to  do,  therefore,  would  be  to  occupy  the 
country  as  fast  as  it  was  cleared  by  the  fire  of  the  fleet,  and 
then  open  the  harbor  to  the  latter  by  cutting  communication 
with  the  submarine  mines  which  were  the  only  effective 
defense  that  the  city  had  on  the  water  side.  General  Shaf- 
ter's  army,  moreover,  would  be  all  the  time  on  high,  sea- 
breeze-swept  land,  and  therefore  comparatively  safe  from 
malarial  fever,  and  it  would  not  only  have  a  railroad  behind 
it  for  the  transportation  of  its  supplies,  but  be  constantly 
within  easy  reach  of  its  base  by  water. 

Why  this  plan  was  eventually  given  up  I  do  not  know.  In 
abandoning  it  General  Shafter  voluntarily  deprived  himself 
of  the  aid  that  might  have  been  rendered  by  three  or  four  hun 
dred  high-powered  and  rapid-fire  guns,  backed  by  a  trained 
fighting  force  of  six  or  eight  thousand  men.  I  do  not  know 
the  exact  strength  of  Sampson's  and  Schley's  combined  fleets, 
but  this  seems  to  me  to  be  a  conservative  estimate.  A 
prominent  officer  of  the  battle-ship  Iowa  told  me  in  Santiago, 
after  the  surrender,  that  the  fighting  ships  under  Admiral 
Sampson's  command,  including  the  auxiliary  cruisers  and 
mosquito  fleet,  could  concentrate  on  any  given  field  a  fire  of 
about  one  hundred  shells  a  second.  This  included,  of  course, 


THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  249 

small  projectiles  from  the  rapid-fire  and  one-pound  machine 
guns.  He  did  not  think  it  possible  for  Spanish  infantry  to 
live,  much  less  fight,  in  the  field  swept  by  such  a  fire,  and 
this  was  his  reason  for  believing  that  the  fleet  could  have 
cleared  the  way  for  the  army  if  the  latter  had  advanced  along 
the  coast  instead  of  going  back  into  the  interior.  The  plan 
of  attack  by  way  of  Aguadores  and  Morro  was  regarded  by 
the  foreign  residents  of  Santiago  as  the  one  most  likely  to 
succeed;  and  a  gentleman  who  lived  eight  years  at  Daiquiri, 
as  manager  of  the  Spanish-American  Iron  Company,  and  who 
is  familiar  with  the  topography  of  the  whole  region,  writes 
me:  "I  have  always  thought  that  the  great  mistake  of  the 
Santiago  campaign  was  that  they  assaulted  the  city  at  its 
most  impregnable  point,  instead  of  taking  possession  of  the 
heights  at  Aguadores,  which  would  have  been  tantamount  to 
the  fall  of  Morro,  the  possession  of  the  harbor  entrance  and 
of  the  harbor  itself.  The  forces  of  the  Spaniards  were  not 
sufficient  to  maintain  any  considerable  number  of  men  there, 
and  it  seems  to  me  that,  with  the  help  of  the  fleet  shelling 
the  heights,  they  could  have  been  reached  very  easily  along 
the  Juragua  Railroad.  If  General  Duffield  had  pressed  on 
when  he  was  there,  it  is  probable  that  he  would  have  met 
with  only  a  thin  skirmish-line,  or,  if  the  fleet  had  done  its 
work,  with  no  resistance  at  all." 

The  reason  assigned  for  General  Shafter's  advance 
through  the  valleys  and  over  the  foot-hills  of  the  interior, 
instead  of  along  the  high  land  of  the  coast,  is  that  he  had 
been  ordered  to  "  capture  the  garrison  at  Santiago  and  assist 
in  capturing  the  harbor  and  the  fleet."  He  did  not  believe, 
it  is  said,  that  he  could  "  capture  the  garrison  "  without  com 
pletely  investing  the  city  on  the  east  and  north.  If  he 
attacked  it  from  the  southern  or  Morro  side,  he  might  take 
the  city,  but  the  garrison  would  escape  by  the  Cobre  or  the 
San  Luis  road.  This  seems  like  a  valid  and  reasonable 


250  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

objection  to  the  original  plan  of  campaign;  but  I  doubt  very 
much  whether  the  Spanish  army  would  have  tried  to  escape 
in  any  event,  for  the  reason  that  the  surrounding  country  was 
almost  wholly  destitute  of  food,  and  General  Linares,  in  the 
hurry  and  confusion  of  defeat,  would  hardly  have  been  able 
to  organize  a  provision-train  for  an  army  of  eight  or  ten 
thousand  men,  even  if  he  had  had  provisions  to  carry.  The 
only  place  where  he  could  hope  to  find  food  in  any  quantity 
was  Manzanillo,  and  to  reach  that  port  he  would  have  had 
to  make  a  forced  march  of  from  twelve  to  fifteen  days.  But 
the  question  whether  the  interior  line  of  advance  or  the  coast 
line  was  the  better  must  be  left  to  strategists,  and  1  express 
no  opinion  with  regard  to  it. 

The  operations  and  manceuvers  of  our  army  in  front  of 
Santiago  have  already  been  described  and  commented  upon 
by  a  number  of  expert  observers,  and  the  only  additional 
criticisms  that  I  have  to  make  relate  to  General  Shafter's 
neglect  of  reconnaissances,  as  a  means  of  ascertaining  the 
enemy's  strength  and  position;  his  apparent  loss  of  grip  after 
the  battle  of  July  1-2;  and  his  failure  not  only  to  prevent, 
but  to  take  any  adequate  steps  to  prevent,  the  reinforcement 
of  the  Santiago  garrison  by  a  column  of  five  thousand  regu 
lars  from  Manzanillo  under  command  of  Colonel  Escarrio. 
If  I  am  correctly  informed,  the  only  reconnaissances  made 
from  the  front  of  our  army,  after  it  came  within  striking 
distance  of  the  enemy's  intrenched  line,  were  made  by  Gen 
eral  Chaffee  and  a  few  other  commanding  officers  upon  their 
own  responsibility  and  for  their  own  information.  General 
Shafter  knew  little  more  about  the  topography  of  the  coun 
try  in  front  of  his  advance  picket-line  than  could  be  ascer 
tained  by  mere  inspection  from  the  top  of  a  hill.  He  received 
information  to  the  effect  that  General  Pando,  with  a  strong 
column  of  Spanish  regulars,  was  approaching  Santiago  from 
the  direction  of  Manzanillo;  but  he  never  took  any  adequate 


THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  251 

steps  to  ascertain  where  General  Pando  was,  when  and  by 
what  road  he  might  be  expected  to  arrive,  or  how  many  men 
he  was  bringing  with  him.  In  the  course  of  a  single  day- 
July  3— General  Shafter  sent  three  telegrams  to  the  War 
Department  with  regard  to  the  whereabouts  of  Pando,  in 
each  of  which  he  located  that  officer  in  a  different  place.  In 
the  first  he  says:  "Pando  has  arrived  at  Palma"  (a  village 
about  twenty-five  miles  northwest  of  Santiago  on  the  Cobre 
road).  In  the  second  he  declares  that  Pando  is  "six  miles 
north  of  Santiago,"  "  near  a  break  in  the  [San  Luis]  railroad," 
and  that  he  thinks  "he  will  be  stopped."  In  the  third  he 
says:  "Pando,  I  find  to-night,  is  some  distance  away  and  will 
not  get  into  Santiago." 

We  know  now— and  General  Shafter  should  have  known 
then— that  the  column  of  reinforcements  from  Manzanillo 
was  not  led  by  General  Pando,  but  by  Colonel  Escarrio,  and 
that  at  the  very  time  when  Shafter,  in  successive  telegrams, 
was  placing  it "  at  Palma,"  "  six  miles  north,"  "  near  a  break 
in  the  railroad,"  and  "  some  distance  away,"  it  was  actually 
in  the  Santiago  intrenchments,  ready  for  business. 

I  take  this  case  as  an  illustration  on  account  of  its  extreme 
importance.  A  column  of  five  thousand  Spanish  regulars  is 
not  to  be  despised;  and  when  it  is  within  a  few  days',  or  per 
haps  a  few  hours',  march,  knowledge  of  its  exact  location 
may  be  a  matter  of  life  and  death  to  a  thousand  men.  Was 
there  any  reason  why  General  Shafter  should  not  have 
informed  himself  accurately  with  regard  to  the  strength  and 
the  position  of  this  column  of  reinforcements?  I  think  not. 
When  Admiral  Sampson  arrived  off  the  entrance  to  Santiago 
harbor,  it  was  of  vital  importance  that  he  should  know  with 
certainty  the  location  of  Cervera's  fleet.  He  did  not  hastily 
telegraph  the  War  Department  that  it  was  reported  at  Cien- 
fuegos;  that  it  was  said  to  be  in  the  Windward  Passage;  that 
it  was  five  miles  north  of  Morro,  or  that  it  was  near  a  reef  in 


252  CAMPAIGNING  IN   CUBA 

the  Este  Channel  and  would  be  stopped.  He  sent  Lieutenant 
Victor  Blue  ashore  to  make  a  thorough  and  careful  recon 
naissance.  Lieutenant  Blue  made  a  difficult  and  dangerous 
journey  of  seventy  miles,  on  foot,  around  the  city  of  Santi 
ago,  saw  personally  every  vessel  in  the  harbor,  and  then 
returned  to  the  flagship,  and  reported  that  Cervera's  fleet  was 
all  there.  I  do  not  know  whether  this  was  good  strategy  on 
the  part  of  Admiral  Sampson  or  not,  but  it  was  certainly  good 
common  sense.  Suppose  that  General  Shafter  had  asked 
General  Wood  to  pick  out  from  the  Rough  Riders  half  a 
dozen  experienced  scouts  and  Indian  fighters  to  make  a 
reconnaissance,  with  Cuban  guides,  in  the  direction  of  Man- 
zanillo,  and  ascertain  exactly  where  that  column  of  reinforce 
ments  was,  and  when  it  might  be  expected  to  arrive.  Would 
not  the  men  have  been  forthcoming,  and  would  not  the 
desired  information  have  been  obtained?  I  have  confidence 
enough  in  the  Rough  Riders  to  answer  this  question  emphati 
cally  in  the  affirmative.  The  capable  men  are  not  all  in  the 
navy,  and  if  General  Shafter  did  not  have  full  information 
with  regard  to  Colonel  Escarrio's  movements,  it  was  simply 
because  he  did  not  ask  any  of  his  officers  or  men  to  get  it  for 
him— and  it  was  information  well  worth  having.  If  that 
column  of  five  thousand  Spanish  regulars  had  reached  San 
tiago  two  days  earlier— the  evening  before  instead  of  the 
morning  after  the  battle  of  July  1-2—1  doubt  very  much 
whether  we  should  have  taken  either  Caney  or  San  Juan  Hill, 
and  General  Shafter  might  have  had  better  reason  than  he 
did  have  to  "consider  the  advisability  of  falling  back  to  a 
position  five  miles  in  the  rear." l 

If  General  Shafter  believed  that  these  Spanish  reinforce 
ments  were  "  some  distance  away  "  and  that  they  would  "  not 
get  into  Santiago,"  it  is  difficult  to  understand  why  he  should 
have  so  far  lost  his  grip,  after  the  capture  of  Caney  and  San 
1  Statement  furnished  to  the  press  by  General  Miles,  September  8, 1898. 


THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  253 

Juan  Hill,  as  to  telegraph  the  War  Department  that  he  was 
"  seriously  considering  the  advisability  of  falling  back  to  a 
position  five  miles  in  the  rear."  His  troops  had  not  been 
defeated,  nor  even  repulsed ;  they  had  been  victorious  at  every 
point;  and  the  Spaniards,  as  we  afterward  learned  in  Santi 
ago,  were  momentarily  expecting  them  to  move  another  mile 
to  the  front,  rather  than  five  miles  to  the  rear.  It  is  the 
belief  of  many  foreign  residents  of  Santiago,  including  the 
English  cable-operators,  who  had  the  best  possible  means  of 
knowing  the  views  of  the  Spanish  commanders,  that  if  our 
army  had  continued  the  attack  after  capturing  Caney  and 
San  Juan  Hill  it  might  have  entered  the  city  before  dark. 
This  may  or  may  not  be  so;  but  the  chance— if  chance  there 
was— vanished  when  Colonel  Escarrio,  on  the  morning  after 
the  battle,  marched  around  the  head  of  the  bay  and  into  the 
city  with  a  reinforcing  column  of  five  thousand  regulars. 
General  Shaf ter  says,  in  his  official  report,  that  "  the  arrival 
of  General  Escarrio  was  not  anticipated  "  because  "  it  was  not 
believed  that  his  troops  could  arrive  so  soon."  The  time 
when  a  reinforcing  column  of  five  thousand  men  will  reach 
the  enemy  ought  not  to  be  a  matter  of  vague  belief —it  should 
be  a  matter  of  accurate  foreknowledge;  and  if  General  Shaf- 
ter  had  sent  a  couple  of  officers  with  a  few  Rough  Riders  out 
on  the  roads  leading  into  Santiago  from  Manzanillo,  he  might 
have  had  information  that  would  have  made  the  arrival  of 
Colonel  Escarrio  less  unexpected.  But  he  seems  to  have 
taken  no  steps  either  to  ascertain  the  movements  of  the 
latter  or  to  prevent  his  junction  with  Linares. 

General  0.  O.  Howard,  in  an  interview  published  in  the 
New  York  "  Tribune  "  of  September  14,  1898,  explains  the 
apparent  indifference  of  General  Shafter  to  the  approach  of 
these  reinforcements  as  follows:  "In  regard  to  the  Cubans 
allowing  the  Spanish  reinforcements  to  enter  Santiago  from 
Manzanillo,  I  would  say  that  I  met  General  Shafter  on  board 


254  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

the  Vixen,  and  from  my  conversation  with  him  I  infer  that 
he  intended  to  allow  the  Spaniards  to  enter  the  city,  so  as  to 
have  them  where  he  could  punish  them  more." 

It  is  to  be  hoped  that  General  Howard  misunderstood  Gen 
eral  Shafter,  because  such  strategy  as  that  indicated  would 
suggest  the  tactics  of  the  pugnacious  John  Phoenix,  who, 
in  a  fight  in  the  editorial  room,  put  his  nose  into  the  mouth 
of  his  adversary  in  order  to  hold  the  latter  more  securely. 

The  explanation  of  the  entrance  of  the  Spanish  reinforce 
ments  given  by  General  Shafter  in  his  official  report  of  the 
campaign  is  as  follows:  "General  Garcia,  with  between  four 
and  five  thousand  Cubans,  was  intrusted  with  the  duty  of 
watching  for  and  intercepting  the  reinforcements  expected. 
This,  however,  he  failed  to  do,  and  Escarrio  passed  into  the 
city  along  my  extreme  right  and  near  the  bay." 

General  Garcia  himself,  however,  in  his  report  to  his  own 
government,  states  that  he  was  directed  by  General  Shafter 
to  occupy  and  hold  a  certain  position  on  the  right  wing  of 
the  army,  and  that,  without  disobeying  orders  and  leaving 
that  position,  he  could  not  possibly  intercept  the  Manzanillo 
troops. 

As  it  happened,  Escarrio's  column  did  not  become  a  con 
trolling  or  decisive  factor  in  the  campaign,  and  the  question 
why  he  was  allowed  to  reinforce  the  Santiago  garrison  has 
therefore  only  a  speculative  interest.  If,  however,  these 
reinforcements  had  happened  to  arrive  two  days  earlier— in 
time  to  take  part  in  the  battle  of  July  1-2— the  whole  course 
of  events  might  have  been  changed.  The  Spanish  garrison 
of  the  city,  according  to  the  English  cable-operators  and  the 
foreign  residents,  consisted  of  three  thousand  regulars,  one 
thousand  volunteers,  and  about  one  thousand  sailors  and 
marines  from  Cervera's  fleet— a  force,  all  together,  of  not 
more  than  five  thousand  men.  This  comparatively  small 
army,  fighting  in  intrenchments  and  in  almost  impregnable 


THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  255 

positions,  came  so  near  repulsing  our  attack  on  July  1  that 
General  Shafter  "seriously  considered  the  advisability  of 
falling  back  to  a  position  five  miles  in  the  rear."  If  the  five 
thousand  men  in  the  Spanish  blockhouses  and  rifle-pits  had 
ueen  reinforced  July  1  instead  of  July  3  by  the  five  thousand 
regulars  from  Manzanillo,  the  Santiago  campaign  might 
have  ended  in  a  great  disaster.  Fortunately  for  General 
Shafter,  and  unfortunately  for  General  Toral,  "  Socorro  de 
Espafia  6  tarde  6  mmca"  ("Spanish  reinforcements  arrive 
late  or  never  "). 


CHAPTER  XXI 
THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN   (Concluded) 

IV.  The  wrecking  of  the  army  by  disease  after  the  de 
cisive  battle  of  July  1-2. 

The  army  under  command  of  General  Shafter  left  Tampa 
on  the  fourteenth  day  of  June,  and  arrived  off  the  Cuban 
coast  near  Santiago  on  the  20th  of  the  same  month.  Dis 
embarkation  began  at  Daiquiri  on  the  22d,  and  ended  at 
Siboney  on  the  24th.  On  the  morning  of  June  25  the 
whole  army  was  ashore,  and  was  then  in  a  state  of  almost 
perfect  health  and  efficiency.  One  week  later  the  sol 
diers  at  the  front  began  to  sicken  with  malarial  and  other 
fevers,  and  two  weeks  later,  according  to  General  Shafter's 
report,  "  sickness  was  increasing  very  rapidly,  and  the  weak 
ness  of  the  troops  was  becoming  so  apparent  that  I  was 
anxious  to  bring  the  siege  to  an  end."  On  July  21,  less  than 
four  weeks  after  the  army  landed,  Colonel  Roosevelt  told  me 
that  not  more  than  one  quarter  of  his  men  were  fit  for  duty, 
and  that  when  they  moved  five  miles  up  into  the  hills,  a  few 
days  before,  fifty  per  cent,  of  the  entire  command  fell  out 
of  the  ranks  from  exhaustion.  On  July  22  a  prominent  sur 
geon  attached  to  the  field-hospital  of  the  First  Division  stated 
to  me  that  at  least  five  thousand  men  in  the  Fifth  Army- 
Corps  were  then  ill  with  fever,  and  that  there  were  more 
than  one  thousand  sick  in  General  Kent's  division  alone. 

256 


THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  257 

On  August  3  eight  general  officers  in  Shafter's  command 
signed  a  round-robin  in  which  they  declared  that  the  army 
had  been  so  disabled  by  malarial  fevers  that  it  had  lost  its 
efficiency;  that  it  was  too  weak  to  move  back  into  the  hills; 
that  the  epidemic  of  yellow  fever  which  was  sure  to  occur 
would  probably  destroy  it,  and  that  if  it  were  not  moved 
North  at  once  it  "  must  perish."  At  that  time,  according  to 
General  Shafter's  telegram  of  August  8  to  the  War  Depart 
ment,  "seventy-five  per  cent,  of  the  command  had  been  ill 
with  a  very  weakening  malarial  fever,  which  leaves  every  man 
too  much  broken  down  to  be  of  any  use."  In  the  short  space 
of  forty  days,  therefore,  an  army  of  sixteen  thousand  men 
had  lost  three  fourths  of  its  efficiency,  and  had  been  reduced 
to  a  condition  so  low  that,  in  the  opinion  of  eight  general 
officers,  it  must  inevitably  "  perish  "  unless  immediately  sent 
back  to  the  United  States.  Early  in  August,  after  a  stay  in 
Cuba  of  only  six  weeks,  the  Fifth  Army-Corps  began  to  move 
northward,  and  before  September  1  the  whole  command  was 
in  camp  at  Montauk  Point,  Long  Island.  Of  the  eighteen 
thousand  men  who  composed  it,  five  thousand  were  very  ill, 
or  soon  became  very  ill,  and  were  sent  to  the  general  hospi 
tal;  while  five  thousand  more,  who  were  less  seriously  sick, 
were  treated  in  their  tents.1  Eight  thousand  men  out 
of  eighteen  thousand  were  nominally  well,  but  had  been  so 
enfeebled  by  the  hardships  and  privations  of  the  campaign 
that  they  were  no  longer  fit  for  active  Cuban  service,  and, 
in  the  opinion  of  General  Miles,  hardly  one  of  them  was  in 
sound  health.2  I  think  it  is  not  an  exaggeration  to  describe 
this  state  of  affairs  as  "  the  wrecking  of  the  army  by  disease." 
It  is  my  purpose  in  the  present  chapter  to  inquire  whether 
such  wrecking  of  the  army  was  inevitable,  and  if  not,  why 
it  was  allowed  to  happen. 

1  Statement  of  General  Wheeler,  New  York  "  Sun,"  September  3. 

2  New  York  "Sun,"  September  21. 

17 


258  CAMPAIGNING   IN  CUBA 

A  review  of  the  history  of  campaigns  in  tropical  countries 
seems  to  show  that  Northern  armies  in  such  regions  have 
always  suffered  more  from  disease  than  from  battle ;  but  it 
does  not  by  any  means  show  that  the  virtual  destruction  of 
a  Northern  army  by  disease  in  a  tropical  country  is  inevitable 
now.  When  the  British  army  under  the  Earl  of  Albemarle 
landed  on  the  Cuban  coast  and  attacked  Havana  in  1762, 
it  lost  nearly  one  half  its  efficiency,  as  a  result  of  sickness,  in 
about  four  weeks;  but  at  that  time  the  fact  that  nine  tenths 
of  all  tropical  diseases  are  caused  by  microscopic  germs,  and 
are  therefore  preventable,  was  not  known.  The  progress 
made  in  sanitary  science  in  the  present  century  renders  un 
necessary  and  inexcusable  in  1898  a  rate  of  sickness  and 
mortality  that  was  perhaps  inevitable  in  1762.  Northern 
soldiers,  if  properly  equipped  and  cared  for,  can  live  and 
maintain  their  health  now  under  conditions  which  would  have 
been  absolutely  and  inevitably  fatal  to  them  a  century  ago. 

In  April  last  there  was  an  interesting  and  instructive  dis 
cussion  of  this  subject,  or  of  a  subject  very  closely  connected 
with  this,  at  a  meeting  held  in  the  rooms  of  the  Royal  Geo 
graphical  Society,  London,  and  attended  by  many  of  the  best- 
known  authorities  on  tropical  pathology  in  Great  Britain. 
Most  of  the  gentlemen  who  took  part  in  the  debate  were  of 
opinion  that  there  is  no  reason  whatever  why  the  white  man 
should  not  be  able  to  adapt  himself  to  the  new  conditions  of 
life  in  the  tropics,  and  protect  himself  against  the  diseases 
that  prevail  in  those  regions.  The  popular  belief  that  the 
white  man  cannot  successfully  colonize  the  tropics  is  dis 
proved  by  the  fact  that  he  has  done  so.  It  is  undoubtedly 
true  that  many  Northerners  who  go  to  equatorial  regions 
contract  disease  there  and  die;  but  in  the  majority  of  such 
cases  the  man  is  the  victim  of  his  obstinate  unwillingness 
to  change  his  habits  in  respect  to  eating,  drinking,  and  cloth 
ing,  and  to  conform  his  life  to  the  new  conditions. 

The  chief  diseases,  both  acute  and  chronic,  of  tropical 


THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  259 

countries— those  which  formerly  caused  such  ravages  among 
the  white  settlers,  and  gave  rise  to  the  prevalent  theory  that 
Europeans  can  live  only  in  the  temperate  zone— are  all 
microbic  in  origin,  and  consequently  in  great  measure  pre 
ventable.  We  cannot  expect,  of  course,  to  see  them  abso 
lutely  wiped  out  of  existence;  but  their  sting  may  be  extracted 
by  means  of  an  improved  public  and  private  hygiene  and  other 
prophylactic  measures.  A  comparison  of  the  healthfulness 
of  the  West  India  Islands  under  enlightened  British  rule  with 
that  of  the  two  under  Spanish  misrule  shows  what  can  be 
done  by  sanitation  to  convert  a  pest-hole  into  a  paradise. 
Indeed,  as  Dr.  L.  Sambon,  in  opening  the  discussion,  well 
said,  sanitation  within  the  last  few  decades  has  wrought 
wonderful  changes  in  all  tropical  countries  as  regards  health 
conditions,  and  the  changes  in  some  places  have  been  so  great 
that  regions  once  considered  most  deadly  are  now  even  recom 
mended  as  health  resorts. 

Dr.  Patrick  Manson,  than  whom  there  is  no  greater 
authority  on  the  pathology  of  equatorial  regions,  began  his 
remarks  with  the  confession  that  in  former  years,  under  the 
influence  of  early  training,  he  shared  in  the  pessimistic  opin 
ions  then  current  about  tropical  colonization  by  the  white 
races.  In  recent  years,  however,  his  views  on  this  subject 
had  undergone  a  complete  revolution— a  revolution  that  be 
gan  with  the  establishment  of  the  germ  theory  of  disease. 
He  now  firmly  believed  in  the  possibility  of  tropical  coloniza 
tion  by  the  white  races.  Heat  and  moisture,  he  contended, 
are  not,  in  themselves,  the  direct  cause  of  any  important 
tropical  disease.  The  direct  causes  of  ninety-nine  per  cent, 
of  these  diseases  are  germs,  and  to  kill  the  germs  is  simply 
a  matter  of  knowledge  and  the  application  of  that  knowledge 
—that  is  to  say,  sanitary  science  and  sanitation.1 

The  fact  that  ninety-nine  per  cent,  or  more  of  the  diseases 

1  "  British  Medical  Journal "  of  April  30, 1898,  quoted  in  the  "Journal  of 

the  Military  Service  Institution." 


260  CAMPAIGNING  IN   CUBA 

that  prevail  in  the  tropics  are  caused  by  germs  was  known, 
of  course,  to  the  surgeon-general  of  our  army,  and  ought  to 
have  been  known  to  General  Shafter  and  the  Secretary  of 
War.  It  was,  therefore,  their  duty,  collectively  and  individ 
ually,  to  protect  our  soldiers  in  Cuba,  not  only  by  informing 
them  of  the  best  means  of  escaping  the  dangers  threatened 
by  these  micro-organisms,  but  also  by  furnishing  them  with 
every  safeguard  that  science  and  experience  could  suggest 
in  the  shape  of  proper  food,  dress,  equipment,  and  medical 
supplies.  The  rules  and  precautions  which  it  is  necessary  to 
observe  in  order  to  escape  the  attacks  of  micro-organisms  and 
maintain  health  in  the  tropics  were  well  known  at  the  time 
when  the  invasion  of  Cuba  was  planned,  and  had  been  pub 
lished,  long  before  the  army  left  Tampa,  in  hundreds  of 
periodicals  throughout  the  country.  Cuban  physicians  and 
surgeons,  Americans  who  had  campaigned  with  Gomez  and 
Garcia,  and  travelers  who,  like  Hornaday,  had  spent  many 
years  in  tropical  forests  and  jungles,  all  agreed  that  if  our 
soldiers  were  to  keep  well  in  Cuba  they  should  drink  boiled 
water,  they  should  avoid  sleeping  on  the  ground,  they  should 
have  adequate  protection  from  rain  and  dew  at  night,  and 
they  should  be  able  to  change  their  clothing,  or  at  least 
their  underwear,  when  wet.1  By  observing  these  very 
simple  precautions  Dr.  Hornaday  maintained  his  health 
throughout  five  years  of  almost  constant  travel  and  explora 
tion  in  the  woods  and  jungles  of  Cuba,  South  America,  India, 
the  Malay  Archipelago,  and  Borneo.  If  our  soldiers  went 
to  Cuba,  or  marched  from  Siboney  to  Santiago,  without  the 
equipment  required  for  the  observance  of  these  precautions, 
it  was  not  the  result  of  necessary  ignorance  on  the  part  of 
their  superiors.  As  the  Philadelphia  "Medical  Journal" 
said,  ten  days  before  the  army  sailed :  "  The  climate  and  sani- 

1  "  Health  Hints  for  Cuba,"  by  William  T.  Hornaday,  director  of  the  New 
York  Zoological  Society;  New  York  "  Sun,"  May  22,  1898. 


THE   SANTIAGO  CAMPAIGN  261 

tary— or  rather  unsanitary— conditions  of  Cuba  have  been 
much  discussed,  and  it  is  well  known  what  our  troops  will 
have  to  contend  against  in  that  island."  The  "  Army  and  Navy 
Journal,"  about  the  same  time,  pointed  out  the  grave  danger 
to  be  apprehended  from  contaminated  drinking-water,  and 
said:  "The  government  should  provide  itself  with  heating 
and  distilling  apparatus  on  an  adequate  scale.  Sterilized 
water  is  cheaper  than  hospitals  and  an  army  of  nurses,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  crippling  of  the  service  that  sickness  brings." 
In  an  article  entitled  "  Special  Sanitary  Instructions  for  the 
Guidance  of  Troops  Serving  in  Tropical  Countries,"  published 
in  the  "  Journal  of  the  American  Medical  Association  "  for  May, 
Dr.  R.  S.  Woodson  described  fully  the  adverse  sanitary  con 
ditions  peculiar  to  Cuba,  and  called  especial  attention  to  the 
danger  of  drinking  impure  water  and  sleeping  on  the  ground. 
Finally,  the  highest  medical  officers  of  our  army,  including 
the  surgeon-general,  the  chief  surgeon  of  the  Fifth  Army- 
Corps,  and  Dr.  John  Guiteras,  published  instructions  and 
suggestions  for  the  maintenance  of  the  health  of  our  soldiers 
in  the  field,  in  which  attention  was  again  called  to  the  danger 
of  drinking  unboiled  water  and  sleeping  in  wet  clothing  on 
the  ground.1 

In  spite  of  all  these  orders,  instructions,  and  suggestions, 
and  in  defiance  of  the  advice  and  warnings  of  all  competent 
authorities,  General  Shaf ter's  army  sailed  from  Tampa  with 
out  its  reserve  medical  supplies  and  ambulance  corps,  and, 
having  landed  on  the  Cuban  coast,  marched  into  the  interior 
without  wall-tents,  without  hammocks,  without  a  change  of 
clothing,  and  without  a  single  utensil  larger  than  a  coffee-cup 
in  which  to  boil  water. 

1  Circular  of  the  surgeon-general,  dated  April  25, 1898;  Memorandum  of 
Instructions  to  Soldiers,  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  B.  F.  Pope,  chief  surgeon  of 
the  Fifth  Army-Corps;  and  General  Order  No.  8,  Fifth  Army-Corps,  Tampa, 
June  2,  1898. 


262  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

The  question  naturally  arises,  Why?  If  everybody,  with 
out  exception,  who  knows  the  climate  of  Cuba  warns  you  that 
your  soldiers  must  not  sleep  on  the  ground,  in  wet  clothing, 
why  not  provide  them  with  hammocks,  rain-sheets,  and  extra 
underwear?  If  your  own  surgeon-general  and  the  chief  sur 
geon  of  your  own  corps  advise  you  officially  that  the  drinking 
of  unboiled  water  will  almost  certainly  cause  disease,  why  not 
supply  your  men  with  camp-kettles?  I  can  think  of  only 
three  possible  answers  to  these  questions.  Either  (1)  the 
War  Department  did  not  furnish  General  Shaf ter  with  these 
articles,  or  with  adequate  transportation  for  them;  or  (2) 
General  Shafter  did  not  believe  in  microbes  and  the  germ 
theory  of  disease,  and  regarded  the  suggestions  of  medical 
and  other  experts  as  foolish  and  nonsensical;  or  (3)  the  com 
manding  general  expected  to  capture  Santiago  before  his 
troops  should  be  put  hors  de  combat  by  disease,  and  did  not 
care  particularly  what  happened  to  them  afterward.  If 
there  be  any  other  explanation  of  the  officially  admitted 
facts,  it  does  not  at  this  moment  occur  to  me. 

Some  of  the  defenders  of  the  War  Department  and  of 
General  Shafter  seek  to  convey  the  idea,  by  implication  at 
least,  that  the  wrecking  of  our  army  was  inevitable— that  it 
was  a  sort  of  divine  visitation,  which  could  not  have  been 
averted,  and  for  which  no  one,  except  the  Creator  of  microbes 
and  the  Cuban  climate,  was  responsible.  But  this  theory 
accords  neither  with  the  facts  nor  with  General  Shafter's 
explanation  of  them.  In  his  telegram  of  August  8  to  Presi 
dent  McKinley,  he  does  not  say,  "  What  put  my  command  in 
its  present  condition  was  a  visitation  of  God";  he  says: 
"What  put  my  command  in  its  present  condition  was  the 
twenty  days  of  the  campaign  when  they  had  nothing  but  meat 
[fat  bacon],  bread,  and  coffee,  without  change  of  clothes,  and 
without  any  shelter  whatever."  From  this  admission  of  the 
commanding  general  it  is  clear  that  the  wrecking  of  the  army 


THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  263 

was  not  due  primarily  to  uncontrollable  climatic  conditions, 
but  rather  to  lack  of  foresight,  mismanagement,  and  ineffi 
ciency.  This  conclusion  is  supported  and  greatly  strength 
ened  by  the  record  of  another  body  of  men,  in  a  different 
branch  of  the  service,  which  spent  more  time  in  Cuba  than 
the  Fifth  Army-Corps  spent  there,  which  was  subjected  to 
nearly  all  the  local  and  climatic  influences  that  are  said  to 
have  wrecked  the  latter,  but  which,  nevertheless,  escaped 
disease  and  came  back  to  the  United  States  in  perfect  health. 
I  refer  to  the  battalion  of  marines  under  command  of  Colonel 
Huntington.  This  small  naval  contingent  landed  on  the 
western  shore  of  Guantanamo  Bay  on  June  10— two  weeks 
before  the  Fifth  Army-Corps  finished  disembarkation  at 
Daiquiri  and  Siboney.  It  was  almost  immediately  attacked 
by  a  superior  force  of  Spanish  regulars,  and  was  so  harassed, 
night  and  day,  by  the  fire  of  the  latter  that  some  of  its 
officers  slept  only  two  hours  out  of  one  hundred  and  fifteen. 
As  soon  as  it  had  obtained  a  foothold  it  went  into  camp  on 
a  slight  elevation  in  the  midst  of  an  almost  impenetrable 
jungle,  surrounded  itself  with  defensive  trenches,  and  there 
lived,  for  a  period  of  ten  weeks,  exposed  to  the  same  sun, 
rain,  and  malaria  that  played  havoc  with  the  troops  of  Gen 
eral  Shafter.  On  the  sixth  day  of  August,  after  eight  weeks 
on  Cuban  soil  and  in  a  tropical  climate,  its  condition,  as  re 
ported  by  Admiral  Sampson,  was  as  follows:  "The  marine 
battalion  is  in  excellent  health.  Sick-list  two  and  one  half 
per  cent.  The  fleet  surgeon  reports  that  they  are  in  better 
condition  for  service  in  this  climate  than  they  were  when  they 
arrived  South  in  June.  I  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  send 
them  North."1  Almost  exactly  at  the  same  time  when 
this  report  was  made,  General  Shafter  was  telegraphing 
the  War  Department  that  seventy-five  per  cent,  of  his 
command  had  been  disabled  by  fever,  and  eight  general 
1  Telegram  to  Secretary  Long,  dated  "  Playa,  Cuba,  August  6,  1898." 


264  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

officers  of  the  Fifth  Army-Corps  were  signing  a  round-robin 
in  which  they  declared  that  if  the  army  were  not  immediately 
moved  North  it  "  must  perish." 

Late  in  August  it  was  decided  that  the  marines  should 
return  to  the  United  States,  notwithstanding  their  satisfac 
tory  state  of  health,  and  on  the  26th  of  that  month  they 
reached  Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire,  with  only  two  men 
sick.  They  had  been  gone  a  little  more  than  eleven  weeks, 
ten  of  which  they  had  spent  in  Cuba,  and  in  that  time  had 
not  lost  a  single  man  from  disease,  and  had  never  had  a 
higher  sick-rate  than  two  and  one  half  per  cent. 

In  view  of  this  record,  as  compared  with  that  of  any  regi 
ment  in  General  Shaf ter's  command,  we  are  forced  to  inquire : 
What  is  the  reason  for  the  difference?  Why  should  a 
battalion  of  marines  be  able  to  live  ten  weeks  in  Cuba,  with 
out  the  loss  of  a  single  man  from  disease,  and  with  a  sick- 
rate  of  only  two  and  one  half  per  cent.,  while  so  hardy  and 
tough  a  body  of  men  as  the  Rough  Riders,  under  substantially 
the  same  climatic  conditions,  had  become  so  reduced  in  four 
weeks  that  seventy-five  per  cent,  of  them  were  unfit  for  duty, 
and  fifty  per  cent,  of  them  fell  out  of  the  ranks  from  ex 
haustion  in  a  march  of  five  miles? 

The  only  answer  I  can  find  to  these  questions  is  that  the 
marines  had  suitable  equipment  and  intelligent  care,  while 
the  soldiers  of  General  Shafter's  command  had  neither. 
When  the  marines  landed  in  Guantanamo  Bay,  every  tent 
and  building  that  the  Spaniards  had  occupied  was  immedi 
ately  destroyed  by  fire,  to  remove  any  possible  danger  of 
infection  with  yellow  fever.  When  General  Shafter  landed 
at  Siboney,  he  not  only  disregarded  the  recommendation  of 
his  chief  surgeon  to  burn  the  buildings  there,  but  allowed 
them  to  be  occupied  as  offices  and  hospitals,  without  even  so 
much  as  attempting  to  clean  or  disinfect  them.  Yellow 
fever  made  its  appearance  in  less  than  two  weeks.  The 


THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  265 

marines  at  Guantanamo  were  supplied  promptly  with  light 
canvas  uniforms  suitable  for  a  tropical  climate,  while  the 
soldiers  of  General  Shafter's  army  sweltered  through  the 
campaign  in  the  heavy  clothing  that  they  had  worn  in  Idaho 
or  Montana,  and  then,  just  before  they  started  North,  were 
furnished  with  thin  suits  to  keep  them  cool  at  Montauk 
Point  in  the  fall.  The  marines  drank  only  water  that  had 
been  boiled  or  sterilized,  while  the  men  of  General  Shafter's 
command  drank  out  of  brooks  into  which  the  heavy  afternoon 
showers  were  constantly  washing  fecal  and  other  decaying 
organic  matter  from  the  banks.  The  marines  were  well  pro 
tected  from  rain  and  dew,  while  the  regulars  of  the  Fifth 
Army-Corps  were  drenched  to  the  skin  almost  every  day,  and 
slept  at  night  on  the  water-soaked  ground.  The  marines 
received  the  full  navy  ration,  while  the  soldiers  had  only 
hardtack  and  fat  bacon,  and  not  always  enough  of  that. 
Finally,  the  marines  had  surgeons  enough  to  take  proper 
care  of  the  sick,  and  medicines  enough  to  give  them,  while 
General  Shafter,  after  leaving  his  reserve  medical  supplies 
and  ambulance  corps  at  Tampa,  telegraphs  the  adjutant- 
general  on  August  3  that  "there  has  never  been  sufficient 
medical  attendance  or  medicines  for  the  daily  wants  of  the 
command."  In  short,  the  marines  observed  the  laws  of 
health,  and  lived  in  Cuba  according  to  the  dictates  of  mod 
ern  sanitary  science,  while  the  soldiers,  through  no  fault  of 
their  own,  were  forced  to  violate  almost  every  known  law  of 
health,  and  to  live  as  if  there  were  no  such  thing  as  sanitary 
science  in  existence. 

Governor  Tanner,  General  Grosvenor,  and  Secretary  Alger 
may  declare  that  the  wrecking  of  the  army  by  disease  was 
inevitable,  that  Northern  soldiers  cannot  maintain  their 
health  in  the  tropics,  and  that  "  when  troops  come  home  sick 
and  worn,  it  is  a  part  of  war";  but,  in  view  of  the  record 
made  at  Guantanamo  Bay,  we  may  say  to  them,  seriously  and 


266  CAMPAIGNING  IN  CUBA 

respectfully,    rather   than   flippantly:   "Tell   that   to   the 
marines!" 

The  record  of  the  marine  battalion,  taken  in  connection 
with  General  Shafter's  admission  that  his  command  was  dis 
abled  by  "twenty  days  of  bread,  meat,  and  coffee,  without 
change  of  clothes,  and  without  any  shelter  whatever,"  seems 
to  show  conclusively  that  the  epidemic  of  disease  which 
wrecked  the  army  was  the  direct  result  of  improper  and 
insufficient  food,  inadequate  equipment,  and  utter  neglect  of 
all  the  rules  prescribed  by  sanitary  science  for  the  mainte 
nance  of  health  in  tropical  regions.  The  questions  then  recur, 
Why  did  not  the  army  have  such  food,  clothes,  and  equip 
ment  as  would  have  made  obedience  to  the  laws  of  health 
possible?  Why  should  they  have  been  directed  by  their 
chief  surgeon  to  boil  all  drinking-water,  to  avoid  sleeping  on 
the  ground,  and  to  change  their  clothing  when  wet,  if  it  was 
not  the  intention  to  give  them  camp-kettles  in  which  to  boil 
the  water,  hammocks  in  which  to  sleep,  and  clothing  enough 
for  a  change?  The  American  people,  certainly,  are  both 
able  and  willing  to  pay  for  the  proper  support  and  equipment 
of  their  army.  If  it  had  cost  five  million  dollars,  or  ten 
million  dollars,  to  supply  every  company  in  General  Shafter's 
command  with  hammocks,  waterproof  rain-sheets,  extra 
clothing,  and  camp-kettles,  the  money  would  have  been 
appropriated  and  paid  without  a  grumble  or  a  murmur. 
We  are  not  a  stingy  people,  nor  even  an  economical  people, 
when  the  question  is  one  of  caring  for  the  men  that  we  send 
into  the  field  to  fight  for  us.  If,  then,  the  financial  resources 
of  the  War  Department  were  unlimited,  and  if  it  had  supreme 
power,  why  could  it  not  properly  equip  and  feed  a  compara 
tively  small  invading  force  of  only  sixteen  or  eighteen  thou 
sand  men?  Were  the  difficulties  insuperable?  Certainly 
not!  It  is  safe,  I  think,  to  say  that  there  were  a  thousand 
business  firms  in  the  United  States  which,  for  a  suitable  con- 


THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  267 

sideration,  would  have  undertaken  to  keep  General  Shafter's 
army  supplied,  at  every  step  of  its  progress  from  Siboney  to 
Santiago,  with  hammocks,  waterproof  tents,  extra  clothing, 
camp-kettles,  and  full  rations  of  food.  The  trouble  was  not 
lack  of  money  or  lack  of  facilities  at  home;  it  was  lack  of 
foresight,  of  system,  and  of  administrative  ability  in  the  field. 

Lieutenant  Parker  of  the  Thirteenth  Infantry  has  pointed 
out  the  fact  that  the  army  was  not  properly  equipped  and 
fed  "  even  after  the  surrender  [of  Santiago]  had  placed  un 
limited  wharfage  at  our  disposal  within  two  and  a  half 
miles  of  the  camps  over  excellent  roads." 1  A  week  or  ten 
days  after  the  surrender,  officers  were  coming  into  Santiago 
on  horseback  and  carrying  out  to  the  camps  over  the  pommels 
of  their  saddles  heavy  hospital  tents  for  which  they  could 
get  no  other  transportation  and  of  which  their  men  were  in 
urgent  need.  As  late  as  August  13— nearly  a  month  after 
the  surrender— the  soldiers  of  the  Ninth  Massachusetts  were 
still  sleeping  on  the  ground  in  dog-kennel  tents,  toasting 
their  bacon  on  the  ends  of  sticks,  and  making  coffee  in  old 
tomato-cans,  although  at  that  very  time  there  were  hun 
dreds  of  large  wall-tents  piled  up  in  front  of  the  army  store 
house  on  the  Santiago  water-front  and  hundreds  of  tons  of 
supplies,  of  all  sorts,  in  the  storehouses  and  on  the  piers. 

The  state  of  affairs  in  the  hospitals  was  not  much  better 
than  it  had  been  a  month  before.  In  a  signed  letter  dated 
"  Santiago,  August  12,"  Dr.  James  S.  Kennedy,  first  assistant 
surgeon  of  the  Second  Division  hospital,  declared  that  there 
was  "  an  utter  lack  of  suitable  medicines  with  which  to  combat 
disease.  There  has  been  so  much  diarrhea,  dysentery,  and 
fever,  and  no  medicine  at  all  to  combat  them,  that  men 
have  actually  died  for  want  of  it.  Four  days  after  my  report 
ing  here  there  was  not  a  single  medicine  in  the  entire  hospi- 

1  "  Some  Lessons  of  the  War  from  an  Officer's  Standpoint,"  by  Lieuten 
ant  John  H.  Parker;  "Review  of  Reviews,"  October,  1898. 


268  CAMPAIGNING   IN   CUBA 

tal  for  the  first  two  diseases,  and  nothing  but  quinine  for  the 
fever.  Yesterday,  August  11,  a  certain  regiment  left  its 
encampment  to  go  on  board  ship  for  the  North,  and  ten  hours 
afterward  a  private  who  had  been  left  behind  started  back  to 
his  former  encampment  to  sleep,  no  private  soldiers  being 
allowed  in  Santiago  after  dark.  On  reaching  his  camp  he 
found  ten  men  abandoned— no  medicines,  no  food,  no  nurses 
or  physicians— simply  abandoned  to  starvation  or  suicide." 

If  these  statements  are  not  true,  Dr.  Kennedy  should  be 
brought  to  trial  by  court  martial  for  conduct  prejudicial  to 
good  order  and  discipline,  if  not  conduct  unbecoming  an 
officer  and  a  gentleman,  in  publicly  making  injurious  charges 
that  have  no  foundation  in  fact.  If  they  are  true,  they  furnish 
another  proof  that  the  lack  of  medical  supplies  and  medical 
attention  in  the  army  was  due  to  official  negligence  and 
inefficiency.  In  June  and  July  it  might  have  been  urged 
with  some  show  of  plausibility  that  a  sudden  and  unexpected 
emergency,  in  the  shape  of  a  wide-spread  epidemic  of  fever, 
had  taken  the  army  by  surprise  and  found  it  unprepared ;  but 
with  the  coast  of  the  United  States  only  four  or  five  days 
distant,  with  uninterrupted  telegraphic  communication,  and 
with  good  landing  facilities  in  a  safe  and  sheltered  harbor, 
there  was  no  excuse  for  a  lack  of  medicines  and  hospital  sup 
plies  on  August  12— seven  weeks  after  the  army  landed  and 
four  weeks  after  it  entered  the  city  of  Santiago. 

Defenders  of  General  Shafter  and  the  War  Department 
try  to  excuse  the  wrecking  of  the  army  by  saying  that  "  the 
invasion  of  Cuba  was  not  a  pleasure  excursion,"  that  "  war 
is  not  strictly  a  hygienic  business,"  that  "  the  outcry  about 
sickness  and  neglect  is  largely  sensational  and  for  the  manu 
facture  of  political  effect,"  and  that  the  general  criticism 
of  the  management  of  the  campaign  is  "  a  concerted  effort  to 
hide  the  glories  of  our  magnificent  triumph  under  alleged 
faults  and  shortcomings  in  its  conduct";  but  these  excuses 


THE   SANTIAGO   CAMPAIGN  269 

and  counter-charges  do  not  break  the  force  of  the  essential 
and  officially  admitted  fact  that  our  army  landed  on  the 
Cuban  coast  on  June  24  in  a  high  state  of  health  and  efficiency, 
and  in  less  than  six  weeks  had  not  only  lost  seventy-five  per 
cent,  of  its  effective  strength,  but  had  been  reduced  by 
disease  to  a  condition  so  low  that,  in  the  opinion  of  eight  of 
its  general  officers,  it  "  must  perish  "  unless  immediately  sent 
back  to  the  United  States.  Secretary  Alger  declares  that 
management  which  produces  these  results  "is  war";  but  I 
should  rather  describe  it  as  incapacity  for  war.  If  we  do  not 
learn  a  lesson  from  the  Santiago  campaign— if  we  continue 
to  equip,  feed,  and  manage  our  armies  in  the  field  as  we 
equipped,  fed,  and  managed  the  Fifth  Army-Corps  in  Cuba 
—  our  newly  acquired  tropical  possessions  will  cost  us  more 
in  pensions  than  they  will  ever  produce  in  revenue. 


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